qurl-python 0.2.1__py3-none-any.whl → 0.3.0__py3-none-any.whl

layerv_qurl/__init__.py

@@ -1,10 +1,16 @@
-"""qURL Python SDK — secure, time-limited access links for AI agents."""
+"""qURL Python SDK — protect a private URL once, then mint short-lived portal links for it.
+
+A portal is cryptographic, just-in-time permission for one actor to reach
+one private resource. Core flow: :meth:`QURLClient.protect_url` →
+:meth:`ProtectedResource.create_portal`; programmatic openers use
+:meth:`QURLClient.enter_portal`.
+"""
 
 from importlib.metadata import PackageNotFoundError
 from importlib.metadata import version as _pkg_version
 
-from layerv_qurl.async_client import AsyncQURLClient
-from layerv_qurl.client import QURLClient
+from layerv_qurl.async_client import AsyncProtectedResource, AsyncQURLClient
+from layerv_qurl.client import ProtectedResource, QURLClient
 from layerv_qurl.errors import (
     AuthenticationError,
     AuthorizationError,
@@ -25,7 +31,6 @@ from layerv_qurl.types import (
     AccessGrant,
     AccessPolicy,
     AccessToken,
-    AgentBootstrapOutput,
     AIAgentPolicy,
     APIKey,
     APIKeyListOutput,
@@ -51,7 +56,7 @@ from layerv_qurl.types import (
     InvoiceListOutput,
     ListOutput,
     MintOutput,
-    NHPServerPeerInfo,
+    Portal,
     PortalSession,
     Quota,
     QuotaPlan,
@@ -61,6 +66,7 @@ from layerv_qurl.types import (
     ResolveOutput,
     Resource,
     ResourceDetail,
+    ResourceHandle,
     ResourceListOutput,
     ResourceType,
     Session,
@@ -80,7 +86,9 @@ from layerv_qurl.types import (
 )
 
 __all__ = [
+    "AsyncProtectedResource",
     "AsyncQURLClient",
+    "ProtectedResource",
     "QURLClient",
     # Errors
     "AuthenticationError",
@@ -98,7 +106,6 @@ __all__ = [
     "AccessCode",
     "AccessCodeListOutput",
     "AIAgentPolicy",
-    "AgentBootstrapOutput",
     "APIKey",
     "APIKeyListOutput",
     "BatchCreateItem",
@@ -120,13 +127,14 @@ __all__ = [
     "DomainVerifyOutput",
     "Invoice",
     "InvoiceListOutput",
-    "NHPServerPeerInfo",
+    "Portal",
     "PortalSession",
     "QuotaPlan",
     "QURLStatus",
     "RedeemAccessCodeOutput",
     "Resource",
     "ResourceDetail",
+    "ResourceHandle",
     "ResourceListOutput",
     "ResourceType",
     "Session",

layerv_qurl/_utils.py

@@ -19,11 +19,11 @@ import secrets
 import time
 import uuid
 from collections.abc import Iterable, Mapping, Set
-from datetime import datetime
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta
 from importlib.metadata import PackageNotFoundError
 from importlib.metadata import version as _pkg_version
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, TypeVar
-from urllib.parse import quote
+from urllib.parse import quote, urlsplit
 
 from layerv_qurl.errors import (
     AuthenticationError,
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ from layerv_qurl.types import (
     AccessGrant,
     AccessPolicy,
     AccessToken,
-    AgentBootstrapOutput,
     AIAgentPolicy,
     APIKey,
     APIKeyListOutput,
@@ -68,7 +67,7 @@ from layerv_qurl.types import (
     InvoiceListOutput,
     ListOutput,
     MintOutput,
-    NHPServerPeerInfo,
+    Portal,
     PortalSession,
     Quota,
     RateLimits,
@@ -76,6 +75,7 @@ from layerv_qurl.types import (
     ResolveOutput,
     Resource,
     ResourceDetail,
+    ResourceHandle,
     ResourceListOutput,
     Session,
     SessionListOutput,
@@ -659,6 +659,310 @@ def parse_resolve_output(data: dict[str, Any]) -> ResolveOutput:
     )
 
