runbooks 0.9.2__py3-none-any.whl → 0.9.5__py3-none-any.whl

runbooks/inventory/cloudtrail.md

@@ -1,727 +0,0 @@
-# CloudTrail: Accountability and Governance
-
-??? info "python check_cloudtrail_status.py"
-
-    | Parent Acct  | Account Number | Region    | Trail Name           | Trail Type | S3 Bucket                     |
-    | ------------ | -------------- | --------- | -------------------- | ---------- | ----------------------------- |
-    | 909135376185 | 909135376185   | us-east-1 | ams-tf-cloudtraillog | OrgTrail   | ams-cloudtrail-vector-all-org |
-
----
-
-## How to identify WHO changed an AWS Resources, WHEN, and HOW it happened
-
-
-
-??? note "🔎 Objective: Changed an AWS Security Group (sg-xxx) in an AWS account"
-
-    > We need to know:
-
-    - **Who** made the change
-    - **When** it happened
-    - **How** (what method/tool was used)
-    - Optionally: **What** exactly was changed (rules added/removed/modified)
-
-
-## ✅ Step-by-Step Forensic Workflow
-
-### 🛠️ **1. Enable or Query AWS CloudTrail (Primary Source)**
-
-CloudTrail is your **single source of truth** for who did what, when, and how in AWS.
-
-#### 🔍 How to Query CloudTrail for SG Changes:
-**Console:**
-1. Go to **CloudTrail > Event History**
-2. Set **Lookup Attribute** to:
-   - **Event name**: `AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress`, `AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress`, `RevokeSecurityGroupIngress`, `RevokeSecurityGroupEgress`, or `UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptions`
-   - Or filter by **Resource Name**: `sg-xxx`
-3. Set **Time Range** (last 7–30 days typically)
-
-**Important Fields to Look At:**
-| Field | Description |
-|-------|-------------|
-| **Event Time** | When the change occurred |
-| **Event Name** | Type of operation (authorize/revoke/modify) |
-| **User Identity** | IAM principal who initiated the change |
-| **Access Key / Session Context** | Whether it was via console, CLI, or automation |
-| **Source IP** | IP address where the change came from |
-| **Event Source** | Always `ec2.amazonaws.com` for SG changes |
-| **Request Parameters** | IP ranges, ports, protocols involved in the change |
-
-> ✅ **Pro Tip**: If you're using **AWS Organizations**, query from the **Audit Account's CloudTrail**, or the central logging bucket if it's delivered via S3.
-
----
-
-### 📜 **2. Use AWS Config for Historical Diff View**
-
-If AWS Config is enabled for your account (highly recommended), it provides **resource-level history and diffs**.
-
-#### 🔍 How to Use:
-1. Go to **AWS Config > Resources**
-2. Filter by **Resource Type**: *EC2 Security Group*
-3. Search for **sg-xxx**
-4. View **Configuration Timeline**:
-   - You’ll see **before/after diffs**
-   - You can pinpoint what rule (CIDR/port/protocol) was added or removed
-
-> 🔐 **Bonus**: AWS Config also tells you **compliance status**, i.e., whether the change violated your internal security baselines.
-
----
-
-### 📊 **3. Use Athena + CloudTrail Logs for Advanced Search (Optional)**
-
-If your CloudTrail is delivered to S3 (recommended for long-term logging), you can:
-- Use **Amazon Athena** with the **AWS CloudTrail partitioned schema**
-- Run a SQL query like this:
-
-```sql
-SELECT
-  eventTime,
-  eventName,
-  userIdentity.arn,
-  sourceIPAddress,
-  requestParameters.groupId,
-  requestParameters.ipPermissions
-FROM cloudtrail_logs
-WHERE eventSource = 'ec2.amazonaws.com'
-  AND requestParameters.groupId = 'sg-xxx'
-  AND eventName IN (
-    'AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress',
-    'RevokeSecurityGroupIngress',
-    'AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress',
-    'RevokeSecurityGroupEgress'
-)
-ORDER BY eventTime DESC
-```
-
----
-
-### 🧑‍💻 **4. Correlate IAM User/Role Access**
-
-Once you identify **who** made the change, validate:
-
-- Was it a human user (`IAMUser`) or automated role (`IAMRole`, `AssumedRole`)?
