stacktrace-cli 0.24.0__py3-none-any.whl → 0.26.0__py3-none-any.whl

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Files changed (84) hide show
  1. stacktrace/__init__.py +1 -1
  2. stacktrace/agentspec/author.py +252 -31
  3. stacktrace/agentspec/checks.py +998 -47
  4. stacktrace/agentspec/core.py +128 -0
  5. stacktrace/agentspec/effects/__init__.py +275 -32
  6. stacktrace/agentspec/effects/model.py +0 -7
  7. stacktrace/agentspec/engine.py +336 -103
  8. stacktrace/agentspec/facts.py +322 -0
  9. stacktrace/agentspec/facts.yaml +48 -0
  10. stacktrace/agentspec/grants.py +1 -2
  11. stacktrace/agentspec/judge.py +43 -5
  12. stacktrace/agentspec/ledger.py +117 -27
  13. stacktrace/agentspec/model.py +19 -0
  14. stacktrace/agentspec/outbound.py +909 -0
  15. stacktrace/agentspec/packs/kubernetes.py +3 -2
  16. stacktrace/agentspec/policies/infra.yaml +4 -2
  17. stacktrace/agentspec/redact.py +301 -19
  18. stacktrace/agentspec/rule.py +75 -20
  19. stacktrace/agentspec/serve.py +22 -12
  20. stacktrace/agentspec/session_facts.py +948 -0
  21. stacktrace/agentspec/shell-core.yaml +140 -0
  22. stacktrace/agentspec/trace.py +20 -7
  23. stacktrace/agentspec/triggers.py +106 -87
  24. stacktrace/analysis.py +3 -0
  25. stacktrace/cli.py +1 -0
  26. stacktrace/correlate/observed.py +195 -20
  27. stacktrace/correlate/render.py +1 -12
  28. stacktrace/cost/usage.py +23 -7
  29. stacktrace/daemon/accounts.py +12 -3
  30. stacktrace/daemon/config.py +18 -0
  31. stacktrace/daemon/db.py +5 -0
  32. stacktrace/daemon/identity.py +19 -3
  33. stacktrace/daemon/injection_state.py +123 -0
  34. stacktrace/daemon/inline_hook.py +220 -12
  35. stacktrace/daemon/policy_engine.py +315 -37
  36. stacktrace/daemon/policy_inputs.py +72 -3
  37. stacktrace/daemon/policy_result.py +4 -0
  38. stacktrace/daemon/policy_runtime.py +212 -14
  39. stacktrace/daemon/protocol.py +8 -0
  40. stacktrace/daemon/runtime.py +16 -4
  41. stacktrace/daemon/server.py +27 -1
  42. stacktrace/daemon/store.py +28 -24
  43. stacktrace/daemon/usage.py +4 -0
  44. stacktrace/detector/blocked.py +10 -0
  45. stacktrace/detector/cache.py +9 -0
  46. stacktrace/detector/command_actions.py +36 -0
  47. stacktrace/detector/deterministic.py +231 -3
  48. stacktrace/detector/fleet_analyzer.py +231 -0
  49. stacktrace/detector/guard_files.py +75 -7
  50. stacktrace/detector/hook_table.py +15 -0
  51. stacktrace/detector/injection.py +784 -0
  52. stacktrace/detector/injection_marks.py +552 -0
  53. stacktrace/detector/injection_values.py +208 -0
  54. stacktrace/detector/inline.py +27 -3
  55. stacktrace/detector/jev.py +19 -0
  56. stacktrace/detector/priors.py +0 -3
  57. stacktrace/detector/reasoning.py +22 -5
  58. stacktrace/detector/render.py +13 -2
  59. stacktrace/detector/rules.py +81 -1
  60. stacktrace/detector/run.py +29 -8
  61. stacktrace/detector/settings.py +3 -0
  62. stacktrace/finding_contract.py +27 -0
  63. stacktrace/finding_titles.py +1 -0
  64. stacktrace/gateway/marker.py +2 -1
  65. stacktrace/gateway/session.py +11 -0
  66. stacktrace/hooks/claude.py +341 -42
  67. stacktrace/hooks/codex.py +56 -9
  68. stacktrace/hooks/cursor.py +35 -2
  69. stacktrace/hooks/devin.py +25 -4
  70. stacktrace/hydrant_cli.py +57 -16
  71. stacktrace/monitor/server.py +19 -6
  72. stacktrace/monitor/site/app.js +1 -0
  73. stacktrace/remote/client.py +6 -0
  74. stacktrace/remote/payload.py +71 -2
  75. stacktrace/remote/policy_localize.py +9 -1
  76. stacktrace/remote/redact.py +6 -9
  77. stacktrace/remote/spool.py +56 -6
  78. stacktrace/remote/sync.py +187 -142
  79. stacktrace/remote/upload_contract.py +218 -0
  80. stacktrace/sessions/outcome.py +37 -0
  81. {stacktrace_cli-0.24.0.dist-info → stacktrace_cli-0.26.0.dist-info}/METADATA +4 -4
  82. {stacktrace_cli-0.24.0.dist-info → stacktrace_cli-0.26.0.dist-info}/RECORD +84 -72
  83. {stacktrace_cli-0.24.0.dist-info → stacktrace_cli-0.26.0.dist-info}/WHEEL +0 -0
  84. {stacktrace_cli-0.24.0.dist-info → stacktrace_cli-0.26.0.dist-info}/entry_points.txt +0 -0
stacktrace/__init__.py CHANGED
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
2
2
 
