prowler 5.16.0__py3-none-any.whl → 5.17.0__py3-none-any.whl

prowler/providers/aws/services/vpc/vpc_endpoint_for_ec2_enabled/vpc_endpoint_for_ec2_enabled.metadata.json

@@ -1,29 +1,40 @@
 {
   "Provider": "aws",
   "CheckID": "vpc_endpoint_for_ec2_enabled",
-  "CheckTitle": "Amazon EC2 should be configured to use VPC endpoints that are created for the Amazon EC2 service.",
-  "CheckType": [],
+  "CheckTitle": "VPC has an Amazon EC2 VPC endpoint",
+  "CheckType": [
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices/Network Reachability"
+  ],
   "ServiceName": "vpc",
   "SubServiceName": "",
-  "ResourceIdTemplate": "arn:partition:service:region:account-id:resource-id",
+  "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
   "Severity": "medium",
   "ResourceType": "AwsEc2VpcEndpointService",
-  "Description": "Ensure that a service endpoint for Amazon EC2 is created for each VPC. The check fails if a VPC does not have a VPC endpoint created for the Amazon EC2 service.",
-  "Risk": "Without VPC endpoints, network traffic between your VPC and Amazon EC2 may traverse the public internet, increasing the risk of unintended access or data exposure.",
-  "RelatedUrl": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/service-vpc-endpoint-enabled.html",
+  "ResourceGroup": "network",
+  "Description": "**Amazon VPCs** are evaluated for an **interface VPC endpoint** to the **Amazon EC2 API** (`ec2`). Its presence indicates private EC2 API connectivity over **AWS PrivateLink** within the VPC.",
+  "Risk": "Without a private EC2 endpoint, EC2 API traffic exits via IGW/NAT. This expands exposure to network path threats (e.g., DNS hijack, MITM) and weakens egress isolation. It also adds an internet egress dependency for API access, reducing availability if NAT/edge paths fail.",
+  "RelatedUrl": "",
+  "AdditionalURLs": [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/service-vpc-endpoint-enabled.html",
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/ec2-controls.html#ec2-10",
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/interface-vpc-endpoints.html"
+  ],
   "Remediation": {
     "Code": {
-      "CLI": "",
-      "NativeIaC": "",
-      "Other": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/ec2-controls.html#ec2-10",
-      "Terraform": ""
+      "CLI": "aws ec2 create-vpc-endpoint --vpc-id <VPC_ID> --service-name com.amazonaws.<REGION>.ec2 --vpc-endpoint-type Interface --subnet-ids <SUBNET_ID>",
+      "NativeIaC": "```yaml\n# CloudFormation: create an EC2 interface VPC endpoint in the VPC\nResources:\n  VPCEndpoint:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::VPCEndpoint\n    Properties:\n      VpcId: \"<example_resource_id>\"                 # CRITICAL: target VPC for the endpoint\n      ServiceName: !Sub \"com.amazonaws.${AWS::Region}.ec2\"  # CRITICAL: EC2 interface endpoint service\n      VpcEndpointType: Interface                      # CRITICAL: create an interface endpoint\n      SubnetIds:                                      # CRITICAL: subnets to place the endpoint ENIs\n        - \"<example_resource_id>\"\n```",
+      "Other": "1. In the AWS console, go to VPC > Endpoints\n2. Click Create endpoint\n3. For Service category, choose AWS services and select Service name com.amazonaws.<region>.ec2\n4. Select your VPC and at least one subnet\n5. Click Create endpoint",
+      "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Create an EC2 interface VPC endpoint\nresource \"aws_vpc_endpoint\" \"<example_resource_name>\" {\n  vpc_id            = \"<example_resource_id>\"           # CRITICAL: target VPC\n  service_name      = \"com.amazonaws.<region>.ec2\"      # CRITICAL: EC2 interface endpoint service\n  vpc_endpoint_type = \"Interface\"                       # CRITICAL: interface endpoint\n  subnet_ids        = [\"<example_resource_id>\"]         # CRITICAL: subnet(s) for endpoint ENIs\n}\n```"
     },
     "Recommendation": {
-      "Text": "To improve the security posture of your VPC, configure Amazon EC2 to use an interface VPC endpoint powered by AWS PrivateLink.",
-      "Url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/interface-vpc-endpoints.html"
+      "Text": "Use an **interface VPC endpoint** for the EC2 service in each VPC that requires EC2 API access.\n- Enable **private DNS** to keep calls on the AWS network\n- Apply restrictive endpoint policies (least privilege)\n- Reduce reliance on public egress and layer controls for **defense in depth**",
+      "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/vpc_endpoint_for_ec2_enabled"
     }
   },
-  "Categories": [],
+  "Categories": [
+    "internet-exposed",
+    "trust-boundaries"
+  ],
   "DependsOn": [],
   "RelatedTo": [],
   "Notes": ""

prowler/providers/aws/services/vpc/vpc_endpoint_multi_az_enabled/vpc_endpoint_multi_az_enabled.metadata.json