 
+# ---- Portal verbs (mirrors qurl-go) --------------------------------------
+# Shared by client.py and async_client.py so the portal surface stays in
+# lockstep between the sync and async clients and with qurl-go's
+# client-side option guardrails.
+
+#: Client-side floor for portal lifetimes, mirroring qurl-go's ``ValidFor``.
+#: The LayerV API remains the source of truth for account limits; there is
+#: intentionally no SDK-side maximum.
+MIN_PORTAL_VALID_FOR_SECONDS = 60
+#: Client-side floor for session durations, mirroring qurl-go's
+#: ``WithSessionDuration`` (at least one second; zero is rejected rather
+#: than treated as the server default).
+MIN_SESSION_DURATION_SECONDS = 1
+
+
+def serialize_api_duration(
+    value: str | timedelta | None, *, field_name: str, minimum_seconds: int
+) -> str | None:
+    """Serialize a duration option to the API's h/m/s duration grammar.
+
+    Strings pass through unvalidated — the server is authoritative, same
+    as the REST-shaped ``expires_in`` fields. :class:`~datetime.timedelta`
+    values get qurl-go's client-side guardrails: whole seconds only and at
+    least ``minimum_seconds``. Serialized with hours as the largest unit
+    so all API duration fields use the same grammar across SDKs.
+    """
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        if not value.strip():
+            raise ValueError(f"{field_name}: must be a non-empty duration string")
+        return value
+    if isinstance(value, timedelta):
+        total = value.total_seconds()
+        # Minimum before whole-seconds, matching qurl-go's check order so
+        # e.g. 30.5s reports "at least 60s" in both SDKs.
+        if total < minimum_seconds:
+            raise ValueError(f"{field_name}: must be at least {minimum_seconds}s")
+        seconds = int(total)
+        if seconds != total:
+            raise ValueError(f"{field_name}: must be whole seconds")
+        if seconds % 3600 == 0:
+            return f"{seconds // 3600}h"
+        if seconds % 60 == 0:
+            return f"{seconds // 60}m"
+        return f"{seconds}s"
+    raise ValueError(
+        f"{field_name}: must be a duration string (e.g. '5m') or datetime.timedelta"
+    )
+
+
+def validate_portal_target_url(target_url: str) -> None:
+    """Reject malformed target URLs and embedded credentials (qurl-go parity).
+
+    The portal verbs mirror qurl-go's ``ProtectURL`` guardrails: http(s)
+    scheme, a host, and no userinfo. The REST-shaped compatibility layer
+    keeps its original prefix-only check so its accepted inputs don't
+    change.
+
+    A userinfo URL contains credentials that must stay out of logs and
+    tracebacks, so the userinfo check runs FIRST with a non-echoing error
+    — before ``_require_http_url``, which echoes its input. Otherwise a
+    credentialed URL with a bad scheme (``ftp://user:pass@host``) would
+    leak the password through the scheme error before ever reaching the
+    userinfo branch.
+    """
+    if not isinstance(target_url, str) or not target_url.strip():
+        raise ValueError("target_url: must be a non-empty string")
+    try:
+        parts = urlsplit(target_url)
+        # Accessed inside the try: .hostname can also raise ValueError
+        # for malformed netlocs (e.g. unbalanced IPv6 brackets).
+        username, password, hostname = parts.username, parts.password, parts.hostname
+    except ValueError:
+        raise ValueError("target_url: malformed URL") from None
+    if username is not None or password is not None:
+        # Reject credentials before any echoing validator sees the URL.
+        raise ValueError(
+            "target_url: must not include embedded credentials (userinfo)"
+        )
+    # Safe to echo now: the URL carries no userinfo. This enforces the
+    # http(s) scheme and length and gives a helpful (input-echoing) error
+    # for credential-free malformed URLs.
+    _require_http_url(target_url, "target_url")
+    if not hostname:
+        raise ValueError("target_url: must include a host")
+
+
+def build_protect_body(
+    *,
+    target_url: str,
+    description: str | None,
+    tags: list[str] | None,
+    custom_domain: str | None,
+    alias: str | None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Validate protect-url inputs and build the create-resource request body."""
+    validate_portal_target_url(target_url)
+    validate_update_input(
+        description=description, tags=tags, custom_domain=custom_domain
+    )
+    validate_alias(alias)
+    return build_body(
+        {
+            "target_url": target_url,
+            "description": description,
+            "tags": tags,
+            "custom_domain": custom_domain,
+            "alias": alias,
+        }
+    )
+
+
+def require_connector_resource(
+    resources: list[Resource], connector_id: str
+) -> Resource:
