timecs 2.0.0__py3-none-any.whl

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (94) hide show
  1. app.py +3014 -0
  2. ast_scanner.py +36187 -0
  3. banner.py +146 -0
  4. ci_reporter.py +570 -0
  5. cli.py +2347 -0
  6. config_loader.py +307 -0
  7. cross_file_engine.py +1781 -0
  8. delivery_models.py +145 -0
  9. delivery_repository.py +78 -0
  10. diff_scan.py +127 -0
  11. durable_delivery_sink.py +103 -0
  12. event_bus.py +155 -0
  13. event_publisher.py +345 -0
  14. event_taxonomy.py +313 -0
  15. function_summarizer.py +354 -0
  16. html_auditor.py +274 -0
  17. iac_auditor.py +400 -0
  18. in_app_adapter.py +115 -0
  19. js_scanner.py +895 -0
  20. manifest_parser.py +960 -0
  21. master_rules_bank.py +389 -0
  22. notification_models.py +346 -0
  23. notification_policy.py +309 -0
  24. notification_repository.py +118 -0
  25. notification_routes.py +394 -0
  26. notification_service.py +199 -0
  27. osv_client.py +437 -0
  28. remediation/__init__.py +39 -0
  29. remediation/base.py +102 -0
  30. remediation/contracts.py +196 -0
  31. remediation/cwe1188_binding.py +78 -0
  32. remediation/cwe1336_jinja.py +91 -0
  33. remediation/cwe22_path_traversal.py +348 -0
  34. remediation/cwe295_ssl.py +87 -0
  35. remediation/cwe327_weak_hash.py +78 -0
  36. remediation/cwe377_tempfile.py +77 -0
  37. remediation/cwe489_debug.py +80 -0
  38. remediation/cwe502_yaml.py +89 -0
  39. remediation/cwe614_cookie.py +91 -0
  40. remediation/cwe78_cmdi.py +415 -0
  41. remediation/cwe798_credentials.py +153 -0
  42. remediation/cwe89_sqli.py +425 -0
  43. remediation/cwe916_password_hash.py +131 -0
  44. remediation/cwe95_eval.py +77 -0
  45. remediation/dispatcher.py +114 -0
  46. remediation/orchestrator.py +541 -0
  47. remediation/patch_engine.py +213 -0
  48. remediation/verification.py +253 -0
  49. rule_engine.py +1535 -0
  50. sarif_adapter.py +719 -0
  51. sarif_exporter.py +88 -0
  52. sca_reachability/__init__.py +28 -0
  53. sca_reachability/ast_analyzer.py +366 -0
  54. sca_reachability/call_graph.py +203 -0
  55. sca_reachability/contracts.py +365 -0
  56. sca_reachability/dist_import_map.py +46 -0
  57. sca_reachability/engine.py +603 -0
  58. sca_reachability/resolver.py +169 -0
  59. scanners/__init__.py +70 -0
  60. scanners/container_scanner.py +323 -0
  61. scanners/cve_index.py +521 -0
  62. scanners/iac_scanner.py +328 -0
  63. scanners/sbom.py +183 -0
  64. scanners/sca_scanner.py +667 -0
  65. scanners/secret_scanner.py +345 -0
  66. scanners/yaml_lite.py +217 -0
  67. secret_filters.py +435 -0
  68. secret_scanner.py +943 -0
  69. sqlite_delivery_repository.py +277 -0
  70. sqlite_notification_repository.py +441 -0
  71. ssrf_guard.py +276 -0
  72. staged_scanner.py +492 -0
  73. suppression_resolver.py +282 -0
  74. symbol_indexer.py +424 -0
  75. tcs/__init__.py +1 -0
  76. tcs/analysis/__init__.py +1 -0
  77. tcs/analysis/def_use.py +408 -0
  78. tcs/analysis/function_contracts.py +290 -0
  79. tcs/parallel_analyzer.py +276 -0
  80. tcs/parallel_scanner.py +630 -0
  81. tcs/treesitter_packer.py +1446 -0
  82. tcs_cli.py +2086 -0
  83. tcs_config.py +218 -0
  84. tcs_gui.py +2123 -0
  85. timecs-2.0.0.dist-info/METADATA +142 -0
  86. timecs-2.0.0.dist-info/RECORD +94 -0
  87. timecs-2.0.0.dist-info/WHEEL +5 -0
  88. timecs-2.0.0.dist-info/entry_points.txt +4 -0
  89. timecs-2.0.0.dist-info/licenses/LICENSE +201 -0
  90. timecs-2.0.0.dist-info/top_level.txt +49 -0
  91. version_matcher.py +934 -0
  92. webhook_adapter.py +495 -0
  93. webhook_client.py +483 -0
  94. webhook_formatters.py +245 -0
remediation/base.py ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
1
+ """
2
+ TimeCodeSecurity - Vector D Base Remediation Transformer Interface.
