securevector-sdk-langgraph 1.0.0__py3-none-any.whl

securevector_sdk_langgraph/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+"""SecureVector SDK for LangGraph.
+
+Enforcement (recommended) — the ``wrap_tool_call`` middleware, accepted by the
+langgraph-backed ``create_agent`` (note: ``langgraph.prebuilt.create_react_agent``
+does NOT take a ``middleware`` argument — use ``create_agent``)::
+
+    from securevector_sdk_langgraph import secure_middleware
+    from langchain.agents import create_agent
+
+    agent = create_agent(
+        model, tools,
+        middleware=[secure_middleware(mode="enforce")],
+    )
+
+Observe-only logging (any graph) — pass the callback handler in config::
+
+    from securevector_sdk_langgraph import SecureVectorCallbackHandler
+    graph.invoke(state, config={"callbacks": [SecureVectorCallbackHandler()]})
+
+For a raw ``StateGraph`` with custom tool nodes (no middleware surface), gate
+execution with LangGraph's ``interrupt()`` inside the tool — see the README.
+
+Either way, every tool call runs the local SecureVector app's three controls —
+tool-call permissions, secret/data-leak detection, threat detection — and each
+decision is written to the app's tamper-evident audit chain with
+``runtime_kind="langgraph"``. Requires the SecureVector app running locally
+(installed automatically as the ``securevector-ai-monitor`` dependency).
+"""
+
+import logging
+from typing import Optional
+
+from ._version import __version__
+from .config import Config
+from .errors import AppUnreachable, SecureVectorError, ToolBlocked
+from .handler import SecureVectorCallbackHandler
+from .middleware import secure_middleware
+
+log = logging.getLogger("securevector_sdk_langgraph")
+
+__all__ = [
+    "__version__",
+    "secure_middleware",
+    "install",
+    "SecureVectorCallbackHandler",
+    "Config",
+    "SecureVectorError",
+    "ToolBlocked",
+    "AppUnreachable",
+]
+
+
+def install(mode: str = "observe", base_url: Optional[str] = None, **kwargs):
+    """Convenience alias for :func:`secure_middleware` — returns the middleware
+    to pass to ``create_agent(..., middleware=[install(mode="enforce")])``."""
+    return secure_middleware(mode=mode, base_url=base_url, **kwargs)

securevector_sdk_langgraph/_version.py

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+"""Single source of truth for the package version at runtime.
+
+The published version is stamped from pyproject.toml / the release tag by CI;
+this constant is what `securevector_sdk_langgraph.__version__` reports.
+"""
+
+__version__ = "1.0.0"

securevector_sdk_langgraph/auto.py

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+"""``import securevector_sdk_langgraph.auto`` — observe-mode global logging.
+
+There is no global registration for middleware (it is passed to
+``create_agent``), so this module registers an **observe-only** callback handler
+as a LangChain global handler where the version supports it. For enforcement,
+add ``secure_middleware(mode="enforce")`` to your agent's ``middleware`` list.
+"""
+
+import logging
+import os
+
+from .handler import SecureVectorCallbackHandler
+
+log = logging.getLogger("securevector_sdk_langgraph")
+
+_handler = SecureVectorCallbackHandler()
+
+try:
+    # Best-effort: register as a global handler so existing chains are logged.
+    from langchain_core.callbacks.manager import register_configure_hook
+    from contextvars import ContextVar
+
+    _var: ContextVar = ContextVar("securevector_sdk_langgraph_handler", default=None)
+    _var.set(_handler)
+    register_configure_hook(_var, True)
+except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - depends on langchain version
+    log.warning(
+        "Global observe handler unavailable (%s); pass SecureVectorCallbackHandler "
+        "via config={'callbacks': [...]}, or use secure_middleware to enforce.",
+        exc,
+    )
+
+if os.environ.get("SECUREVECTOR_SDK_MODE", "observe").lower() == "enforce":
+    log.warning(
+        "SECUREVECTOR_SDK_MODE=enforce has no effect via auto-import (callbacks "
+        "cannot block). Add secure_middleware(mode='enforce') to create_agent."
+    )

