clickwrap 0.0.0 → 0.1.1

data/lib/clickwrap/current_state.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+module Clickwrap
+  # Projects retained event payloads onto the current-state table.
+  #
+  # Everything here is derived from retained event payloads. `rebuild_for!`
+  # replays them while they still contain the affected statement identity. A
+  # reviewed core disposition deliberately removes that identity, so rebuilding
+  # through a disposed root would invent or silently lose state. The method
+  # refuses first and leaves the existing projection untouched in that case.
+  module CurrentState
+    # `imported_legacy` projects like a capture: the source system says the act
+    # happened, and a migrated application must keep answering "did this person
+    # agree?" the way it answered the day before the migration — otherwise
+    # every import ends in a mass forced re-acceptance, which is exactly the
+    # history-rewriting an import exists to avoid. What stays different is the
+    # evidence, not the answer: the event keeps `imported_provider`
+    # attribution, its receipt names every unknown, and
+    # `require_current_version` still sends people back when the documents
+    # move on. (An exemption, by contrast, records that NO human acted — it
+    # projects under its own state and never satisfies a human-action
+    # predicate.)
+    INITIAL_EVENT_TYPES = (Vocabulary::HUMAN_ACTION_EVENT_TYPES + %w[exemption imported_legacy]).freeze
+    TRANSITION_STATE_BY_EVENT_TYPE = {
+      "withdrawal" => "withdrawn",
+      "supersession" => "superseded",
+      "expiry" => "expired",
+      "consumption" => "consumed",
+      "revocation" => "revoked"
+    }.freeze
+
+    class << self
+      # Applies one event to the projection. Runs inside the capture's
+      # transaction, so a failure here rolls the capture back rather than
+      # leaving evidence whose current state nobody can query.
+      def apply!(event)
+        return event unless INITIAL_EVENT_TYPES.include?(event.event_type)
+        # An import quarantined with `counts_as_current: false` must stay
+        # quarantined through every path — including a projection REBUILD.
+        # Without this guard, `rebuild_for!` would launder consent the host
+        # explicitly declined to honour into an active grant.
+        return event unless projects_into_current_state?(event)
+
+        StatementIdentityLock.acquire_for_actor!(event.actor_reference)
+        identities = event.statements.map { |statement| identity_for(event, statement) }
+        identities.sort_by { |identity| identity.fetch(:identity_digest) }.each do |identity|
+          StatementIdentityLock.acquire!(identity.fetch(:identity_digest))
+        end
+
+        event.statements.each { |statement| apply_statement!(event, statement) }
+      end
+
+      def apply_statement!(event, statement)
+        identity = identity_for(event, statement)
+
+        loop do
+          return StatementState.transaction(requires_new: true) do
+            state = StatementState.find_or_initialize_by(identity)
+            return state if candidate_is_not_newer?(state, event, statement)
+
+            # A previous grant for the same identity is superseded rather
+            # than overwritten. The projection moves on; the event that
+            # recorded the earlier act stays exactly where it was.
+            state.assign_attributes(
+              kind: statement.kind,
+              purpose_key: statement.purpose_key,
+              actor_type: event.actor_type,
+              actor_id: event.actor_id,
+              subject_type: event.subject_type,
+              subject_id: event.subject_id,
+              subject_fingerprint: statement.subject_fingerprint,
+              represented_party_reference: event.represented_party_reference.to_s,
+              state: state_for(event, statement),
+              current_action: statement.action,
+              current_event_id: event.id,
+              root_event_id: event.root_event_id || event.id,
+              policy_revision_id: event.policy_revision_id,
+              effective_at: effective_at_for(event, statement),
+              expires_at: statement.expires_at,
+              one_time: statement.one_time,
+              document_version_ids: document_version_ids_for(event, statement)
+            )
+
+            apply_lifecycle_timestamps(state, event, statement)
+            state.save!
+            state
+          end
+        rescue ::ActiveRecord::RecordNotUnique
+          # PostgreSQL marks a transaction failed after a uniqueness error.