-- Was MFA enforced for human access?
-- Did the user belong to a **delegated group (like `Admin`, `NetworkOps`)**?
-
-Use **AWS IAM > Access Analyzer** or **CloudTrail "userIdentity" block** for this.
-
-> 🔐 If it's an assumed role like `DevOpsAssumeRole`, look for **"sessionContext > sessionIssuer > userName"** in CloudTrail to trace back the original IAM identity.
-
----
-
-### 🔄 **5. Cross-Check via Change Management / ITSM**
-
-If you're practicing good governance, you should have:
-- A **JIRA ticket**, **ServiceNow request**, or **GitOps pull request** associated with the change
-- Cross-reference **timestamp** and **user** from CloudTrail with ticket system logs
-- If deployed via Terraform/CDK: check the commit history or CI/CD job logs
-
----
-
-## 🔥 Security Best Practices Going Forward
-
-| Practice | Why |
-|---------|-----|
-| ✅ Enable **CloudTrail org-wide** and deliver logs to central S3 | Full audit trail |
-| ✅ Use **AWS Config** across accounts | Historical visibility of resource changes |
-| ✅ Integrate **CloudTrail Insights** | Detect unusual activity like bulk security group changes |
-| ✅ Tag SGs with `Owner`, `Environment`, `ChangeTicket` | Aids investigation |
-| ✅ Enforce **IAM Conditions** for `ec2:AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress` etc. | Only allow changes through approved paths |
-| ✅ Use **GuardDuty** or **Security Hub** to flag risky changes (e.g., `0.0.0.0/0` open port) | Detection & alerting |
-
----
-
-> **An enterprise-grade, fully automated solution** for **monitoring and alerting on AWS Security Group (`sg-xxx`) changes** with forensic-level visibility, real-time alerts, and infrastructure governance.
-
-We're going to:
-
-1. ✅ Deep dive: How to **use Athena with CloudTrail partitioned schema**
-2. ✅ Craft **Athena queries** to detect SG changes
-3. ✅ Configure **AWS Config rules** to enforce and detect policy violations
-4. ✅ Build a **real-time alert workflow** using **EventBridge + SNS + Microsoft Teams**
-5. ✅ Wrap with best practices for **automation, security, and audit-readiness**
-
----
-
-## 🔍 PART 1: Use Amazon Athena with AWS CloudTrail Logs (Partitioned Schema)
-
-Amazon Athena allows you to **query CloudTrail logs stored in S3 using SQL**, which is ideal for forensic investigations or continuous audits.
