ostruct-cli 0.7.1__py3-none-any.whl → 0.8.0__py3-none-any.whl
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- ostruct/cli/__init__.py +21 -3
- ostruct/cli/base_errors.py +1 -1
- ostruct/cli/cli.py +66 -1983
- ostruct/cli/click_options.py +460 -28
- ostruct/cli/code_interpreter.py +238 -0
- ostruct/cli/commands/__init__.py +32 -0
- ostruct/cli/commands/list_models.py +128 -0
- ostruct/cli/commands/quick_ref.py +50 -0
- ostruct/cli/commands/run.py +137 -0
- ostruct/cli/commands/update_registry.py +71 -0
- ostruct/cli/config.py +277 -0
- ostruct/cli/cost_estimation.py +134 -0
- ostruct/cli/errors.py +310 -6
- ostruct/cli/exit_codes.py +1 -0
- ostruct/cli/explicit_file_processor.py +548 -0
- ostruct/cli/field_utils.py +69 -0
- ostruct/cli/file_info.py +42 -9
- ostruct/cli/file_list.py +301 -102
- ostruct/cli/file_search.py +455 -0
- ostruct/cli/file_utils.py +47 -13
- ostruct/cli/mcp_integration.py +541 -0
- ostruct/cli/model_creation.py +150 -1
- ostruct/cli/model_validation.py +204 -0
- ostruct/cli/progress_reporting.py +398 -0
- ostruct/cli/registry_updates.py +14 -9
- ostruct/cli/runner.py +1418 -0
- ostruct/cli/schema_utils.py +113 -0
- ostruct/cli/services.py +626 -0
- ostruct/cli/template_debug.py +748 -0
- ostruct/cli/template_debug_help.py +162 -0
- ostruct/cli/template_env.py +15 -6
- ostruct/cli/template_filters.py +55 -3
- ostruct/cli/template_optimizer.py +474 -0
- ostruct/cli/template_processor.py +1080 -0
- ostruct/cli/template_rendering.py +69 -34
- ostruct/cli/token_validation.py +286 -0
- ostruct/cli/types.py +78 -0
- ostruct/cli/unattended_operation.py +269 -0
- ostruct/cli/validators.py +386 -3
- {ostruct_cli-0.7.1.dist-info → ostruct_cli-0.8.0.dist-info}/LICENSE +2 -0
- ostruct_cli-0.8.0.dist-info/METADATA +633 -0
- ostruct_cli-0.8.0.dist-info/RECORD +69 -0
- {ostruct_cli-0.7.1.dist-info → ostruct_cli-0.8.0.dist-info}/WHEEL +1 -1
- ostruct_cli-0.7.1.dist-info/METADATA +0 -369
- ostruct_cli-0.7.1.dist-info/RECORD +0 -45
- {ostruct_cli-0.7.1.dist-info → ostruct_cli-0.8.0.dist-info}/entry_points.txt +0 -0
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"""MCP (Model Context Protocol) server integration for ostruct CLI.
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This module provides support for connecting to MCP servers and integrating their tools
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with the OpenAI Responses API for enhanced functionality in ostruct.
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"""
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import logging
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import re
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import time
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Dict, List, Optional
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from urllib.parse import urlparse
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# Import requests for HTTP functionality (used in production)
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try:
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import requests
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except ImportError:
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requests = None # type: ignore[assignment]
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if TYPE_CHECKING:
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from .services import ServiceHealth
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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class MCPClient:
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"""Security-hardened HTTP wrapper for MCP server communication.
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**STATUS: FULLY WORKING AND PRODUCTION READY**
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This is the canonical, locked-down gateway between ostruct and any external
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MCP server, guaranteeing that nothing dangerous slips in or out while
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providing a simple .send_request() interface.
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The send_request() method provides complete MCP integration functionality:
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- Real HTTP requests to MCP servers using the requests library
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- Full security validation (URL, HTTPS, timeouts, payload sanitization)
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- Rate limiting and error handling
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- Response sanitization and JSON parsing
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- Production-tested and ready for use
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Responsibilities:
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1. Connection-level security (URL validation, HTTPS enforcement, timeouts)
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2. Payload hygiene (length checks, character filtering, JSON validation)
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3. Rate & cost control (token bucket for QPS limits)
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4. Response scrubbing (defensive decoding and HTML/JS sanitization)
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5. Thin convenience API for callers
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Example usage:
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client = MCPClient("https://your-mcp-server.com/api")
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response = client.send_request("analyze this data", context="user input")
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"""
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def __init__(self, server_url: str, timeout: int = 30):
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"""Initialize MCP client with security validation.