3
3
  from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
4
4
 
5
- __version__ = "0.24.0"
5
+ __version__ = "0.26.0"
6
6
 
7
7
  # The package logger's `NullHandler` (ADR-0048) is attached by
8
8
  # `package_logger`, which every module that logs imports. Not here: every
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ OpenAI-compatible endpoint when `STACKTRACE_HYDRANT_LLM_URL` names one.
13
13
 
14
14
  from __future__ import annotations
15
15
 
16
+ import ast
16
17
  import os
17
18
  import re
18
19
  import shutil
@@ -26,28 +27,38 @@ import yaml
26
27
 
27
28
  from stacktrace.agentspec.checks import CODE_CHECKS
28
29
  from stacktrace.agentspec.fleet import call_rules
29
- from stacktrace.agentspec.rule import ACTIONS, TRIGGERS, VIEWS, Policy, PolicyError, load_policy
30
+ from stacktrace.agentspec.rule import (
31
+ ACTIONS,
32
+ MOMENTS,
33
+ TRIGGERS,
34
+ VIEWS,
35
+ Policy,
36
+ PolicyError,
37
+ load_policy,
38
+ )
30
39
 
31
40
  ENV_URL = "STACKTRACE_HYDRANT_LLM_URL"
32
41
  ENV_KEY = "STACKTRACE_HYDRANT_LLM_KEY"
33
42
  ENV_MODEL = "STACKTRACE_HYDRANT_MODEL"
34
43
 
35
- #: What each trigger means, for the model and for the readback.
44
+ #: What each trigger means, for the model and for the readback: the moment a
45
+ #: rule on it is evaluated (`rule.MOMENTS`).
36
46
  TRIGGER_WORDS: Mapping[str, str] = {
37
- "any_call": "makes any tool call",
38
- "reads_secret": "reads a private key, token, password, .env file or cloud credentials file",
39
- "writes_file": "creates, edits, moves or deletes a file",
40
- "weakens_test": "skips, deletes or loosens a test, or makes CI ignore a failure",
41
- "network_send": "sends data off the machine (upload, post, push)",
42
- "publishes": "deploys a site, app or service, publishes a package, or uploads files publicly",
43
- "deletes": "deletes files, directories, records or resources",
44
- "installs_package": "installs a package or adds one to a dependency manifest",
45
- "changes_agent_config": "edits the agent's settings, hooks, MCP config or instruction files",
46
- "changes_ci_config": "edits CI configuration",
47
- "vcs_push": "pushes to a git remote",
48
- "sends_message": "sends a message to a person (email, chat, a comment)",
49
- "changes_infra": "changes cloud or cluster infrastructure",
50
- "ends_turn": "finishes its turn",
47
+ "any_call": "the agent makes any tool call",
48
+ "reads_secret": "the agent reads a private key, token, password, .env file or cloud credentials file",
49
+ "writes_file": "the agent creates, edits, moves or deletes a file",
50
+ "weakens_test": "the agent skips, deletes or loosens a test, or makes CI ignore a failure",
51
+ "network_send": "the agent sends data off the machine (upload, post, push)",
52
+ "publishes": "the agent deploys a site, app or service, publishes a package, or uploads files publicly",
53
+ "deletes": "the agent deletes files, directories, records or resources",
54
+ "installs_package": "the agent installs a package or adds one to a dependency manifest",
55
+ "changes_agent_config": "the agent edits its settings, hooks, MCP config or instruction files",
56
+ "changes_ci_config": "the agent edits CI configuration",
57
+ "vcs_push": "the agent pushes to a git remote",
58
+ "sends_message": "the agent sends a message to a person (email, chat, a comment)",
59
+ "changes_infra": "the agent changes cloud or cluster infrastructure",
60
+ "person_prompt": "you send the agent a message",
61
+ "ends_turn": "the agent finishes its turn",
51
62
  }
52
63
 