securevector_sdk_langgraph/client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+"""Thin client to the local SecureVector app.
+
+Two transports, on purpose:
+
+* **Tool-permission resolution + audit** go over the local REST API
+  (``/api/tool-permissions/*``) via the stdlib (``urllib``) — no extra HTTP
+  dependency. The permission *decision* is computed client-side by merging the
+  three policy tiers exactly as the app's own OpenClaw hook does:
+  synced (cloud-pushed) > local override > essential registry > default-allow.
+
+* **Secret + threat detection** reuses the already-shipped ``SecureVectorClient``
+  from ``securevector-ai-monitor`` — the detection engine lives there; the
+  adapter must not reimplement it.
+
+Everything is best-effort and lazy: importing this module never requires the
+app or langchain to be installed, so unit tests run standalone.
+"""
+
+import json
+import logging
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
+
+from .config import Config
+from .errors import AppUnreachable
+from .tool_id import RUNTIME_KIND
+
+log = logging.getLogger("securevector_sdk_langgraph")
+
+_VALID_AUDIT_ACTIONS = ("block", "allow", "log_only")
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Verdict:
+    """Resolved permission decision for one tool id."""
+
+    action: str          # allow | block | log_only
+    risk: str
+    reason: str
+    is_essential: bool
+    tool_id: str
+
+
+@dataclass
+class AnalysisVerdict:
+    """Outcome of a secret/threat scan over a piece of text."""
+
+    is_threat: bool
+    risk_score: int
+    reason: str
+
+
+class LocalAppClient:
+    def __init__(self, cfg: Config):
+        self.cfg = cfg
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
+    # REST transport (stdlib)                                            #
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
+    def _request(self, method: str, path: str, body: Optional[dict]) -> Any:
+        url = f"{self.cfg.base_url.rstrip('/')}{path}"
+        data = json.dumps(body).encode("utf-8") if body is not None else None
+        req = urllib.request.Request(
+            url,
+            data=data,
+            method=method,
+            headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
+        )
+        timeout = max(self.cfg.timeout_ms / 1000.0, 0.1)
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:  # noqa: S310 (localhost)
+            raw = resp.read()
+            return json.loads(raw) if raw else {}
+
+    def _get(self, path: str) -> Any:
+        return self._request("GET", path, None)
+
+    def _post(self, path: str, body: dict) -> Any:
+        return self._request("POST", path, body)
+
+    def reachable(self) -> bool:
+        try:
+            self._get("/api/tool-permissions/essential")
+            return True
+        except Exception:
+            return False
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
+    # (a) Permissions — synced > override > essential > default-allow    #
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
+    def resolve_permission(self, tool_id: str) -> Verdict:
+        try:
+            essential = self._get("/api/tool-permissions/essential") or {}
+            overrides = self._get("/api/tool-permissions/overrides") or {}
+            synced = self._get(
+                "/api/tool-permissions/synced-overrides?"
+                + urllib.parse.urlencode({"runtime": RUNTIME_KIND})
+            ) or {}
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise AppUnreachable(str(exc)) from exc
+        return self._resolve(tool_id, essential, overrides, synced)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _index(arr: Optional[List[dict]], key: str) -> Dict[str, dict]:
+        """Index rows by their id, with a case-insensitive fallback (exact
+        casing wins, mirroring the app's lookup)."""
+        out: Dict[str, dict] = {}
+        for item in arr or []:
+            k = item.get(key)
+            if k is not None:
+                out.setdefault(str(k).lower(), item)
+        for item in arr or []:
+            k = item.get(key)
+            if k is not None:
+                out[str(k)] = item
+        return out
+
+    def _resolve(self, tool_id, essential, overrides, synced) -> Verdict:
+        name = tool_id
+        low = tool_id.lower()
+        emap = self._index(essential.get("tools"), "tool_id")
+        omap = self._index(overrides.get("overrides"), "tool_id")
+        smap = self._index(synced.get("synced"), "tool_id")
+
+        # 1. Cloud-pushed synced policy wins.
+        s = smap.get(name) or smap.get(low)
+        if s:
+            effect = str(s.get("effect", "")).lower()
+            action = "allow" if effect == "allow" else "block"
+            policy = s.get("policy_name") or s.get("policy_id") or "synced"
+            ver = f" v{s['policy_version']}" if s.get("policy_version") is not None else ""
+            return Verdict(
+                action, "synced", f"Synced policy '{policy}'{ver}: {effect}",
+                (name in emap or low in emap), name,
+            )
+        # 2. Local user override.
+        o = omap.get(name) or omap.get(low)
+        if o:
+            return Verdict(
+                o.get("action", "allow"), "overridden",
+                f"User override: {o.get('action')}",
+                (name in emap or low in emap), name,
+            )
+        # 3. Essential registry default.
+        e = emap.get(name) or emap.get(low)
+        if e:
+            return Verdict(
+                e.get("effective_action") or e.get("default_action") or "allow",
+                e.get("risk", "unknown"), e.get("reason", "Essential tool policy"),
+                True, name,
+            )
+        # 4. Not in registry — allowed by default.
+        return Verdict("allow", "unknown", "Not in registry — allowed by default", False, name)
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
+    # (b)+(c) Secret + threat detection — the running app's /api/analyze       #
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
+    # We deliberately use the app's REST `/analyze` (same engine, same HTTP
+    # transport as permissions/audit) rather than constructing an in-process
+    # SecureVectorClient: the SDK already requires the app running, and the
+    # in-process local analyzer needs its own config/license and can raise on
+    # init. Tool input is user→tool ("outgoing"); tool output is fetched
+    # context→model, which is exactly the app's IDPI "incoming" scan mode.
+    _DIRECTION_MODE = {"tool_input": "outgoing", "tool_output": "incoming"}
+
+    def analyze(self, text: str, direction: str) -> AnalysisVerdict:
+        if not text:
+            return AnalysisVerdict(False, 0, "empty")
+        mode = self._DIRECTION_MODE.get(direction, "outgoing")
+        try:
+            # The analyze route is mounted at /analyze (no /api prefix).
+            res = self._post("/analyze", {"text": str(text)[:102400], "mode": mode})
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
+            raise AppUnreachable(f"analyze failed: {exc}") from exc
+        if not isinstance(res, dict):
+            return AnalysisVerdict(False, 0, "no-result")
+        risk = int(res.get("risk_score") or 0)
+        is_threat = bool(res.get("is_threat", False))
+        # Secrets/data-leaks also surface via redaction: the app sets
+        # redacted_text (and action_taken=redact/block) when it catches a secret.
+        # Control (b) keys on that, control (c) on is_threat. A finding is either.
+        has_secret = bool(res.get("redacted_text")) or (res.get("action_taken") in ("redact", "block"))
+        finding = is_threat or has_secret
+        return AnalysisVerdict(
+            finding, risk,
+            f"{direction} threat={is_threat} secret={has_secret} risk={risk}",
+        )
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
+    # Audit — append to the tamper-evident chain                         #
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
+    def record_audit(
+        self,
+        *,
+        tool_id: str,
+        function_name: Optional[str],
+        action: str,
+        risk: Optional[str],
+        reason: Optional[str],
+        is_essential: bool,
+        args_preview: Optional[str],
+        session_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        request_id: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        act = action if action in _VALID_AUDIT_ACTIONS else "log_only"
+        body = {
+            "tool_id": tool_id,
+            "function_name": function_name or tool_id,
+            "action": act,
+            "risk": risk,
+            "reason": reason,
+            "is_essential": bool(is_essential),
+            "args_preview": args_preview,
+            "runtime_kind": RUNTIME_KIND,
+            "session_id": session_id,
+            "request_id": (request_id or None) and str(request_id)[:64],
+        }
+        try:
+            self._post("/api/tool-permissions/call-audit", body)
+        except Exception as exc:  # never let audit failure break the agent
+            log.debug("audit post failed: %s", exc)