@@ -1,30 +1,38 @@
 {
   "Provider": "aws",
   "CheckID": "vpc_endpoint_multi_az_enabled",
-  "CheckTitle": "Amazon VPC Interface Endpoints should have ENIs in more than one subnet.",
-  "CheckType": [],
+  "CheckTitle": "Amazon VPC interface endpoint has subnets in multiple Availability Zones",
+  "CheckType": [
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices",
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/AWS Foundational Security Best Practices"
+  ],
   "ServiceName": "vpc",
   "SubServiceName": "",
-  "ResourceIdTemplate": "arn:partition:service:region:account-id:resource-id",
+  "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
   "Severity": "medium",
-  "ResourceType": "AwsVpcEndpointService",
-  "Description": "Ensure that all vpc interface endpoints have ENIs in multiple subnets. If a VPC endpoint has an ENI in only a single subnet then this check will fail. You cannot create VPC Endpoints in 2 different subnets in the same AZ. So, for the purpose of VPC endpoints, having multiple subnets implies multiple AZs.",
-  "Risk": "Without VPC endpoints ENIs in multiple subnets an AZ impacting event could lead to increased downtime or your network traffic between your VPC and Amazon services may traverse the public internet.",
-  "RelatedUrl": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/privatelink/interface-endpoints.html",
+  "ResourceType": "AwsEc2VpcEndpointService",
+  "ResourceGroup": "network",
+  "Description": "**VPC interface endpoints** are evaluated for whether their endpoint network interfaces are placed in **multiple subnets**, which implies distribution across different **Availability Zones**. Endpoints present in only one subnet are identified.",
+  "Risk": "A **single-subnet endpoint** creates a **single-AZ dependency**. An AZ outage or routing issue can cut access to the service, reducing **availability**. Workloads may revert to **public endpoints**, exposing traffic to the Internet and risking **confidentiality** through interception or tampering.",
+  "RelatedUrl": "",
+  "AdditionalURLs": [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/privatelink/interface-endpoints.html",
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/interface-vpc-endpoints.html"
+  ],
   "Remediation": {
     "Code": {
-      "CLI": "",
-      "NativeIaC": "",
-      "Other": "",
-      "Terraform": ""
+      "CLI": "aws ec2 modify-vpc-endpoint --vpc-endpoint-id <example_resource_id> --add-subnet-ids <example_subnet_id_2>",
+      "NativeIaC": "```yaml\nResources:\n  <example_resource_name>:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::VPCEndpoint\n    Properties:\n      VpcEndpointType: Interface\n      VpcId: <example_resource_id>\n      ServiceName: com.amazonaws.<region>.<service>\n      SubnetIds:  # CRITICAL: include at least two subnets (preferably in different AZs) to pass the check\n        - <example_subnet_id_1>\n        - <example_subnet_id_2>\n```",
+      "Other": "1. Open the AWS VPC console and go to Endpoints\n2. Select the interface endpoint\n3. Click Actions > Manage subnets\n4. Select an additional subnet in a different Availability Zone\n5. Click Modify subnets to save",
+      "Terraform": "```hcl\nresource \"aws_vpc_endpoint\" \"<example_resource_name>\" {\n  vpc_id            = \"<example_resource_id>\"\n  service_name      = \"com.amazonaws.<region>.<service>\"\n  vpc_endpoint_type = \"Interface\"\n\n  subnet_ids = [\n    \"<example_subnet_id_1>\",\n    \"<example_subnet_id_2>\"  # CRITICAL: add a second subnet (ideally in a different AZ) to satisfy multi-AZ\n  ]\n}\n```"
     },
     "Recommendation": {
-      "Text": "To improve the availability of your services residing in your VPC, configure multiple subnets for VPC Interface Endpoints.",
-      "Url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/interface-vpc-endpoints.html"
+      "Text": "Place interface endpoints in **multiple subnets across distinct AZs** to remove single-AZ reliance. Prefer zone-local routing so clients use the nearest endpoint, and combine with **private DNS** and restrictive **security groups** to limit exposure-supporting **defense in depth** and resilient connectivity.",
+      "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/vpc_endpoint_multi_az_enabled"
     }
   },
   "Categories": [
-    "redundancy"
+    "resilience"
   ],
   "DependsOn": [],
   "RelatedTo": [],

prowler/providers/aws/services/vpc/vpc_endpoint_services_allowed_principals_trust_boundaries/vpc_endpoint_services_allowed_principals_trust_boundaries.metadata.json

@@ -1,28 +1,35 @@
 {
   "Provider": "aws",
   "CheckID": "vpc_endpoint_services_allowed_principals_trust_boundaries",
-  "CheckTitle": "Find trust boundaries in VPC endpoint services allowlisted principles.",
+  "CheckTitle": "VPC endpoint service allows only trusted principals or none",
   "CheckType": [
-    "Infrastructure Security"
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices/Network Reachability",
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/AWS Foundational Security Best Practices",
+    "TTPs/Initial Access",
+    "Effects/Data Exposure"
   ],
   "ServiceName": "vpc",
-  "SubServiceName": "service_endpoint",
-  "ResourceIdTemplate": "arn:partition:service:region:account-id:resource-id",
-  "Severity": "medium",
+  "SubServiceName": "",
+  "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
+  "Severity": "high",
   "ResourceType": "AwsEc2VpcEndpointService",
-  "Description": "Find trust boundaries in VPC endpoint services allowlisted principles.",
-  "Risk": "Account VPC could be linked to other accounts.",
+  "ResourceGroup": "network",
+  "Description": "**VPC endpoint services** are assessed for their **allowed principals**, comparing each to a configured set of trusted accounts and identifying any **untrusted principals** or a wildcard `*` present in the allowlist.",
+  "Risk": "Untrusted or wildcard principals can create PrivateLink connections to your service, eroding segmentation. This enables unauthorized data access (**confidentiality**), abuse of internal APIs (**integrity**), and excess load on backends (**availability**).",
   "RelatedUrl": "",
+  "AdditionalURLs": [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/privatelink/vpc-endpoints-access.html"
+  ],
   "Remediation": {
     "Code": {
       "CLI": "",
-      "NativeIaC": "",
-      "Other": "https://docs.prowler.com/checks/aws/networking-policies/networking_9#aws-vpc-endpoints-are-exposed",
-      "Terraform": ""
+      "NativeIaC": "```yaml\n# Allow only a trusted principal (or attach none to allow no principals)\nResources:\n  <example_resource_name>:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::VPCEndpointServicePermissions\n    Properties:\n      ServiceId: <example_resource_id>\n      AllowedPrincipals:\n        - arn:aws:iam::<TRUSTED_ACCOUNT_ID>:root  # CRITICAL: restricts access to only this trusted account\n```",
+      "Other": "1. Open the AWS VPC console and go to Endpoint services\n2. Select the endpoint service (<example_resource_id>)\n3. Open the Allowed principals tab and click Edit allowed principals\n4. Remove all entries that are not trusted, including any wildcard (*)\n5. Optionally leave the list empty (no principals) or keep only trusted account IDs/ARNs\n6. Save changes",
+      "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Allow only a trusted principal (delete this resource to allow none)\nresource \"aws_vpc_endpoint_service_allowed_principal\" \"<example_resource_name>\" {\n  service_id    = \"<example_resource_id>\"\n  principal_arn = \"arn:aws:iam::<TRUSTED_ACCOUNT_ID>:root\"  # CRITICAL: only this trusted account can create endpoints\n}\n```"
     },
     "Recommendation": {
-      "Text": "In multi Account environments identify untrusted links. Check trust chaining and dependencies between accounts.",
-      "Url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/privatelink/vpc-endpoints-access.html"
+      "Text": "Apply **least privilege**: restrict **allowed principals** to vetted account IDs and avoid `*`. Maintain a central trust registry, enforce **separation of duties** with approval workflows, and review entries regularly. Use **defense in depth** with strong service authentication and continuous configuration monitoring.",
+      "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/vpc_endpoint_services_allowed_principals_trust_boundaries"
     }
   },
   "Categories": [