+    """Select the single alias-matching resource from a connector lookup.
+
+    Mirrors qurl-go's ``ConnectorResource`` checks: the slug lookup must
+    return exactly one resource, and its alias must equal the connector
+    id. Raises the portal surface's client-detected errors (``status=0``)
+    otherwise — see :meth:`QURLClient.connector_resource` for the mapping.
+
+    ASSUMPTION: ``resources`` is the complete result set for the slug —
+    ``slug`` is an exact, unique server-side filter, so a connector maps
+    to at most one resource. This is the same contract qurl-go relies on;
+    the caller passes a single ``list_resources(slug=...)`` page and does
+    not paginate. If ``slug`` ever became a non-exact (prefix/substring)
+    filter whose matches could span pages, the ``len > 1`` ambiguity guard
+    below could be evaded and this lookup would need to page through the
+    full set.
+    """
+    if not resources:
+        raise NotFoundError(
+            status=0,
+            code="resource_not_found",
+            title="Resource Not Found",
+            detail=f"connector_resource: no resource found for connector {connector_id!r}",
+        )
+    if len(resources) > 1:
+        raise QURLError(
+            status=0,
+            code="ambiguous_resource",
+            title="Ambiguous Resource",
+            detail=(
+                f"connector_resource: connector {connector_id!r} returned "
+                f"{len(resources)} resources"
+            ),
+        )
+    resource = resources[0]
+    if resource.alias != connector_id:
+        raise ValidationError(
+            status=0,
+            code="unexpected_response",
+            title="Unexpected Response",
+            detail=(
+                f"connector_resource: connector {connector_id!r} returned a "
+                "resource with a missing or different alias"
+            ),
+        )
+    return resource
+
+
+def build_portal_body(
+    *,
+    valid_for: str | timedelta | None,
+    label: str | None,
+    one_time_use: bool | None,
+    max_sessions: int | None,
+    session_duration: str | timedelta | None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Validate portal options and build a create-portal request body."""
+    # qurl-go's WithLabel rejects empty labels; the REST-shaped mint_link
+    # keeps its permissive behavior, so the check lives here rather than
+    # in validate_mint_input.
+    if label is not None and not label.strip():
+        raise ValueError("label: must not be empty")
+    validate_mint_input(label=label, max_sessions=max_sessions)
+    return build_body(
+        {
+            "expires_in": serialize_api_duration(
+                valid_for,
+                field_name="valid_for",
+                minimum_seconds=MIN_PORTAL_VALID_FOR_SECONDS,
+            ),
+            "label": label,
+            "one_time_use": one_time_use,
+            "max_sessions": max_sessions,
+            "session_duration": serialize_api_duration(
+                session_duration,
+                field_name="session_duration",
+                minimum_seconds=MIN_SESSION_DURATION_SECONDS,
+            ),
+        }
+    )
+
+
+def parse_portal(data: dict[str, Any]) -> Portal:
+    """Parse a Portal from a create-portal API response.
+
+    Fails closed like qurl-go when the response lacks its identity
+    fields — a portal without a resource id or link is not actionable.
+    Everything else is optional because the two mint endpoints differ in
+    which ancillary fields they return.
+    """
+    resource_id = data.get("resource_id")
+    qurl_link = data.get("qurl_link")
+    if not resource_id or not qurl_link:
+        raise ValidationError(
+            status=0,
+            code="unexpected_response",
+            title="Unexpected Response",
+            detail="create portal: API response is missing resource_id or qurl_link",
+        )
+    return Portal(
+        resource_id=resource_id,
+        link=qurl_link,
+        site=data.get("qurl_site"),
+        expires_at=_parse_dt(data.get("expires_at")),
+        # Same empty-string → None normalization as parse_create_output.
+        qurl_id=data.get("qurl_id") or None,
+        label=data.get("label"),
+    )
+
+
+# qurl-go's offline signed-fragment links have the four-part shape
+# <version>.<claims>.<secret>.<sig>. We match any fragment of 3+
+# dot-separated base64url parts — broad enough to catch malformed or
+# future-versioned signed links — only to give them a precise error below
+# (a bare access token never contains a dot, so there's no overlap).
+_SIGNED_FRAGMENT_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+(?:\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+){2,}$")
+# Access tokens carry the stable ``at_`` prefix and a lowercase
+# base64url-ish charset (the server enforces the exact