securevector_sdk_langgraph/config.py

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+"""Adapter configuration — explicit kwargs override environment overrides
+defaults.
+
+Environment variables (all optional):
+    SECUREVECTOR_SDK_APP_URL        local app base URL (default http://127.0.0.1:8741)
+    SECUREVECTOR_SDK_MODE           observe | enforce          (default observe)
+    SECUREVECTOR_SDK_TIMEOUT_MS     per-call verdict timeout   (default 3000)
+    SECUREVECTOR_SDK_RISK_THRESHOLD enforce-block risk cutoff  (default 70)
+    SECUREVECTOR_SDK_ANALYZE_MODE   SecureVectorClient mode    (default local)
+    SECUREVECTOR_SDK_DISABLED       set truthy to no-op entirely
+
+Note: we deliberately use SECUREVECTOR_SDK_APP_URL, not the existing
+SECUREVECTOR_URL — the latter points at the *cloud* API in the rest of the
+ecosystem, whereas the SDK talks to the *local* app.
+"""
+
+import os
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:8741"
+
+
+def _truthy(val: str) -> bool:
+    return str(val).strip().lower() in ("1", "true", "yes", "on")
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Config:
+    base_url: str = DEFAULT_BASE_URL
+    mode: str = "observe"            # observe (fail-open) | enforce (fail-closed)
+    timeout_ms: int = 3000
+    threat_risk_threshold: int = 70  # risk_score >= this blocks in enforce mode
+    analyze_mode: str = "local"      # SecureVectorClient mode used for /analyze
+    enabled: bool = True
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_env(cls, **overrides) -> "Config":
+        cfg = cls(
+            base_url=os.environ.get("SECUREVECTOR_SDK_APP_URL", DEFAULT_BASE_URL),
+            mode=os.environ.get("SECUREVECTOR_SDK_MODE", "observe").strip().lower(),
+            timeout_ms=int(os.environ.get("SECUREVECTOR_SDK_TIMEOUT_MS", "3000")),
+            threat_risk_threshold=int(
+                os.environ.get("SECUREVECTOR_SDK_RISK_THRESHOLD", "70")
+            ),
+            analyze_mode=os.environ.get("SECUREVECTOR_SDK_ANALYZE_MODE", "local"),
+            enabled=not _truthy(os.environ.get("SECUREVECTOR_SDK_DISABLED", "")),
+        )
+        # Explicit kwargs win over env, but only when actually provided.
+        for key, value in overrides.items():
+            if value is not None and hasattr(cfg, key):
+                setattr(cfg, key, value)
+        if cfg.mode not in ("observe", "enforce"):
+            cfg.mode = "observe"
+        return cfg