-
-### ✅ Step-by-Step Setup
-
-#### **Step 1 – Ensure CloudTrail is Delivered to S3**
-If not already configured:
-- Go to **CloudTrail > Trails**
-- Ensure **S3 logging is enabled** and directed to a known bucket (e.g., `cloudtrail-logs-org-central`)
-- Ideally use **organization trail** for centralized auditing
-
-#### **Step 2 – Create Athena Table for CloudTrail Logs**
-
-Use this sample schema to create an Athena table (you only need to do this once per account or org-wide audit bucket):
-
-> ~~s3://<your-cloudtrail-bucket-name>/AWSLogs/<account-id>/CloudTrail/~~ --> s3://cloudtrail-logs-org-central/AWSLogs/~~Your_Management_Account_ID~~/CloudTrail/
-
-s3://ams-cloudtrail-vector-all-org/AWSLogs/909135376185/CloudTrail/
-
-> create-cloudtrail_logs-table.sql
-
-```sql
-CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE IF NOT EXISTS cloudtrail_logs (
-  eventVersion STRING,
-  eventTime TIMESTAMP,
-  eventSource STRING,
-  eventName STRING,
-  awsRegion STRING,
-  sourceIPAddress STRING,
-  userAgent STRING,
-  userIdentity STRUCT<
-    type: STRING,
-    principalId: STRING,
-    arn: STRING,
-    accountId: STRING,
-    accessKeyId: STRING,
-    userName: STRING,
-    sessionContext: STRUCT<
-      attributes: STRUCT<
-        mfaAuthenticated: STRING,
-        creationDate: STRING>,
-      sessionIssuer: STRUCT<
-        type: STRING,
-        principalId: STRING,
-        arn: STRING,
-        accountId: STRING,
-        userName: STRING>>>,
-  requestParameters STRING,
-  responseElements STRING,
-  additionalEventData STRING,
-  errorCode STRING,
-  errorMessage STRING,
-  requestID STRING,
-  eventID STRING,
-  readOnly STRING,
-  eventType STRING,
-  apiVersion STRING,
-  managementEvent BOOLEAN,
-  recipientAccountId STRING,
-  sharedEventID STRING,
-  vpcEndpointId STRING
-)
-PARTITIONED BY (`region` STRING, `year` STRING, `month` STRING, `day` STRING)
-STORED AS PARQUET
-LOCATION 's3://your-cloudtrail-logs/AWSLogs/<account-id>/CloudTrail/'
-TBLPROPERTIES (
-  "classification"="parquet",
-  "projection.enabled"="true",
-  "projection.region.type"="enum",
-  "projection.region.values"="us-east-1,us-west-2,ap-southeast-2",
-  "projection.year.type"="integer",
-  "projection.year.range"="2024,2030",
-  "projection.month.type"="integer",
-  "projection.month.range"="1,12",
-  "projection.day.type"="integer",
-  "projection.day.range"="1,31",
-  "storage.location.template"="s3://your-cloudtrail-logs/AWSLogs/<account-id>/CloudTrail/${region}/${year}/${month}/${day}/"
-);
-```
-
-> Replace `<your-cloudtrail-bucket-name>` and `<account-id>` accordingly.
-
-#### **Step 3 – Repair Partitions (very important)**
-
-```sql
-MSCK REPAIR TABLE cloudtrail_logs;
-```
-
-This loads available partitions into Athena for querying.
-
----
-
-## 📊 PART 2: Craft Athena Query to Detect SG Changes
-
-Here's an optimized, real-world Athena SQL query to detect all Security Group changes (`sg-xxx`):
-
-```sql
-SELECT
-  eventTime,
-  eventName,
-  userIdentity.arn AS actor,
-  userIdentity.sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName AS assumedBy,
-  sourceIPAddress,
-  requestParameters,
-  json_extract_scalar(requestParameters, '$.groupId') AS securityGroupId
-FROM cloudtrail_logs
-WHERE eventName IN (
-    'AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress',
-    'RevokeSecurityGroupIngress',
-    'AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress',
-    'RevokeSecurityGroupEgress',
-    'UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsEgress',
-    'UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsIngress'
-  )
-  AND json_extract_scalar(requestParameters, '$.groupId') = 'sg-xxx'
-  AND year = '2025'
-  AND month = '04'
-ORDER BY eventTime DESC;
-```
-
-> ✅ **Customize** the `year` and `month` fields based on your timeframe. This is important for partition pruning and performance.
