prompture 0.0.50.dev1__py3-none-any.whl → 0.0.51__py3-none-any.whl

prompture/sandbox/restrictions.py

@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+"""Import and path restriction logic for the sandbox.
+
+Defines configurable restrictions for imports and filesystem access.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from pathlib import Path
+
+# Always blocked imports - these are never allowed regardless of configuration
+# These modules can be used to escape the sandbox or cause serious harm
+ALWAYS_BLOCKED_IMPORTS = frozenset(
+    {
+        # Low-level system access
+        "ctypes",
+        "ctypes.util",
+        "_ctypes",
+        # Process/threading that could escape sandbox
+        "multiprocessing",
+        "_multiprocessing",
+        "threading",
+        "_thread",
+        "concurrent",
+        "concurrent.futures",
+        # Memory/garbage collection manipulation
+        "gc",
+        # System internals
+        "sys",
+        "_sys",
+        "builtins",
+        "_builtins",
+        # Import system manipulation
+        "importlib",
+        "importlib.util",
+        "importlib.abc",
+        "importlib.machinery",
+        "importlib.resources",
+        "pkgutil",
+        "runpy",
+        # Code introspection/manipulation
+        "code",
+        "codeop",
+        "ast",  # Could be used to construct code
+        "dis",
+        "inspect",
+        "traceback",
+        "linecache",
+        "tokenize",
+        "token",
+        "symbol",
+        "parser",
+        # Debugging
+        "pdb",
+        "bdb",
+        "trace",
+        "faulthandler",
+        # Serialization that can execute code
+        "pickle",
+        "cPickle",
+        "_pickle",
+        "shelve",
+        "marshal",
+        "pickletools",
+        # OS/subprocess access
+        "os",
+        "posix",
+        "nt",
+        "posixpath",
+        "ntpath",
+        "_posixsubprocess",
+        "subprocess",
+        "shutil",
+        "pathlib",  # Can access filesystem
+        "glob",
+        "fnmatch",
+        # Signals and process control
+        "signal",
+        "pty",
+        "tty",
+        "termios",
+        # Resource control
+        "resource",
+        # Windows-specific
+        "msilib",
+        "winreg",
+        "_winapi",
+        "msvcrt",
+        # Platform info leakage
+        "platform",
+        "sysconfig",
+        # Sockets/networking
+        "socket",
+        "_socket",
+        "ssl",
+        "_ssl",
+        "select",
+        "selectors",
+        "asyncio",
+        # File-related
+        "io",
+        "_io",
+        "tempfile",
+        # Weak references (can leak objects)
+        "weakref",
+        # Exit/termination
+        "atexit",
+    }
+)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ImportRestrictions:
+    """Configuration for import restrictions in the sandbox.
+
+    Attributes:
+        allowed: Set of explicitly allowed module names. If non-empty,
+            only these modules can be imported (whitelist mode).
+        blocked: Set of explicitly blocked module names. Used in
+            blacklist mode when allowed is empty.
+        block_all: If True, block all imports except builtins.
+    """
+
+    allowed: set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
+    blocked: set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
+    block_all: bool = False
+
+    def is_allowed(self, module_name: str) -> tuple[bool, str | None]:
+        """Check if a module import is allowed.
+
+        Args:
+            module_name: The module name to check.
+
+        Returns:
+            Tuple of (is_allowed, reason_if_blocked).