securevector_sdk_langgraph/core.py

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+"""Control routing — the three checks on every tool call.
+
+This is the framework-agnostic engine. Detection already exists in the app; the
+job here is **routing + the observe/enforce state machine**. The public surface
+is deliberately non-raising so each adapter can choose how to *act* on a block:
+
+* the LangChain/LangGraph ``wrap_tool_call`` middleware returns a ``ToolMessage``
+  to short-circuit (the documented block primitive);
+* the CrewAI tool wrapper raises ``ToolBlocked`` (CrewAI has no middleware).
+
+Per intercepted call, in order:
+
+    (a) PERMISSIONS  — resolve allow/block for the tool id
+    (b) SECRET scan  — \\
+    (c) THREAT scan  — // over the serialized tool input (and, on end, output)
+
+``observe`` (default) is fail-open: everything is logged, nothing is blocked,
+and an unreachable app degrades to allow. ``enforce`` is fail-closed: a policy
+block, a high-risk input finding, or an unreachable app all mark the decision
+``blocked``.
+"""
+
+import logging
+import re
+import sys
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Optional
+
+from .client import LocalAppClient
+from .config import Config
+from .errors import AppUnreachable, ToolBlocked
+
+log = logging.getLogger("securevector_sdk_langgraph")
+
+# Belt-and-braces preview redaction (the app redacts too; this keeps obvious
+# secrets out of the args_preview we send).
+_REDACTIONS = [
+    (re.compile(r"AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}"), "AKIA[REDACTED]"),
+    (re.compile(r"ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}"), "ghp_[REDACTED]"),
+    (re.compile(r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}"), "sk-[REDACTED]"),
+    (re.compile(r"(?i)(password\"?\s*[:=]\s*\")[^\"]+(\")"), r"\1[REDACTED]\2"),
+]
+
+
+def redact(text: object, limit: int = 500) -> str:
+    if not text:
+        return ""
+    s = str(text)
+    for pattern, repl in _REDACTIONS:
+        s = pattern.sub(repl, s)
+    return s[:limit]
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Decision:
+    """Result of evaluating a tool call's input. ``blocked`` already accounts
+    for mode — it is only True when the call should actually be stopped (i.e.
+    enforce mode + a deny). ``action`` is the audited action."""
+
+    blocked: bool
+    action: str          # allow | block | log_only
+    reason: str
+    risk: str
+
+
+class Interceptor:
+    def __init__(self, cfg: Config, client: Optional[LocalAppClient] = None):
+        self.cfg = cfg
+        self.client = client or LocalAppClient(cfg)
+        self._disclosed = False
+
+    @property
+    def enforce(self) -> bool:
+        return self.cfg.mode == "enforce"
+
+    def _disclose_once(self) -> None:
+        if self.enforce and not self._disclosed:
+            self._disclosed = True
+            sys.stderr.write(
+                "[SecureVector] SDK is in ENFORCE mode — tool calls will be "
+                "BLOCKED if a policy denies them or the local app is unreachable.\n"
+            )
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
+    # Primary, non-raising API                                           #
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
+    def evaluate_input(
+        self,
+        tool_id: str,
+        args_text: str,
+        *,
+        session_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        request_id: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> Decision:
+        """Run the three controls on a tool's input and return a Decision.
+        Records the audit row as a side effect. Never raises."""
+        if not self.cfg.enabled:
+            return Decision(False, "allow", "sdk disabled", "")
+        self._disclose_once()
+        preview = redact(args_text)
+
+        # (a) PERMISSIONS
+        try:
+            verdict = self.client.resolve_permission(tool_id)
+        except AppUnreachable:
+            if self.enforce:
+                return Decision(True, "block", "local app unreachable (fail-closed)", "unreachable")
+            log.warning("app unreachable; observe mode allows %s", tool_id)
+            return Decision(False, "allow", "app unreachable (observe, fail-open)", "unreachable")
+
+        if verdict.action == "block":
+            self.client.record_audit(
+                tool_id=tool_id, function_name=tool_id, action="block",
+                risk=verdict.risk, reason=verdict.reason,
+                is_essential=verdict.is_essential, args_preview=preview,
+                session_id=session_id, request_id=request_id,
+            )
+            return Decision(self.enforce, "block", verdict.reason, verdict.risk)
+
+        # (b)+(c) SECRET + THREAT on the tool input
+        a_in = None
+        try:
+            a_in = self.client.analyze(args_text, "tool_input")
+        except AppUnreachable:
+            a_in = None  # analysis best-effort; permissions already passed
+
+        if a_in and a_in.is_threat:
+            should_block = self.enforce and a_in.risk_score >= self.cfg.threat_risk_threshold
+            act = "block" if should_block else "log_only"
+            self.client.record_audit(
+                tool_id=tool_id, function_name=tool_id, action=act,
+                risk=str(a_in.risk_score),
+                reason=f"Input secret/threat detected (risk={a_in.risk_score})",
+                is_essential=verdict.is_essential, args_preview=preview,
+                session_id=session_id, request_id=request_id,
+            )
+            return Decision(should_block, act, f"input secret/threat risk={a_in.risk_score}", str(a_in.risk_score))
+
+        # Allowed — record the decision.
+        self.client.record_audit(
+            tool_id=tool_id, function_name=tool_id, action="allow",
+            risk=verdict.risk, reason=verdict.reason,
+            is_essential=verdict.is_essential, args_preview=preview,
+            session_id=session_id, request_id=request_id,
+        )
+        return Decision(False, "allow", verdict.reason, verdict.risk)
+
+    def scan_output(
+        self,
+        tool_id: str,
+        output_text: str,
+        *,
+        session_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        request_id: Optional[str] = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        """Scan the tool RESULT for secrets / exfiltration (observe-only — the
+        tool already ran). Records a row if anything is found. Never raises."""
+        if not self.cfg.enabled:
+            return
+        try:
+            a_out = self.client.analyze(output_text, "tool_output")
+        except AppUnreachable:
+            return
+        if a_out and a_out.is_threat:
+            self.client.record_audit(
+                tool_id=tool_id, function_name=tool_id, action="log_only",
+                risk=str(a_out.risk_score),
+                reason=f"Output secret/threat detected (risk={a_out.risk_score})",
+                is_essential=False, args_preview=redact(output_text),
+                session_id=session_id, request_id=request_id,
+            )
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
+    # Raising convenience (CrewAI wrapper, where blocking == raising)     #
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------ #
+    def guard_input(self, tool_id: str, args_text: str, **kwargs) -> Decision:
+        decision = self.evaluate_input(tool_id, args_text, **kwargs)
+        if decision.blocked:
+            raise ToolBlocked(tool_id, decision.reason)
+        return decision