3
+ Defines the abstract base contract for deterministic, AST-guided vulnerability
4
+ remediation transformers.
5
+ """
6
+
7
+ from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
8
+ from typing import Any, Dict, Optional, Tuple
9
+ import ast
10
+
11
+ from remediation.contracts import RemediationRule, PatchStatus
12
+
13
+
14
+ class BaseRemediationTransformer(ABC):
15
+ """
16
+ Abstract base class for deterministic AST-guided vulnerability remediation transformers.
17
+ All transformers must operate strictly statically, without executing target code,
18
+ importing target packages, or using LLMs.
19
+ """
20
+
21
+ @property
22
+ @abstractmethod
23
+ def rule(self) -> RemediationRule:
24
+ """The categorical remediation rule handled by this transformer."""
25
+ ...
26
+
27
+ @abstractmethod
28
+ def can_transform(
29
+ self,
30
+ tree: ast.AST,
31
+ finding: Dict[str, Any],
32
+ source_code: str
33
+ ) -> bool:
34
+ """
35
+ Determines whether the given AST and finding can be deterministically transformed.
36
+ Must check AST structure and ensure no unsupported patterns (e.g. dynamic table names) exist.
37
+ """
38
+ ...
39
+
40
+ @abstractmethod
41
+ def transform(
42
+ self,
43
+ tree: ast.AST,
44
+ finding: Dict[str, Any],
45
+ source_code: str
46
+ ) -> Tuple[PatchStatus, Optional[str], Optional[str], Tuple[str, ...]]:
47
+ """
48
+ Executes the AST-guided transformation.
49
+ Returns:
50
+ (patch_status, patched_source, patched_snippet, limitations)
51
+ If transformation succeeds:
52
+ returns (PatchStatus.SUCCESS, patched_source, patched_snippet, limitations)
53
+ If pattern is unsupported (e.g. dynamic table/column name):
54
+ returns (PatchStatus.UNSUPPORTED_CWE, None, None, limitations)
55
+ If transformation fails:
56
+ returns (PatchStatus.FAILED_SYNTAX / FAILED_VERIFICATION, None, None, limitations)
57
+ """
58
+ ...
59
+
60
+ @staticmethod
61
+ def patched_statement_snippet(
62
+ tree: ast.AST,
63
+ source_code: str,
64
+ line_number: int
65
+ ) -> Optional[str]:
66
+ """
67
+ Renders the patched text of the statement covering line_number after the
68
+ AST has been mutated, preserving the original indentation.
69
+
70
+ Transformers mutate `tree` in place, so unparsing the enclosing statement
71
+ yields the replacement block that editors must write over the vulnerable
72
+ statement. Returns None when no statement covers the requested line.
