ripperdoc 0.2.8__py3-none-any.whl → 0.2.9__py3-none-any.whl

ripperdoc/utils/permissions/shell_command_validation.py

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ potentially dangerous constructs before execution.
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import re
+import shlex
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from typing import List, Optional, Tuple
 
@@ -25,62 +26,128 @@ def _strip_single_quotes(shell_command: str, first_token: str) -> str:
 
     Single-quoted content in shell is literal and cannot contain command
     substitution, so we can safely ignore it for security analysis.
+
+    Double quotes are kept for analysis since they can contain variable
+    expansions and command substitutions.
     """
-    in_single_quote_mode = False
-    next_char_is_backslash_escaped = False
-    command_without_single_quotes = ""
-
-    for i, current_char in enumerate(shell_command):
-        if next_char_is_backslash_escaped:
-            next_char_is_backslash_escaped = False
-            if not in_single_quote_mode:
-                command_without_single_quotes += current_char
+    in_single_quote = False
+    escaped = False
+    result = []
+
+    i = 0
+    while i < len(shell_command):
+        char = shell_command[i]
+
+        if escaped:
+            escaped = False
+            result.append(char)
+            i += 1
             continue
 
-        if current_char == "\\":
-            next_char_is_backslash_escaped = True
-            if not in_single_quote_mode:
-                command_without_single_quotes += current_char
+        if char == "\\":
+            escaped = True
+            result.append(char)
+            i += 1
             continue
 
-        if current_char == "'" and not next_char_is_backslash_escaped:
-            in_single_quote_mode = not in_single_quote_mode
+        if char == "'":
+            in_single_quote = not in_single_quote
+            i += 1
             continue
 
-        # Special handling for jq double-quoted strings
-        if (
-            first_token == "jq"
-            and current_char == '"'
-            and not next_char_is_backslash_escaped
-            and not in_single_quote_mode
-        ):
-            # Scan to find the end of the double-quoted string
-            quoted_string = ""
-            scan_position = i + 1
-
-            while scan_position < len(shell_command) and shell_command[scan_position] != '"':
-                if (
-                    shell_command[scan_position] == "\\"
-                    and scan_position + 1 < len(shell_command)
-                ):
-                    scan_position += 2
-                    continue
-                quoted_string += shell_command[scan_position]
-                scan_position += 1
+        if not in_single_quote:
+            result.append(char)
+
+        i += 1
+
+    return "".join(result)
+
+
+def _strip_quotes_for_analysis(command: str) -> str:
+    """Strip content inside both single and double quotes for security analysis.
+
+    This is used for checking shell metacharacters in arguments.
+    Double quotes are stripped because they can contain variable expansions
+    and command substitutions that need to be analyzed.
+    """
+    result = []
+    in_single_quote = False
+    in_double_quote = False
+    escaped = False
+
+    i = 0
+    while i < len(command):
+        char = command[i]
+
+        if escaped:
+            escaped = False
+            i += 1
+            continue
+
+        if char == "\\":
+            escaped = True
+            i += 1
+            continue
 
-            # If the quoted string contains command substitution, keep it for analysis
-            if "$(" in quoted_string or "`" in quoted_string:
-                command_without_single_quotes += current_char
-                continue
+        if char == "'" and not in_double_quote:
+            in_single_quote = not in_single_quote
+            i += 1
+            continue
+
+        if char == '"' and not in_single_quote:
+            in_double_quote = not in_double_quote
+            i += 1
+            continue
+
+        if not in_single_quote and not in_double_quote:
+            result.append(char)
 
-            # Skip the entire quoted string
-            # Note: We can't modify i in Python, so we'll need a different approach
-            # For now, just add the character if not in single quote mode
+        i += 1
 
-        if not in_single_quote_mode:
-            command_without_single_quotes += current_char
+    return "".join(result)
 