securevector_sdk_langgraph/errors.py

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+"""Exceptions raised by the SecureVector LangChain adapter.
+
+``ToolBlocked`` is the one that matters operationally: in ``enforce`` mode the
+callback handler raises it from ``on_tool_start`` *before* the tool executes,
+which aborts the tool step. In ``observe`` mode it is never raised — the call
+is logged and allowed through.
+"""
+
+
+class SecureVectorError(Exception):
+    """Base class for all adapter errors."""
+
+
+class ToolBlocked(SecureVectorError):
+    """Raised in enforce mode to abort a tool call (policy block, input threat,
+    or fail-closed when the local app is unreachable)."""
+
+    def __init__(self, tool_id: str, reason: str):
+        self.tool_id = tool_id
+        self.reason = reason
+        super().__init__(f"SecureVector blocked tool '{tool_id}': {reason}")
+
+
+class AppUnreachable(SecureVectorError):
+    """The local SecureVector app could not be reached. Mode decides the
+    consequence: observe → allow (fail-open); enforce → deny (fail-closed)."""

securevector_sdk_langgraph/handler.py

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+"""Observe-mode LangChain callback handler.
+
+Callbacks are an **observability** surface — they cannot cleanly block a tool
+call (raising from them is version-dependent and tends to crash the run rather
+than return a clean result). So this handler is for **logging/audit** in
+contexts where the ``wrap_tool_call`` middleware isn't available (legacy
+AgentExecutor, raw LCEL chains). For real enforcement, use
+:func:`securevector_sdk_langgraph.secure_middleware` with ``create_agent``.
+
+Attach it via ``config={"callbacks": [SecureVectorCallbackHandler()]}``.
+``run_id`` correlates start→end so the output scan is attributed to the same
+tool.
+"""
+
+import json
+import logging
+import uuid
+from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
+
+from .config import Config
+from .core import Interceptor
+
+log = logging.getLogger("securevector_sdk_langgraph")
+
+try:  # langchain-core ships with langchain; guard so tests import standalone
+    from langchain_core.callbacks import BaseCallbackHandler
+except Exception:  # pragma: no cover
+    try:
+        from langchain.callbacks.base import BaseCallbackHandler  # type: ignore
+    except Exception:
+        BaseCallbackHandler = object  # type: ignore
+
+
+def _to_text(value: Any) -> str:
+    if value is None:
+        return ""
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return value
+    try:
+        return json.dumps(value, default=str)
+    except Exception:
+        return str(value)
+
+
+class SecureVectorCallbackHandler(BaseCallbackHandler):
+    """Observe-only audit handler. Logs the three controls' findings for every
+    tool call; does not block (use ``secure_middleware`` to enforce)."""
+
+    def __init__(self, mode: Optional[str] = None, base_url: Optional[str] = None, **kwargs):
+        # Force observe: callbacks cannot reliably block, so we never pretend to.
+        kwargs.pop("mode", None)
+        self.cfg = Config.from_env(mode="observe", base_url=base_url, **kwargs)
+        self.interceptor = Interceptor(self.cfg)
+        self._session = uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]
+        self._runs: Dict[Any, str] = {}
+        if mode == "enforce":
+            log.warning(
+                "SecureVectorCallbackHandler runs in observe mode only; for "
+                "enforcement use secure_middleware(mode='enforce') with create_agent."
+            )
+
+    def on_tool_start(
+        self,
+        serialized: Optional[dict],
+        input_str: str,
+        *,
+        run_id: Any = None,
+        **kwargs: Any,
+    ) -> None:
+        from .tool_id import normalize_tool_id
+
+        tool_id = normalize_tool_id(serialized, kwargs.get("name"))
+        if run_id is not None:
+            self._runs[run_id] = tool_id
+        self.interceptor.evaluate_input(
+            tool_id,
+            _to_text(input_str),
+            session_id=self._session,
+            request_id=str(run_id) if run_id is not None else None,
+        )
+
+    def on_tool_end(self, output: Any, *, run_id: Any = None, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
+        tool_id = self._runs.pop(run_id, None) or "unknown"
+        self.interceptor.scan_output(
+            tool_id,
+            _to_text(output),
+            session_id=self._session,
+            request_id=str(run_id) if run_id is not None else None,
+        )
+
+    def on_tool_error(self, error: BaseException, *, run_id: Any = None, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
+        self._runs.pop(run_id, None)

