contrast-agent 6.6.4 → 6.8.0

data/lib/contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmd_injection.rb

@@ -6,40 +6,53 @@ require 'contrast/utils/stack_trace_utils'
 require 'contrast/utils/object_share'
 require 'contrast/components/logger'
 require 'contrast/agent/reporting/input_analysis/input_type'
+require 'contrast/agent_lib/interface'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_chained_command'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_dangerous_path'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_base_rule'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_backdoors'
 
 module Contrast
   module Agent
     module Protect
       module Rule
         # The Ruby implementation of the Protect Command Injection rule.
-        class CmdInjection < Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::BaseService
+        class CmdInjection < Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiBaseRule
           include Contrast::Components::Logger::InstanceMethods
           include Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputType
-
           NAME = 'cmd-injection'
-          CHAINED_COMMAND_CHARS = /[;&|<>]/.cs__freeze
+
           APPLICABLE_USER_INPUTS = [
             BODY, COOKIE_VALUE, HEADER, PARAMETER_NAME,
             PARAMETER_VALUE, JSON_VALUE, MULTIPART_VALUE,
             MULTIPART_FIELD_NAME, XML_VALUE, DWR_VALUE
           ].cs__freeze
-
-          class << self
-            # @param attack_sample [Contrast::Api::Dtm::RaspRuleSample]
-            # @return [Hash] the details for this specific rule
-            def extract_details attack_sample
-              {
-                  command: attack_sample.cmdi.command,
-                  startIndex: attack_sample.cmdi.start_idx,
-                  endIndex: attack_sample.cmdi.end_idx
-              }
-            end
-          end
+          SUB_RULES = [
+            Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiBackdoors.new,
+            Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiChainedCommand.new,
+            Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiDangerousPath.new
+          ].cs__freeze
 
           def rule_name
             NAME
           end
 
+          def sub_rules
+            SUB_RULES
+          end
+
+          def applicable_user_inputs
+            APPLICABLE_USER_INPUTS
+          end
+
+          # CMDI infilter:
+          #
+          # @param context [Contrast::Agent::RequestContext] current request context
+          # @param classname [String] Name of the class
+          # @param method [String] name of the method triggering the rule
+          # @param command [String] potential dangerous command executed.
+          # @raise [Contrast::SecurityException] if the rule mode is set
+          # to BLOCK and valid cdmi is detected.
           def infilter context, classname, method, command
             return unless infilter?(context)
 
@@ -62,90 +75,8 @@ module Contrast
 
             return unless blocked?
 