73
+ """
74
+ candidates = [
75
+ node
76
+ for node in ast.walk(tree)
77
+ if isinstance(node, ast.stmt)
78
+ and getattr(node, "lineno", 0)
79
+ and node.lineno <= line_number <= (node.end_lineno or node.lineno)
80
+ ]
81
+ if not candidates:
82
+ return None
83
+
84
+ # Deepest (smallest span) enclosing statement
85
+ stmt = min(candidates, key=lambda n: (n.end_lineno or n.lineno) - n.lineno)
86
+
87
+ try:
88
+ rendered = ast.unparse(stmt)
89
+ except Exception:
90
+ return None
91
+
92
+ original_lines = source_code.split("\n")
93
+ if 0 < line_number <= len(original_lines):
94
+ indent = original_lines[line_number - 1][: len(original_lines[line_number - 1]) - len(original_lines[line_number - 1].lstrip())]
95
+ else:
96
+ indent = ""
97
+
98
+ rendered_lines = rendered.split("\n")
99
+ out = [f"{indent}{rendered_lines[0]}"]
100
+ for extra in rendered_lines[1:]:
101
+ out.append(f"{indent}{extra}" if extra.strip() else extra)
102
+ return "\n".join(out)
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
1
+ """
2
+ TimeCodeSecurity - Vector D Remediation Engine Contracts.
3
+ Defines immutable data models, state invariant validation, and semantic
4
+ remediation schemas for automated vulnerability patching and verification.
5
+ """
6
+
7
+ from dataclasses import dataclass
8
+ from enum import Enum
9
+ from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple, Union
10
+
11
+
12
+ class PatchStatus(str, Enum):
13
+ """Execution status of an automated remediation patch."""
14
+ SUCCESS = "SUCCESS"
15
+ FAILED_SYNTAX = "FAILED_SYNTAX"
16
+ FAILED_VERIFICATION = "FAILED_VERIFICATION"
17
+ UNSUPPORTED_CWE = "UNSUPPORTED_CWE"
18
+
19
+
20
+ class RemediationRule(str, Enum):
21
+ """Categorical AST rewrite rule identifiers."""
22
+ SQLI_PARAMETERIZE = "SQLI_PARAMETERIZE"
23
+ PATH_TRAVERSAL_RESOLVE = "PATH_TRAVERSAL_RESOLVE"
24
+ CMD_INJECTION_SPLIT = "CMD_INJECTION_SPLIT"
25
+ COOKIE_SECURE_FLAGS = "COOKIE_SECURE_FLAGS"
26
+ TEMPLATE_AUTOESCAPE = "TEMPLATE_AUTOESCAPE"
27
+ WEAK_HASH_REPLACE = "WEAK_HASH_REPLACE"
28
+ PASSWORD_HASH_KDF = "PASSWORD_HASH_KDF"
29
+ YAML_SAFE_LOADER = "YAML_SAFE_LOADER"
30
+ CREDENTIAL_ENVIRON_GET = "CREDENTIAL_ENVIRON_GET"
31
+ DEBUG_FLAG_DISABLE = "DEBUG_FLAG_DISABLE"
32
+ SSL_VERIFY_ENABLE = "SSL_VERIFY_ENABLE"
33
+ TEMPFILE_SECURE = "TEMPFILE_SECURE"
34
+ EVAL_LITERAL_REPLACE = "EVAL_LITERAL_REPLACE"
35
+ NETWORK_BINDING_LOCALHOST = "NETWORK_BINDING_LOCALHOST"
36
+
37
+
38
+ @dataclass(frozen=True)
39
+ class RemediationRecord:
40
+ """
41
+ Immutable representation of an automated vulnerability remediation patch attempt.
42
+ Enforces strict state invariants forbidding contradictory outcomes.