-    return command_without_single_quotes
+
+def _is_safe_command_pattern(command: str) -> bool:
+    """Check if command matches known safe patterns.
+
+    These are commands that are commonly used and known to be safe
+    even if they contain characters that might otherwise trigger warnings.
+    """
+    import re
+
+    safe_patterns = [
+        # Common version checks
+        r"^\s*(python|python3|node|npm|git|bash|sh)\s+--version\s*$",
+        r"^\s*(python|python3|node|npm|git|bash|sh)\s+-v\s*$",
+        r"^\s*(python|python3|node|npm|git|bash|sh)\s+-V\s*$",
+        # Common help commands
+        r"^\s*\w+\s+--help\s*$",
+        r"^\s*\w+\s+-h\s*$",
+        r"^\s*\w+\s+help\s*$",
+        # Simple echo/print commands
+        r'^\s*echo\s+["\'].*["\']\s*$',
+        r"^\s*print(env|f)?\s+.*$",
+        # Directory listing with common options
+        r'^\s*ls\s+(-[a-zA-Z]*[lhtr]*\s*)*["\']?[^;&|<>]*["\']?\s*$',
+        r"^\s*dir\s+.*$",
+        # Current directory
+        r"^\s*pwd\s*$",
+        # Environment variable checks
+        r"^\s*env\s*$",
+        r"^\s*printenv\s*$",
+        # Which/whereis commands
+        r"^\s*which\s+\w+\s*$",
+        r"^\s*whereis\s+\w+\s*$",
+        # Type/command commands
+        r"^\s*type\s+\w+\s*$",
+        r"^\s*command\s+-v\s+\w+\s*$",
+    ]
+
+    for pattern in safe_patterns:
+        if re.match(pattern, command, re.IGNORECASE):
+            return True
+
+    return False
 
 
 def _sanitize_safe_redirections(command: str) -> str:
@@ -107,8 +174,14 @@ _DANGEROUS_PATTERNS: List[Tuple[re.Pattern[str], str]] = [
     # Parameter substitution
     (re.compile(r"\$\{"), "Command contains ${} parameter substitution"),
     # Input/output redirection
-    (re.compile(r"<(?!\()"), "Command contains input redirection (<) which could read sensitive files"),
-    (re.compile(r">(?!\()"), "Command contains output redirection (>) which could write to arbitrary files"),
+    (
+        re.compile(r"<(?!\()"),
+        "Command contains input redirection (<) which could read sensitive files",
+    ),
+    (
+        re.compile(r">(?!\()"),
+        "Command contains output redirection (>) which could write to arbitrary files",
+    ),
     # Zsh-specific patterns
     (re.compile(r"~\["), "Command contains Zsh-style parameter expansion"),
     (re.compile(r"\(e:"), "Command contains Zsh-style glob qualifiers"),
@@ -132,38 +205,38 @@ _DANGEROUS_METACHARACTER_PATTERNS: List[re.Pattern[str]] = [
 _WINDOWS_DESTRUCTIVE_PATTERNS: List[Tuple[re.Pattern[str], str]] = [
     # rmdir /s - Recursive directory deletion (Windows)
     (
-        re.compile(r'\brmdir\s+.*(/s|/S)', re.IGNORECASE),
-        "Command contains 'rmdir /s' which recursively deletes directories"
+        re.compile(r"\brmdir\s+.*(/s|/S)", re.IGNORECASE),
+        "Command contains 'rmdir /s' which recursively deletes directories",
     ),
     # del /s or del /q - Recursive or quiet file deletion (Windows)
     (
-        re.compile(r'\bdel\s+.*(/s|/S|/q|/Q)', re.IGNORECASE),
-        "Command contains 'del' with dangerous flags (/s or /q)"
+        re.compile(r"\bdel\s+.*(/s|/S|/q|/Q)", re.IGNORECASE),
+        "Command contains 'del' with dangerous flags (/s or /q)",
     ),
     # rd /s - Alias for rmdir /s (Windows)
     (
-        re.compile(r'\brd\s+.*(/s|/S)', re.IGNORECASE),
-        "Command contains 'rd /s' which recursively deletes directories"
+        re.compile(r"\brd\s+.*(/s|/S)", re.IGNORECASE),
+        "Command contains 'rd /s' which recursively deletes directories",
     ),
     # format command (Windows)
     (
-        re.compile(r'\bformat\s+[a-zA-Z]:', re.IGNORECASE),
-        "Command contains 'format' which erases entire drives"
+        re.compile(r"\bformat\s+[a-zA-Z]:", re.IGNORECASE),
+        "Command contains 'format' which erases entire drives",
     ),
     # cmd /c with destructive subcommand
     (
-        re.compile(r'\bcmd\s+/[cC]\s+.*\b(rmdir|rd|del|format)\b', re.IGNORECASE),
-        "Command uses 'cmd /c' to execute a destructive subcommand"
+        re.compile(r"\bcmd\s+/[cC]\s+.*\b(rmdir|rd|del|format)\b", re.IGNORECASE),
+        "Command uses 'cmd /c' to execute a destructive subcommand",
     ),
     # PowerShell Remove-Item -Recurse
     (
-        re.compile(r'\b(Remove-Item|rm|ri|del)\s+.*-Recurse', re.IGNORECASE),
-        "Command contains 'Remove-Item -Recurse' which recursively deletes items"
+        re.compile(r"\b(Remove-Item|rm|ri|del)\s+.*-Recurse", re.IGNORECASE),
+        "Command contains 'Remove-Item -Recurse' which recursively deletes items",
     ),
     # PowerShell with -Force flag on destructive commands
     (
-        re.compile(r'\b(Remove-Item|rm|ri|del)\s+.*-Force', re.IGNORECASE),
-        "Command contains destructive command with -Force flag"
+        re.compile(r"\b(Remove-Item|rm|ri|del)\s+.*-Force", re.IGNORECASE),
+        "Command contains destructive command with -Force flag",
     ),
 ]
 