-            raise(Contrast::SecurityException.new(self,
-                                                  'Command Injection rule triggered. '\
-                                                  "Call to #{ classname }.#{ method } blocked."))
-          end
-
-          def build_attack_with_match context, input_analysis_result, result, candidate_string, **kwargs
-            if mode == Contrast::Api::Settings::ProtectionRule::Mode::NO_ACTION ||
-                  mode == Contrast::Api::Settings::ProtectionRule::Mode::PERMIT
-
-              return result
-            end
-
-            result ||= build_attack_result(context)
-            update_successful_attack_response(context, input_analysis_result, result, candidate_string)
-            append_sample(context, input_analysis_result, result, candidate_string, **kwargs)
-            result
-          end
-
-          protected
-
-          # Because results are not necessarily on the context across
-          # processes; extract early and pass into the method
-          def find_attacker_with_results context, potential_attack_string, ia_results, **kwargs
-            logger.trace('Checking vectors for attacks', rule: rule_name, input: potential_attack_string)
-            result = super(context, potential_attack_string, ia_results, **kwargs)
-            if result.nil? && potential_attack_string
-              result = find_probable_attacker(context, potential_attack_string, ia_results, **kwargs)
-            end
-            result
-          end
-
-          # Build a subclass of the RaspRuleSample using the query string and the
-          # evaluation
-          def build_sample context, input_analysis_result, candidate_string, **_kwargs
-            sample = build_base_sample(context, input_analysis_result)
-            sample.cmdi = Contrast::Api::Dtm::CmdInjectionDetails.new
-
-            command = candidate_string || input_analysis_result.value
-            command = Contrast::Utils::StringUtils.protobuf_safe_string(command)
-            sample.cmdi.command = command
-            sample.cmdi.end_idx = command.length
-
-            # This is a special case where the user input is UNKNOWN_USER_INPUT but
-            # we want to send the attack value
-            if input_analysis_result.nil?
-              ui = Contrast::Api::Dtm::UserInput.new
-              ui.input_type = :UNKNOWN
-              ui.value = command
-              sample.user_input = ui
-            end
-
-            sample
-          end
-
-          private
-
-          def report_command_execution context, command, **kwargs
-            return unless report_any_command_execution?
-            return if protect_excluded_by_code?
-
-            build_attack_with_match(context, nil, nil, command, **kwargs)
-          end
-
-          def find_probable_attacker context, potential_attack_string, ia_results, **kwargs
-            return unless chained_command?(potential_attack_string)
-
-            likely_attacker = ia_results.find { |input_analysis_result| chained_command?(input_analysis_result.value) }
-            return unless likely_attacker
-
-            build_attack_with_match(context, likely_attacker, nil, potential_attack_string, **kwargs)
-          end
-
-          def chained_command? command
-            CHAINED_COMMAND_CHARS.match(command)
-          end
-
-          # Part of the Hardening for Command Injection detection is the
-          # ability to detect and prevent any command execution from within the
-          # application. This check determines if that hardening has been
-          # enabled.
-          # @return [Boolean] if the agent should report all command
-          #   executions.
-          def report_any_command_execution?
-            ::Contrast::PROTECT.report_any_command_execution?
+            # Raise cmdi error
+            raise_error(classname, method)
           end
         end
       end