prowler/providers/aws/services/vpc/vpc_flow_logs_enabled/vpc_flow_logs_enabled.metadata.json

@@ -1,33 +1,43 @@
 {
   "Provider": "aws",
   "CheckID": "vpc_flow_logs_enabled",
-  "CheckTitle": "Ensure VPC Flow Logging is Enabled in all VPCs.",
+  "CheckTitle": "VPC flow logs are enabled",
   "CheckType": [
-    "Logging and Monitoring"
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices",
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/AWS Foundational Security Best Practices",
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark",
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/PCI-DSS",
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/NIST 800-53 Controls (USA)",
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/NIST CSF Controls (USA)"
   ],
   "ServiceName": "vpc",
-  "SubServiceName": "flow_log",
-  "ResourceIdTemplate": "arn:partition:service:region:account-id:resource-id",
+  "SubServiceName": "",
+  "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
   "Severity": "medium",
   "ResourceType": "AwsEc2Vpc",
-  "Description": "Ensure VPC Flow Logging is Enabled in all VPCs.",
-  "Risk": "VPC Flow Logs provide visibility into network traffic that traverses the VPC and can be used to detect anomalous traffic or insight during security workflows.",
+  "ResourceGroup": "network",
+  "Description": "**AWS VPCs** have **Flow Logs** configured to capture IP traffic for their network interfaces and deliver records to a logging destination.\n\nVPCs lacking an active flow log configuration are highlighted.",
+  "Risk": "Without flow logs, network activity is opaque, hindering detection and investigation of malicious traffic. Attackers can probe, exfiltrate, or move laterally unnoticed, impacting **confidentiality** and **integrity**; outages and misconfigurations are harder to diagnose, reducing **availability**.",
   "RelatedUrl": "",
+  "AdditionalURLs": [
+    "http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/flow-logs.html",
+    "https://www.trendmicro.com/cloudoneconformity/knowledge-base/aws/VPC/vpc-flow-logs-enabled.html"
+  ],
   "Remediation": {
     "Code": {
-      "CLI": "",
-      "NativeIaC": "",
-      "Other": "https://docs.prowler.com/checks/aws/logging-policies/logging_9-enable-vpc-flow-logging#aws-console",
-      "Terraform": "https://docs.prowler.com/checks/aws/logging-policies/logging_9-enable-vpc-flow-logging#terraform"
+      "CLI": "aws ec2 create-flow-logs --resource-type VPC --resource-ids <VPC_ID> --traffic-type ALL --log-destination-type s3 --log-destination arn:aws:s3:::<S3_BUCKET_NAME>",
+      "NativeIaC": "```yaml\n# CloudFormation: Enable VPC Flow Logs to S3 for an existing VPC\nResources:\n  FlowLog:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::FlowLog\n    Properties:\n      ResourceId: <example_resource_id>         # Critical: target the VPC ID\n      ResourceType: VPC                         # Critical: enable flow logs at VPC level\n      TrafficType: ALL                          # Critical: log all traffic\n      LogDestinationType: s3                    # Critical: send logs to S3 (no IAM role needed)\n      LogDestination: arn:aws:s3:::<example_resource_name>  # Critical: S3 bucket ARN\n```",
+      "Other": "1. In the AWS Console, go to VPC > Your VPCs\n2. Select the target VPC\n3. Open the Flow logs tab and click Create flow log\n4. Set Traffic type to All\n5. Set Destination to S3 and enter Bucket ARN: arn:aws:s3:::<example_resource_name>\n6. Click Create flow log",
+      "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Enable VPC Flow Logs to S3 for an existing VPC\nresource \"aws_flow_log\" \"vpc\" {\n  vpc_id               = \"<example_resource_id>\"                 # Critical: target the VPC to enable flow logs\n  traffic_type         = \"ALL\"                                   # Critical: log all traffic\n  log_destination_type = \"s3\"                                    # Critical: send logs to S3 (no IAM role needed)\n  log_destination      = \"arn:aws:s3:::<example_resource_name>\"  # Critical: S3 bucket ARN\n}\n```"
     },
     "Recommendation": {
-      "Text": "It is recommended that VPC Flow Logs be enabled for packet Rejects for VPCs.",
-      "Url": "http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/flow-logs.html"
+      "Text": "Enable **VPC Flow Logs** for all VPCs to provide baseline telemetry.\nPrefer capturing at least `REJECT` and, for sensitive networks, `ALL`. Send logs to a centralized, access-controlled destination with retention. Apply **least privilege** to writers/readers and integrate with monitoring for **defense in depth**.",
+      "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/vpc_flow_logs_enabled"
     }
   },
   "Categories": [
-    "forensics-ready",
-    "logging"
+    "logging",
+    "forensics-ready"
   ],
   "DependsOn": [],
   "RelatedTo": [],

prowler/providers/aws/services/vpc/vpc_peering_routing_tables_with_least_privilege/vpc_peering_routing_tables_with_least_privilege.metadata.json