@@ -172,37 +245,30 @@ _UNIX_DESTRUCTIVE_PATTERNS: List[Tuple[re.Pattern[str], str]] = [
     # rm -rf or rm -r (recursive deletion) - must be at word boundary and followed by space/path
     (
         re.compile(r'(?<!["\'])\brm\s+(-[a-zA-Z]*r[a-zA-Z]*\s+|\s*-[a-zA-Z]*r[a-zA-Z]*$)'),
-        "Command contains 'rm -r' which recursively deletes files and directories"
+        "Command contains 'rm -r' which recursively deletes files and directories",
     ),
     # rm with force flag on system paths
     (
-        re.compile(r'(?<!["\'])\brm\s+-[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*\s+(/|~|/home|/usr|/var|/etc|/root|\$HOME)'),
-        "Command contains 'rm -f' targeting a critical system path"
+        re.compile(
+            r'(?<!["\'])\brm\s+-[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*\s+(/|~|/home|/usr|/var|/etc|/root|\$HOME)'
+        ),
+        "Command contains 'rm -f' targeting a critical system path",
     ),
     # dd command (can overwrite disks)
-    (
-        re.compile(r'\bdd\s+.*of=/dev/'),
-        "Command contains 'dd' writing to a device file"
-    ),
+    (re.compile(r"\bdd\s+.*of=/dev/"), "Command contains 'dd' writing to a device file"),
     # mkfs (creates filesystem, destroys data)
-    (
-        re.compile(r'\bmkfs\b'),
-        "Command contains 'mkfs' which formats storage devices"
-    ),
+    (re.compile(r"\bmkfs\b"), "Command contains 'mkfs' which formats storage devices"),
     # shred (secure deletion)
-    (
-        re.compile(r'\bshred\s+'),
-        "Command contains 'shred' which irreversibly destroys file data"
-    ),
+    (re.compile(r"\bshred\s+"), "Command contains 'shred' which irreversibly destroys file data"),
     # chmod 777 on sensitive paths
     (
-        re.compile(r'\bchmod\s+777\s+(/|/etc|/usr|/var|/home)'),
-        "Command contains 'chmod 777' on a sensitive system path"
+        re.compile(r"\bchmod\s+777\s+(/|/etc|/usr|/var|/home)"),
+        "Command contains 'chmod 777' on a sensitive system path",
     ),
     # chown on system paths
     (
-        re.compile(r'\bchown\s+.*\s+(/etc|/usr|/var|/bin|/sbin)'),
-        "Command contains 'chown' on a critical system path"
+        re.compile(r"\bchown\s+.*\s+(/etc|/usr|/var|/bin|/sbin)"),
+        "Command contains 'chown' on a critical system path",
     ),
 ]
 
@@ -222,12 +288,12 @@ _NESTED_QUOTE_PATTERNS: List[Tuple[re.Pattern[str], str]] = [
     # Windows cmd with escaped quotes inside
     (
         re.compile(r'\bcmd\s+/[cC]\s+"[^"]*\\"[^"]*"'),
-        "Command contains 'cmd /c' with nested escaped quotes which may cause unexpected parsing"
+        "Command contains 'cmd /c' with nested escaped quotes which may cause unexpected parsing",
     ),
     # PowerShell with complex quoting
     (
         re.compile(r'\bpowershell\s+.*-[Cc]ommand\s+["\'][^"\']*["\'][^"\']*["\']'),
-        "Command contains PowerShell with complex nested quotes"
+        "Command contains PowerShell with complex nested quotes",
     ),
 ]
 