+        """
+        # Get the top-level module
+        top_level = module_name.split(".")[0]
+
+        # Always blocked takes precedence
+        if module_name in ALWAYS_BLOCKED_IMPORTS or top_level in ALWAYS_BLOCKED_IMPORTS:
+            return False, "Module is on the always-blocked list for security"
+
+        # Check block_all mode
+        if self.block_all:
+            return False, "All imports are blocked in this sandbox"
+
+        # Whitelist mode (allowed is non-empty)
+        if self.allowed:
+            if top_level in self.allowed or module_name in self.allowed:
+                return True, None
+            return False, "Module is not on the allowed list"
+
+        # Blacklist mode
+        if top_level in self.blocked or module_name in self.blocked:
+            return False, "Module is explicitly blocked"
+
+        return True, None
+
+
+# Safe imports that are typically allowed for data processing
+SAFE_IMPORTS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "json",
+        "re",
+        "math",
+        "statistics",
+        "decimal",
+        "fractions",
+        "random",
+        "collections",
+        "itertools",
+        "functools",
+        "operator",
+        "string",
+        "textwrap",
+        "unicodedata",
+        "difflib",
+        "typing",
+        "dataclasses",
+        "enum",
+        "numbers",
+        "datetime",
+        "calendar",
+        "time",
+        "copy",
+        "pprint",
+        "reprlib",
+        "types",
+        "abc",
+        "contextlib",
+        "heapq",
+        "bisect",
+        "array",
+        "hashlib",
+        "hmac",
+        "secrets",
+        "base64",
+        "binascii",
+        "struct",
+        "codecs",
+        "html",
+        "html.parser",
+        "html.entities",
+        "urllib.parse",
+        "zlib",
+        "gzip",
+        "bz2",
+        "lzma",
+        "csv",
+    }
+)
+
+
+def get_safe_imports() -> set[str]:
+    """Return a copy of the safe imports set.
+
+    These are modules that are generally safe to allow in a sandbox
+    for data processing tasks.
+    """
+    return set(SAFE_IMPORTS)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class PathRestrictions:
+    """Configuration for filesystem path restrictions in the sandbox.
+
+    Attributes:
+        allowed_read: Set of directory paths allowed for reading.
+        allowed_write: Set of directory paths allowed for writing.
+        allow_cwd: Whether to allow read/write in the current working directory.
+        working_directory: Optional working directory override.
+    """
+
+    allowed_read: set[Path] = field(default_factory=set)
+    allowed_write: set[Path] = field(default_factory=set)
+    allow_cwd: bool = False
+    working_directory: Path | None = None
+
+    def _resolve_path(self, path: str | Path) -> Path:
+        """Resolve a path relative to the working directory."""
+        p = Path(path)
+        if not p.is_absolute():
+            base = self.working_directory or Path.cwd()
+            p = base / p
+        return p.resolve()
+
+    def can_read(self, path: str | Path) -> bool:
+        """Check if a path can be read."""
+        resolved = self._resolve_path(path)
+
+        # Check if it's under any allowed read directory
+        for allowed in self.allowed_read:
+            try:
+                resolved.relative_to(allowed.resolve())
+                return True
+            except ValueError:
+                continue
+
+        # Check CWD allowance
+        if self.allow_cwd:
+            cwd = self.working_directory or Path.cwd()
+            try:
+                resolved.relative_to(cwd.resolve())
+                return True
+            except ValueError:
+                pass
+
+        return False
+
+    def can_write(self, path: str | Path) -> bool:
+        """Check if a path can be written."""
+        resolved = self._resolve_path(path)
+
+        # Check if it's under any allowed write directory
+        for allowed in self.allowed_write:
+            try:
+                resolved.relative_to(allowed.resolve())
+                return True
+            except ValueError:
+                continue
+
+        # Check CWD allowance
+        if self.allow_cwd:
+            cwd = self.working_directory or Path.cwd()
+            try:
+                resolved.relative_to(cwd.resolve())
+                return True
+            except ValueError:
+                pass
+
+        return False

prompture/sandbox/sandbox.py

@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
+"""Main PythonSandbox class for safe code execution.
+
+Provides a configurable sandbox environment for executing Python code
+with import restrictions, path restrictions, and resource limits.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import builtins
+import io
+import sys
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+from prompture.analysis import analyze_python
+
+from .exceptions import ImportViolationError, PathViolationError, SandboxError, SandboxTimeoutError
+from .resource_limits import ResourceContext, ResourceLimits
+from .restrictions import ImportRestrictions, PathRestrictions, get_safe_imports
+
+
+@dataclass
+class SandboxResult:
+    """Result of sandbox code execution.
