tree-sitter-analyzer 1.0.0__py3-none-any.whl → 1.1.1__py3-none-any.whl

tree_sitter_analyzer/security/boundary_manager.py

@@ -1,260 +1,260 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""
-Project Boundary Manager for Tree-sitter Analyzer
-
-Provides strict project boundary control to prevent access to files
-outside the designated project directory.
-"""
-
-from pathlib import Path
-
-from ..exceptions import SecurityError
-from ..utils import log_debug, log_info, log_warning
-
-
-class ProjectBoundaryManager:
-    """
-    Project boundary manager for access control.
-
-    This class enforces strict boundaries around project directories
-    to prevent unauthorized file access outside the project scope.
-
-    Features:
-    - Real path resolution for symlink protection
-    - Configurable allowed directories
-    - Comprehensive boundary checking
-    - Audit logging for security events
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self, project_root: str) -> None:
-        """
-        Initialize project boundary manager.
-
-        Args:
-            project_root: Root directory of the project
-
-        Raises:
-            SecurityError: If project root is invalid
-        """
-        if not project_root:
-            raise SecurityError("Project root cannot be empty")
-
-        project_path = Path(project_root)
-        if not project_path.exists():
-            raise SecurityError(f"Project root does not exist: {project_root}")
-
-        if not project_path.is_dir():
-            raise SecurityError(f"Project root is not a directory: {project_root}")
-
-        # Store real path to prevent symlink attacks
-        self.project_root = str(project_path.resolve())
-        self.allowed_directories: set[str] = {self.project_root}
-
-        log_debug(f"ProjectBoundaryManager initialized with root: {self.project_root}")
-
-    def add_allowed_directory(self, directory: str) -> None:
-        """
-        Add an additional allowed directory.
-
-        Args:
-            directory: Directory path to allow access to
-
-        Raises:
-            SecurityError: If directory is invalid
-        """
-        if not directory:
-            raise SecurityError("Directory cannot be empty")
-
-        dir_path = Path(directory)
-        if not dir_path.exists():
-            raise SecurityError(f"Directory does not exist: {directory}")
-
-        if not dir_path.is_dir():
-            raise SecurityError(f"Path is not a directory: {directory}")
-
-        real_dir = str(dir_path.resolve())
-        self.allowed_directories.add(real_dir)
-
-        log_info(f"Added allowed directory: {real_dir}")
-
-    def is_within_project(self, file_path: str) -> bool:
-        """
-        Check if file path is within project boundaries.
-
-        Args:
-            file_path: File path to check
-
-        Returns:
-            True if path is within allowed boundaries
-        """
-        try:
-            if not file_path:
-                log_warning("Empty file path provided to boundary check")
-                return False
-
-            # Resolve real path to handle symlinks
-            real_path = str(Path(file_path).resolve())
-
-            # Check against all allowed directories
-            for allowed_dir in self.allowed_directories:
-                # Use pathlib to check if path is within allowed directory
-                try:
-                    Path(real_path).relative_to(Path(allowed_dir))
-                    log_debug(f"File path within boundaries: {file_path}")
-                    return True
-                except ValueError:
-                    # Path is not within this allowed directory, continue checking
-                    continue
-
-            log_warning(f"File path outside boundaries: {file_path} -> {real_path}")
-            return False
-
-        except Exception as e:
-            log_warning(f"Boundary check error for {file_path}: {e}")
-            return False
-
-    def get_relative_path(self, file_path: str) -> str | None:
-        """
-        Get relative path from project root if within boundaries.
-
-        Args:
-            file_path: File path to convert
-
-        Returns:
-            Relative path from project root, or None if outside boundaries
-        """
-        if not self.is_within_project(file_path):
-            return None
-
-        try:
-            real_path = Path(file_path).resolve()
-            try:
-                rel_path = real_path.relative_to(Path(self.project_root))
-                rel_path = str(rel_path)
-            except ValueError:
-                # Path is not relative to project root
-                log_warning(f"Path not relative to project root: {file_path}")
-                return None
-
-            # Ensure relative path doesn't start with ..
-            if rel_path.startswith(".."):
-                log_warning(f"Relative path calculation failed: {rel_path}")
-                return None
-
-            return rel_path
-
-        except Exception as e:
-            log_warning(f"Relative path calculation error: {e}")
-            return None
-
-    def validate_and_resolve_path(self, file_path: str) -> str | None:
-        """
-        Validate path and return resolved absolute path if within boundaries.
-
-        Args:
-            file_path: File path to validate and resolve
-
-        Returns:
-            Resolved absolute path if valid, None otherwise
-        """
-        try:
-            # Handle relative paths from project root
-            file_path_obj = Path(file_path)
-            if not file_path_obj.is_absolute():
-                full_path = Path(self.project_root) / file_path
-            else:
-                full_path = file_path_obj
-
-            # Check boundaries
-            if not self.is_within_project(str(full_path)):
-                return None
-
-            # Return real path
-            return str(full_path.resolve())
-
-        except Exception as e:
-            log_warning(f"Path validation error: {e}")
-            return None
-
-    def list_allowed_directories(self) -> set[str]:
-        """
-        Get list of all allowed directories.
