transcrypto 1.8.0__py3-none-any.whl → 2.0.3__py3-none-any.whl

transcrypto/{dsa.py → core/dsa.py}

@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ from typing import Self
 
 import gmpy2
 
-from . import base, constants, modmath
+from transcrypto.core import constants, hashes, key, modmath
+from transcrypto.utils import base, saferandom
 
 _MAX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILURES = 15
 
@@ -68,8 +69,8 @@ def NBitRandomDSAPrimes(
     that p % q == 1 and m == (p - 1) // q
 
   Raises:
-    InputError: invalid inputs
-    Error: prime search failed
+    base.InputError: invalid inputs
+    base.Error: prime search failed
 
   """
   # test inputs
@@ -140,7 +141,7 @@ def _PrimePSearchShard(q: int, p_bits: int) -> tuple[int | None, int | None]:
     return all(m % r != f for r, f in forbidden.items())
 
   # try searching starting here
-  m: int = base.RandInt(min_m, max_m)
+  m: int = saferandom.RandInt(min_m, max_m)
   if m % 2:
     m += 1  # make even
   count: int = 0
@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ def _PrimePSearchShard(q: int, p_bits: int) -> tuple[int | None, int | None]:
 
 
 @dataclasses.dataclass(kw_only=True, slots=True, frozen=True, repr=False)
-class DSASharedPublicKey(base.CryptoKey):
+class DSASharedPublicKey(key.CryptoKey):
   """DSA shared public key. This key can be shared by a group.
 
   No measures are taken here to prevent timing attacks.
@@ -178,7 +179,7 @@ class DSASharedPublicKey(base.CryptoKey):
     """Check data.
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     if self.prime_seed < 7 or not modmath.IsPrime(self.prime_seed):  # noqa: PLR2004
@@ -227,16 +228,16 @@ class DSASharedPublicKey(base.CryptoKey):
       Hash512("prefix" || len(aad) || aad || message || salt)
 
     Raises:
-      CryptoError: hash output is out of range
+      key.CryptoError: hash output is out of range
 
     """
     aad: bytes = b'' if associated_data is None else associated_data
     la: bytes = base.IntToFixedBytes(len(aad), 8)
     assert len(salt) == 64, 'should never happen: salt should be exactly 64 bytes'  # noqa: PLR2004, S101
-    y: int = base.BytesToInt(base.Hash512(_DSA_SIGNATURE_HASH_PREFIX + la + aad + message + salt))
+    y: int = base.BytesToInt(hashes.Hash512(_DSA_SIGNATURE_HASH_PREFIX + la + aad + message + salt))
     if not 1 < y < self.prime_seed - 1:
       # will only reasonably happen if prime seed is small
-      raise base.CryptoError(f'hash output {y} is out of range/invalid {self.prime_seed}')
+      raise key.CryptoError(f'hash output {y} is out of range/invalid {self.prime_seed}')
     return y
 
   @classmethod
@@ -257,13 +258,13 @@ class DSASharedPublicKey(base.CryptoKey):
     # generate random number, create object (should never fail)
     g: int = 0
     while g < 3:  # noqa: PLR2004
-      h: int = base.RandBits(p_bits - 1)
+      h: int = saferandom.RandBits(p_bits - 1)
       g = int(gmpy2.powmod(h, m, p))
     return cls(prime_modulus=p, prime_seed=q, group_base=g)
 
 
 @dataclasses.dataclass(kw_only=True, slots=True, frozen=True, repr=False)
-class DSAPublicKey(DSASharedPublicKey, base.Verifier):
+class DSAPublicKey(DSASharedPublicKey, key.Verifier):
   """DSA public key. This is an individual public key.
 
