grpc 1.59.2 → 1.62.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/v3_purp.c

@@ -0,0 +1,645 @@
+/*
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2001.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1 | EXFLAG_SS)
+#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
+  (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
+  (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
+
+static int check_ca(const X509 *x);
+static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca);
+static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca);
+static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                       int ca);
+static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca);
+static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                       int ca);
+static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                  int ca);
+static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                        int ca);
+static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
+
+static const X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
+    {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0,
+     check_purpose_ssl_client, (char *)"SSL client", (char *)"sslclient", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
+     check_purpose_ssl_server, (char *)"SSL server", (char *)"sslserver", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
+     check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, (char *)"Netscape SSL server",
+     (char *)"nssslserver", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign,
+     (char *)"S/MIME signing", (char *)"smimesign", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0,
+     check_purpose_smime_encrypt, (char *)"S/MIME encryption",
+     (char *)"smimeencrypt", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign,
+     (char *)"CRL signing", (char *)"crlsign", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, (char *)"Any Purpose",
+     (char *)"any", NULL},
+    // |X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER| performs no actual checks. OpenSSL's OCSP
+    // implementation relied on the caller performing EKU and KU checks.
+    {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, no_check,
+     (char *)"OCSP helper", (char *)"ocsphelper", NULL},
+    {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0,
+     check_purpose_timestamp_sign, (char *)"Time Stamp signing",
+     (char *)"timestampsign", NULL},
+};
+
+int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) {
+  // This differs from OpenSSL, which uses -1 to indicate a fatal error and 0 to
+  // indicate an invalid certificate. BoringSSL uses 0 for both.
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (id == -1) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
+  if (idx == -1) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // Historically, |check_purpose| implementations other than |X509_PURPOSE_ANY|
+  // called |check_ca|. This is redundant with the |X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA|
+  // logic, but |X509_check_purpose| is public API, so we preserve this
+  // behavior.
+  if (ca && id != X509_PURPOSE_ANY && !check_ca(x)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  const X509_PURPOSE *pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+  return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) {
+  if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  *p = purpose;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) { return OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(xstandard); }
+
+const X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) {
+  if (idx < 0 || (size_t)idx >= OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(xstandard)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return xstandard + idx;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(const char *sname) {
+  const X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
+  for (int i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
+    xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
+    if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) {
+      return i;
+    }
+  }
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) {
+  for (size_t i = 0; i <OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(xstandard); i++) {
+    if (xstandard[i].purpose == purpose) {
+      static_assert(OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(xstandard) <= INT_MAX,
+                    "indices must fit in int");
+      return (int)i;
+    }
+  }
+  return -1;
+}
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->purpose; }
+
+char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->name; }
+
+char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->sname; }
+
+int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->trust; }
+
+int X509_supported_extension(const X509_EXTENSION *ex) {
+  int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
+  return nid == NID_key_usage ||             //
+         nid == NID_subject_alt_name ||      //
+         nid == NID_basic_constraints ||     //
+         nid == NID_certificate_policies ||  //
+         nid == NID_ext_key_usage ||         //
+         nid == NID_policy_constraints ||    //
+         nid == NID_name_constraints ||      //
+         nid == NID_policy_mappings ||       //
+         nid == NID_inhibit_any_policy;
+}
+
+static int setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) {
+  if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+    if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
+      iname = gen->d.directoryName;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!iname) {
+    iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+  }
+
+  return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
+}
+
+static int setup_crldp(X509 *x) {
+  int j;
+  x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, &j, NULL);
+  if (x->crldp == NULL && j != -1) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
+    if (!setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i))) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) {
+  BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
+  ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
+  EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
+  size_t i;
+  int j;
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&x->lock);
+  const int is_set = x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET;
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&x->lock);
+
+  if (is_set) {
+    return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
+  }
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&x->lock);
+  if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
+    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
+    return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!X509_digest(x, EVP_sha256(), x->cert_hash, NULL)) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  // V1 should mean no extensions ...
+  if (X509_get_version(x) == X509_VERSION_1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
+  }
+  // Handle basic constraints
+  if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &j, NULL))) {
+    if (bs->ca) {
+      x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
+    }
+    if (bs->pathlen) {
+      if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) || !bs->ca) {
+        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+        x->ex_pathlen = 0;
+      } else {
+        // TODO(davidben): |ASN1_INTEGER_get| returns -1 on overflow,
+        // which currently acts as if the constraint isn't present. This
+        // works (an overflowing path length constraint may as well be
+        // infinity), but Chromium's verifier simply treats values above
+        // 255 as an error.
+        x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
+      }
+    } else {
+      x->ex_pathlen = -1;
+    }
+    BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
+  } else if (j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  // Handle key usage
+  if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, &j, NULL))) {
+    if (usage->length > 0) {
+      x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
+      if (usage->length > 1) {
+        x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
+      }
+    } else {
+      x->ex_kusage = 0;
+    }
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
+  } else if (j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  x->ex_xkusage = 0;
+  if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &j, NULL))) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
+      switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
+        case NID_server_auth:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_client_auth:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_email_protect:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_code_sign:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_ms_sgc:
+        case NID_ns_sgc:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_OCSP_sign:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_time_stamp:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_dvcs:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
+          break;
+
+        case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
+          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
+          break;
+      }
+    }
+    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+  } else if (j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, &j, NULL);
+  if (x->skid == NULL && j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, &j, NULL);
+  if (x->akid == NULL && j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  // Does subject name match issuer ?