+          # The requires_new savepoint above absorbs that state before retry.
+        end
+      end
+
+      # Marks a statement's projection with a lifecycle outcome, without
+      # touching the event that produced it.
+      def transition!(state, to:, event:, at: nil)
+        at ||= Clickwrap.now
+
+        StatementIdentityLock.acquire_for_actor!(state.actor_reference)
+        StatementIdentityLock.acquire!(state.identity_digest)
+        state = StatementState.lock.find(state.id)
+        return state if event_is_not_newer?(state, event, effective_at: at)
+
+        attributes = {
+          state: to.to_s,
+          current_event_id: event.id,
+          current_action: event_action_for(to),
+          effective_at: at
+        }
+
+        case to.to_s
+        when "withdrawn" then attributes[:withdrawn_at] = at
+        when "superseded" then attributes[:superseded_at] = at
+        when "consumed" then attributes[:consumed_at] = at
+        when "revoked" then attributes[:revoked_at] = at
+        when "corrected" then attributes[:corrected_at] = at
+        end
+
+        state.update!(attributes)
+      end
+
+      # Rebuilds the projection for one actor from retained event payloads.
+      # Refuses before deleting anything when an existing state depends on a
+      # disposed root whose statement identity can no longer be reconstructed.
+      def rebuild_for!(actor_reference:)
+        StatementState.transaction do
+          StatementIdentityLock.acquire_for_actor!(actor_reference)
+          existing_states = StatementState.for_actor(actor_reference).lock.to_a
+          ensure_rebuildable!(existing_states, actor_reference)
+          StatementState.for_actor(actor_reference).delete_all
+
+          Event.for_actor(actor_reference)
+               .chronological
+               .includes(:statements)
+               .to_a
+               .each { |event| replay!(event) }
+        end
+      end
+
+      # Whether this event is allowed to shape the projection. Captures and
+      # every other initial type always do; an `imported_legacy` event carries
+      # its own answer in the structured provenance it was written with.
+      # Imports that predate the flag project (they were written with exactly
+      # that intent); only an explicit `counts_as_current: false` quarantines.
+      def projects_into_current_state?(event)
+        return true unless event.event_type == "imported_legacy"
+
+        event.provider_verification.to_h["counts_as_current"] != false
+      end
+
+      private
+
+      def identity_for(event, statement)
+        StatementState.identity_for(
+          policy_key: event.policy_key,
+          statement_key: statement.statement_key,
+          actor_reference: event.actor_reference,
+          tenant_key: event.tenant_key,
+          subject_key: event.subject_key,
+          represented_party_reference: event.represented_party_reference
+        )
+      end
+
+      def effective_at_for(event, statement)
+        statement.valid_from || event.occurred_at || event.recorded_at_by_server
+      end
+
+      # Imports are commonly appended years after the act they describe. They
+      # remain in history, but an older effective act must never resurrect a
+      # grant that was withdrawn or superseded later. Server-recorded order and
+      # durable sequence are deterministic tie-breakers only when effective
+      # times are equal; they do not rewrite when the source says the act
+      # happened.
+      def candidate_is_not_newer?(state, event, statement)
+        return false unless state.persisted?
+
+        event_is_not_newer?(state, event, effective_at: effective_at_for(event, statement))
+      end
+
+      def event_is_not_newer?(state, event, effective_at:)
+        current_event = state.current_event
+        return false unless current_event
+        return true if current_event.id.to_s == event.id.to_s
+
+        candidate = [effective_at, event.recorded_at_by_server, event.recording_sequence.to_i, event.id.to_s]
+        current = [state.effective_at, current_event.recorded_at_by_server,
+                   current_event.recording_sequence.to_i, current_event.id.to_s]
+        (candidate <=> current) <= 0
+      end
+
+      def ensure_rebuildable!(states, actor_reference)
+        root_ids = states.map(&:root_event_id).compact.uniq
+        disposed_root_id = Event.where(id: root_ids).where.not(core_event_disposed_at: nil).pick(:id)
+        return unless disposed_root_id
+
+        raise IntegrityCheckFailed,
+              "Current state for #{actor_reference} depends on disposed root event #{disposed_root_id}. " \
+              "Clickwrap refused to delete the existing projection because the reviewed disposition " \
+              "removed the statement identity needed to rebuild it."