@@ -1,31 +1,41 @@
 {
   "Provider": "aws",
   "CheckID": "vpc_peering_routing_tables_with_least_privilege",
-  "CheckTitle": "Ensure routing tables for VPC peering are least access.",
+  "CheckTitle": "VPC peering connection route tables do not include 0.0.0.0/0 or entire requester/accepter VPC CIDR routes",
   "CheckType": [
-    "Infrastructure Security"
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices/Network Reachability",
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/AWS Foundational Security Best Practices",
+    "TTPs/Lateral Movement",
+    "Effects/Data Exposure"
   ],
   "ServiceName": "vpc",
-  "SubServiceName": "route_table",
-  "ResourceIdTemplate": "arn:partition:service:region:account-id:resource-id",
+  "SubServiceName": "",
+  "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
   "Severity": "medium",
   "ResourceType": "AwsEc2VpcPeeringConnection",
-  "Description": "Ensure routing tables for VPC peering are least access.",
-  "Risk": "Being highly selective in peering routing tables is a very effective way of minimizing the impact of breach as resources outside of these routes are inaccessible to the peered VPC.",
-  "RelatedUrl": "https://www.trendmicro.com/cloudoneconformity-staging/knowledge-base/aws/VPC/vpc-peering-access.html#",
+  "ResourceGroup": "network",
+  "Description": "**AWS VPC peering** route tables are assessed for **least-privilege routing**. Routes that target `0.0.0.0/0` or an entire peer VPC CIDR are considered overly broad; only specific subnets or narrower prefixes should be advertised across the peering link.",
+  "Risk": "Broad peering routes expand cross-VPC reachability, enabling lateral movement and unauthorized discovery, harming **confidentiality** and **integrity**. Using `0.0.0.0/0` or full-CIDR paths also increases misrouting with overlapping ranges, reducing network **availability**.",
+  "RelatedUrl": "",
+  "AdditionalURLs": [
+    "https://www.trendmicro.com/cloudoneconformity-staging/knowledge-base/aws/VPC/vpc-peering-access.html#",
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/peering/peering-configurations-partial-access.html"
+  ],
   "Remediation": {
     "Code": {
       "CLI": "",
-      "NativeIaC": "",
-      "Other": "https://docs.prowler.com/checks/aws/networking-policies/networking_5",
-      "Terraform": ""
+      "NativeIaC": "```yaml\n# CloudFormation: restrict VPC peering route to a specific subnet (least privilege)\nResources:\n  PeeringSpecificRoute:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::Route\n    Properties:\n      RouteTableId: <example_resource_id>\n      DestinationCidrBlock: 10.0.1.0/24  # CRITICAL: use a specific subnet, not 0.0.0.0/0 or full VPC CIDR\n      VpcPeeringConnectionId: <example_resource_id>\n```",
+      "Other": "1. In AWS Console, go to VPC > Route tables\n2. Select the route table(s) used to reach the peered VPC and click Routes > Edit routes\n3. Delete any route to 0.0.0.0/0 or to the entire requester/accepter VPC CIDR that targets the VPC peering connection\n4. Add route(s) only to required subnet CIDR(s) in the peer VPC, targeting the same VPC peering connection\n5. Save changes and repeat in the peer VPC's route table(s)",
+      "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Restrict VPC peering route to a specific subnet (least privilege)\nresource \"aws_route\" \"peering_specific\" {\n  route_table_id             = \"<example_resource_id>\"\n  destination_cidr_block     = \"10.0.1.0/24\"  # CRITICAL: specific subnet, not 0.0.0.0/0 or full VPC CIDR\n  vpc_peering_connection_id  = \"<example_resource_id>\"\n}\n```"
     },
     "Recommendation": {
-      "Text": "Review routing tables of peered VPCs for whether they route all subnets of each VPC and whether that is necessary to accomplish the intended purposes for peering the VPCs.",
-      "Url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/peering/peering-configurations-partial-access.html"
+      "Text": "Enforce **least privilege** in peering: advertise only required subnets or more specific prefixes; avoid `0.0.0.0/0` and whole VPC ranges. Keep routes symmetric on both sides, and layer **defense in depth** with security groups and NACLs. *If broad connectivity is required*, prefer segmented designs or a transit gateway.",
+      "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/vpc_peering_routing_tables_with_least_privilege"
     }
   },
-  "Categories": [],
+  "Categories": [
+    "trust-boundaries"
+  ],
   "DependsOn": [],
   "RelatedTo": [],
   "Notes": ""

prowler/providers/aws/services/vpc/vpc_subnet_different_az/vpc_subnet_different_az.metadata.json