+
+    Attributes:
+        success: Whether execution completed without errors.
+        output: Captured stdout from execution.
+        error: Error message if execution failed.
+        exception: The exception object if one was raised.
+        return_value: The return value of the executed code (if any).
+        locals: Dictionary of local variables after execution.
+    """
+
+    success: bool
+    output: str = ""
+    error: str | None = None
+    exception: BaseException | None = None
+    return_value: Any = None
+    locals: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
+class RestrictedImporter:
+    """Custom import handler that enforces import restrictions."""
+
+    def __init__(self, restrictions: ImportRestrictions, original_import: Any) -> None:
+        self.restrictions = restrictions
+        self.original_import = original_import
+
+    def __call__(
+        self,
+        name: str,
+        globals: dict | None = None,
+        locals: dict | None = None,
+        fromlist: tuple = (),
+        level: int = 0,
+    ) -> Any:
+        """Check import restrictions before allowing the import."""
+        allowed, reason = self.restrictions.is_allowed(name)
+        if not allowed:
+            raise ImportViolationError(name, reason)
+
+        # Also check fromlist items
+        if fromlist:
+            for item in fromlist:
+                full_name = f"{name}.{item}"
+                allowed, reason = self.restrictions.is_allowed(full_name)
+                if not allowed:
+                    raise ImportViolationError(full_name, reason)
+
+        return self.original_import(name, globals, locals, fromlist, level)
+
+
+class RestrictedOpen:
+    """Custom open handler that enforces path restrictions."""
+
+    def __init__(self, path_restrictions: PathRestrictions) -> None:
+        self.path_restrictions = path_restrictions
+
+    def __call__(
+        self,
+        file: str | Path,
+        mode: str = "r",
+        *args: Any,
+        **kwargs: Any,
+    ) -> io.IOBase:
+        """Check path restrictions before opening a file."""
+        is_write = any(c in mode for c in "wax+")
+
+        if is_write:
+            if not self.path_restrictions.can_write(file):
+                raise PathViolationError(str(file), "write")
+        else:
+            if not self.path_restrictions.can_read(file):
+                raise PathViolationError(str(file), "read")
+
+        return builtins.open(file, mode, *args, **kwargs)
+
+
+class PythonSandbox:
+    """Sandbox for safe Python code execution.
+
+    Provides a restricted execution environment with:
+    - Import whitelist/blacklist with always-blocked security list
+    - Filesystem path restrictions
+    - Timeout handling
+    - Optional memory limits (Unix only)
+    - Captured stdout/stderr
+
+    Example::
+
+        from prompture.sandbox import PythonSandbox
+
+        sandbox = PythonSandbox(
+            allowed_imports=["json", "math"],
+            timeout_seconds=5,
+        )
+
+        result = sandbox.execute('''
+            import json
+            data = {"x": 1, "y": 2}
+            print(json.dumps(data))
+        ''')
+
+        if result.success:
+            print(result.output)  # '{"x": 1, "y": 2}'
+        else:
+            print(f"Error: {result.error}")
+
+    Args:
+        allowed_imports: List of module names to allow (whitelist mode).
+            If empty, uses blocked_imports as a blacklist.
+        blocked_imports: List of module names to block (blacklist mode).
+            Only used if allowed_imports is empty.
+        timeout_seconds: Maximum execution time in seconds.
+        max_memory_bytes: Maximum memory usage (Unix only).
+        allowed_read_paths: List of directory paths allowed for reading.
+        allowed_write_paths: List of directory paths allowed for writing.
+        allow_cwd: Whether to allow file access in the current working directory.
+        working_directory: Optional working directory for the sandbox.
+        use_safe_imports: If True and allowed_imports is empty, use the
+            predefined SAFE_IMPORTS set as the allowed list.