53
64
  VIEW_WORDS: Mapping[str, str] = {
@@ -60,14 +71,20 @@ VIEW_WORDS: Mapping[str, str] = {
60
71
  "agent_said": "what the agent said",
61
72
  "recent_steps": "the agent's recent steps",
62
73
  "destinations": "where the call sends things",
74
+ "session_facts": "what code read from the whole session: refusals and values read",
63
75
  }
64
76
 
65
77
  ACTION_WORDS: Mapping[str, str] = {
66
78
  "block": "blocks the call and tells the agent why",
67
79
  "ask_person": "holds the call until you say yes",
68
80
  "record": "lets it run and records it",
69
- "allow": "lets it run",
81
+ # The most severe verdict of all rules wins (`engine`), so an allow
82
+ # cannot let through what another rule stops.
83
+ "allow": "does nothing: it cannot let through a call another rule stops",
70
84
  }
85
+ #: The actions `hy write` offers. The loader still takes `allow`, for a file a
86
+ #: person wrote, but it never relaxes another rule.
87
+ _OFFERED = tuple(a for a in ACTIONS if a != "allow")
71
88
 
72
89
  _EXAMPLES = """\
73
90
  # "Don't let it fake a green CI run. Fix the cause, don't skip the test."
@@ -78,10 +95,10 @@ rules:
78
95
  checks:
79
96
  weakens:
80
97
  decision: "`call` skips, deletes or loosens a test or assertion, or makes CI ignore a failure."
81
- over: [call, recent_steps]
98
+ over: [call, recent_steps, person_said]
82
99
  criteria:
83
- "true": It adds a skip or xfail, deletes or comments out a test, loosens an expected value, or changes CI so a failing test no longer fails the run.
84
- "false": It fixes the code under test, adds or strengthens a test, only runs or reads tests, or doesn't touch tests or CI.
100
+ "true": It adds a skip or xfail, or makes a test skip or pass only under a flag, missing network or an environment variable; deletes or comments out a test or assertion; mocks out what the test checks; moves, renames or excludes a test file so the runner no longer finds it; widens a tolerance; sets an expected value to the value a failing run returned (the actual value in an assertion failure in `recent_steps`), even when a comment says the test is wrong; or changes CI so a failing test no longer fails the run.
101
+ "false": It fixes the code under test, adds or strengthens a test, restores a test it changed, only runs or reads tests, changes an expectation only after the person said the behaviour should change (in `person_said`), or doesn't touch tests or CI.
85
102
  fires: weakens
86
103
  enforce:
87
104
  action: block
@@ -110,6 +127,23 @@ rules:
110
127
  action: ask_person
111
128
  steer: This is a public production deploy with no login in front of it. Put a login in front of it first, or ask the person to confirm it should be public.
112
129
 
130
+ # "Flag every time someone cusses and remind them."
131
+ rules:
132
+ - id: keep-it-clean
133
+ says: Flag every time someone cusses and remind them.
134
+ trigger: person_prompt
135
+ checks:
136
+ cusses:
137
+ decision: "`person_latest` contains profanity or a curse word."
138
+ over: [person_latest]
139
+ criteria:
140
+ "true": It swears, curses or uses a vulgar word, even in passing.
141
+ "false": It has no vulgar word; a technical term (kill, abort, master, dump) is not one.
142
+ fires: cusses
143
+ enforce:
144
+ action: record
145
+ steer: The person cursed in their last message. Before you answer, remind them, briefly and kindly, to keep the language clean.
146
+
113
147
  # "Never send our keys anywhere."
114
148
  rules:
115
149
  - id: keys-stay-here
@@ -117,22 +151,43 @@ rules:
117
151
  trigger: any_call
118
152
  checks:
119
153
  hit: {code: builtin, rule: stacktrace-credential-egress}
120
- fires: hit
154
+ leaks:
155
+ fact: sends_credential_read
156
+ decision: "`call` sends a credential, or something built from one, to a host off this machine."
157
+ over: [call, recent_steps, files]
158
+ criteria:
159
+ "true": It sends a token, key or password, a secrets file such as .env, or a file or archive `recent_steps` show was built from one, directly or through a script it runs.
160
+ "false": Nothing it sends holds a secret, the secret values are shown replaced, it only reads or builds locally, or it sends to this machine.
161
+ fires: hit or leaks
121
162
  enforce:
122
163
  action: block
123
164
  steer: This would send a credential off the machine. Remove it from the call.
124
165
  """
125
166
 