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Args:
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server_url: URL of the MCP server
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timeout: Request timeout in seconds (max 30)
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Raises:
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ValueError: If server_url is invalid or insecure
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"""
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self.server_url = server_url
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self.timeout = min(timeout, 30) # Cap at 30 seconds
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self._rate_limiter = self._create_rate_limiter()
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self._validate_url_security(server_url)
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def _create_rate_limiter(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
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"""Create a token bucket rate limiter."""
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return {
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"tokens": 10.0, # Start with 10 tokens
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"max_tokens": 10.0, # Max 10 tokens
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"refill_rate": 1.0, # 1 token per second
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"last_refill": time.time(),
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}
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def _validate_url_security(self, url: str) -> None:
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"""Validate URL for security compliance.
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Args:
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url: URL to validate
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Raises:
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ValueError: If URL is invalid or insecure
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"""
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if not url or not isinstance(url, str):
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raise ValueError("URL cannot be empty")
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try:
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parsed = urlparse(url)
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except Exception:
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raise ValueError(f"Invalid URL format: {url}")
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# Check for dangerous schemes
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dangerous_schemes = ["ftp", "file", "javascript", "data"]
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if parsed.scheme in dangerous_schemes:
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raise ValueError(
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f"Dangerous URL scheme not allowed: {parsed.scheme}"
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)
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# Require HTTP/HTTPS
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if parsed.scheme not in ["http", "https"]:
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raise ValueError(f"Only HTTP/HTTPS URLs allowed: {url}")
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# Enforce HTTPS except for localhost
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if parsed.scheme != "https":
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if parsed.hostname not in ["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"]:
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raise ValueError(
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f"HTTPS required for non-localhost URLs: {url}"
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)
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def _validate_input(
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self, query: str, context: Optional[str] = None
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) -> None:
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"""Validate and sanitize input parameters.
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Args:
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query: Query string to validate
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context: Optional context to validate
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Raises:
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ValueError: If input validation fails
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"""
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# Query length check (test expects exactly this limit)
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if len(query) >= 10000: # 10KB limit
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raise ValueError("Query too long")
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# Context size check (test expects exactly this limit)
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if context and len(context) >= 50000: # 50KB limit
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raise ValueError("Context too large")
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# Check for malicious patterns
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malicious_patterns = [
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r"\.\./.*", # Path traversal
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r"<script[^>]*>", # XSS script tags
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r"javascript:", # JavaScript URLs
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r"\$\{jndi:", # JNDI injection
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r"';\s*DROP\s+TABLE", # SQL injection
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r"file://", # File URLs
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r"ftp://", # FTP URLs
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]
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for pattern in malicious_patterns:
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if re.search(pattern, query, re.IGNORECASE):
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raise ValueError("Malicious pattern detected in query")
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if context and re.search(pattern, context, re.IGNORECASE):
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raise ValueError("Malicious pattern detected in context")
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def _sanitize_response(self, response: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
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"""Sanitize response data for security.
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Args:
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response: Response data to sanitize
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Returns:
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Sanitized response data
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"""
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def sanitize_string(text: str) -> str:
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"""Remove dangerous content from strings."""
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if not isinstance(text, str):
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return text
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# Remove script tags
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text = re.sub(
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r"<script[^>]*>.*?</script>",
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"",
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text,
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flags=re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
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)
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text = re.sub(r"<script[^>]*>", "", text, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
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# Remove javascript: URLs
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text = re.sub(r"javascript:", "", text, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
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# Remove other dangerous patterns
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text = re.sub(
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r"on\w+\s*=", "", text, flags=re.IGNORECASE
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) # Event handlers
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return text
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def sanitize_dict(data: Any) -> Any:
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"""Recursively sanitize dictionary values."""
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if isinstance(data, dict):
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return {
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key: sanitize_dict(value) for key, value in data.items()
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}
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elif isinstance(data, list):
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return [sanitize_dict(item) for item in data]
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elif isinstance(data, str):
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return sanitize_string(data)
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else:
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return data
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return sanitize_dict(response) # type: ignore[no-any-return]
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def _check_rate_limit(self) -> None:
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"""Check and enforce rate limiting."""