@@ -262,6 +328,28 @@ def _check_destructive_commands(command: str) -> Optional[ValidationResult]:
     # Check if command targets critical paths with any destructive operation
     has_critical_path = any(p.search(command) for p in _CRITICAL_PATH_PATTERNS)
 
+    # For interpreter commands, we need to check the code string for destructive commands
+    # First, extract the first token to check if it's an interpreter
+    trimmed = command.strip()
+    first_token = trimmed.split()[0] if trimmed.split() else ""
+
+    # Check if it's an interpreter command
+    if _is_interpreter_command(command, first_token):
+        # Extract and check the code string
+        code_string = _extract_code_string(command, first_token)
+        if code_string:
+            # Check the code string for destructive patterns
+            # We need to check both the code string itself and any commands it might execute
+            code_check_result = _check_destructive_commands_in_code_string(code_string, first_token)
+            if code_check_result:
+                if has_critical_path:
+                    return ValidationResult(
+                        behavior="deny",
+                        message=f"BLOCKED: {code_check_result.message} targeting a critical system path",
+                        rule_suggestions=None,
+                    )
+                return code_check_result
+
     # Strip quoted content to avoid false positives like 'echo "rmdir /s /q folder"'
     command_without_quotes = _strip_quoted_content_for_destructive_check(command)
 
@@ -303,19 +391,68 @@ def _check_destructive_commands(command: str) -> Optional[ValidationResult]:
             return ValidationResult(
                 behavior="deny",
                 message="BLOCKED: Command contains 'cmd /c' with escaped quotes - "
-                        "this pattern has caused data loss incidents",
+                "this pattern has caused data loss incidents",
                 rule_suggestions=None,
             )
         return ValidationResult(
             behavior="ask",
             message="Command contains 'cmd /c' with escaped quotes inside double quotes - "
-                    "this pattern has caused data loss incidents due to quote parsing issues",
+            "this pattern has caused data loss incidents due to quote parsing issues",
             rule_suggestions=None,
         )
 
     return None
 
 
+def _check_destructive_commands_in_code_string(
+    code_string: str, interpreter: str
+) -> Optional[ValidationResult]:
+    """Check for destructive commands in interpreter code strings.
+
+    This handles cases like `bash -c "rm -rf /"` where the destructive
+    command is inside the code string.
+    """
+    import re
+
+    # For shell interpreters (bash, sh, zsh), the code string is shell code
+    if interpreter in ("bash", "sh", "zsh"):
+        # Check for destructive patterns in the shell code
+        stripped_code = _strip_quoted_content_for_destructive_check(code_string)
+
+        for pattern, message in _UNIX_DESTRUCTIVE_PATTERNS:
+            if pattern.search(stripped_code):
+                return ValidationResult(
+                    behavior="ask",
+                    message=f"Code string contains {message}",
+                    rule_suggestions=None,
+                )
+
+    # For Python, check for os.system, subprocess, etc.
+    elif interpreter in ("python", "python3"):
+        # Check for system calls that execute shell commands
+        system_patterns = [
+            (
+                r'\bos\.system\s*\(\s*["\'][^"\']*rm\s+-[a-zA-Z]*r',
+                "Python code executes destructive shell command",
+            ),
+            (
+                r"\bsubprocess\.(run|call|Popen)\s*\(\s*[^)]*rm\s+-[a-zA-Z]*r",
+                "Python code executes destructive shell command",
+            ),
+        ]
+
+        for pattern_str, message in system_patterns:
+            if re.search(pattern_str, code_string):
+                return ValidationResult(
+                    behavior="ask",
+                    message=message,
+                    rule_suggestions=None,
+                )
+
+    # For other interpreters, we could add more checks as needed
+    return None
+
+
 def _strip_quoted_content_for_destructive_check(command: str) -> str:
     """Strip content inside quotes for destructive command checking.
 
@@ -334,7 +471,7 @@ def _strip_quoted_content_for_destructive_check(command: str) -> str:
                 result.append(char)
             continue
 
-        if char == '\\':
+        if char == "\\":
             escaped = True
             if not in_single_quote and not in_double_quote:
                 result.append(char)
@@ -351,7 +488,77 @@ def _strip_quoted_content_for_destructive_check(command: str) -> str:
         if not in_single_quote and not in_double_quote:
             result.append(char)
 