-
-        Returns:
-            Set of allowed directory paths
-        """
-        return self.allowed_directories.copy()
-
-    def is_symlink_safe(self, file_path: str) -> bool:
-        """
-        Check if file path is safe from symlink attacks.
-
-        Args:
-            file_path: File path to check
-
-        Returns:
-            True if path is safe from symlink attacks
-        """
-        try:
-            file_path_obj = Path(file_path)
-            if not file_path_obj.exists():
-                return True  # Non-existent files are safe
-
-            # If the fully resolved path is within project boundaries, we treat it as safe.
-            # This makes the check tolerant to system-level symlinks like
-            # /var -> /private/var on macOS runners.
-            resolved = str(file_path_obj.resolve())
-            if self.is_within_project(resolved):
-                return True
-
-            # Otherwise, inspect each path component symlink to ensure no hop jumps outside
-            # the allowed directories.
-            path_parts = file_path_obj.parts
-            current_path = Path()
-
-            for part in path_parts:
-                current_path = current_path / part if current_path.parts else Path(part)
-
-                if current_path.is_symlink():
-                    target = str(current_path.resolve())
-                    if not self.is_within_project(target):
-                        log_warning(
-                            f"Unsafe symlink detected: {current_path} -> {target}"
-                        )
-                        return False
-
-            # If no unsafe hop found, consider safe
-            return True
-
-        except Exception as e:
-            log_warning(f"Symlink safety check error: {e}")
-            return False
-
-    def audit_access(self, file_path: str, operation: str) -> None:
-        """
-        Log file access for security auditing.
-
-        Args:
-            file_path: File path being accessed
-            operation: Type of operation (read, write, analyze, etc.)
-        """
-        is_within = self.is_within_project(file_path)
-        status = "ALLOWED" if is_within else "DENIED"
-
-        log_info(f"AUDIT: {status} {operation} access to {file_path}")
-
-        if not is_within:
-            log_warning(f"SECURITY: Unauthorized access attempt to {file_path}")
-
-    def __str__(self) -> str:
-        """String representation of boundary manager."""
-        return f"ProjectBoundaryManager(root={self.project_root}, allowed_dirs={len(self.allowed_directories)})"
-
-    def __repr__(self) -> str:
-        """Detailed representation of boundary manager."""
-        return (
-            f"ProjectBoundaryManager("
-            f"project_root='{self.project_root}', "
-            f"allowed_directories={self.allowed_directories}"
-            f")"
-        )
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Project Boundary Manager for Tree-sitter Analyzer
+
+Provides strict project boundary control to prevent access to files
+outside the designated project directory.
+"""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from ..exceptions import SecurityError
+from ..utils import log_debug, log_info, log_warning
+
+
+class ProjectBoundaryManager:
+    """
+    Project boundary manager for access control.
+
+    This class enforces strict boundaries around project directories
+    to prevent unauthorized file access outside the project scope.
+
+    Features:
+    - Real path resolution for symlink protection
+    - Configurable allowed directories
+    - Comprehensive boundary checking
+    - Audit logging for security events
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, project_root: str) -> None:
+        """
+        Initialize project boundary manager.
+
+        Args:
+            project_root: Root directory of the project
+
+        Raises:
+            SecurityError: If project root is invalid
+        """
+        if not project_root:
+            raise SecurityError("Project root cannot be empty")
+
+        project_path = Path(project_root)
+        if not project_path.exists():
+            raise SecurityError(f"Project root does not exist: {project_root}")
+
+        if not project_path.is_dir():
+            raise SecurityError(f"Project root is not a directory: {project_root}")
+
+        # Store real path to prevent symlink attacks
+        self.project_root = str(project_path.resolve())
+        self.allowed_directories: set[str] = {self.project_root}
+
+        log_debug(f"ProjectBoundaryManager initialized with root: {self.project_root}")
+
+    def add_allowed_directory(self, directory: str) -> None:
+        """
+        Add an additional allowed directory.
+
+        Args:
+            directory: Directory path to allow access to
+
+        Raises:
+            SecurityError: If directory is invalid
+        """
+        if not directory:
+            raise SecurityError("Directory cannot be empty")
+
+        dir_path = Path(directory)
+        if not dir_path.exists():
+            raise SecurityError(f"Directory does not exist: {directory}")
+
+        if not dir_path.is_dir():
+            raise SecurityError(f"Path is not a directory: {directory}")
+
+        real_dir = str(dir_path.resolve())
+        self.allowed_directories.add(real_dir)
+
+        log_info(f"Added allowed directory: {real_dir}")
+
+    def is_within_project(self, file_path: str) -> bool:
+        """
+        Check if file path is within project boundaries.