   No measures are taken here to prevent timing attacks.
@@ -279,7 +280,7 @@ class DSAPublicKey(DSASharedPublicKey, base.Verifier):
     """Check data.
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     super(DSAPublicKey, self).__post_init__()
@@ -315,7 +316,7 @@ class DSAPublicKey(DSASharedPublicKey, base.Verifier):
       self.group_base,
       self.individual_base,
     }:
-      ephemeral_key = base.RandBits(bit_length - 1)
+      ephemeral_key = saferandom.RandBits(bit_length - 1)
     return (ephemeral_key, modmath.ModInv(ephemeral_key, self.prime_seed))
 
   def RawVerify(self, message: int, signature: tuple[int, int], /) -> bool:
@@ -333,7 +334,7 @@ class DSAPublicKey(DSASharedPublicKey, base.Verifier):
       True if signature is valid, False otherwise
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     # test inputs
@@ -371,7 +372,7 @@ class DSAPublicKey(DSASharedPublicKey, base.Verifier):
       True if signature is valid, False otherwise
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     k: int = self.modulus_size[1]  # use prime_seed size
@@ -409,7 +410,7 @@ class DSAPublicKey(DSASharedPublicKey, base.Verifier):
 
 
 @dataclasses.dataclass(kw_only=True, slots=True, frozen=True, repr=False)
-class DSAPrivateKey(DSAPublicKey, base.Signer):
+class DSAPrivateKey(DSAPublicKey, key.Signer):
   """DSA private key.
 
   No measures are taken here to prevent timing attacks.
@@ -425,8 +426,8 @@ class DSAPrivateKey(DSAPublicKey, base.Signer):
     """Check data.
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
-      CryptoError: modulus math is inconsistent with values
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
+      key.CryptoError: modulus math is inconsistent with values
 
     """
     super(DSAPrivateKey, self).__post_init__()
@@ -436,7 +437,7 @@ class DSAPrivateKey(DSAPublicKey, base.Signer):
     }:
       raise base.InputError(f'invalid decrypt_exp: {self}')
     if gmpy2.powmod(self.group_base, self.decrypt_exp, self.prime_modulus) != self.individual_base:
-      raise base.CryptoError(f'inconsistent g**d % p == i: {self}')
+      raise key.CryptoError(f'inconsistent g**d % p == i: {self}')
 
   def __str__(self) -> str:
     """Safe (no secrets) string representation of the DSAPrivateKey.
@@ -448,7 +449,7 @@ class DSAPrivateKey(DSAPublicKey, base.Signer):
     return (
       'DSAPrivateKey('
       f'{super(DSAPrivateKey, self).__str__()}, '
-      f'decrypt_exp={base.ObfuscateSecret(self.decrypt_exp)})'
+      f'decrypt_exp={hashes.ObfuscateSecret(self.decrypt_exp)})'
     )
 
   def RawSign(self, message: int, /) -> tuple[int, int]:
@@ -465,7 +466,7 @@ class DSAPrivateKey(DSAPublicKey, base.Signer):
       signed message tuple ((int, int), 2 ≤ s1,s2 < prime_seed
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     # test inputs
@@ -502,13 +503,13 @@ class DSAPrivateKey(DSAPublicKey, base.Signer):
       bytes: Signature; salt || Padded(s, k) - see above
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     k: int = self.modulus_size[1]  # use prime_seed size
     if k <= 64:  # noqa: PLR2004
       raise base.InputError(f'modulus/seed too small for signing operations: {k} bytes')
-    salt: bytes = base.RandBytes(64)
+    salt: bytes = saferandom.RandBytes(64)
     s_int: tuple[int, int] = self.RawSign(self._DomainSeparatedHash(message, associated_data, salt))
     s_bytes: bytes = base.IntToFixedBytes(s_int[0], k) + base.IntToFixedBytes(s_int[1], k)
     assert len(s_bytes) == 2 * k, 'should never happen: s_bytes should be exactly 2k bytes'  # noqa: S101
@@ -525,8 +526,8 @@ class DSAPrivateKey(DSAPublicKey, base.Signer):
       DSAPrivateKey object ready for use
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
-      CryptoError: failed generation
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
+      key.CryptoError: failed generation
 