+      end
+
+      def replay!(event)
+        return if event.disposed?
+        unless event.digest_verified?
+          raise IntegrityCheckFailed,
+                "Event #{event.id} failed its digest during state rebuild."
+        end
+
+        if INITIAL_EVENT_TYPES.include?(event.event_type)
+          apply!(event)
+          return
+        end
+
+        destination = TRANSITION_STATE_BY_EVENT_TYPE[event.event_type]
+        return unless destination
+
+        root = Event.find_by(id: event.root_event_id)
+        unless root&.digest_verified?
+          raise IntegrityCheckFailed,
+                "Lifecycle event #{event.id} does not have a verifiable root event, so its " \
+                "statement identity cannot be rebuilt safely."
+        end
+
+        event.statements.each do |statement|
+          identity = StatementState.identity_for(
+            policy_key: event.policy_key,
+            statement_key: statement.statement_key,
+            # A withdrawal, expiry, consumption, or revocation may be appended
+            # by a system/operator actor. That actor performed the lifecycle
+            # transition; it is not the human whose statement is affected.
+            # The immutable root event owns the statement identity.
+            actor_reference: root.actor_reference,
+            tenant_key: root.tenant_key,
+            subject_key: root.subject_key,
+            represented_party_reference: root.represented_party_reference
+          )
+          state = StatementState.find_by(identity)
+          next unless state
+
+          transition!(state, to: destination, event: event, at: statement.valid_from)
+        end
+      end
+
+      def state_for(event, statement)
+        return "exempted" if event.event_type == "exemption"
+        return "declined" if statement.action == "declined"
+
+        "active"
+      end
+
+      def apply_lifecycle_timestamps(state, event, statement)
+        return unless state.persisted?
+
+        # A renewal starts a fresh validity period rather than extending the old
+        # one, so the previous expiry never quietly survives.
+        return unless statement.action == "renewed"
+
+        state.effective_at = effective_at_for(event, statement)
+        state.withdrawn_at = nil
+        state.expires_at = statement.expires_at
+      end
+
+      def event_action_for(state_name)
+        case state_name.to_s
+        when "withdrawn" then "withdrawn"
+        when "superseded" then "superseded"
+        when "consumed" then "consumed"
+        when "revoked" then "revoked"
+        when "corrected" then "corrected"
+        when "expired" then "expired"
+        else state_name.to_s
+        end
+      end
+
+      def document_version_ids_for(event, statement)
+        event.documents
+             .select { |document| document.statement_key == statement.statement_key }
+             .map { |document| document.document_version_id.to_s }
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/clickwrap/digest.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require "digest"
+require "openssl"
+
+module Clickwrap
+  # Digest helpers for document bytes, presentation manifests, receipts, and the
+  # optional event chain.
+  #
+  # What a digest here does and does not mean is part of the public contract.
+  # A digest detects that the bytes it covers changed. It does not identify who
+  # produced them, when they were produced, or that a party with full control
+  # of the database and application could not have rewritten both the bytes and
+  # the digest. Stronger claims need the optional independent anchor or
+  # timestamp adapters, and even then Clickwrap reports exactly the assurance
+  # those adapters supply.
+  #
+  # SHA-2 is a hash standard (NIST FIPS 180-4,
+  # https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/180-4/upd1/final). It is not a signature,
+  # not an identity, and not a time source.
+  module Digest
+    # Algorithm name => the OpenSSL digest that computes it. Every value stored
+    # in evidence carries its algorithm name so a future release can add an
+    # algorithm without making old events unverifiable.