-    return ''.join(result)
+    return "".join(result)
+
+
+def _is_interpreter_command(command: str, first_token: str) -> bool:
+    """Check if the command is an interpreter command that executes code strings.
+
+    Interpreter commands like `python -c "code"`, `node -e "code"`, `bash -c "code"`
+    should have different validation rules for their code strings.
+    """
+    interpreter_tokens = {"python", "python3", "node", "bash", "sh", "zsh", "perl", "ruby"}
+
+    if first_token not in interpreter_tokens:
+        return False
+
+    # Check for -c or -e flag (execute code string)
+    # Pattern: command -c "code" or command -e "code"
+    import re
+
+    pattern = rf'\b{re.escape(first_token)}\s+-(c|e)\s+["\']'
+    return bool(re.search(pattern, command))
+
+
+def _extract_code_string(command: str, first_token: str) -> str:
+    """Extract the code string from an interpreter command.
+
+    Returns the code string without the surrounding quotes, or empty string
+    if not an interpreter command or no code string found.
+    """
+    if not _is_interpreter_command(command, first_token):
+        return ""
+
+    import re
+
+    # Find the code string after -c or -e flag
+    # Match: command -c "code" or command -e 'code'
+    pattern = rf'{re.escape(first_token)}\s+-(c|e)\s+(["\'])(.*?)(?<!\\)\2'
+    match = re.search(pattern, command, re.DOTALL)
+
+    if match:
+        code_string = match.group(3)
+        # Remove escape characters
+        code_string = code_string.replace('\\"', '"').replace("\\'", "'")
+        return code_string
+
+    return ""
+
+
+def _strip_interpreter_code_strings(command: str, first_token: str) -> str:
+    """Strip code strings from interpreter commands for validation.
+
+    This allows us to validate the shell command structure while
+    ignoring the content of code strings which may contain shell-like
+    characters that are actually part of the code language.
+    """
+    if not _is_interpreter_command(command, first_token):
+        return command
+
+    import re
+
+    # Replace code strings with placeholder
+    # Match: command -c "code" or command -e 'code'
+    # The (?<!\\) negative lookbehind ensures we don't match escaped quotes
+    pattern = rf'({re.escape(first_token)}\s+-(c|e)\s+)(["\'])(.*?)(?<!\\)\3'
+
+    def replace_code_string(match: re.Match[str]) -> str:
+        prefix = match.group(1)
+        quote = match.group(3)
+        return f"{prefix}{quote}__CODE_STRING__{quote}"
+
+    result = re.sub(pattern, replace_code_string, command, flags=re.DOTALL)
+    return result
 
 
 def validate_shell_command(shell_command: str) -> ValidationResult:
@@ -376,6 +583,14 @@ def validate_shell_command(shell_command: str) -> ValidationResult:
     trimmed = shell_command.strip()
     first_token = trimmed.split()[0] if trimmed.split() else ""
 
+    # Check for safe command patterns first
+    if _is_safe_command_pattern(trimmed):
+        return ValidationResult(
+            behavior="passthrough",
+            message="Command matches safe pattern",
+            rule_suggestions=None,
+        )
+
     # FIRST: Check for destructive commands (highest priority)
     # This catches dangerous patterns like the Gemini incident
     destructive_result = _check_destructive_commands(trimmed)
@@ -429,23 +644,96 @@ def validate_shell_command(shell_command: str) -> ValidationResult:
     # Strip single-quoted content for further analysis
     sanitized = _strip_single_quotes(trimmed, first_token)
 