+        validate_before_exec: If True, run code analysis before execution.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        allowed_imports: list[str] | None = None,
+        blocked_imports: list[str] | None = None,
+        timeout_seconds: float = 30.0,
+        max_memory_bytes: int | None = None,
+        allowed_read_paths: list[str | Path] | None = None,
+        allowed_write_paths: list[str | Path] | None = None,
+        allow_cwd: bool = False,
+        working_directory: str | Path | None = None,
+        use_safe_imports: bool = True,
+        validate_before_exec: bool = True,
+    ) -> None:
+        # Set up import restrictions
+        if allowed_imports is not None:
+            allowed_set = set(allowed_imports)
+        elif use_safe_imports:
+            allowed_set = get_safe_imports()
+        else:
+            allowed_set = set()
+
+        blocked_set = set(blocked_imports) if blocked_imports else set()
+
+        self.import_restrictions = ImportRestrictions(
+            allowed=allowed_set,
+            blocked=blocked_set,
+        )
+
+        # Set up path restrictions
+        read_paths = {Path(p) for p in (allowed_read_paths or [])}
+        write_paths = {Path(p) for p in (allowed_write_paths or [])}
+        work_dir = Path(working_directory) if working_directory else None
+
+        self.path_restrictions = PathRestrictions(
+            allowed_read=read_paths,
+            allowed_write=write_paths,
+            allow_cwd=allow_cwd,
+            working_directory=work_dir,
+        )
+
+        # Set up resource limits
+        self.resource_limits = ResourceLimits(
+            timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds,
+            max_memory_bytes=max_memory_bytes,
+        )
+
+        self.validate_before_exec = validate_before_exec
+
+    def execute(self, code: str, globals_dict: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> SandboxResult:
+        """Execute Python code in the sandbox.
+
+        Args:
+            code: Python source code to execute.
+            globals_dict: Optional dictionary of global variables to make
+                available during execution. Defaults to a minimal safe set.
+
+        Returns:
+            SandboxResult with execution outcome.
+        """
+        # Validate code first if enabled
+        if self.validate_before_exec:
+            analysis = analyze_python(code)
+            if not analysis.syntax_valid:
+                return SandboxResult(
+                    success=False,
+                    error=f"Syntax error: {analysis.syntax_error}",
+                )
+
+        # Set up restricted builtins
+        safe_builtins = self._get_safe_builtins()
+
+        # Set up globals
+        exec_globals: dict[str, Any] = {"__builtins__": safe_builtins}
+        if globals_dict:
+            exec_globals.update(globals_dict)
+
+        exec_locals: dict[str, Any] = {}
+
+        # Capture stdout
+        old_stdout = sys.stdout
+        old_stderr = sys.stderr
+        captured_stdout = io.StringIO()
+        captured_stderr = io.StringIO()
+
+        try:
+            sys.stdout = captured_stdout
+            sys.stderr = captured_stderr
+
+            # Execute with resource limits
+            with ResourceContext(self.resource_limits):
+                exec(compile(code, "<sandbox>", "exec"), exec_globals, exec_locals)
+
+            # Success
+            output = captured_stdout.getvalue()
+            if len(output) > self.resource_limits.max_output_bytes:
+                output = output[: self.resource_limits.max_output_bytes] + "\n... [output truncated]"
+
+            return SandboxResult(
+                success=True,
+                output=output,
+                locals={k: v for k, v in exec_locals.items() if not k.startswith("_")},
+            )
+
+        except ImportViolationError as e:
+            return SandboxResult(
+                success=False,
+                output=captured_stdout.getvalue(),
+                error=str(e),
+                exception=e,
+            )
+
+        except PathViolationError as e:
+            return SandboxResult(
+                success=False,
+                output=captured_stdout.getvalue(),
+                error=str(e),
+                exception=e,
+            )
+
+        except SandboxTimeoutError as e:
+            return SandboxResult(
+                success=False,
+                output=captured_stdout.getvalue(),
+                error=str(e),
+                exception=e,
+            )
+
+        except SandboxError as e:
+            return SandboxResult(
+                success=False,
+                output=captured_stdout.getvalue(),
+                error=str(e),
+                exception=e,
+            )
+
+        except Exception as e:
+            return SandboxResult(
+                success=False,
+                output=captured_stdout.getvalue(),
+                error=f"{type(e).__name__}: {e}",
+                exception=e,
+            )
+
+        finally:
+            sys.stdout = old_stdout
+            sys.stderr = old_stderr
+
+    def _get_safe_builtins(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        """Return a dictionary of safe builtins for the sandbox."""