@@ -1,32 +1,38 @@
 {
   "Provider": "aws",
   "CheckID": "vpc_subnet_different_az",
-  "CheckTitle": "Ensure all VPC has subnets in more than one availability zone",
+  "CheckTitle": "VPC has subnets in more than one Availability Zone",
   "CheckType": [
-    "Infrastructure Security"
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices",
+    "Effects/Denial of Service"
   ],
   "ServiceName": "vpc",
-  "SubServiceName": "subnet",
-  "ResourceIdTemplate": "arn:partition:service:region:account-id:resource-id",
+  "SubServiceName": "",
+  "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
   "Severity": "medium",
-  "ResourceType": "AwsEc2Vpc",
-  "Description": "Ensure all VPC has subnets in more than one availability zone",
-  "Risk": "",
-  "RelatedUrl": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/configure-subnets.html",
+  "ResourceType": "AwsEc2Subnet",
+  "ResourceGroup": "network",
+  "Description": "**VPCs** are assessed for **subnets spread across multiple Availability Zones**. The finding distinguishes VPCs with subnets confined to a single AZ or with no subnets from those with subnets in `2+` distinct AZs.",
+  "Risk": "Single-AZ subnet layouts create a **single point of failure**, leading to **service downtime** during AZ outages, maintenance, or capacity events. Lack of **zonal redundancy** constrains load balancing and egress design, reduces **fault isolation**, and undermines availability and recovery objectives.",
+  "RelatedUrl": "",
+  "AdditionalURLs": [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/pdfs/whitepapers/latest/building-scalable-secure-multi-vpc-network-infrastructure/building-scalable-secure-multi-vpc-network-infrastructure.pdf",
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/configure-subnets.html"
+  ],
   "Remediation": {
     "Code": {
-      "CLI": "aws ec2 create-subnet",
-      "NativeIaC": "",
-      "Other": "",
-      "Terraform": ""
+      "CLI": "",
+      "NativeIaC": "```yaml\n# CloudFormation: create two subnets in different AZs to ensure VPC spans multiple AZs\nResources:\n  SubnetA:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::Subnet\n    Properties:\n      VpcId: <example_resource_id>\n      CidrBlock: 10.0.0.0/24\n      AvailabilityZone: <example_az_1>  # Critical: place subnet in AZ1 to start AZ diversity\n  SubnetB:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::Subnet\n    Properties:\n      VpcId: <example_resource_id>\n      CidrBlock: 10.0.1.0/24\n      AvailabilityZone: <example_az_2>  # Critical: second AZ ensures VPC has subnets in more than one AZ\n```",
+      "Other": "1. In the AWS Console, go to VPC > Subnets\n2. Click Create subnet\n3. Select the target VPC (<example_resource_id>)\n4. Add two subnets with non-overlapping CIDRs in different Availability Zones (e.g., <example_az_1> and <example_az_2>)\n5. Click Create subnet to save\n",
+      "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Create two subnets in different AZs so the VPC spans multiple Availability Zones\nresource \"aws_subnet\" \"subnet_a\" {\n  vpc_id            = \"<example_resource_id>\"\n  cidr_block        = \"10.0.0.0/24\"\n  availability_zone = \"<example_az_1>\" # Critical: first AZ\n}\n\nresource \"aws_subnet\" \"subnet_b\" {\n  vpc_id            = \"<example_resource_id>\"\n  cidr_block        = \"10.0.1.0/24\"\n  availability_zone = \"<example_az_2>\" # Critical: second AZ; ensures subnets in more than one AZ\n}\n```"
     },
     "Recommendation": {
-      "Text": "Ensure all VPC has subnets in more than one availability zone",
-      "Url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/configure-subnets.html"
+      "Text": "Distribute subnets across `2+` **Availability Zones** and deploy workloads in separate AZs for **high availability**. Mirror network tiers per AZ, align routing and egress per AZ, and enforce multi-AZ layouts with IaC and policy guardrails. *Regularly test failover* to validate resilience.",
+      "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/vpc_subnet_different_az"
     }
   },
   "Categories": [
-    "redundancy"
+    "resilience"
   ],
   "DependsOn": [],
   "RelatedTo": [],

prowler/providers/aws/services/vpc/vpc_subnet_no_public_ip_by_default/vpc_subnet_no_public_ip_by_default.metadata.json