-
----
-
-## 🛡️ PART 3: Use AWS Config to Detect Non-Compliant SG Changes
-
-### ✅ AWS Config Setup
-
-Ensure AWS Config is:
-- **Enabled in the account or centrally via org**
-- Recording **EC2:SecurityGroup** as a tracked resource
-
-### 🔧 Create AWS Managed or Custom Rule
-
-Use AWS Managed Rule: `INCOMING_SSH_DISABLED`, `RESTRICTED_INCOMING_TRAFFIC`, or create a **custom rule** (Lambda-backed) to detect violations like:
-
-- **Ports open to 0.0.0.0/0**
-- **New rules outside of allowed IP range**
-- **Unauthorized source CIDRs**
-
-### ✅ Example: Custom AWS Config Rule for CIDR Scope
-
-You can use [AWS Config Rule example](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/evaluate-config_develop-rules_nodejs.html) or build a custom rule in Python that flags any ingress rule with `0.0.0.0/0`.
-
----
-
-## 🚨 PART 4: Automate Real-Time Alerting with EventBridge + SNS + MS Teams
-
-### 🧱 Overview of Architecture
-
-1. **EventBridge Rule** watches for specific `AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress`, etc.
-2. **SNS Topic** receives those events
-3. **Lambda Function** transforms event into MS Teams format and posts via webhook
-
----
-
-### 🔧 Step-by-Step: Setup
-
-#### ✅ 1. Create EventBridge Rule
-
-```json
-{
-  "source": ["aws.ec2"],
-  "detail-type": ["AWS API Call via CloudTrail"],
-  "detail": {
-    "eventName": [
-      "AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress",
-      "RevokeSecurityGroupIngress",
-      "AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress",
-      "RevokeSecurityGroupEgress"
-    ],
-    "requestParameters.groupId": ["sg-xxx"]
-  }
-}
-```
-
-#### ✅ 2. Create SNS Topic (e.g., `SGChangeAlerts`)
-
-- In **SNS**, create a topic
-- Add Lambda (below) as a subscriber
-
-#### ✅ 3. Create MS Teams Incoming Webhook
-
-- In MS Teams:
-  - Go to a channel
-  - Choose “Connectors” → “Incoming Webhook”
-  - Name it, copy the **Webhook URL**
-
----
-
-#### ✅ 4. Lambda Function to Post to MS Teams
-
-Use a simple Python Lambda (add your webhook URL):
-
-```python
-import json
-import urllib3
-
-http = urllib3.PoolManager()
-teams_webhook_url = "<YOUR_MS_TEAMS_WEBHOOK_URL>"
-
-def lambda_handler(event, context):
-    for record in event['Records']:
-        message = json.loads(record['Sns']['Message'])
-        detail = message.get('detail', {})
-
-        sg_id = detail.get('requestParameters', {}).get('groupId', 'Unknown SG')
-        event_name = detail.get('eventName', 'UnknownEvent')
-        actor = detail.get('userIdentity', {}).get('arn', 'Unknown')
-        region = detail.get('awsRegion', 'Unknown')
-        source_ip = detail.get('sourceIPAddress', 'Unknown')
-
-        msg = {
-            "title": "⚠️ AWS Security Group Change Detected",
-            "text": f"**Event**: {event_name}\n**SG**: {sg_id}\n**User**: {actor}\n**Region**: {region}\n**Source IP**: {source_ip}"
-        }
-
-        http.request('POST', teams_webhook_url, body=json.dumps(msg), headers={'Content-Type': 'application/json'})
-```
-
-- Attach basic execution policy (SNS invocation + logs)
-- Test by triggering a manual SG change
-
----
-
-## 🔄 PART 5: Best Practices for Automation & Audit Maturity
-
-| Category | Best Practice |
-|----------|----------------|
-| **Logging** | Store CloudTrail in centralized, versioned, encrypted S3 bucket |
-| **Query** | Partition Athena tables by `year/month/day` for efficiency |
-| **Alerting** | Always include user identity, IP, region in alerts |
-| **Tagging** | Tag SGs with `Owner`, `Environment`, `ChangeTicket` |
-| **Governance** | Use SCPs and IAM boundaries to restrict unauthorized SG changes |
-| **Forensics** | Store Athena queries in a shared repo; automate with scheduled queries for weekly audits |
-| **Cost Optimization** | Use Amazon Athena scheduled queries + QuickSight dashboards instead of external tools |
-
----
-
-## 🎯 Final Thoughts: Governance-Driven Cloud Security
-
-This solution provides:
-- **Immediate visibility** (EventBridge + Teams alerting)
-- **Historical traceability** (CloudTrail + Athena)
-- **Policy enforcement** (AWS Config + IAM/SCP)
-- **Audit readiness** (Tagging + documentation + centralized logs)
-
-By integrating these layers, you go beyond reaction and establish a **proactive, auditable, and secure cloud operating model**.