43
+ """
44
+ finding_id: str
45
+ cwe: str
46
+ remediation_rule: RemediationRule
47
+ original_file: str
48
+ line_number: int
49
+ patch_status: PatchStatus
50
+ original_code_snippet: str
51
+ patched_code_snippet: str
52
+ unified_diff: str
53
+ verification_passed: bool
54
+ limitations: Tuple[str, ...] = ()
55
+ patched_source: Optional[str] = None
56
+
57
+ def __post_init__(self):
58
+ # Blocker 1 & Contract Validation: Type integrity
59
+ if not isinstance(self.patch_status, PatchStatus):
60
+ try:
61
+ object.__setattr__(self, "patch_status", PatchStatus(self.patch_status))
62
+ except (ValueError, TypeError) as err:
63
+ raise ValueError(f"Invalid patch_status: {self.patch_status}") from err
64
+
65
+ if not isinstance(self.remediation_rule, RemediationRule):
66
+ try:
67
+ object.__setattr__(self, "remediation_rule", RemediationRule(self.remediation_rule))
68
+ except (ValueError, TypeError) as err:
69
+ raise ValueError(f"Invalid remediation_rule: {self.remediation_rule}") from err
70
+
71
+ # Blocker 2: State invariant enforcement - strictly forbid contradictory states
72
+ if self.patch_status == PatchStatus.SUCCESS and not self.verification_passed:
73
+ raise ValueError(
74
+ "Contradictory state: patch_status SUCCESS requires verification_passed == True"
75
+ )
76
+ if self.patch_status in (
77
+ PatchStatus.FAILED_SYNTAX,
78
+ PatchStatus.FAILED_VERIFICATION,
79
+ PatchStatus.UNSUPPORTED_CWE,
80
+ ) and self.verification_passed:
81
+ raise ValueError(
82
+ f"Contradictory state: patch_status {self.patch_status.value} requires verification_passed == False"
83
+ )
84
+
85
+ def to_dict(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
86
+ """Serializes the record to a standard JSON-compatible dictionary."""
87
+ d = {
88
+ "finding_id": self.finding_id,
89
+ "cwe": self.cwe,
90
+ "remediation_rule": self.remediation_rule.value if isinstance(self.remediation_rule, Enum) else str(self.remediation_rule),
91
+ "original_file": self.original_file,
92
+ "line_number": self.line_number,
93
+ "patch_status": self.patch_status.value if isinstance(self.patch_status, Enum) else str(self.patch_status),
94
+ "original_code_snippet": self.original_code_snippet,
95
+ "patched_code_snippet": self.patched_code_snippet,
96
+ "unified_diff": self.unified_diff,
97
+ "verification_passed": self.verification_passed,
98
+ "limitations": list(self.limitations),
99
+ }
100
+ if self.patched_source is not None:
101
+ d["patched_source"] = self.patched_source
102
+ return d
103
+
104
+ @classmethod
105
+ def from_dict(cls, data: Dict[str, Any]) -> "RemediationRecord":
106
+ """Deserializes a dictionary into a frozen RemediationRecord."""
107
+ raw_status = data.get("patch_status", PatchStatus.UNSUPPORTED_CWE)
108
+ status = PatchStatus(raw_status) if isinstance(raw_status, str) else raw_status
109
+
110
+ raw_rule = data.get("remediation_rule")
111
+ if not raw_rule:
112
+ raise ValueError("Missing required 'remediation_rule' in RemediationRecord payload")
113
+ rule = RemediationRule(raw_rule) if isinstance(raw_rule, str) else raw_rule
114
+
115
+ return cls(
116
+ finding_id=str(data["finding_id"]),
117
+ cwe=str(data["cwe"]),
118
+ remediation_rule=rule,
119
+ original_file=str(data["original_file"]),
120
+ line_number=int(data["line_number"]),
121
+ patch_status=status,
122
+ original_code_snippet=str(data.get("original_code_snippet", "")),
123
+ patched_code_snippet=str(data.get("patched_code_snippet", "")),
124
+ unified_diff=str(data.get("unified_diff", "")),
125
+ verification_passed=bool(data.get("verification_passed", False)),
126
+ limitations=tuple(data.get("limitations", ())),
127
+ patched_source=data.get("patched_source"),
128
+ )
129
+
130
+
131
+ # ======================================================================
132
+ # GOLDEN FIXTURE SEMANTIC CONTRACT REGISTRY (PHASE 2 ORACLE)
133
+ # ======================================================================
134
+
135
+ FIXTURE_SEMANTIC_CONTRACTS: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {
136
+ "fixture_01_sqli_fstring": {
137
+ "fixture_id": "fixture_01_sqli_fstring",
138
+ "cwe": "CWE-89",
139
+ "remediation_rule": RemediationRule.SQLI_PARAMETERIZE,
140
+ "expected_security_property": "SQL data MUST NOT remain concatenated/interpolated into SQL text; user input is bound via driver placeholder tuple.",
141
+ "input_ast_pattern": "ast.Call to cursor.execute where query argument is an ast.JoinedStr (f-string).",
142
+ "vulnerable_sink": "cursor.execute(f\"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '{username}'\")",