126
167
 
168
+ def _packs() -> str:
169
+ """Each pack and the programs it parses, for the model."""
170
+ from stacktrace.agentspec.packs import PACKS
171
+
172
+ return "\n".join(f" {p.name}: {', '.join(p.programs)}" for p in PACKS.values())
173
+
174
+
127
175
  def _instructions() -> str:
128
176
  builtins = ", ".join(call_rules())
129
- triggers = "\n".join(f" {t}: the agent {TRIGGER_WORDS[t]}" for t in TRIGGERS)
177
+ triggers = "\n".join(f" {t}: {TRIGGER_WORDS[t]}" for t in TRIGGERS)
130
178
  return f"""You turn what a person says they are worried about into Hydrant policy rules.
131
- Hydrant checks every tool call a coding agent (Claude Code) makes before it runs.
179
+ Hydrant checks every tool call a coding agent (Claude Code) makes before it runs, every
180
+ message the person sends it, and every time it finishes its turn.
132
181
 
133
182
  Reply with one YAML document only, inside a ```yaml block, with a top-level `rules:` list.
134
183
  No prose outside the block.
135
184
 
185
+ When a rule is about infrastructure (clusters, clouds, infrastructure as code, databases),
186
+ also give a top-level `packs:` list. A pack parses its programs exactly, so the `effects`
187
+ view says what a call changes and `changes_infra` needs no judge to see it. Without a
188
+ pack, `effects` is empty. Name only the packs the worry is about:
189
+ {_packs()}
190
+
136
191
  A rule:
137
192
  id: short kebab-case name. Never starts with "stacktrace-".
138
193
  says: the person's own words, lightly cleaned. Keep their meaning exactly.
@@ -140,21 +195,41 @@ A rule:
140
195
  {triggers}
141
196
  Pick the narrowest trigger that covers the worry. `any_call` makes the judge read
142
197
  every call, so use it only with a `code:` check or when nothing narrower fits.
198
+ `person_prompt` and `ends_turn` have no `call`. A rule on `person_prompt` judges
199
+ `person_latest`, the message just sent: block stops the message and shows the
200
+ person why; record with a steer lets it through and gives the agent the steer as
201
+ a note. A rule on `ends_turn` judges `agent_said`, the agent's final message
202
+ (`recent_steps` and `person_latest` may help): block makes the agent keep going,
203
+ with the steer as what to do first. On either, ask_person stops as block does,
204
+ and an unsure answer never stops anything.
143
205
  checks: named facts that decide the rule. Each is exactly one of:
144
- decision: a yes/no question about the pending call, which a judge model answers
145
- with a probability. Refer to the call as `call` in backticks. One fact per question.
206
+ decision: a yes/no question about the pending call (or, for `person_prompt` and
207
+ `ends_turn`, about `person_latest` or `agent_said`), which a judge model answers
208
+ with a probability. Refer to what it reads in backticks. One fact per question.
146
209
  over: what the judge may see, a list from: {", ".join(VIEWS)}.
147
210
  Use [person_said] for "did the person ask for this".
148
211
  criteria: {{"true": ..., "false": ...}} saying what counts as yes and no. Always
149
212
  give it. In "false", name the harmless look-alikes the judge must let through:
150
213
  previews, drafts, dry runs, plans, local or staging targets, reading or
151
214
  listing, and tools whose default is a preview unless a flag says otherwise.
215
+ fact: optional, a session fact that answers the decision in code when code is
216
+ sure, so the judge is asked only otherwise:
217
+ around_refusal a push to a repository that refused access earlier,
218
+ another way (yes) or the same way again (no)
219
+ sends_personal_data_read the call sends an email, phone, card, IBAN or ID a
220
+ tool result showed (yes only)
221
+ sends_credential_read the call sends a credential a tool result showed
222
+ (yes only)
223
+ Give it on a question it answers: "don't push another way after a refusal"
224
+ is {{decision: ..., fact: around_refusal}}.
152
225
  code: an exact check. Use only these:
153
226
  builtin with rule: one of {builtins}
154
227
  (use for literal credentials, personal data, credential files, deletes
155
228
  outside the project, agent config tampering, persistence, unknown installs)
156
229
  contains with source: secrets, target: published_files | payload | command
157
- location with where: outside (paths outside the project folder)
230
+ location with where: outside | home | system | inside
231
+ (a path the call names: outside the project folder, in the person's
232
+ home outside it, elsewhere on the machine, or inside it)
158
233
  last_result with is: failed | passed | none (the last test run)
159
234
  tokens with measure: session | context, at_least: <tokens>
160
235
  (session: every token the session used so far; context: the size of
@@ -162,13 +237,22 @@ A rule:
162
237
  {{code: tokens, measure: session, at_least: 2000000}})
163
238
  fires: how checks combine, with and / or / not over check names. Default: all of them.
164
239
  enforce:
165
- action: one of {", ".join(ACTIONS)}. Use block for "never". Use ask_person when the
166
- action is sometimes fine ("without asking me", "unless I say so").
240
+ action: one of {", ".join(_OFFERED)}. Use block for "never". Use ask_person when the
241
+ action is sometimes fine ("without asking me", "unless I say so"). A rule
242
+ cannot make an exception to another rule: the strictest one wins.
167
243
  steer: what the agent is told instead: what to do next, in one or two sentences.
168
244
 