-
----
-
-Absolutely. Let's take our time and raise the bar.
-
-We are now enhancing the **Athena Query Suite** to support **real-time or near-real-time** analysis of **Critical Alerts** across:
-
-1. 🔐 **Security**
-2. 🌐 **Network**
-3. 🏗️ **Infrastructure**
-4. 💻 **EC2 Runtime**
-
----
-
-## 🧠 Goal:
-
-Design and implement **production-ready Athena SQL queries**, with **partition projection**, **structured access**, and **cost-efficient filtering**, for all **critical alert types**. These queries should:
-- Align with **AWS best practices**
-- Be easy to integrate with **scheduled queries, dashboards, or alert pipelines**
-- Prioritize **precision, performance, and auditability**
-
----
-
-## 🧩 Improvements Identified from Previous Athena Queries:
-
-| Area | Original | To-Be |
-|------|----------|-------|
-| Filtering | Broad or unpartitioned | Partitioned by `year`, `month`, `day`, `region` |
-| Identity Insight | Simple `userIdentity.arn` | Full `sessionContext.sessionIssuer.userName`, MFA check |
-| Parameter Handling | `json_extract_scalar` | Structured `MAP` access (e.g. `requestParameters['groupId']`) |
-| Output Fields | Too generic | Specific fields like `eventName`, `caller`, `ip`, `action`, `resourceId` |
-| Extensibility | Hardcoded SG ID | Accepts any SG, port, or IP — makes it reusable |
-
----
-
-## ✅ Let’s Now Write the Full Set of **Critical Athena Queries**
-
----
-
-### 🔐 **1. Security Alerts**
-
----
-
-#### 🔸 A. Unauthorized API Calls (Brute Force, Exploitation Attempts)
-
-> UnauthorizedOperation.sql
-
-```sql
-SELECT
-  eventTime,
-  userIdentity.arn AS user_arn,
-  sourceIPAddress,
-  awsRegion,
-  eventName,
-  errorCode
-FROM cloudtrail_logs
-WHERE eventName = 'UnauthorizedOperation'
-  AND year = '2025'
-  AND month = '04'
-  AND day BETWEEN '01' AND '08'
-ORDER BY eventTime DESC;
-```
-
-> 📌 **Improvement**: Could also add `errorCode IN ('AccessDenied', 'UnauthorizedOperation')` to catch more cases.
-
----
-
-#### 🔸 B. Root Account Usage
-
-> RootAccountUsage.sql
-
-```sql
-SELECT
-  eventTime,
-  eventName,
-  sourceIPAddress,
-  userIdentity.arn AS user_arn,
-  userAgent
-FROM cloudtrail_logs
-WHERE userIdentity.type = 'Root'
-  AND year = '2025'
-  AND month = '04'
-  AND day BETWEEN '01' AND '08'
-ORDER BY eventTime DESC;
-```
-
-> ✅ Use `userIdentity.type = 'Root'` — most accurate method to detect root usage across API calls.