securevector_sdk_langgraph/middleware.py

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+"""LangChain v1 ``wrap_tool_call`` middleware — the primary interception path.
+
+This is the documented way to intercept a tool call before it runs and block
+it: the middleware receives a ``ToolCallRequest`` (with structured
+``tool_call["name"]`` / ``["args"]``), and either calls ``handler(request)`` to
+execute the tool or returns a ``ToolMessage`` *without* calling the handler to
+short-circuit it. Returning a ``ToolMessage`` is the sanctioned block — it
+feeds a clean result back to the model instead of raising.
+
+    from securevector_sdk_langgraph import secure_middleware
+    from langchain.agents import create_agent
+
+    agent = create_agent(model, tools, middleware=[secure_middleware(mode="enforce")])
+
+Works for both LangChain ``create_agent`` and LangGraph
+``create_react_agent``/``create_agent`` (they share the middleware surface).
+"""
+
+import json
+import logging
+import uuid
+from typing import Any, Callable, Optional
+
+from .config import Config
+from .core import Interceptor
+
+log = logging.getLogger("securevector_sdk_langgraph")
+
+
+def _to_text(value: Any) -> str:
+    if value is None:
+        return ""
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return value
+    try:
+        return json.dumps(value, default=str)
+    except Exception:
+        return str(value)
+
+
+def _result_text(result: Any) -> str:
+    """Pull text out of whatever the tool handler returned (usually a
+    ToolMessage, possibly a Command or raw value)."""
+    content = getattr(result, "content", None)
+    if content is not None:
+        return _to_text(content)
+    return _to_text(result)
+
+
+def _make_tool_call_handler(
+    interceptor: Interceptor,
+    session: str,
+    tool_message_factory: Callable[..., Any],
+):
+    """Build the ``(request, handler)`` callable used by ``wrap_tool_call``.
+
+    Factored out (and parameterised on the ToolMessage factory) so it is unit
+    testable without a full LangChain v1 install.
+    """
+
+    def _securevector(request, handler):
+        tool_call = getattr(request, "tool_call", None) or {}
+        name = tool_call.get("name") or "unknown"
+        args = tool_call.get("args")
+        call_id = tool_call.get("id")
+        req = uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]
+
+        decision = interceptor.evaluate_input(
+            name, _to_text(args), session_id=session, request_id=req
+        )
+        if decision.blocked:
+            # Documented short-circuit: return a ToolMessage WITHOUT running the
+            # tool. The model sees a clean blocked result, not an exception.
+            return tool_message_factory(
+                content=f"[SecureVector] Tool '{name}' blocked: {decision.reason}",
+                tool_call_id=call_id,
+                status="error",
+            )
+
+        result = handler(request)
+        interceptor.scan_output(
+            name, _result_text(result), session_id=session, request_id=req
+        )
+        return result
+
+    return _securevector
+
+
+def secure_middleware(mode: str = "observe", base_url: Optional[str] = None, **kwargs):
+    """Build a SecureVector ``wrap_tool_call`` middleware.
+
+    ``mode``: ``"observe"`` (fail-open, default) or ``"enforce"`` (fail-closed —
+    denied tools are short-circuited with a ToolMessage before they run).
+    Raises ``ImportError`` if LangChain v1's middleware API is unavailable.
+    """
+    try:
+        from langchain.agents.middleware import wrap_tool_call
+        from langchain.messages import ToolMessage
+    except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover - depends on langchain version
+        raise ImportError(
+            "secure_middleware requires LangChain v1 (langchain>=1.0) for "
+            "langchain.agents.middleware.wrap_tool_call. For older versions, "
+            "use SecureVectorCallbackHandler for observe-only logging."
+        ) from exc
+
+    cfg = Config.from_env(mode=mode, base_url=base_url, **kwargs)
+    interceptor = Interceptor(cfg)
+    session = uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]
+    return wrap_tool_call(_make_tool_call_handler(interceptor, session, ToolMessage))