+# ``^at_[a-z0-9_-]{22}$`` form). We pin the prefix and charset — both
+# stable — but leave the length open so a future token-length change
+# doesn't make the SDK reject links the platform still mints. This is a
+# cheap "looks like a token" sanity check; the server stays authoritative.
+#
+# INVARIANT: this pattern must stay a strict subset of ``_RESOURCE_ID_RE``.
+# ``enter_portal`` validates the extracted token here (a non-echoing error)
+# and then hands it to ``resolve`` → ``validate_id``, whose error DOES echo
+# the value. As long as anything matching this pattern also matches
+# ``_RESOURCE_ID_RE``, that echoing check never fires on the enter_portal
+# path, so a credential can't leak into a ``validate_id`` error. Loosening
+# this charset beyond ``_RESOURCE_ID_RE`` would reopen that leak.
+_ACCESS_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r"^at_[a-z0-9_-]+$")
+
+
+def extract_access_token(qurl_link: str) -> str:
+    """Extract the access token from a qURL link, or pass a bare token through.
+
+    Platform-issued links carry the access token in the URL fragment
+    (``https://qurl.link/#at_...``); a bare ``at_...`` token is accepted
+    as-is. Error messages deliberately do not echo the input — qURL links
+    are credentials and must stay out of logs and tracebacks.
+    """
+    if not isinstance(qurl_link, str) or not qurl_link.strip():
+        raise ValueError("qurl_link: must be a non-empty string")
+    # Tolerate surrounding whitespace/newlines from a copy-paste.
+    qurl_link = qurl_link.strip()
+    # The platform fragment is exactly the token (qurl-service builds
+    # links as ``https://<domain>/#<tokenID>`` with nothing appended), so
+    # the whole fragment is the token. If links ever grew fragment
+    # parameters (``#at_xxx&ref=...``), this would need to parse the token
+    # out of the fragment rather than equate them.
+    token = qurl_link.split("#", 1)[1] if "#" in qurl_link else qurl_link
+    if _SIGNED_FRAGMENT_RE.match(token):
+        raise ValueError(
+            "qurl_link: this is a signed qURL link (offline fragment format), "
+            "which cannot be opened through the API resolver — enter_portal "
+            "only accepts platform links (https://qurl.link/#at_...) or bare "
+            "access tokens"
+        )
+    if not _ACCESS_TOKEN_RE.match(token):
+        raise ValueError(
+            "qurl_link: no access token found — pass a platform qURL link "
+            "(https://qurl.link/#at_...) or a bare access token (at_...)"
+        )
+    return token
+
+
+def resource_handle_from_resolve(out: ResolveOutput) -> ResourceHandle:
+    """Map a ResolveOutput onto the portal-verb ResourceHandle.
+
+    Fails closed like qurl-go's ``EnterPortal``: a grant that carries no
+    resource URL is not actionable, so raise instead of handing back an
+    empty handle. Uses the same client-detected-failure convention as
+    the batch_create shape guard (``status=0``, ``unexpected_response``).
+    """
+    if not out.target_url:
+        raise ValidationError(
+            status=0,
+            code="unexpected_response",
+            title="Unexpected Response",
+            detail="enter_portal: access was granted but the API returned no resource URL",
+        )
+    open_seconds = out.access_grant.expires_in if out.access_grant else 0
+    return ResourceHandle(
+        resource_url=out.target_url,
+        open_seconds=open_seconds,
+        resource_id=out.resource_id,
+    )
+
+
 def parse_quota(data: dict[str, Any]) -> Quota:
     """Parse a Quota from API response data."""
     return Quota(
@@ -686,7 +990,6 @@ def _parse_rate_limits(data: dict[str, Any] | None) -> RateLimits | None:
         list_per_minute=data.get("list_per_minute", 0),
         resolve_per_minute=data.get("resolve_per_minute", 0),
         max_active_qurls=data.get("max_active_qurls", 0),
-        max_tokens_per_qurl=data.get("max_tokens_per_qurl", 0),
         max_expiry_seconds=data.get("max_expiry_seconds", 0),
     )
 
@@ -1133,22 +1436,6 @@ def parse_connector_installation_list_output(
     )
 
 
-def parse_agent_bootstrap_output(data: dict[str, Any]) -> AgentBootstrapOutput:
-    """Parse connector agent bootstrap output."""
-    raw_peer = data.get("nhp_server_peer")
-    peer = raw_peer if isinstance(raw_peer, dict) else {}
-    return AgentBootstrapOutput(
-        agent_id=data.get("agent_id", ""),
-        registered_at=_parse_dt(data.get("registered_at")),
-        nhp_server_peer=NHPServerPeerInfo(
-            public_key_b64=peer.get("public_key_b64", ""),
-            host=peer.get("host", ""),
-            port=peer.get("port", 0),
-            expire_time=peer.get("expire_time", 0),
-        ),
-    )
-
-
 def _validate_batch_create_shape(data: Any) -> None:
     """Defense-in-depth structural check for batch_create responses.