-
----
-
-#### 🔸 C. Security Group Rule Changes
-
-> SecurityGroupRuleChanges.sql
-
-```sql
-SELECT
-  eventTime,
-  userIdentity.arn AS user,
-  eventName,
-  requestParameters['groupId'] AS securityGroupId,
-  requestParameters['ipPermissions'] AS modifiedPermissions,
-  sourceIPAddress
-FROM cloudtrail_logs
-WHERE eventName IN (
-  'AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress',
-  'RevokeSecurityGroupIngress',
-  'AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress',
-  'RevokeSecurityGroupEgress',
-  'UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsIngress',
-  'UpdateSecurityGroupRuleDescriptionsEgress'
-)
-  AND year = '2025'
-  AND month = '04'
-  AND day BETWEEN '01' AND '08'
-ORDER BY eventTime DESC;
-```
-
----
-
-#### 🔸 D. IAM Policy/Role Changes
-
-```sql
-SELECT
-  eventTime,
-  eventName,
-  userIdentity.arn AS user,
-  requestParameters['roleName'] AS role,
-  requestParameters['policyDocument'] AS newPolicy,
-  sourceIPAddress
-FROM cloudtrail_logs
-WHERE eventName IN (
-  'PutRolePolicy', 'AttachRolePolicy', 'CreatePolicy',
-  'CreateRole', 'UpdateAssumeRolePolicy'
-)
-  AND year = '2025'
-  AND month = '04'
-  AND day BETWEEN '01' AND '08'
-ORDER BY eventTime DESC;
-```
-
----
-
-#### 🔸 E. Port 22/3389 Open to 0.0.0.0/0
-
-```sql
-SELECT
-  eventTime,
-  userIdentity.arn AS user,
-  requestParameters['groupId'] AS sg_id,
-  requestParameters['ipPermissions'] AS permissions,
-  sourceIPAddress
-FROM cloudtrail_logs
-WHERE eventName IN ('AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress')
-  AND requestParameters['ipPermissions'] LIKE '%0.0.0.0/0%'
-  AND (
-    requestParameters['ipPermissions'] LIKE '%22%' OR
-    requestParameters['ipPermissions'] LIKE '%3389%'
-  )
-  AND year = '2025'
-  AND month = '04'
-  AND day BETWEEN '01' AND '08'
-ORDER BY eventTime DESC;
-```
-
----
-
-### 🌐 **2. Network Alerts**
-
----
-
-#### 🔸 A. NAT Gateway or Internet Gateway Failures (CloudTrail-Based)
-
-CloudTrail doesn't capture health-check failure natively. Use **CloudWatch logs + SNS** for real-time alerts. But you can **detect removal** of NAT/IGW:
-
-```sql
-SELECT
-  eventTime,
-  eventName,
-  userIdentity.arn AS user,
-  requestParameters['gatewayId'] AS gateway_id,
-  sourceIPAddress
-FROM cloudtrail_logs
-WHERE eventName IN ('DeleteNatGateway', 'DetachInternetGateway')
-  AND year = '2025'
-  AND month = '04'
-  AND day BETWEEN '01' AND '08'
-ORDER BY eventTime DESC;
-```
-
----
-
-#### 🔸 B. VPC Flow Logs — Suspicious Connections (JOIN with parsed Flow Logs)
-
-This requires **VPC Flow Logs** parsed via **Athena + Glue**. Sample query pattern:
-
-```sql
-SELECT *
-FROM vpc_flow_logs_parquet
-WHERE dstaddr IN ('1.2.3.4', '8.8.8.8')
-  AND dstport IN (22, 3389, 3306)
-  AND action = 'ACCEPT'
-  AND day BETWEEN '2025-04-01' AND '2025-04-08'
-ORDER BY start DESC;
-```
-
----
-
-### 🏗️ **3. Infrastructure Monitoring Alerts**
-
-> These are best handled via **CloudWatch alarms**, but some are detectable via Athena from CloudTrail as *resource state changes*.