securevector_sdk_langgraph/tool_id.py

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+"""Canonical tool-id normalization — the ONLY framework-specific mapping.
+
+The whole SecureVector fleet keys permissions and audit on a single canonical
+``tool_id``. LangChain surfaces a tool's name as ``Tool.name``, delivered in
+the callback's ``serialized["name"]`` (or, for newer cores, a flat ``name``
+kwarg). Normalizing it here is the one piece of LangChain-specific code; every
+downstream step (permission resolution, analysis, audit) is shared engine
+behaviour, so a policy authored once — "allow web_search, block shell" —
+applies identically across LangChain / LangGraph / CrewAI.
+
+Casing is preserved: the local app matches tool ids case-insensitively, so a
+rule authored ``tool_id="Bash"`` still governs a LangChain tool named ``bash``.
+"""
+
+from typing import Any, Optional
+
+# The audit/Bill-of-Tools/OCSF pipeline groups by this attribution tag.
+RUNTIME_KIND = "langgraph"
+
+
+def normalize_tool_id(serialized: Any, name: Optional[str] = None) -> str:
+    """Resolve a canonical tool id from a LangChain ``on_tool_start`` payload.
+
+    Accepts the legacy ``serialized`` dict (``{"name": ...}`` or a dotted
+    ``{"id": [...]}`` path) and/or a flat ``name`` kwarg. Falls back to
+    ``"unknown"`` so a missing name never crashes the agent.
+    """
+    raw: Optional[str] = None
+    if isinstance(serialized, dict):
+        raw = serialized.get("name")
+        if not raw:
+            ident = serialized.get("id")
+            if isinstance(ident, (list, tuple)) and ident:
+                raw = str(ident[-1])
+    if not raw:
+        raw = name
+    if not raw:
+        return "unknown"
+    return str(raw).strip() or "unknown"