+  if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
+    // If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed
+    if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
+        !ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) {
+      x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
+    }
+  }
+  x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &j, NULL);
+  if (x->altname == NULL && j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &j, NULL);
+  if (x->nc == NULL && j != -1) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+  if (!setup_crldp(x)) {
+    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+  }
+
+  for (j = 0; j < X509_get_ext_count(x); j++) {
+    const X509_EXTENSION *ex = X509_get_ext(x, j);
+    if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) {
+      x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+  x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
+
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
+  return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
+}
+
+// check_ca returns one if |x| should be considered a CA certificate and zero
+// otherwise.
+static int check_ca(const X509 *x) {
+  // keyUsage if present should allow cert signing
+  if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // Version 1 certificates are considered CAs and don't have extensions.
+  if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  // Otherwise, it's only a CA if basicConstraints says so.
+  return ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA));
+}
+
+int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return check_ca(x);
+}
+
+// check_purpose returns one if |x| is a valid part of a certificate path for
+// extended key usage |required_xku| and at least one of key usages in
+// |required_kus|. |ca| indicates whether |x| is a CA or end-entity certificate.
+static int check_purpose(const X509 *x, int ca, int required_xku,
+                         int required_kus) {
+  // Check extended key usage on the entire chain.
+  if (required_xku != 0 && xku_reject(x, required_xku)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Check key usages only on the end-entity certificate.
+  return ca || !ku_reject(x, required_kus);
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca) {
+  // We need to do digital signatures or key agreement.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben): We do not implement any TLS client certificate modes based
+  // on key agreement.
+  return check_purpose(x, ca, XKU_SSL_CLIENT,
+                       X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+}
+
+// Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or
+// key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual
+// key types.
+#define X509v3_KU_TLS                                         \
+  (X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT | \
+   X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)
+
+static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca) {
+  return check_purpose(x, ca, XKU_SSL_SERVER, X509v3_KU_TLS);
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                       int ca) {
+  // We need to encipher or Netscape complains.
+  return check_purpose(x, ca, XKU_SSL_SERVER, X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT);
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                    int ca) {
+  return check_purpose(x, ca, XKU_SMIME,
+                       X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | X509v3_KU_NON_REPUDIATION);
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                       int ca) {
+  return check_purpose(x, ca, XKU_SMIME, X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT);
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                  int ca) {
+  return check_purpose(x, ca, /*required_xku=*/0, X509v3_KU_CRL_SIGN);
+}
+
+static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
+                                        int ca) {
+  if (ca) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // Check the optional key usage field:
+  // if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
+  // and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
+  // be rejected).
+  if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+      ((x->ex_kusage &
+        ~(X509v3_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
+       !(x->ex_kusage &
+         (X509v3_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben): Should we check EKUs up the chain like the other cases?
+  if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Extended Key Usage MUST be critical
+  int i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
+  if (i_ext >= 0) {
+    const X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext(x, i_ext);
+    if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { return 1; }
+
+int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) {
+  if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
+                    X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) {
+    return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
+  }
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer) || !x509v3_cache_extensions(subject)) {
+    return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+  }
+
+  if (subject->akid) {
+    int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
+    if (ret != X509_V_OK) {
+      return ret;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (ku_reject(issuer, X509v3_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) {
+    return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
+  }
+  return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, const AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) {
+  if (!akid) {
+    return X509_V_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Check key ids (if present)
+  if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
+      ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid)) {
+    return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
+  }
+  // Check serial number
+  if (akid->serial &&
+      ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) {
+    return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+  }
+  // Check issuer name
+  if (akid->issuer) {
+    // Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF
+    // GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but
+    // we only take any notice of the first.
+    GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
+    GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+    X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+    size_t i;
+    gens = akid->issuer;
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+      gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+      if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
+        nm = gen->d.dirn;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+    if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) {
+      return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
+    }
+  }
+  return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x) {
+  // Ignore the return value. On failure, |x->ex_flags| will include
+  // |EXFLAG_INVALID|.
+  x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+  return x->ex_flags;
+}
+
+uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) {
+    return x->ex_kusage;
+  }
+  // If there is no extension, key usage is unconstrained, so set all bits to
+  // one. Note that, although we use |UINT32_MAX|, |ex_kusage| only contains the
+  // first 16 bits when the extension is present.
+  return UINT32_MAX;
+}
+
+uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) {
+    return x->ex_xkusage;
+  }
+  // If there is no extension, extended key usage is unconstrained, so set all
+  // bits to one.
+  return UINT32_MAX;
+}
+
+const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x509) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return x509->skid;
+}
+
+const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x509) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->keyid : NULL;
+}
+
+const GENERAL_NAMES *X509_get0_authority_issuer(X509 *x509) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->issuer : NULL;
+}
+
+const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_authority_serial(X509 *x509) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->serial : NULL;
+}
+
+long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x509) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509) || (x509->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) == 0) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return x509->ex_pathlen;
+}