     """
     # test inputs
@@ -542,7 +543,7 @@ class DSAPrivateKey(DSAPublicKey, base.Signer):
         while (
           not 2 < decrypt_exp < shared_key.prime_seed or decrypt_exp == shared_key.group_base  # noqa: PLR2004
         ):
-          decrypt_exp = base.RandBits(bit_length - 1)
+          decrypt_exp = saferandom.RandBits(bit_length - 1)
         # make the object
         return cls(
           prime_modulus=shared_key.prime_modulus,
@@ -556,5 +557,5 @@ class DSAPrivateKey(DSAPublicKey, base.Signer):
       except base.InputError as err:
         failures += 1
         if failures >= _MAX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILURES:
-          raise base.CryptoError(f'failed key generation {failures} times') from err
+          raise key.CryptoError(f'failed key generation {failures} times') from err
         logging.warning(err)

transcrypto/{elgamal.py → core/elgamal.py}

@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ from typing import Self
 
 import gmpy2
 
-from . import aes, base, modmath
+from transcrypto.core import aes, hashes, key, modmath
+from transcrypto.utils import base, saferandom
 
 _MAX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILURES = 15
 
@@ -32,7 +33,7 @@ _ELGAMAL_SIGNATURE_HASH_PREFIX = b'transcrypto.ElGamal.Signature.1.0\x00'
 
 
 @dataclasses.dataclass(kw_only=True, slots=True, frozen=True, repr=False)
-class ElGamalSharedPublicKey(base.CryptoKey):
+class ElGamalSharedPublicKey(key.CryptoKey):
   """El-Gamal shared public key. This key can be shared by a group.
 
   BEWARE: This is **NOT** DSA! No measures are taken here to prevent timing attacks.
@@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ class ElGamalSharedPublicKey(base.CryptoKey):
     """Check data.
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     if self.prime_modulus < 7 or not modmath.IsPrime(self.prime_modulus):  # noqa: PLR2004
@@ -92,18 +93,18 @@ class ElGamalSharedPublicKey(base.CryptoKey):
       Hash512("prefix" || len(aad) || aad || message || salt)
 
     Raises:
-      CryptoError: hash output is out of range
+      key.CryptoError: hash output is out of range
 
     """
     aad: bytes = b'' if associated_data is None else associated_data
     la: bytes = base.IntToFixedBytes(len(aad), 8)
     assert len(salt) == 64, 'should never happen: salt should be exactly 64 bytes'  # noqa: PLR2004, S101
     y: int = base.BytesToInt(
-      base.Hash512(_ELGAMAL_SIGNATURE_HASH_PREFIX + la + aad + message + salt)
+      hashes.Hash512(_ELGAMAL_SIGNATURE_HASH_PREFIX + la + aad + message + salt)
     )
     if not 1 < y < self.prime_modulus:
       # will only reasonably happen if modulus is small
-      raise base.CryptoError(f'hash output {y} is out of range/invalid {self.prime_modulus}')
+      raise key.CryptoError(f'hash output {y} is out of range/invalid {self.prime_modulus}')
     return y
 
   @classmethod
@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ class ElGamalSharedPublicKey(base.CryptoKey):
       ElGamalSharedPublicKey object ready for use
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     # test inputs
@@ -127,12 +128,12 @@ class ElGamalSharedPublicKey(base.CryptoKey):
     p: int = modmath.NBitRandomPrimes(bit_length).pop()
     g: int = 0
     while not 2 < g < p:  # noqa: PLR2004
-      g = base.RandBits(bit_length)
+      g = saferandom.RandBits(bit_length)
     return cls(prime_modulus=p, group_base=g)
 
 
 @dataclasses.dataclass(kw_only=True, slots=True, frozen=True, repr=False)
-class ElGamalPublicKey(ElGamalSharedPublicKey, base.Encryptor, base.Verifier):
+class ElGamalPublicKey(ElGamalSharedPublicKey, key.Encryptor, key.Verifier):
   """El-Gamal public key. This is an individual public key.
 