@@ -1,31 +1,38 @@
 {
   "Provider": "aws",
   "CheckID": "vpc_subnet_no_public_ip_by_default",
-  "CheckTitle": "Ensure VPC subnets do not assign public IP by default",
+  "CheckTitle": "VPC subnet does not assign public IP addresses by default",
   "CheckType": [
-    "Infrastructure Security"
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices/Network Reachability",
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/Industry and Regulatory Standards/AWS Foundational Security Best Practices"
   ],
   "ServiceName": "vpc",
-  "SubServiceName": "subnet",
-  "ResourceIdTemplate": "arn:partition:service:region:account-id:resource-id",
-  "Severity": "medium",
+  "SubServiceName": "",
+  "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
+  "Severity": "high",
   "ResourceType": "AwsEc2Subnet",
-  "Description": "Ensure VPC subnets do not assign public IP by default",
-  "Risk": "VPC subnet is a part of the VPC having its own rules for traffic. Assigning the Public IP to the subnet automatically (on launch) can accidentally expose the instances within this subnet to internet and should be edited to 'No' post creation of the Subnet.",
-  "RelatedUrl": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/subnet-auto-assign-public-ip-disabled.html",
+  "ResourceGroup": "network",
+  "Description": "**VPC subnets** where `MapPublicIpOnLaunch` is `true` automatically assign a public IPv4 address to instances at launch.\n\nThis identifies subnets configured for default public IP assignment.",
+  "Risk": "**Internet-exposed instances** become reachable by default, enabling port scans, SSH/RDP brute force, and exploit attempts. Successful access can lead to data exfiltration (**confidentiality**), unauthorized changes (**integrity**), and outages (**availability**) through abuse or DDoS.",
+  "RelatedUrl": "",
+  "AdditionalURLs": [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/subnet-auto-assign-public-ip-disabled.html"
+  ],
   "Remediation": {
     "Code": {
-      "CLI": "",
-      "NativeIaC": "",
-      "Other": "",
-      "Terraform": "https://docs.prowler.com/checks/aws/networking-policies/ensure-vpc-subnets-do-not-assign-public-ip-by-default#terraform"
+      "CLI": "aws ec2 modify-subnet-attribute --subnet-id <SUBNET_ID> --no-map-public-ip-on-launch",
+      "NativeIaC": "```yaml\n# CloudFormation: Subnet with public IP auto-assign disabled\nResources:\n  ExampleSubnet:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::Subnet\n    Properties:\n      VpcId: <example_resource_id>\n      CidrBlock: 10.0.1.0/24\n      MapPublicIpOnLaunch: false  # Critical: disables automatic public IPv4 assignment on instance launch\n```",
+      "Other": "1. Open the AWS Console and go to VPC\n2. Click Subnets and select the target subnet\n3. Choose Actions > Edit subnet settings (or Modify auto-assign IP settings)\n4. Uncheck Enable auto-assign public IPv4 address\n5. Save changes",
+      "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Subnet with public IP auto-assign disabled\nresource \"aws_subnet\" \"example\" {\n  vpc_id     = \"<example_resource_id>\"\n  cidr_block = \"10.0.1.0/24\"\n\n  map_public_ip_on_launch = false  # Critical: prevents assigning public IPs by default\n}\n```"
     },
     "Recommendation": {
-      "Text": "VPC subnets should not allow automatic public IP assignment",
-      "Url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/subnet-auto-assign-public-ip-disabled.html"
+      "Text": "Disable subnet auto-assign to enforce **least-privilege exposure**. Place workloads in **private subnets**, use controlled egress (NAT or private endpoints), and prefer bastions or SSM for administration.\n\n*When public access is necessary*, assign IPs explicitly and restrict with tight security groups and routes for **defense in depth**.",
+      "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/vpc_subnet_no_public_ip_by_default"
     }
   },
-  "Categories": [],
+  "Categories": [
+    "internet-exposed"
+  ],
   "DependsOn": [],
   "RelatedTo": [],
   "Notes": ""

prowler/providers/aws/services/vpc/vpc_subnet_separate_private_public/vpc_subnet_separate_private_public.metadata.json

@@ -1,31 +1,37 @@
 {
   "Provider": "aws",
   "CheckID": "vpc_subnet_separate_private_public",
-  "CheckTitle": "Ensure all VPC has public and private subnets defined",
+  "CheckTitle": "VPC has both public and private subnets",
   "CheckType": [
-    "Infrastructure Security"
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices/Network Reachability"
   ],
   "ServiceName": "vpc",
-  "SubServiceName": "subnet",
-  "ResourceIdTemplate": "arn:partition:service:region:account-id:resource-id",
+  "SubServiceName": "",
+  "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
   "Severity": "medium",
-  "ResourceType": "AwsEc2Vpc",
-  "Description": "Ensure all VPC has public and private subnets defined",
-  "Risk": "",
-  "RelatedUrl": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_Scenario2.html",
+  "ResourceType": "AwsEc2Subnet",
+  "ResourceGroup": "network",
+  "Description": "**Amazon VPCs** are assessed for network segmentation: at least one **public subnet** (internet-routable) and one **private subnet** (non-internet-routable).\n\nIt flags VPCs with no subnets, only public subnets, or only private subnets.",
+  "Risk": "Missing subnet separation erodes **segmentation**.\n- Only public: workloads face Internet exposure, enabling scanning, brute force, and lateral movement, threatening **confidentiality** and **integrity**.\n- Only private: no controlled egress can break patching and dependencies, impacting **availability**.\n- No subnets: misconfiguration leaves services unreachable.",
+  "RelatedUrl": "",
+  "AdditionalURLs": [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_Scenario2.html"
+  ],
   "Remediation": {
     "Code": {
-      "CLI": "aws ec2 create-subnet",
-      "NativeIaC": "",
-      "Other": "",
-      "Terraform": ""
+      "CLI": "",
+      "NativeIaC": "```yaml\n# CloudFormation: add one public and one private subnet to a VPC\nResources:\n  InternetGateway:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::InternetGateway\n\n  VPCGatewayAttachment:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::VPCGatewayAttachment\n    Properties:\n      VpcId: <example_resource_id>\n      InternetGatewayId: !Ref InternetGateway\n\n  PublicSubnet:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::Subnet\n    Properties:\n      VpcId: <example_resource_id>\n      CidrBlock: 10.0.1.0/24  # creates a subnet to be made public via route\n\n  PrivateSubnet:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::Subnet\n    Properties:\n      VpcId: <example_resource_id>\n      CidrBlock: 10.0.2.0/24  # creates a subnet that remains private (no IGW route)\n\n  PublicRouteTable:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::RouteTable\n    Properties:\n      VpcId: <example_resource_id>\n\n  PublicDefaultRoute:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::Route\n    DependsOn: VPCGatewayAttachment\n    Properties:\n      RouteTableId: !Ref PublicRouteTable\n      DestinationCidrBlock: 0.0.0.0/0  # CRITICAL: makes routes to the Internet\n      GatewayId: !Ref InternetGateway    # CRITICAL: via Internet Gateway\n\n  PublicAssociation:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::SubnetRouteTableAssociation\n    Properties:\n      SubnetId: !Ref PublicSubnet\n      RouteTableId: !Ref PublicRouteTable  # CRITICAL: marks this subnet as public\n\n  PrivateRouteTable:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::RouteTable\n    Properties:\n      VpcId: <example_resource_id>\n\n  PrivateAssociation:\n    Type: AWS::EC2::SubnetRouteTableAssociation\n    Properties:\n      SubnetId: !Ref PrivateSubnet\n      RouteTableId: !Ref PrivateRouteTable  # CRITICAL: no IGW route -> private subnet\n```",
+      "Other": "1. In the AWS console, go to VPC > Your VPCs and select the failing VPC\n2. Attach an Internet Gateway if none exists: Internet Gateways > Create > Attach to the VPC\n3. Create two subnets: Subnets > Create subnet\n   - Subnet A (public): CIDR e.g., 10.0.1.0/24\n   - Subnet B (private): CIDR e.g., 10.0.2.0/24\n4. Create a route table for public subnet: Route tables > Create\n   - Add route: 0.0.0.0/0 -> Internet Gateway (IGW)\n   - Associate this route table to Subnet A (public)\n5. Create a route table for private subnet: Route tables > Create\n   - Do not add a route to an Internet Gateway\n   - Associate this route table to Subnet B (private)\n6. Verify the VPC now has at least one subnet with an IGW route (public) and one without (private)",
+      "Terraform": "```hcl\n# Terraform: add one public and one private subnet to a VPC\nresource \"aws_internet_gateway\" \"<example_resource_name>\" {\n  vpc_id = \"<example_resource_id>\"\n}\n\nresource \"aws_subnet\" \"public_<example_resource_name>\" {\n  vpc_id     = \"<example_resource_id>\"\n  cidr_block = \"10.0.1.0/24\"\n}\n\nresource \"aws_subnet\" \"private_<example_resource_name>\" {\n  vpc_id     = \"<example_resource_id>\"\n  cidr_block = \"10.0.2.0/24\"\n}\n\nresource \"aws_route_table\" \"public_<example_resource_name>\" {\n  vpc_id = \"<example_resource_id>\"\n  route {                         # CRITICAL: makes subnet public via IGW\n    cidr_block = \"0.0.0.0/0\"      # default route to Internet\n    gateway_id = aws_internet_gateway.<example_resource_name>.id\n  }\n}\n\nresource \"aws_route_table_association\" \"public_assoc_<example_resource_name>\" {\n  subnet_id      = aws_subnet.public_<example_resource_name>.id\n  route_table_id = aws_route_table.public_<example_resource_name>.id  # CRITICAL\n}\n\nresource \"aws_route_table\" \"private_<example_resource_name>\" {\n  vpc_id = \"<example_resource_id>\"  # CRITICAL: no IGW route keeps subnet private\n}\n\nresource \"aws_route_table_association\" \"private_assoc_<example_resource_name>\" {\n  subnet_id      = aws_subnet.private_<example_resource_name>.id\n  route_table_id = aws_route_table.private_<example_resource_name>.id  # CRITICAL\n}\n```"
     },
     "Recommendation": {
-      "Text": "Ensure all VPC has public and private subnets defined",
-      "Url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/VPC_Scenario2.html"
+      "Text": "Segment each VPC: put internet-facing endpoints in **public subnets** and internal workloads in **private subnets**. Restrict ingress/egress with tight route tables, NACLs, and security groups, minimizing `0.0.0.0/0`. Apply **least privilege** and **defense in depth**. Provide controlled outbound for private subnets via managed egress and use hardened admin access patterns.",
+      "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/vpc_subnet_separate_private_public"
     }
   },
-  "Categories": [],
+  "Categories": [
+    "trust-boundaries"
+  ],
   "DependsOn": [],
   "RelatedTo": [],
   "Notes": ""