+    SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS = {
+      "sha256" => "SHA256",
+      "sha384" => "SHA384",
+      "sha512" => "SHA512"
+    }.freeze
+
+    DEFAULT_ALGORITHM = "sha256"
+    HEX_LENGTH_BY_ALGORITHM = {
+      "sha256" => 64,
+      "sha384" => 96,
+      "sha512" => 128
+    }.freeze
+
+    # Digests are written as "<algorithm>:<lowercase hex>" everywhere they
+    # appear, so an auditor never has to guess which function produced a bare
+    # hex string.
+    PREFIXED_PATTERN = /\A(?<algorithm>[a-z0-9]+):(?<value>[0-9a-f]+)\z/
+
+    class << self
+      # Returns "sha256:<hex>" for the given bytes.
+      def digest(bytes, algorithm: DEFAULT_ALGORITHM)
+        "#{algorithm}:#{hex(bytes, algorithm:)}"
+      end
+
+      # Returns the bare lowercase hex digest.
+      def hex(bytes, algorithm: DEFAULT_ALGORITHM)
+        OpenSSL::Digest.hexdigest(openssl_name(algorithm), bytes.to_s.b)
+      end
+
+      # Canonicalizes `value` per RFC 8785 and digests the resulting bytes.
+      # This is how manifests, compiled policy revisions, and receipts are
+      # digested: the digest covers meaning, not formatting.
+      def digest_canonical(value, algorithm: DEFAULT_ALGORITHM)
+        digest(CanonicalJson.generate(value), algorithm:)
+      end
+
+      # A keyed digest, used where an unkeyed one would be guessable.
+      #
+      # An IPv4 address is 32 bits (RFC 791), so an unsalted hash of one can be
+      # tested by enumerating every address in minutes. Clickwrap therefore
+      # binds request evidence to its event with a keyed construction and says
+      # plainly that the result is a linkable pseudonymous value, not an
+      # anonymous one.
+      def keyed_digest(bytes, key:, algorithm: DEFAULT_ALGORITHM)
+        raise ArgumentError, "A keyed digest needs a key" if key.nil? || key.to_s.empty?
+
+        mac = OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest(openssl_name(algorithm), key.to_s, bytes.to_s.b)
+        "hmac-#{algorithm}:#{mac}"
+      end
+
+      # Compares two digest strings without leaking timing information.
+      def secure_compare?(left, right)
+        return false if left.nil? || right.nil?
+
+        OpenSSL.secure_compare(left.to_s, right.to_s)
+      end
+
+      def algorithm_of(prefixed)
+        PREFIXED_PATTERN.match(prefixed.to_s)&.[](:algorithm)
+      end
+
+      def supported?(algorithm)
+        SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS.key?(algorithm.to_s)
+      end
+
+      # Whether a stored digest has a supported algorithm prefix and the exact
+      # hexadecimal length that algorithm emits. This validates provenance
+      # identifiers whose source bytes are intentionally unavailable here; it
+      # does not claim the digest matches those unavailable bytes.
+      def well_formed?(prefixed)
+        match = PREFIXED_PATTERN.match(prefixed.to_s)
+        return false unless match
+
+        expected_length = HEX_LENGTH_BY_ALGORITHM[match[:algorithm]]
+        !expected_length.nil? && match[:value].length == expected_length
+      end
+
+      # Verifies that `bytes` still hash to `expected`, which must be a
+      # prefixed digest so the algorithm travels with the value.
+      def matches?(bytes, expected)
+        match = PREFIXED_PATTERN.match(expected.to_s)
+        return false unless match
+
+        algorithm = match[:algorithm]
+        return false unless supported?(algorithm)
+
+        secure_compare?(hex(bytes, algorithm:), match[:value])
+      end
+
+      private
+
+      def openssl_name(algorithm)
+        SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS.fetch(algorithm.to_s) do
+          raise ConfigurationError,
+                "#{algorithm.inspect} is not a supported digest algorithm. " \
+                "Choose one of: #{SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS.keys.join(", ")}."
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end