securevector_sdk_langgraph-1.0.0.dist-info/METADATA

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: securevector-sdk-langgraph
+Version: 1.0.0
+Summary: SecureVector SDK for LangGraph — brings the local threat monitor's three controls (tool-call permissions, secret/data-leak detection, threat detection) to every LangGraph tool call, with tamper-evident audit logging.
+Author: SecureVector
+License: Apache-2.0
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://securevector.io
+Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/Secure-Vector/securevector-sdk-langgraph
+Keywords: langgraph,langchain,llm,security,ai-agent,audit,compliance,tool-permissions
+Classifier: Development Status :: 5 - Production/Stable
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: Apache Software License
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Topic :: Security
+Requires-Python: >=3.10
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+License-File: NOTICE
+Requires-Dist: securevector-ai-monitor>=4.7
+Requires-Dist: langgraph>=1.0
+Requires-Dist: langchain>=1.0
+Provides-Extra: dev
+Requires-Dist: pytest>=7.0; extra == "dev"
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# SecureVector SDK for LangGraph
+
+[![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/securevector-sdk-langgraph)](https://pypi.org/project/securevector-sdk-langgraph/)
+[![Downloads](https://img.shields.io/pypi/dm/securevector-sdk-langgraph)](https://pypistats.org/packages/securevector-sdk-langgraph)
+[![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.10%2B-blue)](https://pypi.org/project/securevector-sdk-langgraph/)
+[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache--2.0-green)](LICENSE)
+
+> Bring the SecureVector local threat monitor's three controls — **tool-call
+> permissions**, **secret / data-leak detection**, and **threat detection** —
+> to every LangGraph tool call, with tamper-evident audit logging. One import.
+
+```bash
+pip install securevector-sdk-langgraph
+```
+
+> 📦 **One install — batteries included.** `pip install securevector-sdk-langgraph`
+> **also installs the local SecureVector app** (`securevector-ai-monitor`): the
+> adapter **and** the detection engine + tamper-evident audit chain arrive in a
+> single `pip install`. The SDK is a thin interception layer — **the app must be
+> running locally** (`securevector-app --web`) for it to do anything.
+
+## Quick start
+
+**Enforcement (recommended)** — the documented `wrap_tool_call` middleware,
+accepted by the langgraph-backed `create_agent` (note:
+`langgraph.prebuilt.create_react_agent` does **not** take a `middleware`
+argument — use `create_agent`):
+
+```python
+from securevector_sdk_langgraph import secure_middleware
+from langchain.agents import create_agent
+
+agent = create_agent(
+    model, tools,
+    middleware=[secure_middleware(mode="enforce")],
+)
+```
+
+A denied tool is short-circuited with a `ToolMessage` before it runs — no
+exceptions, no crashed graph.
+
+**Observe-only logging** for any graph (passes through `langchain-core`'s
+callback manager):
+
+```python
+from securevector_sdk_langgraph import SecureVectorCallbackHandler
+
+graph.invoke(state, config={"callbacks": [SecureVectorCallbackHandler()]})
+```
+
+**Raw `StateGraph` with custom tool nodes** (no middleware surface): gate the
+tool with LangGraph's documented `interrupt()` for human/programmatic approval:
+
+```python
+from langgraph.types import interrupt
+
+@tool
+def run_query(sql: str):
+    interrupt({"action": "run_query", "args": {"sql": sql}})  # pause for approval
+    ...
+```
+
+> Why these paths? LangGraph **callbacks are observability-only** — they cannot
+> cleanly block a tool. The **`wrap_tool_call` middleware** (for `create_agent`)
+> and **`interrupt()`** (for raw graphs) are the documented gates.
+
+## What happens on every tool call
+
+Before a tool node runs, the SDK:
+
+1. **(a) Permissions** — resolves an allow/block verdict for the tool, using the
+   app's own precedence: cloud-pushed **synced** policy → local **override** →
+   **essential** registry → default-allow.
+2. **(b)+(c) Secret & threat scan** — sends the serialized tool input through the
+   app's `/analyze` pipeline.
+
+After the tool returns, the result is scanned the same way to catch secrets /
+exfiltration in tool output. Every decision is written to the app's audit chain
+tagged `runtime_kind="langgraph"`.
+
+## observe vs enforce
+
+| | local app reachable | local app unreachable |
+|---|---|---|
+| **observe** (default) | log + advisory verdict; tool always runs | tool runs (fail-open) |
+| **enforce** (opt-in) | tool runs only if the verdict ≠ block | **tool denied** (fail-closed) |
+
+```python
+agent = create_agent(model, tools, middleware=[secure_middleware(mode="enforce")])
+```
+
+Enforce mode prints a one-time disclosure to stderr. (Enforcement requires the
+middleware or `interrupt()` path; the observe callback handler always logs only.)
+
+## Configuration
+
+All optional, via env or `install(...)` kwargs:
+
+| Env var | Default | Meaning |
+|---|---|---|
+| `SECUREVECTOR_SDK_APP_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8741` | local app base URL |
+| `SECUREVECTOR_SDK_MODE` | `observe` | `observe` or `enforce` |
+| `SECUREVECTOR_SDK_TIMEOUT_MS` | `3000` | per-call verdict timeout |
+| `SECUREVECTOR_SDK_RISK_THRESHOLD` | `70` | risk score that blocks in enforce mode |
+| `SECUREVECTOR_SDK_DISABLED` | _(unset)_ | set truthy to no-op |
+
+## Compliance
+
+The tool-call-level, attributed, tamper-evident audit trail this produces is
+exactly the **action-layer logging** auditors ask for under **EU AI Act
+Art. 12 / 15**. This SDK produces the local evidence; the cloud governance
+surface turns it into an auditor-ready pack.
+
+## Trademarks
+
+**SecureVector** is the product name of this SDK. **LangGraph** and
+**LangChain** are trademarks of LangChain, Inc. This is an independent,
+community SDK that *integrates with* LangGraph via its public callback API. It
+is **not affiliated with, sponsored by, or endorsed by LangChain, Inc.** The
+name uses "langgraph" only descriptively, to identify the framework this
+package works with (nominative fair use).
+
+## License
+
+Apache-2.0. See [LICENSE](LICENSE) and [NOTICE](NOTICE).

securevector_sdk_langgraph-1.0.0.dist-info/RECORD

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+securevector_sdk_langgraph-1.0.0.dist-info/licenses/NOTICE,sha256=BRqOuh_6RkQGy-jba3gfwmNCJtwb4Zt5y0T9g8aob80,688
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+securevector_sdk_langgraph-1.0.0.dist-info/WHEEL,sha256=aeYiig01lYGDzBgS8HxWXOg3uV61G9ijOsup-k9o1sk,91
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securevector_sdk_langgraph-1.0.0.dist-info/WHEEL

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Wheel-Version: 1.0
+Generator: setuptools (82.0.1)
+Root-Is-Purelib: true
+Tag: py3-none-any
+

securevector_sdk_langgraph-1.0.0.dist-info/licenses/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+
+                                 Apache License
+                           Version 2.0, January 2004
+                        http://www.apache.org/licenses/
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securevector_sdk_langgraph-1.0.0.dist-info/licenses/NOTICE

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+SecureVector SDK for LangGraph
+Copyright (c) SecureVector
+
+This product is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (see LICENSE).
+
+This software integrates with the LangGraph framework via its public callback
+API. "LangGraph" and "LangChain" are trademarks of LangChain, Inc. This
+package is an independent, community integration and is not affiliated with,
+sponsored by, or endorsed by LangChain, Inc. The framework name is used only
+descriptively to identify compatibility (nominative fair use).
+
+This package depends on:
+  - securevector-ai-monitor (the local SecureVector app + SDK)
+  - langgraph (MIT, (c) LangChain, Inc.)
+  - langchain-core (Apache-2.0, (c) LangChain, Inc.)

securevector_sdk_langgraph-1.0.0.dist-info/top_level.txt

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+securevector_sdk_langgraph