data/lib/contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_backdoors.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2022 Contrast Security, Inc. See https://www.contrastsecurity.com/enduser-terms-0317a for more details.
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/base_service'
+require 'contrast/agent/request_context'
+require 'contrast/utils/object_share'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_base_rule'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmd_injection'
+
+module Contrast
+  module Agent
+    module Protect
+      module Rule
+        # The Ruby implementation of the Protect Command Injection Command
+        # Backdoors sub-rule.
+        class CmdiBackdoors < Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiBaseRule
+          NAME = 'cmd-injection-command-backdoors'
+          MATCHES = %w[/bin/bash-c /bin/sh-c sh-c bash-c].cs__freeze
+
+          def rule_name
+            NAME
+          end
+
+          # CMDI Backdoors infilter:
+          # This rule does not have input classification.
+          # If a value matches the CMDI applicable input types and it's length is > 2
+          # we can check if it's used as command backdoors.
+          #
+          # @param context [Contrast::Agent::RequestContext] current request contest
+          # @param classname [String] Name of the class
+          # @param method [String] name of the method triggering the rule
+          # @param command [String] potential dangerous command executed.
+          # @raise [Contrast::SecurityException] if the rule mode ise set
+          # to BLOCK and valid cdmi is detected.
+          def infilter context, classname, method, command
+            return unless (ia_results = gather_ia_results(context))
+            return unless backdoors_match?(command)
+            return unless (likely_attacker = match_applicable_input_type(ia_results, command))
+            return if protect_excluded_by_code?
+            return unless (result = build_attack_with_match(context, likely_attacker, nil, command,
+                                                            **{ classname: classname, method: method }))
+
+            append_to_activity(context, result)
+            cef_logging(result, :successful_attack)
+            return unless blocked?
+
+            raise_error(classname, method)
+          end
+
+          # @param context [Contrast::Agent::RequestContext]
+          def infilter? context
+            return false unless enabled?
+            # This rule does not have input tracing stage so we need to check the results of
+            # the main rule instead.
+            return false unless context&.agent_input_analysis&.results&.any? do |result|
+              result.rule_id == Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdInjection::NAME
+            end
+
+            return false if protect_excluded_by_code?
+
+            true
+          end
+
+          protected
+
+          # Used to customize the raised error message.
+          #
+          # @param classname [String] Name of the class
+          # @param method [String] name of the method triggering the rule
+          # @raise [Contrast::SecurityException]
+          def raise_error classname, method
+            raise(Contrast::SecurityException.new(self,
+                                                  'Command Injection Command Backdoor rule triggered. '\
+                                                  "Call to #{ classname }.#{ method } blocked."))
+          end
+
+          private
+
+          # Check to see if value is backdoor match
+          #
+          # @param potential_attack_string [String]
+          def backdoors_match? potential_attack_string
+            return false unless potential_attack_string && potential_attack_string.length > 2
+            return false unless matches_shell_parameter?(potential_attack_string)
+
+            true
+          end
+
+          # Checks to see if input is used as parameter for a shell cmd.
+          #
+          # @param cmd [String]
+          # @return [Boolean]
+          def matches_shell_parameter? cmd
+            normalize_cmd = cmd.delete(Contrast::Utils::ObjectShare::SPACE)
+            MATCHES.each do |match|
+              return true if normalize_cmd.include?(match)
+            end
+            false
+          end
+
+          # Check to see if the user input is one of the applicable types.
+          # With Agent_ia if we are here and CMDI is being analyzed then
+          # the applicable input type is already checked before input
+          # classification. Only thing left is the match check.
+          #
+          # @param ia_results [Contrast::Agent::Reporting::Settings::InputAnalysisResult] gathered results
+          # @param cmd [String] potential attack vector
+          # @return [Contrast::Agent::Reporting::Settings::InputAnalysisResult, nil] matched input_type
+          def match_applicable_input_type ia_results, cmd
+            ia_results.each do |ia_result|
+              return ia_result if ia_result.value == cmd
+            end
+            nil
+          end
+
+          # Backdoors does not have input classification so we check for match within the
+          # result for the main rule - CMDI.
+          #
+          # @param context [Contrast::Agent::RequestContext]
+          def gather_ia_results context
+            return Contrast::Utils::ObjectShare::EMPTY_ARRAY unless context&.agent_input_analysis&.results
+
+            context.agent_input_analysis.results.select do |ia_result|
+              ia_result.rule_id == Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdInjection::NAME &&
+                  ia_result.score_level != Contrast::Agent::Reporting::ScoreLevel::IGNORE
+            end
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_base_rule.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2022 Contrast Security, Inc. See https://www.contrastsecurity.com/enduser-terms-0317a for more details.
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require 'contrast/agent/reporting/details/cmd_injection_details'
+require 'contrast/agent/reporting/attack_result/user_input'
+
+module Contrast
+  module Agent
+    module Protect
+      module Rule