143
+ "expected_ast_transformation": "Extract string constant literal fragments, replace formatted values ({username}) with driver placeholders (?), strip surrounding quotes from SQL text, and append tuple of interpolated expressions as second argument to cursor.execute.",
144
+ "placeholder_style": "?",
145
+ "parameter_ordering": "Positional tuple matches left-to-right order of ast.FormattedValue expressions in ast.JoinedStr.",
146
+ "assumptions_and_limitations": [
147
+ "Assumes SQLite parameter syntax '?'",
148
+ "Does not support dynamic table/column identifiers via query parameters",
149
+ "Only handles inline FormattedValue expressions"
150
+ ]
151
+ },
152
+ "fixture_02_sqli_concat": {
153
+ "fixture_id": "fixture_02_sqli_concat",
154
+ "cwe": "CWE-89",
155
+ "remediation_rule": RemediationRule.SQLI_PARAMETERIZE,
156
+ "expected_security_property": "Dynamic concatenation operands are stripped from query string construction and bound as SQL query parameters.",
157
+ "input_ast_pattern": "ast.BinOp(op=ast.Add()) constructing SQL query string passed to cursor.execute.",
158
+ "vulnerable_sink": "cursor.execute(query) where query = '...' + str(order_id)",
159
+ "expected_ast_transformation": "Decompose binary addition tree: replace dynamic operands (e.g. str(order_id) or order_id) with driver placeholder (?), strip surrounding quote delimiters if present, and bind dynamic operand expressions as a tuple argument to cursor.execute.",
160
+ "operands_becoming_parameters": "Right-hand dynamic operand 'order_id' (with redundant type conversions unwrapped if present).",
161
+ "assumptions_and_limitations": [
162
+ "Operands must represent scalar data values, not SQL keywords or table names",
163
+ "Preserves underlying operand evaluation order in parameter tuple"
164
+ ]
165
+ },
166
+ "fixture_03_cmdi_shell_true": {
167
+ "fixture_id": "fixture_03_cmdi_shell_true",
168
+ "cwe": "CWE-78",
169
+ "remediation_rule": RemediationRule.CMD_INJECTION_SPLIT,
170
+ "expected_security_property": "Command execution bypasses system shell parser (/bin/sh or cmd.exe) by utilizing direct execve array invocation with shell=False.",
171
+ "input_ast_pattern": "ast.Call to subprocess.{call,run,Popen,check_output} with keyword argument shell=ast.Constant(value=True).",
172
+ "vulnerable_sink": "subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True)",
173
+ "expected_ast_transformation": "Transform string command into structured argument list (via static tokenization or shlex.split), set keyword argument shell=False (or omit shell default).",
174
+ "command_splitting_mechanism": "Decompose command string into argument list [executable, arg1, arg2, ...] while preserving argument boundaries so shell metacharacters (; | & ` $ ()) cannot alter execution topology.",
175
+ "assumptions_and_limitations": [
176
+ "Bypasses shell built-ins (cd, echo) which require explicit executable binaries",
177
+ "Shell pipelines (|) or redirection (>, <) require multi-process piping or file descriptors"
178
+ ]
179
+ },
180
+ "fixture_04_path_traversal_open": {
181
+ "fixture_id": "fixture_04_path_traversal_open",
182
+ "cwe": "CWE-22",
183
+ "remediation_rule": RemediationRule.PATH_TRAVERSAL_RESOLVE,
184
+ "expected_security_property": "Canonicalized target path is mathematically guaranteed to remain within the trusted base directory boundary via is_relative_to.",
185
+ "input_ast_pattern": "ast.Call to open() or os.path operations concatenating untrusted filename to a base directory.",
186
+ "vulnerable_sink": "open(base_dir + filename)",
187
+ "expected_ast_transformation": "Resolve trusted base directory (Path(base_dir).resolve()), resolve candidate target path ((safe_base / filename).resolve()), and insert containment guard (if not target_path.is_relative_to(safe_base): raise ValueError).",
188
+ "resolution_step": "Both base directory and target path are fully canonicalized with Path.resolve() to collapse symlinks and '..' traversal segments.",
189
+ "containment_check": "target_path.is_relative_to(safe_base) verifies prefix containment.",
190
+ "failure_behavior": "Explicitly raises ValueError or SecurityException when target path resolves outside trusted base directory boundary.",
191
+ "assumptions_and_limitations": [
192
+ "Requires Python 3.9+ for Path.is_relative_to",
193
+ "Calling resolve() alone is insufficient without the containment check against safe_base"
194
+ ]
195
+ }
196
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
1
+ """
2
+ TimeCodeSecurity - Vector D CWE-1188 Insecure Network Binding Transformer.