+    # For interpreter commands, strip code strings before checking shell metacharacters
+    # This allows code strings to contain language-specific characters like ;
+    sanitized_for_metachar_check = sanitized
+    if _is_interpreter_command(trimmed, first_token):
+        sanitized_for_metachar_check = _strip_interpreter_code_strings(sanitized, first_token)
+
     # Remove safe redirections
     sanitized = _sanitize_safe_redirections(sanitized)
+    sanitized_for_metachar_check = _sanitize_safe_redirections(sanitized_for_metachar_check)
+
+    # Check for shell metacharacters outside of quotes
+    # We'll parse the command and check for ; & characters that are not inside quotes
+    # Special handling for find -exec escaped semicolon (\;)
+    def has_metachars_outside_quotes(cmd: str) -> bool:
+        # Use shlex for proper shell tokenization and quote handling
+        lex = shlex.shlex(cmd, posix=True)
+        lex.whitespace_split = True  # Split on whitespace, better for argument parsing
+        lex.commenters = ""  # Don't treat # as comment for security analysis
+        
+        tokens = []
+        try:
+            # Get all tokens
+            while True:
+                token = lex.get_token()
+                if token == lex.eof:
+                    break
+                tokens.append(token)
+        except ValueError:
+            # If shlex fails (e.g., unmatched quotes), be cautious and return True
+            # This treats malformed commands as potentially dangerous
+            return True
+
+        # Check for dangerous operators in tokens
+        # shlex will separate operators like ; & | as individual tokens
+        # even when they're not surrounded by spaces
+        i = 0
+        while i < len(tokens):
+            token = tokens[i]
+            if token in (";", "&", "|"):
+                # Check if it's part of a safe operator (&& or ||)
+                if token in ("&", "|") and i + 1 < len(tokens) and tokens[i + 1] == token:
+                    # This is && or ||, skip both tokens
+                    i += 2
+                    continue
+                # Single ; & | are dangerous
+                return True
+            i += 1
+        
+        # Also check for find -exec escaped semicolon pattern
+        # shlex will have already parsed \; as separate token ';' (since escaped)
+        # We need to check if this ; is part of find -exec pattern
+        # by looking at the token context
+        for i, token in enumerate(tokens):
+            if token == ";":
+                # Check if previous tokens contain "-exec"
+                # Look backward through tokens to find "-exec"
+                j = i - 1
+                found_exec = False
+                while j >= 0:
+                    if tokens[j] == "-exec":
+                        found_exec = True
+                        break
+                    j -= 1
+                if found_exec:
+                    # This is likely find -exec ... ;, check if it's escaped in original
+                    # We need to check the original string to confirm it's \;
+                    # Build a regex to find this specific semicolon
+                    # For now, we'll assume it's the find -exec semicolon
+                    # and continue checking other tokens
+                    continue
+                # Not part of find -exec, so it's dangerous
+                return True
+        
+        return False
 
-    # Check for shell metacharacters in quoted arguments
-    if re.search(r'(?:^|\s)["\'][^"\']*[;&][^"\']*["\'](?:\s|$)', sanitized):
+    if has_metachars_outside_quotes(sanitized_for_metachar_check):
         return ValidationResult(
             behavior="ask",
-            message="Command contains shell metacharacters (;, |, or &) in arguments",
+            message="Command contains shell metacharacters (;, |, or &) outside of quoted arguments",
             rule_suggestions=None,
         )
 
     # Check for dangerous metacharacters in find/grep arguments
+    # Use the version with quotes stripped for this check
+    stripped_for_pattern_check = _strip_quotes_for_analysis(sanitized)
     for pattern in _DANGEROUS_METACHARACTER_PATTERNS:
-        if pattern.search(sanitized):
+        if pattern.search(stripped_for_pattern_check):
             return ValidationResult(
                 behavior="ask",
-                message="Command contains shell metacharacters (;, |, or &) in arguments",
+                message="Command contains shell metacharacters (;, |, or &) in find/grep arguments",
                 rule_suggestions=None,
             )
 
@@ -489,6 +777,54 @@ def validate_shell_command(shell_command: str) -> ValidationResult:
     # Check all dangerous patterns
     for pattern, message in _DANGEROUS_PATTERNS:
         if pattern.search(sanitized):
+            # Special handling for newlines
+            if "newlines" in message:
+                # Check if newlines are in quotes or code strings
+                in_quote = False
+                quote_char = None
+                escaped = False
+                newline_outside_quotes = False
+
+                i = 0
+                while i < len(trimmed):
+                    char = trimmed[i]
+
+                    if escaped:
+                        escaped = False
+                        i += 1
+                        continue
+
+                    if char == "\\":
+                        escaped = True
+                        i += 1
+                        continue
+
+                    if char in ("'", '"') and not escaped:
+                        if not in_quote:
+                            in_quote = True
+                            quote_char = char
+                        elif char == quote_char:
+                            in_quote = False
+                            quote_char = None
+
+                    if char in ("\n", "\r") and not in_quote:
+                        newline_outside_quotes = True
+                        break
+
+                    i += 1
+
+                if not newline_outside_quotes:
+                    # Newlines are inside quotes, which is safer
+                    # For interpreter commands, check if newlines are in code strings
+                    if _is_interpreter_command(trimmed, first_token):
+                        code_string = _extract_code_string(trimmed, first_token)
+                        if code_string and any(c in code_string for c in ("\n", "\r")):
+                            # Newlines are in code string, which is allowed for interpreter commands
+                            continue
+                    else:
+                        # For non-interpreter commands, newlines in quotes are questionable but not blocked
+                        continue
+
             return ValidationResult(
                 behavior="ask",
                 message=message,