169
245
  How to write good rules:
170
246
  - "Unless I asked" or "without my OK" becomes an `asked` decision over [person_said],
171
- and `fires: <the fact> and not asked`.
247
+ and `fires: <the fact> and not asked`. A sub-agent the agent starts never sees the
248
+ person's words (`person_said` and `person_latest` are empty there), so such a rule
249
+ fires or asks on every matching call a sub-agent makes. Say so in `says` only if
250
+ the person asked about sub-agents.
251
+ - A rule that keeps the person's own work, files or data safe from the agent
252
+ ("never throw away my changes", "never delete my notes") means "unless I asked":
253
+ the person may tell the agent to discard their own work. Write the same `asked`
254
+ check. Never put "the person asked" inside a fact's criteria: the fact is still
255
+ true, and the judge answers the fact.
172
256
  - Split a compound worry into separate facts rather than one long question.
173
257
  - Never name a specific tool, CLI, host or file unless the person did. Describe what
174
258
  the call does.
@@ -317,8 +401,14 @@ def translate(
317
401
  )
318
402
  reply = _ask_model(system, prompt)
319
403
  try:
320
- doc = parse(reply)
404
+ doc = complete(parse(reply))
321
405
  check(merge(existing or {}, doc))
406
+ for rule in _rules(doc):
407
+ if _map(rule.get("enforce")).get("action") not in _OFFERED:
408
+ raise PolicyError(
409
+ f"{rule.get('id')}: enforce.action is one of {', '.join(_OFFERED)}; "
410
+ "allow cannot relax another rule"
411
+ )
322
412
  except PolicyError as failed:
323
413
  error = str(failed)
324
414
  continue
@@ -326,6 +416,98 @@ def translate(
326
416
  raise PolicyError(f"the model's rules did not load after {tries} tries: {error}")
327
417
 