3
+ Implements deterministic AST-guided remediation changing host="0.0.0.0" to host="127.0.0.1".
4
+ """
5
+
6
+ from typing import Any, Dict, Optional, Tuple
7
+ import ast
8
+
9
+ from remediation.base import BaseRemediationTransformer
10
+ from remediation.contracts import RemediationRule, PatchStatus
11
+
12
+
13
+ class Cwe1188NetworkBindingTransformer(BaseRemediationTransformer):
14
+ """
15
+ Deterministic AST transformer for CWE-1188 (Insecure Default Network Binding).
16
+ Replaces host="0.0.0.0" with host="127.0.0.1" in server/socket calls.
17
+ """
18
+
19
+ @property
20
+ def rule(self) -> RemediationRule:
21
+ return RemediationRule.NETWORK_BINDING_LOCALHOST
22
+
23
+ def can_transform(
24
+ self,
25
+ tree: ast.AST,
26
+ finding: Dict[str, Any],
27
+ source_code: str
28
+ ) -> bool:
29
+ """Check if finding has host="0.0.0.0" argument."""
30
+ line_number = finding.get("line_number", 0)
31
+ call_node = self._find_wildcard_bind_call(tree, line_number)
32
+ return call_node is not None
33
+
34
+ def transform(
35
+ self,
36
+ tree: ast.AST,
37
+ finding: Dict[str, Any],
38
+ source_code: str
39
+ ) -> Tuple[PatchStatus, Optional[str], Optional[str], Tuple[str, ...]]:
40
+ """Replace host="0.0.0.0" with host="127.0.0.1"."""
41
+ line_number = finding.get("line_number", 0)
42
+
43
+ call_node = self._find_wildcard_bind_call(tree, line_number)
44
+ if not call_node:
45
+ return (PatchStatus.UNSUPPORTED_CWE, None, None, ("Wildcard bind call not found",))
46
+
47
+ # Find and replace host="0.0.0.0" keyword
48
+ for kw in call_node.keywords:
49
+ if kw.arg == "host" and isinstance(kw.value, ast.Constant) and kw.value.value == "0.0.0.0":
50
+ kw.value = ast.Constant(value="127.0.0.1")
51
+ break
52
+ else:
53
+ return (PatchStatus.UNSUPPORTED_CWE, None, None, ("host='0.0.0.0' not found",))
54
+
55
+ try:
56
+ patched_source = ast.unparse(tree)
57
+ snippet = self.patched_statement_snippet(tree, source_code, line_number) or ""
58
+
59
+ return (PatchStatus.SUCCESS, patched_source, snippet, ())
60
+ except Exception as e:
61
+ return (PatchStatus.FAILED_SYNTAX, None, None, (f"AST unparse failed: {e}",))
62
+
63
+ def _find_wildcard_bind_call(
64
+ self,
65
+ tree: ast.AST,
66
+ line_number: int
67
+ ) -> Optional[ast.Call]:
68
+ """Locate call with host="0.0.0.0" at or near the given line."""
69
+ for node in ast.walk(tree):
70
+ if isinstance(node, ast.Call):
71
+ # Check for host="0.0.0.0" keyword
72
+ for kw in node.keywords:
73
+ if kw.arg == "host" and isinstance(kw.value, ast.Constant) and kw.value.value == "0.0.0.0":
74
+ node_lineno = getattr(node, "lineno", 0)
75
+ node_end = getattr(node, "end_lineno", node_lineno)
76
+ if node_lineno <= line_number <= node_end or node_lineno == line_number:
77
+ return node
78
+ return None
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
1
+ """
2
+ TimeCodeSecurity - Vector D CWE-1336 Jinja2 Template Injection Transformer.