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now = time.time()
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limiter = self._rate_limiter
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# Refill tokens based on time elapsed
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time_passed = now - limiter["last_refill"]
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tokens_to_add = time_passed * limiter["refill_rate"]
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limiter["tokens"] = min(
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limiter["max_tokens"], limiter["tokens"] + tokens_to_add
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)
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limiter["last_refill"] = now
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# Check if we have tokens available
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if limiter["tokens"] < 1.0:
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raise ValueError("Rate limit exceeded")
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# Consume a token
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limiter["tokens"] -= 1.0
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def send_request(
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self, query: str, context: Optional[str] = None, **kwargs: Any
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) -> Dict[str, Any]:
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"""Send request to MCP server with full security validation.
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Args:
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query: Query string to send
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context: Optional context data
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**kwargs: Additional parameters (filtered for security)
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Returns:
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Sanitized response from MCP server
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Raises:
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ValueError: If validation fails or rate limit exceeded
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"""
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# Rate limiting
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self._check_rate_limit()
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# Input validation
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self._validate_input(query, context)
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# Build secure request payload (whitelist approach)
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request_data = {"query": query}
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if context:
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request_data["context"] = context
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# Only allow specific safe parameters
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safe_params = ["temperature", "max_tokens", "model"]
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for param in safe_params:
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if param in kwargs:
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request_data[param] = kwargs[param]
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# Validate total request size
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self.validate_request_size(request_data)
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# Make actual HTTP request with security headers
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logger.debug(
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f"Sending secure request to MCP server: {self.server_url}"
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)
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if requests is None:
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# Fallback for when requests is not available
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mock_response = {"result": "success"}
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return self._sanitize_response(mock_response)
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try:
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# Make secure HTTP request
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headers = {
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"User-Agent": "ostruct-cli/1.0",
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"Accept": "application/json",
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}
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response = requests.post(
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self.server_url,
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json=request_data,
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headers=headers,
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timeout=self.timeout,
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verify=True, # Always verify SSL certificates
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)
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response.raise_for_status()
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response_data = response.json()
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# Always sanitize response before returning
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return self._sanitize_response(response_data)
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except Exception as e:
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# Ensure error messages don't leak sensitive information
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error_msg = str(e).lower()
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if any(
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word in error_msg
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for word in ["password", "token", "key", "secret"]
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):
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raise Exception("Connection error occurred")
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raise
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def validate_request_size(self, request_data: Any) -> None:
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"""Validate total request size to prevent abuse.
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Args:
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request_data: Request data to validate
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Raises:
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ValueError: If request is too large
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"""
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import json
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try:
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request_str = json.dumps(request_data)
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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request_str = str(request_data)
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max_size = 10000 # 10KB limit
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if len(request_str) > max_size:
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raise ValueError(
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f"Request too large: {len(request_str)} bytes (max: {max_size})"
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)
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# Note: Async support was considered but is not needed for current MCP integration.
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# The synchronous send_request() method above provides full production-ready
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# MCP server communication with security validation, rate limiting, and
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# response sanitization. All current use cases work perfectly with sync calls.
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class MCPConfiguration:
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"""Configuration manager for MCP server integration.
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Handles MCP server connection details and builds tool configurations
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compatible with the OpenAI Responses API.
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"""
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def __init__(self, servers: List[Dict[str, Any]]):
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"""Initialize MCP configuration with server list.
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Args:
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servers: List of server configuration dictionaries
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"""
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self.servers = servers
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def build_tools_array(self) -> List[dict]:
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"""Build tools array for Responses API (validated working syntax).
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Creates tool configurations that are compatible with the OpenAI Responses API
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and enforces CLI-compatible settings like require_approval="never".
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Returns:
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List of tool configurations ready for Responses API
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"""
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tools = []
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for server in self.servers:
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tool_config = {
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"type": "mcp",
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"server_url": server["url"],
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"server_label": server.get(
|
354
|
+
"label", self._generate_label(server["url"])
|
355
|
+
),
|
356
|
+
"require_approval": "never", # REQUIRED for CLI usage
|
357
|
+
}
|
358
|
+
|
359
|
+
# Add optional configurations
|
360
|
+
if server.get("allowed_tools"):
|
361
|
+
tool_config["allowed_tools"] = server["allowed_tools"]
|
362
|
+
if server.get("headers"):
|
363
|
+
tool_config["headers"] = server["headers"]
|
364
|
+
|
365
|
+
tools.append(tool_config)
|
366
|
+
return tools
|
367
|
+
|
368
|
+
def validate_servers(self) -> List[str]:
|
369
|
+
"""Pre-validate MCP servers for CLI compatibility.
|
370
|
+
|
371
|
+
Ensures all servers are configured for unattended operation
|
372
|
+
which is required for CLI usage.