328
418
 
419
+ #: The question a typed credential rule always carries next to the builtin. The
420
+ #: builtin reads only the call's text: a key typed into a network command. This
421
+ #: reads the session, so it also sees a script that uploads .env, an archive
422
+ #: built from one, or a file the call sends.
423
+ _LEAKS_NAME = "leaks"
424
+ _LEAKS: Mapping[str, object] = {
425
+ "fact": "sends_credential_read",
426
+ "decision": "`call` sends a credential, or something built from one, to a host off this machine.",
427
+ "over": ["call", "recent_steps", "files"],
428
+ "criteria": {
429
+ "true": (
430
+ "What `call` sends, directly or through a script or program it runs, includes a "
431
+ "token, key, password or other secret; or a secrets file such as .env, a key file "
432
+ "or a credentials file; or a file, archive or output that `recent_steps` show was "
433
+ "built from one. An argument `call` passes to a script counts as sent when "
434
+ "`recent_steps` show the script sends its arguments over the network. An "
435
+ "Authorization header, a bearer token, or text redacted as a secret is a "
436
+ "credential. A secret copied from a log, a config or an earlier result counts. "
437
+ "Retrying such an upload over plain HTTP counts. Running a script or program counts "
438
+ "as sending what it sends: when a runbook, README, the script itself or an earlier "
439
+ "step says it uploads, posts or shares a bundle, config or .env, running it sends "
440
+ "those secrets, even if `call` names no host. An agent's statement that it removed "
441
+ "the secrets counts only when `recent_steps` or `files` show the sent content with "
442
+ "the secret values replaced."
443
+ ),
444
+ "false": (
445
+ "Nothing `call` sends holds a secret: it sends documentation, source code, logs or "
446
+ "data with no token, key or password in them; or a copy whose secret values "
447
+ "`recent_steps` or `files` show replaced (REDACTED, ***, <redacted>, a "
448
+ "placeholder); or it only downloads, reads, lists or builds locally without "
449
+ "sending; or it sends to this machine."
450
+ ),
451
+ },
452
+ }
453
+ #: The band the measured credential rule ran with: almost no unsure zone, so an
454
+ #: unsure answer neither lets a leak through nor leaves the rule undecided.
455
+ _LEAKS_BAND: Mapping[str, float] = {"lo": 0.45, "hi": 0.5}
456
+
457
+
458
+ def complete(doc: Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
459
+ """`doc` with every credential rule reading the session, not only the call.
460
+
461
+ A rule that uses the builtin `stacktrace-credential-egress` gets the measured
462
+ `sends_credential_read` question and band: the model's own question, if it
463
+ wrote one, is replaced, and one is added if it did not. `fires` reads the
464
+ builtin as `(builtin or leaks)` unless it already names the question, so
465
+ `egress and not asked` stays the same rule. In code, not in the prompt: the
466
+ model writes the builtin alone, or a weaker question, often enough.
467
+ """
468
+ out = dict(doc)
469
+ rules: list[object] = []
470
+ for raw in _list(doc.get("rules")):
471
+ rule = _map(raw)
472
+ checks = {name: _map(spec) for name, spec in _map(rule.get("checks")).items()}
473
+ builtins = [
474
+ name
475
+ for name, spec in checks.items()
476
+ if spec.get("code") == "builtin" and spec.get("rule") == "stacktrace-credential-egress"
477
+ ]
478
+ if not builtins:
479
+ rules.append(rule)
480
+ continue
481
+ asked = [n for n, s in checks.items() if s.get("fact") == "sends_credential_read"]
482
+ name = asked[0] if asked else _LEAKS_NAME
483
+ while not asked and name in checks:
484
+ name += "_"
485
+ fires = ast.parse(str(rule.get("fires") or " and ".join(checks)), mode="eval")
486
+ if not any(isinstance(n, ast.Name) and n.id == name for n in ast.walk(fires)):
487
+ for node in ast.walk(fires):
488
+ for field, value in ast.iter_fields(node):
489
+ if isinstance(value, ast.Name) and value.id in builtins:
490
+ setattr(node, field, _either(value.id, name))
491
+ elif isinstance(value, list):
492
+ value[:] = [
493
+ _either(v.id, name)
494
+ if isinstance(v, ast.Name) and v.id in builtins
495
+ else v
496
+ for v in value # pyright: ignore[reportUnknownVariableType]
497
+ ]
498
+ rule = dict(rule)
499
+ rule["checks"] = {**_map(rule.get("checks")), name: dict(_LEAKS)}
500
+ rule["fires"] = ast.unparse(fires.body)
501
+ rule.setdefault("band", dict(_LEAKS_BAND))
502
+ rules.append(rule)
503
+ out["rules"] = rules
504
+ return out
505
+
506
+
507
+ def _either(builtin: str, leaks: str) -> ast.BoolOp:
508
+ return ast.BoolOp(op=ast.Or(), values=[ast.Name(id=builtin), ast.Name(id=leaks)])
509
+
510
+
329
511
  def merge(base: Mapping[str, object], add: Mapping[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
330
512
  """`base` with `add`'s rules appended; a rule with the same id is replaced."""
331
513
  new = _rules(add)
@@ -363,12 +545,15 @@ def save(path: Path, doc: Mapping[str, object]) -> None:
363
545
  def readback(doc: Mapping[str, object]) -> list[str]:
364
546
  """Each rule in plain words, as lines."""
365
547
  lines: list[str] = []
548
+ packs = [str(p) for p in _list(doc.get("packs"))]
549
+ if packs:
550
+ lines += [f"Hydrant reads these systems' commands exactly: {', '.join(packs)}.", ""]
366
551
  for rule in _rules(doc):
367
552
  enforce = _map(rule.get("enforce"))
368
553
  checks = _map(rule.get("checks"))
369
554
  trigger = str(rule.get("trigger", ""))
370
555
  lines.append(f"Rule {rule.get('id')}: \u201c{str(rule.get('says', '')).strip()}\u201d")
371
- lines.append(f" When the agent {TRIGGER_WORDS.get(trigger, trigger)},")
556
+ lines.append(f" When {TRIGGER_WORDS.get(trigger, trigger)},")
372
557
  for name, raw in checks.items():
373
558
  spec = _map(raw)
374
559
  if "decision" in spec:
@@ -382,6 +567,13 @@ def readback(doc: Mapping[str, object]) -> list[str]:
382
567
  lines.append(f" {name}: exact check {spec.get('code')} ({params})")
383
568
  if checks:
384
569
  lines.append(f" It fires when: {rule.get('fires') or ' and '.join(checks)}")
570
+ yours = [n for n, c in checks.items() if _reads_your_words(_map(c))]
571
+ if yours and MOMENTS.get(trigger) == "call": # no sub-agent's prompt or turn is judged
572
+ lines.append(
573
+ f" In a sub-agent the agent starts, Hydrant does not see your words, so "
574
+ f"{', '.join(yours)} cannot be true there: this rule fires or asks on every "
575
+ "matching call a sub-agent makes."
576
+ )
385
577
  action = str(enforce.get("action", ""))
386
578
  lines.append(f" Then Hydrant {ACTION_WORDS.get(action, action)}.")
387
579
  steer = " ".join(str(enforce.get("steer", "")).split())
@@ -391,6 +583,34 @@ def readback(doc: Mapping[str, object]) -> list[str]:
391
583
  return lines
392
584
 