+        # The Ruby implementation of the Protect Command Injection Semantic
+        # Dangerous Path sub-rule. This rule should report
+        class CmdiBaseRule < Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::BaseService
+          include Contrast::Components::Logger::InstanceMethods
+          include Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputType
+
+          CHAINED_COMMAND_CHARS = /[;&|<>]/.cs__freeze
+          APPLICABLE_USER_INPUTS = [
+            BODY, COOKIE_VALUE, HEADER, PARAMETER_NAME,
+            PARAMETER_VALUE, JSON_VALUE, MULTIPART_VALUE,
+            MULTIPART_FIELD_NAME, XML_VALUE, DWR_VALUE
+          ].cs__freeze
+
+          # CMDI infilter:
+          #
+          # @param context [Contrast::Agent::RequestContext] current request contest
+          # @param classname [String] Name of the class
+          # @param method [String] name of the method triggering the rule
+          # @param command [String] potential dangerous command executed.
+          # @raise [Contrast::SecurityException] if the rule mode ise set
+          # to BLOCK and valid cdmi is detected.
+          def infilter context, classname, method, command
+            if ::Contrast::APP_CONTEXT.in_new_process?
+              logger.trace('Running cmd-injection infilter within new process - creating new context')
+              context = Contrast::Agent::RequestContext.new(context.request.rack_request)
+              Contrast::Agent::REQUEST_TRACKER.update_current_context(context)
+            end
+            return unless infilter?(context)
+
+            result = find_attacker_with_results(context, command, nil, **{ classname: classname, method: method })
+            result ||= report_command_execution(context, command, **{ classname: classname, method: method })
+            return unless result
+
+            append_to_activity(context, result)
+            cef_logging(result, :successful_attack)
+            return unless blocked?
+
+            raise_error(classname, method)
+          end
+
+          def build_attack_with_match(context,
+                                      input_analysis_result,
+                                      result,
+                                      candidate_string,
+                                      **kwargs)
+            return result if mode == :NO_ACTION || mode == :PERMIT
+
+            result ||= build_attack_result(context)
+            update_successful_attack_response(context, input_analysis_result, result, candidate_string)
+            append_sample(context, input_analysis_result, result, candidate_string, **kwargs)
+            result
+          end
+
+          protected
+
+          # Used to customize the raised error message.
+          #
+          # @param classname [String] Name of the class
+          # @param method [String] name of the method triggering the rule
+          # @raise [Contrast::SecurityException]
+          def raise_error classname, method
+            raise(Contrast::SecurityException.new(self,
+                                                  'Command Injection Rule triggered. '\
+                                                  "Call to #{ classname }.#{ method } blocked."))
+          end
+
+          # Allows for the InputAnalysis from service to be extracted early.
+          # Because results are not necessarily on the context across
+          # processes; extract early and pass into the method
+          #
+          # @param context [Contrast::Agent::RequestContext]
+          # @param potential_attack_string [String, nil]
+          # @param ia_results [Array<Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputAnalysis>]
+          # @param **kwargs
+          # @return [Contrast::Agent::Reporting, nil]
+          def find_attacker_with_results context, potential_attack_string, ia_results, **kwargs
+            logger.trace('Checking vectors for attacks', rule: rule_name, input: potential_attack_string)
+            result = super(context, potential_attack_string, ia_results, **kwargs) if ia_results
+            if result.nil? && potential_attack_string
+              result = find_probable_attacker(context, potential_attack_string, ia_results, **kwargs)
+            end
+            result
+          end
+
+          # Build a subclass of the RaspRuleSample using the query string and the
+          # evaluation
+          def build_sample context, input_analysis_result, candidate_string, **kwargs
+            sample = build_base_sample(context, input_analysis_result)
+            sample.details = Contrast::Agent::Reporting::Details::CmdInjectionDetails.new
+
+            # extract data from kwargs for the agent_lib check
+            agent_lib_result_struct = kwargs[:result_struct]
+            command = candidate_string || input_analysis_result.value
+            command = Contrast::Utils::StringUtils.protobuf_safe_string(command)
+            handle_with_agent_lib(sample, agent_lib_result_struct, command)
+
+            # This is a special case where the user input is UNKNOWN_USER_INPUT but
+            # we want to send the attack value
+            if input_analysis_result.nil?
+              ui = Contrast::Agent::Reporting::UserInput.new
+              ui.input_type = :UNKNOWN
+              ui.value = command
+              sample.user_input = ui
+            end
+
+            sample
+          end
+
+          private
+
+          def report_command_execution context, command, **kwargs
+            return unless report_any_command_execution?
+            return if protect_excluded_by_code?
+
+            build_attack_with_match(context, nil, nil, command, **kwargs)
+          end
+
+          def find_probable_attacker context, potential_attack_string, ia_results, **kwargs
+            return unless chained_command?(potential_attack_string)
+
+            likely_attacker = ia_results.find { |input_analysis_result| chained_command?(input_analysis_result.value) }
+            return unless likely_attacker
+
+            build_attack_with_match(context, likely_attacker, nil, potential_attack_string, **kwargs)
+          end
+
+          def chained_command? command
+            CHAINED_COMMAND_CHARS.match(command)
+          end
+
+          # Part of the Hardening for Command Injection detection is the