+        # Start with a minimal set of safe builtins
+        safe = {
+            # Types
+            "bool": bool,
+            "int": int,
+            "float": float,
+            "str": str,
+            "bytes": bytes,
+            "bytearray": bytearray,
+            "list": list,
+            "tuple": tuple,
+            "dict": dict,
+            "set": set,
+            "frozenset": frozenset,
+            "type": type,
+            "object": object,
+            # Functions
+            "abs": abs,
+            "all": all,
+            "any": any,
+            "bin": bin,
+            "chr": chr,
+            "divmod": divmod,
+            "enumerate": enumerate,
+            "filter": filter,
+            "format": format,
+            "hash": hash,
+            "hex": hex,
+            "id": id,
+            "isinstance": isinstance,
+            "issubclass": issubclass,
+            "iter": iter,
+            "len": len,
+            "map": map,
+            "max": max,
+            "min": min,
+            "next": next,
+            "oct": oct,
+            "ord": ord,
+            "pow": pow,
+            "print": print,
+            "range": range,
+            "repr": repr,
+            "reversed": reversed,
+            "round": round,
+            "slice": slice,
+            "sorted": sorted,
+            "sum": sum,
+            "zip": zip,
+            # Constants
+            "True": True,
+            "False": False,
+            "None": None,
+            # Exceptions (subset)
+            "Exception": Exception,
+            "BaseException": BaseException,
+            "ValueError": ValueError,
+            "TypeError": TypeError,
+            "KeyError": KeyError,
+            "IndexError": IndexError,
+            "AttributeError": AttributeError,
+            "RuntimeError": RuntimeError,
+            "StopIteration": StopIteration,
+            "ZeroDivisionError": ZeroDivisionError,
+            "AssertionError": AssertionError,
+            "NotImplementedError": NotImplementedError,
+        }
+
+        # Add restricted import
+        safe["__import__"] = RestrictedImporter(self.import_restrictions, builtins.__import__)
+
+        # Add restricted open if path restrictions are configured
+        if (
+            self.path_restrictions.allowed_read
+            or self.path_restrictions.allowed_write
+            or self.path_restrictions.allow_cwd
+        ):
+            safe["open"] = RestrictedOpen(self.path_restrictions)
+
+        return safe
+
+    def read_file(self, path: str | Path) -> str:
+        """Convenience method to read a file through the sandbox.
+
+        Args:
+            path: Path to the file to read.
+
+        Returns:
+            File contents as a string.
+
+        Raises:
+            PathViolationError: If the path is not allowed for reading.
+            FileNotFoundError: If the file does not exist.
+        """
+        if not self.path_restrictions.can_read(path):
+            raise PathViolationError(str(path), "read")
+        return Path(path).read_text()
+
+    def write_file(self, path: str | Path, content: str) -> None:
+        """Convenience method to write a file through the sandbox.
+
+        Args:
+            path: Path to the file to write.
+            content: Content to write to the file.
+
+        Raises:
+            PathViolationError: If the path is not allowed for writing.
+        """
+        if not self.path_restrictions.can_write(path):
+            raise PathViolationError(str(path), "write")
+        Path(path).write_text(content)

{prompture-0.0.50.dev1.dist-info → prompture-0.0.51.dist-info}/METADATA

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: prompture
-Version: 0.0.50.dev1
+Version: 0.0.51
 Summary: Ask LLMs to return structured JSON and run cross-model tests. API-first.
 Author-email: Juan Denis <juan@vene.co>
 License-Expression: MIT