   BEWARE: This is **NOT** DSA! No measures are taken here to prevent timing attacks.
@@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ class ElGamalPublicKey(ElGamalSharedPublicKey, base.Encryptor, base.Verifier):
     """Check data.
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     super(ElGamalPublicKey, self).__post_init__()
@@ -186,8 +187,8 @@ class ElGamalPublicKey(ElGamalSharedPublicKey, base.Encryptor, base.Verifier):
       self.group_base,
       self.individual_base,
     }:
-      ephemeral_key = base.RandBits(bit_length)
-      if base.GCD(ephemeral_key, p_1) != 1:
+      ephemeral_key = saferandom.RandBits(bit_length)
+      if modmath.GCD(ephemeral_key, p_1) != 1:
         ephemeral_key = 0  # we have to try again
     return (ephemeral_key, modmath.ModInv(ephemeral_key, p_1))
 
@@ -205,7 +206,7 @@ class ElGamalPublicKey(ElGamalSharedPublicKey, base.Encryptor, base.Verifier):
       ciphertext message tuple ((int, int), 2 ≤ c1,c2 < modulus)
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     # test inputs
@@ -252,13 +253,13 @@ class ElGamalPublicKey(ElGamalSharedPublicKey, base.Encryptor, base.Verifier):
     # generate random r and encrypt it
     r: int = 0
     while not 1 < r < self.prime_modulus:
-      r = base.RandBits(self.prime_modulus.bit_length())
+      r = saferandom.RandBits(self.prime_modulus.bit_length())
     k: int = self.modulus_size
     i_ct: tuple[int, int] = self.RawEncrypt(r)
     ct: bytes = base.IntToFixedBytes(i_ct[0], k) + base.IntToFixedBytes(i_ct[1], k)
     assert len(ct) == 2 * k, 'should never happen: c_kem should be exactly 2k bytes'  # noqa: S101
     # encrypt plaintext with AES-256-GCM using SHA512(r)[32:] as key; return ct || Encrypt(...)
-    ss: bytes = base.Hash512(base.IntToFixedBytes(r, k))
+    ss: bytes = hashes.Hash512(base.IntToFixedBytes(r, k))
     aad: bytes = b'' if associated_data is None else associated_data
     aad_prime: bytes = _ELGAMAL_ENCRYPTION_AAD_PREFIX + base.IntToFixedBytes(len(aad), 8) + aad + ct
     return ct + aes.AESKey(key256=ss[32:]).Encrypt(plaintext, associated_data=aad_prime)
@@ -278,7 +279,7 @@ class ElGamalPublicKey(ElGamalSharedPublicKey, base.Encryptor, base.Verifier):
       True if signature is valid, False otherwise
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     # test inputs
@@ -312,7 +313,7 @@ class ElGamalPublicKey(ElGamalSharedPublicKey, base.Encryptor, base.Verifier):
       True if signature is valid, False otherwise
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     k: int = self.modulus_size
@@ -349,7 +350,7 @@ class ElGamalPublicKey(ElGamalSharedPublicKey, base.Encryptor, base.Verifier):
 
 
 @dataclasses.dataclass(kw_only=True, slots=True, frozen=True, repr=False)
-class ElGamalPrivateKey(ElGamalPublicKey, base.Decryptor, base.Signer):
+class ElGamalPrivateKey(ElGamalPublicKey, key.Decryptor, key.Signer):
   """El-Gamal private key.
 
   BEWARE: This is **NOT** DSA! No measures are taken here to prevent timing attacks.
@@ -365,8 +366,8 @@ class ElGamalPrivateKey(ElGamalPublicKey, base.Decryptor, base.Signer):
     """Check data.
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
-      CryptoError: modulus math is inconsistent with values
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
+      key.CryptoError: modulus math is inconsistent with values
 