+          # ability to detect and prevent any command execution from within the
+          # application. This check determines if that hardening has been
+          # enabled.
+          # @return [Boolean] if the agent should report all command
+          #   executions.
+          def report_any_command_execution?
+            ::Contrast::PROTECT.report_any_command_execution?
+          end
+
+          # handle agent_lib data being attached
+          def handle_with_agent_lib sample, agent_lib_result_struct, command
+            sample.details.cmd = command
+            if agent_lib_result_struct&.cs__is_a?(Hash)
+              sample.details.start_idx = agent_lib_result_struct[:start_index]
+              sample.details.end_idx = if (agent_lib_result_struct[:end_index]).zero?
+                                         command.length
+                                       else
+                                         agent_lib_result_struct[:end_index]
+                                       end
+            else
+              sample.details.end_idx = command.length
+            end
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_chained_command.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2022 Contrast Security, Inc. See https://www.contrastsecurity.com/enduser-terms-0317a for more details.
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/base_service'
+require 'contrast/agent/request_context'
+require 'contrast/utils/object_share'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_base_rule'
+
+module Contrast
+  module Agent
+    module Protect
+      module Rule
+        # The Ruby implementation of the Protect Command Injection Semantic
+        # Chained Command sub-rule. This rule should report
+        class CmdiChainedCommand < Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiBaseRule
+          NAME = 'cmd-injection-semantic-chained-commands'
+
+          def initialize
+            super
+            @mode = :MONITOR
+          end
+
+          def rule_name
+            NAME
+          end
+
+          def sub_rules
+            Contrast::Utils::ObjectShare::EMPTY_ARRAY
+          end
+
+          protected
+
+          # Used to customize the raised error message.
+          #
+          # @param classname [String] Name of the class
+          # @param method [String] name of the method triggering the rule
+          # @raise [Contrast::SecurityException]
+          def raise_error classname, method
+            raise(Contrast::SecurityException.new(self,
+                                                  'Command Injection Semantic Chained Commands rule triggered. '\
+                                                  "Call to #{ classname }.#{ method } blocked."))
+          end
+
+          private
+
+          def find_probable_attacker context, potential_attack_string, _ia_results, **kwargs
+            chained = chained_command?(potential_attack_string)
+            return unless chained
+
+            build_attack_with_match(context, nil, nil, potential_attack_string, **kwargs)
+          end
+
+          # Check if potential chained attack is detected in user input.
+          #
+          # @param command [String] command to check.
+          # @return index[Boolean Returns the index of the command chaining if found.
+          # If the chaining index is >= 0, an injection is detected. Returns -1 when no
+          # command chaining is found.
+          def chained_command? command
+            return false unless (agent_lib = Contrast::AGENT_LIB) && command
+            return false if agent_lib.chained_cmdi_index(command).negative?
+
+            true
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_dangerous_path.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2022 Contrast Security, Inc. See https://www.contrastsecurity.com/enduser-terms-0317a for more details.
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/base_service'
+require 'contrast/agent/request_context'
+require 'contrast/utils/object_share'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_base_rule'
+
+module Contrast
+  module Agent
+    module Protect
+      module Rule
+        # The Ruby implementation of the Protect Command Injection Semantic
+        # Dangerous Path sub-rule. This rule should report
+        class CmdiDangerousPath < Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiBaseRule
+          NAME = 'cmd-injection-semantic-dangerous-paths'
+
+          def initialize
+            super
+            @mode = :MONITOR
+          end
+
+          def rule_name
+            NAME
+          end
+
+          def sub_rules
+            Contrast::Utils::ObjectShare::EMPTY_ARRAY
+          end
+
+          protected
+
+          # Used to customize the raised error message.
+          #
+          # @param classname [String] Name of the class
+          # @param method [String] name of the method triggering the rule
+          # @raise [Contrast::SecurityException]
+          def raise_error classname, method
+            raise(Contrast::SecurityException.new(self,
+                                                  'Command Injection Dangerous Path rule triggered. '\
+                                                  "Call to #{ classname }.#{ method } blocked."))
+          end
+
+          private
+
+          def find_probable_attacker context, potential_attack_string, _ia_results, **kwargs
+            dangerous_path = dangerous_path?(potential_attack_string)
+            return unless dangerous_path
+
+            build_attack_with_match(context, nil, nil, potential_attack_string, **kwargs)
+          end
+
+          # Checks if a given shell command is trying to access a dangerous path.
+          # This is used for the cmd-injection-semantic-dangerous-paths rule.
+          #
+          # @param path [String] path to check.
+          # @return index[Boolean] Returns true if a dangerous path is found.
+          # Returns false if no dangerous paths are found.
+          def dangerous_path? path
+            return false unless (agent_lib = Contrast::AGENT_LIB) && path
+
+            agent_lib.dangerous_path?(path)
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_input_classification.rb