+
+        Args:
+            file_path: File path to check
+
+        Returns:
+            True if path is within allowed boundaries
+        """
+        try:
+            if not file_path:
+                log_warning("Empty file path provided to boundary check")
+                return False
+
+            # Resolve real path to handle symlinks
+            real_path = str(Path(file_path).resolve())
+
+            # Check against all allowed directories
+            for allowed_dir in self.allowed_directories:
+                # Use pathlib to check if path is within allowed directory
+                try:
+                    Path(real_path).relative_to(Path(allowed_dir))
+                    log_debug(f"File path within boundaries: {file_path}")
+                    return True
+                except ValueError:
+                    # Path is not within this allowed directory, continue checking
+                    continue
+
+            log_warning(f"File path outside boundaries: {file_path} -> {real_path}")
+            return False
+
+        except Exception as e:
+            log_warning(f"Boundary check error for {file_path}: {e}")
+            return False
+
+    def get_relative_path(self, file_path: str) -> str | None:
+        """
+        Get relative path from project root if within boundaries.
+
+        Args:
+            file_path: File path to convert
+
+        Returns:
+            Relative path from project root, or None if outside boundaries
+        """
+        if not self.is_within_project(file_path):
+            return None
+
+        try:
+            real_path = Path(file_path).resolve()
+            try:
+                rel_path = real_path.relative_to(Path(self.project_root))
+                rel_path = str(rel_path)
+            except ValueError:
+                # Path is not relative to project root
+                log_warning(f"Path not relative to project root: {file_path}")
+                return None
+
+            # Ensure relative path doesn't start with ..
+            if rel_path.startswith(".."):
+                log_warning(f"Relative path calculation failed: {rel_path}")
+                return None
+
+            return rel_path
+
+        except Exception as e:
+            log_warning(f"Relative path calculation error: {e}")
+            return None
+
+    def validate_and_resolve_path(self, file_path: str) -> str | None:
+        """
+        Validate path and return resolved absolute path if within boundaries.
+
+        Args:
+            file_path: File path to validate and resolve
+
+        Returns:
+            Resolved absolute path if valid, None otherwise
+        """
+        try:
+            # Handle relative paths from project root
+            file_path_obj = Path(file_path)
+            if not file_path_obj.is_absolute():
+                full_path = Path(self.project_root) / file_path
+            else:
+                full_path = file_path_obj
+
+            # Check boundaries
+            if not self.is_within_project(str(full_path)):
+                return None
+
+            # Return real path
+            return str(full_path.resolve())
+
+        except Exception as e:
+            log_warning(f"Path validation error: {e}")
+            return None
+
+    def list_allowed_directories(self) -> set[str]:
+        """
+        Get list of all allowed directories.
+
+        Returns:
+            Set of allowed directory paths
+        """
+        return self.allowed_directories.copy()
+
+    def is_symlink_safe(self, file_path: str) -> bool:
+        """
+        Check if file path is safe from symlink attacks.
+
+        Args:
+            file_path: File path to check
+
+        Returns:
+            True if path is safe from symlink attacks
+        """
+        try:
+            file_path_obj = Path(file_path)
+            if not file_path_obj.exists():
+                return True  # Non-existent files are safe
+
+            # If the fully resolved path is within project boundaries, we treat it as safe.
+            # This makes the check tolerant to system-level symlinks like
+            # /var -> /private/var on macOS runners.
+            resolved = str(file_path_obj.resolve())
+            if self.is_within_project(resolved):
+                return True
+
+            # Otherwise, inspect each path component symlink to ensure no hop jumps outside
+            # the allowed directories.
+            path_parts = file_path_obj.parts
+            current_path = Path()
+
+            for part in path_parts:
+                current_path = current_path / part if current_path.parts else Path(part)
+
+                if current_path.is_symlink():
+                    target = str(current_path.resolve())
+                    if not self.is_within_project(target):
+                        log_warning(
+                            f"Unsafe symlink detected: {current_path} -> {target}"
+                        )
+                        return False
+
+            # If no unsafe hop found, consider safe
+            return True
+
+        except Exception as e:
+            log_warning(f"Symlink safety check error: {e}")
+            return False
+
+    def audit_access(self, file_path: str, operation: str) -> None:
+        """
+        Log file access for security auditing.
+
+        Args:
+            file_path: File path being accessed
+            operation: Type of operation (read, write, analyze, etc.)
+        """
+        is_within = self.is_within_project(file_path)
+        status = "ALLOWED" if is_within else "DENIED"
+
+        log_info(f"AUDIT: {status} {operation} access to {file_path}")
+
+        if not is_within:
+            log_warning(f"SECURITY: Unauthorized access attempt to {file_path}")
+
+    def __str__(self) -> str:
+        """String representation of boundary manager."""
+        return f"ProjectBoundaryManager(root={self.project_root}, allowed_dirs={len(self.allowed_directories)})"
+
+    def __repr__(self) -> str:
+        """Detailed representation of boundary manager."""
+        return (
+            f"ProjectBoundaryManager("
+            f"project_root='{self.project_root}', "
+            f"allowed_directories={self.allowed_directories}"
+            f")"
+        )