     """
     super(ElGamalPrivateKey, self).__post_init__()
@@ -376,7 +377,7 @@ class ElGamalPrivateKey(ElGamalPublicKey, base.Decryptor, base.Signer):
     }:
       raise base.InputError(f'invalid decrypt_exp: {self}')
     if gmpy2.powmod(self.group_base, self.decrypt_exp, self.prime_modulus) != self.individual_base:
-      raise base.CryptoError(f'inconsistent g**e % p == i: {self}')
+      raise key.CryptoError(f'inconsistent g**e % p == i: {self}')
 
   def __str__(self) -> str:
     """Safe (no secrets) string representation of the ElGamalPrivateKey.
@@ -388,7 +389,7 @@ class ElGamalPrivateKey(ElGamalPublicKey, base.Decryptor, base.Signer):
     return (
       'ElGamalPrivateKey('
       f'{super(ElGamalPrivateKey, self).__str__()}, '
-      f'decrypt_exp={base.ObfuscateSecret(self.decrypt_exp)})'
+      f'decrypt_exp={hashes.ObfuscateSecret(self.decrypt_exp)})'
     )
 
   def RawDecrypt(self, ciphertext: tuple[int, int], /) -> int:
@@ -404,7 +405,7 @@ class ElGamalPrivateKey(ElGamalPublicKey, base.Decryptor, base.Signer):
       decrypted message (int, 1 ≤ m < modulus)
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     # test inputs
@@ -437,7 +438,7 @@ class ElGamalPrivateKey(ElGamalPublicKey, base.Decryptor, base.Signer):
       bytes: Decrypted plaintext bytes
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     k: int = self.modulus_size
@@ -446,7 +447,7 @@ class ElGamalPrivateKey(ElGamalPublicKey, base.Decryptor, base.Signer):
     # split ciphertext in 3 parts: the first 2k bytes is ct, the rest is AES-256-GCM
     ct1, ct2, aes_ct = ciphertext[:k], ciphertext[k : 2 * k], ciphertext[2 * k :]
     r: int = self.RawDecrypt((base.BytesToInt(ct1), base.BytesToInt(ct2)))
-    ss: bytes = base.Hash512(base.IntToFixedBytes(r, k))
+    ss: bytes = hashes.Hash512(base.IntToFixedBytes(r, k))
     aad: bytes = b'' if associated_data is None else associated_data
     aad_prime: bytes = (
       _ELGAMAL_ENCRYPTION_AAD_PREFIX + base.IntToFixedBytes(len(aad), 8) + aad + ct1 + ct2
@@ -467,7 +468,7 @@ class ElGamalPrivateKey(ElGamalPublicKey, base.Decryptor, base.Signer):
       signed message tuple ((int, int), 2 ≤ s1 < modulus, 2 ≤ s2 < modulus-1)
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     # test inputs
@@ -505,13 +506,13 @@ class ElGamalPrivateKey(ElGamalPublicKey, base.Decryptor, base.Signer):
       bytes: Signature; salt || Padded(s, k) - see above
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
 
     """
     k: int = self.modulus_size
     if k <= 64:  # noqa: PLR2004
       raise base.InputError(f'modulus too small for signing operations: {k} bytes')
-    salt: bytes = base.RandBytes(64)
+    salt: bytes = saferandom.RandBytes(64)
     s_int: tuple[int, int] = self.RawSign(self._DomainSeparatedHash(message, associated_data, salt))
     s_bytes: bytes = base.IntToFixedBytes(s_int[0], k) + base.IntToFixedBytes(s_int[1], k)
     assert len(s_bytes) == 2 * k, 'should never happen: s_bytes should be exactly 2k bytes'  # noqa: S101
@@ -528,8 +529,8 @@ class ElGamalPrivateKey(ElGamalPublicKey, base.Decryptor, base.Signer):
       ElGamalPrivateKey object ready for use
 
     Raises:
-      InputError: invalid inputs
-      CryptoError: failed generation
+      base.InputError: invalid inputs
+      key.CryptoError: failed generation
 