3
+ Implements deterministic AST-guided remediation for missing autoescape in Jinja2 environments.
4
+ """
5
+
6
+ from typing import Any, Dict, Optional, Tuple
7
+ import ast
8
+
9
+ from remediation.base import BaseRemediationTransformer
10
+ from remediation.contracts import RemediationRule, PatchStatus
11
+
12
+
13
+ class Cwe1336JinjaAutoescapeTransformer(BaseRemediationTransformer):
14
+ """
15
+ Deterministic AST transformer for CWE-1336 (Template Injection).
16
+ Adds autoescape=True to jinja2.Environment() instantiation if missing.
17
+ """
18
+
19
+ @property
20
+ def rule(self) -> RemediationRule:
21
+ return RemediationRule.TEMPLATE_AUTOESCAPE
22
+
23
+ def can_transform(
24
+ self,
25
+ tree: ast.AST,
26
+ finding: Dict[str, Any],
27
+ source_code: str
28
+ ) -> bool:
29
+ """Check if finding is a jinja2.Environment() call without autoescape."""
30
+ line_number = finding.get("line_number", 0)
31
+ call_node = self._find_jinja_env_call(tree, line_number)
32
+ return call_node is not None
33
+
34
+ def transform(
35
+ self,
36
+ tree: ast.AST,
37
+ finding: Dict[str, Any],
38
+ source_code: str
39
+ ) -> Tuple[PatchStatus, Optional[str], Optional[str], Tuple[str, ...]]:
40
+ """Add autoescape=True to jinja2.Environment() calls."""
41
+ line_number = finding.get("line_number", 0)
42
+
43
+ call_node = self._find_jinja_env_call(tree, line_number)
44
+ if not call_node:
45
+ return (PatchStatus.UNSUPPORTED_CWE, None, None, ("jinja2.Environment call not found",))
46
+
47
+ # Check if autoescape is already present
48
+ existing_keywords = {kw.arg for kw in call_node.keywords if kw.arg}
49
+ if "autoescape" in existing_keywords:
50
+ return (PatchStatus.SUCCESS, source_code, "", ("autoescape already configured",))
51
+
52
+ # Add autoescape=True keyword argument
53
+ autoescape_const = ast.Constant(value=True)
54
+ new_keyword = ast.keyword(arg="autoescape", value=autoescape_const)
55
+ call_node.keywords.append(new_keyword)
56
+
57
+ try:
58
+ patched_source = ast.unparse(tree)
59
+ snippet = self.patched_statement_snippet(tree, source_code, line_number) or ""
60
+
61
+ return (PatchStatus.SUCCESS, patched_source, snippet, ())
62
+ except Exception as e:
63
+ return (PatchStatus.FAILED_SYNTAX, None, None, (f"AST unparse failed: {e}",))
64
+
65
+ def _find_jinja_env_call(
66
+ self,
67
+ tree: ast.AST,
68
+ line_number: int
69
+ ) -> Optional[ast.Call]:
70
+ """Locate jinja2.Environment() call at or near the given line."""
71
+ for node in ast.walk(tree):
72
+ if isinstance(node, ast.Call):
73
+ # Match both jinja2.Environment and Environment (if imported)
74
+ func = node.func
75
+ is_jinja_env = False
76
+
77
+ if isinstance(func, ast.Attribute):
78
+ if func.attr == "Environment":
79
+ # Check if it's jinja2.Environment
80
+ if isinstance(func.value, ast.Name) and func.value.id == "jinja2":
81
+ is_jinja_env = True
82
+ elif isinstance(func, ast.Name):
83
+ if func.id == "Environment":
84
+ is_jinja_env = True
85
+
86
+ if is_jinja_env:
87
+ node_lineno = getattr(node, "lineno", 0)
88
+ node_end = getattr(node, "end_lineno", node_lineno)
89
+ if node_lineno <= line_number <= node_end or node_lineno == line_number:
90
+ return node
91
+ return None