-
----
-
-#### 🔸 A. Auto Scaling Group Launch Failures
-
-```sql
-SELECT
-  eventTime,
-  userIdentity.arn,
-  eventName,
-  errorMessage,
-  sourceIPAddress
-FROM cloudtrail_logs
-WHERE eventSource = 'autoscaling.amazonaws.com'
-  AND eventName = 'CreateAutoScalingGroup'
-  AND errorCode IS NOT NULL
-  AND year = '2025'
-  AND month = '04'
-ORDER BY eventTime DESC;
-```
-
----
-
-#### 🔸 B. Backup Failure (AWS Backup)
-
-```sql
-SELECT
-  eventTime,
-  eventName,
-  userIdentity.arn,
-  requestParameters['backupVaultName'],
-  errorMessage
-FROM cloudtrail_logs
-WHERE eventSource = 'backup.amazonaws.com'
-  AND eventName = 'StartBackupJob'
-  AND errorCode IS NOT NULL
-  AND year = '2025'
-  AND month = '04'
-ORDER BY eventTime DESC;
-```
-
----
-
-### 💻 **4. EC2 Instance Alerts**
-
----
-
-#### 🔸 A. Unexpected Stop or Termination
-
-```sql
-SELECT
-  eventTime,
-  userIdentity.arn,
-  eventName,
-  requestParameters['instanceId'],
-  sourceIPAddress
-FROM cloudtrail_logs
-WHERE eventSource = 'ec2.amazonaws.com'
-  AND eventName IN ('StopInstances', 'TerminateInstances')
-  AND year = '2025'
-  AND month = '04'
-ORDER BY eventTime DESC;
-```
-
----
-
-#### 🔸 B. EC2 Status Check Failure (Indirect Detection)
-
-You can track `DescribeInstanceStatus` calls or hook into **CloudWatch Alarm**. Sample from CloudTrail:
-
-```sql
-SELECT
-  eventTime,
-  userIdentity.arn,
-  eventName,
-  requestParameters['instanceId'],
-  sourceIPAddress
-FROM cloudtrail_logs
-WHERE eventSource = 'ec2.amazonaws.com'
-  AND eventName = 'DescribeInstanceStatus'
-  AND year = '2025'
-  AND month = '04'
-ORDER BY eventTime DESC;
-```
-
----
-
-## 🧱 Implementation Tips
-
-- Automate Athena queries via **Scheduled Queries (daily/hourly)**
-- Export results to **S3 + QuickSight** or **alert on non-empty results**
-- Pair with **EventBridge rules** for real-time alerts
-- Use **Lambda** to format and send alert messages to:
-  - **MS Teams / Slack / Email**
-  - Custom dashboards
-
----
-
-## ✅ Summary Table of Enhanced Queries
-
-| Alert Type | Query Name | Detection Method |
-|------------|------------|------------------|
-| Security | Unauthorized API Calls | CloudTrail via Athena |
-| Security | Root Account Usage | `userIdentity.type = 'Root'` |
-| Security | SG Rule Changes | `eventName` in SG Ops |
-| Security | IAM Policy Changes | `PutRolePolicy`, etc. |
-| Security | Public SSH/RDP | `ipPermissions` contains `0.0.0.0/0` |
-| Network | NAT/IGW Delete | `DeleteNatGateway`, `DetachInternetGateway` |
-| Network | VPC Flow Anomaly | Join with VPC logs |
-| Infra | ASG Fail | CloudTrail errorCode on `CreateAutoScalingGroup` |
-| Infra | AWS Backup Fail | `StartBackupJob` with error |
-| EC2 | Unexpected Stop | `StopInstances`, `TerminateInstances` |
-| EC2 | Status Check Fail | `DescribeInstanceStatus` queries |
-
----
-
-> TODO: Let’s turn this into a full-scale, automated DevSecOps solution.
-
-- **Terraform/CDK to create scheduled Athena queries + alerts?**
-- A ready-made **QuickSight security dashboard?**
-- A **GitHub repo** for these SQL files + alert infrastructure?
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