     """
     # test inputs
@@ -545,7 +546,7 @@ class ElGamalPrivateKey(ElGamalPublicKey, base.Decryptor, base.Signer):
         while (
           not 2 < decrypt_exp < shared_key.prime_modulus or decrypt_exp == shared_key.group_base  # noqa: PLR2004
         ):
-          decrypt_exp = base.RandBits(bit_length)
+          decrypt_exp = saferandom.RandBits(bit_length)
         # make the object
         return cls(
           prime_modulus=shared_key.prime_modulus,
@@ -558,5 +559,5 @@ class ElGamalPrivateKey(ElGamalPublicKey, base.Decryptor, base.Signer):
       except base.InputError as err:
         failures += 1
         if failures >= _MAX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILURES:
-          raise base.CryptoError(f'failed key generation {failures} times') from err
+          raise key.CryptoError(f'failed key generation {failures} times') from err
         logging.warning(err)

transcrypto/core/hashes.py

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright 2026 Daniel Balparda <balparda@github.com>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+"""Balparda's TransCrypto hash utilities library."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import logging
+import pathlib
+
+from transcrypto.utils import base
+
+
+def Hash256(data: bytes, /) -> bytes:
+  """SHA-256 hash of bytes data. Always a length of 32 bytes.
+
+  Args:
+    data (bytes): Data to compute hash for
+
+  Returns:
+    32 bytes (256 bits) of SHA-256 hash;
+    if converted to hexadecimal (with BytesToHex() or hex()) will be 64 chars of string;
+    if converted to int (big-endian, unsigned, with BytesToInt()) will be 0 ≤ i < 2**256
+
+  """
+  return hashlib.sha256(data).digest()
+
+
+def Hash512(data: bytes, /) -> bytes:
+  """SHA-512 hash of bytes data. Always a length of 64 bytes.
+
+  Args:
+    data (bytes): Data to compute hash for
+
+  Returns:
+    64 bytes (512 bits) of SHA-512 hash;
+    if converted to hexadecimal (with BytesToHex() or hex()) will be 128 chars of string;
+    if converted to int (big-endian, unsigned, with BytesToInt()) will be 0 ≤ i < 2**512
+
+  """
+  return hashlib.sha512(data).digest()
+
+
+def FileHash(full_path: str, /, *, digest: str = 'sha256') -> bytes:
+  """SHA-256 hex hash of file on disk. Always a length of 32 bytes (if default digest=='sha256').
+
+  Args:
+    full_path (str): Path to existing file on disk
+    digest (str, optional): Hash method to use, accepts 'sha256' (default) or 'sha512'
+
+  Returns:
+    32 bytes (256 bits) of SHA-256 hash (if default digest=='sha256');
+    if converted to hexadecimal (with BytesToHex() or hex()) will be 64 chars of string;
+    if converted to int (big-endian, unsigned, with BytesToInt()) will be 0 ≤ i < 2**256
+
+  Raises:
+    base.InputError: file could not be found
+
+  """
+  # test inputs
+  digest = digest.lower().strip().replace('-', '')  # normalize so we can accept e.g. "SHA-256"
+  if digest not in {'sha256', 'sha512'}:
+    raise base.InputError(f'unrecognized digest: {digest!r}')
+  full_path = full_path.strip()
+  if not full_path or not pathlib.Path(full_path).exists():
+    raise base.InputError(f'file {full_path!r} not found for hashing')
+  # compute hash
+  logging.info(f'Hashing file {full_path!r}')
+  with pathlib.Path(full_path).open('rb') as file_obj:
+    return hashlib.file_digest(file_obj, digest).digest()
+
+
+def ObfuscateSecret(data: str | bytes | int, /) -> str:
+  """Obfuscate a secret string/key/bytes/int by hashing SHA-512 and only showing the first 4 bytes.
+
+  Always a length of 9 chars, e.g. "aabbccdd…" (always adds '…' at the end).
+  Known vulnerability: If the secret is small, can be brute-forced!
+  Use only on large (~>64bits) secrets.
+
+  Args:
+    data (str | bytes | int): Data to obfuscate
+
+  Raises:
+      base.InputError: _description_
+
+  Returns:
+      str: obfuscated string, e.g. "aabbccdd…"
+
+  """
+  if isinstance(data, str):
+    data = data.encode('utf-8')
+  elif isinstance(data, int):
+    data = base.IntToBytes(data)
+  if not isinstance(data, bytes):  # pyright: ignore[reportUnnecessaryIsInstance]
+    raise base.InputError(f'invalid type for data: {type(data)}')
+  return base.BytesToHex(Hash512(data))[:8] + '…'