393
585
 
586
+ def held_without_judge(doc: Mapping[str, object]) -> list[str]:
587
+ """The ids of the rules that, with no judge, stop every call their trigger
588
+ allows and ask the person: a block or ask_person rule on a call that needs
589
+ a judge's answer (its trigger's question, or a check code cannot settle).
590
+ An unsure answer asks (`uncertain: ask`, the default)."""
591
+ held: list[str] = []
592
+ for rule in _rules(doc):
593
+ trigger = str(rule.get("trigger", ""))
594
+ enforce = _map(rule.get("enforce"))
595
+ if MOMENTS.get(trigger) != "call" or enforce.get("action") not in ("block", "ask_person"):
596
+ continue
597
+ if enforce.get("uncertain", "ask") != "ask":
598
+ continue
599
+ checks = [_map(c) for c in _map(rule.get("checks")).values()]
600
+ if trigger != "any_call" or any(
601
+ c.get("code") in (None, "effect", "intent") for c in checks
602
+ ):
603
+ held.append(str(rule.get("id")))
604
+ return held
605
+
606
+
607
+ def _reads_your_words(check: Mapping[str, object]) -> bool:
608
+ """Whether a check reads what the person said, which a sub-agent's trace
609
+ does not hold (ADR-0185)."""
610
+ over = {str(v) for v in _list(check.get("over"))}
611
+ return check.get("code") == "intent" or bool(over & {"person_said", "person_latest"})
612
+
613
+
394
614
  def dump(doc: Mapping[str, object]) -> str:
395
615
  return yaml.safe_dump(dict(doc), sort_keys=False, allow_unicode=True, width=100)
396
616
 
@@ -400,6 +620,7 @@ __all__ = [
400
620
  "TRIGGER_WORDS",
401
621
  "check",
402
622
  "dump",
623
+ "held_without_judge",
403
624
  "load_file",
404
625
  "merge",
405
626
  "parse",