prowler/providers/aws/services/vpc/vpc_vpn_connection_tunnels_up/vpc_vpn_connection_tunnels_up.metadata.json

@@ -1,32 +1,38 @@
 {
   "Provider": "aws",
   "CheckID": "vpc_vpn_connection_tunnels_up",
-  "CheckTitle": "Both VPN tunnels for an AWS Site-to-Site VPN connection should be up",
+  "CheckTitle": "AWS Site-to-Site VPN connection has both tunnels up",
   "CheckType": [
-    "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices"
+    "Software and Configuration Checks/AWS Security Best Practices/Network Reachability",
+    "Effects/Denial of Service"
   ],
   "ServiceName": "vpc",
   "SubServiceName": "",
-  "ResourceIdTemplate": "arn:partition:service:region:account-id:vpn-connection/resource-id",
+  "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
   "Severity": "medium",
   "ResourceType": "AwsEc2ClientVpnEndpoint",
-  "Description": "A VPN tunnel is an encrypted link where data can pass from the customer network to or from AWS within an AWS Site-to-Site VPN connection. Each VPN connection includes two VPN tunnels which you can simultaneously use for high availability. Ensuring that both VPN tunnels are up for a VPN connection is important for confirming a secure and highly available connection between an AWS VPC and your remote network.",
-  "Risk": "If one or both VPN tunnels are down, it can compromise the security and availability of the connection between your AWS VPC and your remote network. This could result in connectivity issues and potential data exposure or loss during the downtime, affecting business operations and overall network security.",
-  "RelatedUrl": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/vpc-vpn-2-tunnels-up.html",
+  "ResourceGroup": "network",
+  "Description": "**AWS Site-to-Site VPN** connections have two IPsec tunnels. This evaluates tunnel status and detects when any tunnel is not `UP`, indicating whether both tunnels are concurrently available for high availability.",
+  "Risk": "With only one active tunnel or none, the link loses redundancy, degrading **availability** and increasing the chance of outages, session drops, or route blackholing. Failover cannot occur, disrupting critical workloads and cross-environment operations.",
+  "RelatedUrl": "",
+  "AdditionalURLs": [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpn/latest/s2svpn/modify-vpn-tunnel-options.html",
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/vpc-vpn-2-tunnels-up.html"
+  ],
   "Remediation": {
     "Code": {
       "CLI": "",
       "NativeIaC": "",
-      "Other": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/securityhub/latest/userguide/ec2-controls.html#ec2-20",
+      "Other": "1. In the AWS Console, go to VPC > Site-to-Site VPN connections and select the VPN connection with a tunnel DOWN\n2. Open the Tunnel details tab\n3. For each tunnel (1 and 2), choose Actions > Download configuration, select your device/vendor, and download the config\n4. On your customer gateway device, configure BOTH tunnels using the downloaded parameters (pre-shared key, IKE/IPsec settings, inside CIDR, and routing/BGP as applicable)\n5. If your device requires different parameters, in the AWS console choose Actions > Modify VPN tunnel options, select the tunnel outside IP, adjust only the necessary options (for example IKE version or pre-shared key), and Save\n6. Wait a few minutes and verify both tunnels show Status: UP under Tunnel details",
       "Terraform": ""
     },
     "Recommendation": {
-      "Text": "To modify VPN tunnel options, see Modifying Site-to-Site VPN tunnel options in the AWS Site-to-Site VPN User Guide.",
-      "Url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpn/latest/s2svpn/modify-vpn-tunnel-options.html"
+      "Text": "Maintain both tunnels healthy and ready for failover:\n- Deploy redundant customer gateways and resilient routing\n- Monitor tunnel health with alerts\n- Periodically test failover and document runbooks\n\nApply **high availability** and **defense-in-depth** to avoid single points of failure.",
+      "Url": "https://hub.prowler.com/check/vpc_vpn_connection_tunnels_up"
     }
   },
   "Categories": [
-    "redundancy"
+    "resilience"
   ],
   "DependsOn": [],
   "RelatedTo": [],

prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_global_rule_with_conditions/waf_global_rule_with_conditions.metadata.json

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
   "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
   "Severity": "medium",
   "ResourceType": "AwsWafRule",
+  "ResourceGroup": "security",
   "Description": "**AWS WAF Classic global rules** contain at least one **condition** that matches HTTP(S) requests the rule evaluates for action (e.g., `allow`, `block`, `count`).",
   "Risk": "**No-condition rules** never match traffic, providing no filtering. Malicious requests (SQLi/XSS, bots) can reach origins, impacting **confidentiality** (data exfiltration), **integrity** (tampering), and **availability** (service disruption). They may also create a false sense of coverage.",
   "RelatedUrl": "",

prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_global_rulegroup_not_empty/waf_global_rulegroup_not_empty.metadata.json

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
   "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
   "Severity": "high",
   "ResourceType": "AwsWafRuleGroup",
+  "ResourceGroup": "security",
   "Description": "**AWS WAF Classic global rule groups** are assessed for the presence of **one or more rules**. Empty groups are identified even when referenced by a web ACL, meaning the group adds no match logic.",
   "Risk": "An empty rule group performs no inspection, so web requests pass without WAF scrutiny. This creates blind spots enabling:\n- **Confidentiality**: data exfiltration via SQLi/XSS\n- **Integrity**: parameter tampering\n- **Availability**: bot abuse and layer-7 DoS\n\nIt also creates a false sense of protection when attached.",
   "RelatedUrl": "",

prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_global_webacl_logging_enabled/waf_global_webacl_logging_enabled.metadata.json

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
   "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
   "Severity": "medium",
   "ResourceType": "AwsWafWebAcl",
+  "ResourceGroup": "security",
   "Description": "**AWS WAF Classic global Web ACLs** have **logging** enabled to capture evaluated web requests and rule actions for each ACL",
   "Risk": "Without **WAF logging**, you lose **visibility** into attacks (SQLi/XSS probes, bots, brute-force) and into allow/block decisions, limiting detection and forensics. This degrades **confidentiality**, **integrity**, and **availability**, and slows incident response and tuning.",
   "RelatedUrl": "",

prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_global_webacl_with_rules/waf_global_webacl_with_rules.metadata.json

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
   "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
   "Severity": "medium",
   "ResourceType": "AwsWafWebAcl",
+  "ResourceGroup": "security",
   "Description": "**AWS WAF Classic global web ACLs** are evaluated for the presence of at least one **rule** or **rule group** that inspects HTTP(S) requests",
   "Risk": "With no rules, the web ACL relies solely on its default action. If `allow`, hostile traffic reaches origins uninspected; if `block`, legitimate traffic can be denied.\n- SQLi/XSS can expose data (confidentiality)\n- Malicious requests can alter state (integrity)\n- Bots and scraping can drain resources (availability)",
   "RelatedUrl": "",

prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_rule_with_conditions/waf_regional_rule_with_conditions.metadata.json

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
   "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
   "Severity": "medium",
   "ResourceType": "AwsWafRegionalRule",
+  "ResourceGroup": "security",
   "Description": "**AWS WAF Classic Regional rules** have one or more **conditions (predicates)** attached (IP, byte/regex, geo, size, SQLi/XSS) to define which requests the rule evaluates",
   "Risk": "An empty rule never matches, letting traffic bypass that control. This weakens defense-in-depth and can impact **confidentiality** (data exfiltration), **integrity** (SQLi/XSS), and **availability** (missing rate/size limits), depending on Web ACL order and default action.",
   "RelatedUrl": "",

prowler/providers/aws/services/waf/waf_regional_rulegroup_not_empty/waf_regional_rulegroup_not_empty.metadata.json

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
   "ResourceIdTemplate": "",
   "Severity": "medium",
   "ResourceType": "AwsWafRegionalRuleGroup",
+  "ResourceGroup": "security",
   "Description": "**AWS WAF Classic Regional rule groups** are evaluated to confirm they contain at least one **rule**. Groups with no rule entries are considered empty.",
   "Risk": "An empty rule group contributes no filtering in a web ACL, letting requests bypass inspection within that group. This erodes **defense in depth** and can enable injection, brute-force, or bot traffic to reach applications, threatening **confidentiality**, **integrity**, and **availability**.",
   "RelatedUrl": "",