@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
 # Copyright (c) 2022 Contrast Security, Inc. See https://www.contrastsecurity.com/enduser-terms-0317a for more details.
 # frozen_string_literal: true
 
-require 'contrast/utils/object_share'
-require 'contrast/agent/reporting/input_analysis/input_type'
 require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmd_injection'
 require 'contrast/agent/reporting/input_analysis/score_level'
-require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_worth_watching'
 require 'contrast/agent/protect/input_analyzer/input_analyzer'
-require 'contrast/utils/input_classification'
+require 'contrast/utils/input_classification_base'
 require 'contrast/components/logger'
 
 module Contrast
@@ -18,63 +15,10 @@ module Contrast
         # as a result input would be marked as WORTHWATCHING or IGNORE,
         # to be analyzed at the sink level.
         module CmdiInputClassification
+          WORTHWATCHING_MATCH = 'cmdi-worth-watching-v2'.cs__freeze
           class << self
             include InputClassificationBase
-            include Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiWorthWatching
             include Contrast::Components::Logger::InstanceMethods
-
-            WORTHWATCHING_MATCH = 'cmdi-worth-watching-v2'
-            CMDI_KEYS_NEEDED = [
-              COOKIE_VALUE, PARAMETER_VALUE, JSON_VALUE, MULTIPART_VALUE, XML_VALUE, DWR_VALUE
-            ].cs__freeze
-
-            # This method will determine actually if the user input is WORTHWATCHING
-            #
-            # @param input_type [Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputType] the type of the user input
-            # @param value [String, Array<String>] the value of the input
-            # @param input_analysis [Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputAnalysis] Holds all the results from the input
-            # analysis from the current request.
-            def classify input_type, value, input_analysis
-              return unless Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdInjection::APPLICABLE_USER_INPUTS.include?(input_type)
-              return unless super
-
-              rule_id = Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdInjection::NAME
-
-              Array(value).each do |val|
-                Array(val).each do |v|
-                  input_analysis.results << cmdi_create_new_input_result(input_analysis.request, rule_id, input_type, v)
-                end
-              end
-
-              input_analysis
-            rescue StandardError => e
-              logger.debug('An Error was recorded in the input classification of the cmdi.')
-              logger.debug(e)
-            end
-
-            private
-
-            # This methods checks if input is tagged WORTHWATCHING or IGNORE matches value with it's
-            # key if needed and Creates new instance of InputAnalysisResult.
-            #
-            # @param request [Contrast::Agent::Request] the current request context.
-            # @param rule_id [String] The name of the Protect Rule.
-            # @param input_type [Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputType] The type of the user input.
-            # @param value [String, Array<String>] the value of the input.
-            #
-            # @return res [Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputAnalysisResult]
-            def cmdi_create_new_input_result request, rule_id, input_type, value
-              ia_result = new_ia_result(rule_id, input_type, request.path, value)
-              if cmdi_worth_watching?(value)
-                ia_result.score_level = WORTHWATCHING
-                ia_result.ids << WORTHWATCHING_MATCH
-              else
-                ia_result.score_level = IGNORE
-              end
-
-              add_needed_key(request, ia_result, input_type, value) if CMDI_KEYS_NEEDED.include?(input_type)
-              ia_result
-            end
           end
         end
       end