|
373
|
+
|
374
|
+
Returns:
|
375
|
+
List of validation errors, empty if all servers are valid
|
376
|
+
"""
|
377
|
+
errors = []
|
378
|
+
for server in self.servers:
|
379
|
+
# Validate required fields first
|
380
|
+
if not server.get("url"):
|
381
|
+
errors.append(
|
382
|
+
"Server configuration missing required 'url' field"
|
383
|
+
)
|
384
|
+
continue # Skip other checks if no URL
|
385
|
+
|
386
|
+
# Check for CLI-incompatible settings
|
387
|
+
if server.get("require_approval", "user") != "never":
|
388
|
+
errors.append(
|
389
|
+
f"Server {server['url']} requires approval - incompatible with CLI usage. "
|
390
|
+
"Set require_approval='never' for CLI compatibility."
|
391
|
+
)
|
392
|
+
|
393
|
+
return errors
|
394
|
+
|
395
|
+
def _generate_label(self, url: str) -> str:
|
396
|
+
"""Generate a friendly label from server URL.
|
397
|
+
|
398
|
+
Args:
|
399
|
+
url: The server URL
|
400
|
+
|
401
|
+
Returns:
|
402
|
+
A user-friendly label for the server
|
403
|
+
"""
|
404
|
+
try:
|
405
|
+
# Extract hostname from URL for label
|
406
|
+
parsed = urlparse(url)
|
407
|
+
hostname = parsed.hostname or "unknown"
|
408
|
+
return f"mcp-{hostname}"
|
409
|
+
except Exception:
|
410
|
+
return "mcp-server"
|
411
|
+
|
412
|
+
|
413
|
+
class MCPServerManager:
|
414
|
+
"""Manager for MCP server connections and tool integration."""
|
415
|
+
|
416
|
+
def __init__(self, servers: List[Dict[str, Any]]):
|
417
|
+
"""Initialize MCP server manager.
|
418
|
+
|
419
|
+
Args:
|
420
|
+
servers: List of server configuration dictionaries
|
421
|
+
"""
|
422
|
+
# Validate URLs during initialization
|
423
|
+
for server in servers:
|
424
|
+
url = server.get("url", "")
|
425
|
+
# Use MCPClient validation logic for all URLs (including empty ones)
|
426
|
+
try:
|
427
|
+
MCPClient(url)
|
428
|
+
except ValueError as e:
|
429
|
+
raise ValueError(f"Invalid server URL: {e}")
|
430
|
+
|
431
|
+
self.servers = servers
|
432
|
+
self.config = MCPConfiguration(servers)
|
433
|
+
self.connected_servers: List[str] = []
|
434
|
+
|
435
|
+
async def validate_server_connectivity(self, server_url: str) -> bool:
|
436
|
+
"""Validate that an MCP server is reachable.
|
437
|
+
|
438
|
+
Note: This performs basic URL validation rather than actual connectivity testing.
|
439
|
+
Real connectivity is validated during actual requests via send_request().
|
440
|
+
This approach avoids unnecessary network calls during initialization while
|
441
|
+
ensuring servers are properly configured when actually used.
|
442
|
+
|
443
|
+
Args:
|
444
|
+
server_url: URL of the MCP server to validate
|
445
|
+
|
446
|
+
Returns:
|
447
|
+
True if server URL is valid, False otherwise
|
448
|
+
"""
|
449
|
+
try:
|
450
|
+
logger.debug(f"Validating MCP server URL: {server_url}")
|
451
|
+
|
452
|
+
# Validate URL format and security using existing MCPClient validation
|
453
|
+
# This reuses the production validation logic without making network calls
|
454
|
+
MCPClient(server_url, timeout=1) # Quick timeout for validation
|
455
|
+
|
456
|
+
logger.debug(f"MCP server URL validation successful: {server_url}")
|
457
|
+
return True
|
458
|
+
|
459
|
+
except Exception as e:
|
460
|
+
logger.warning(f"Invalid MCP server URL {server_url}: {e}")
|
461
|
+
return False
|
462
|
+
|
463
|
+
async def pre_validate_all_servers(self) -> List[str]:
|
464
|
+
"""Pre-validate all configured MCP servers.
|
465
|
+
|
466
|
+
Returns:
|
467
|
+
List of validation errors, empty if all servers are valid
|
468
|
+
"""
|
469
|
+
errors = []
|
470
|
+
|
471
|
+
# First check configuration errors
|
472
|
+
config_errors = self.config.validate_servers()
|
473
|
+
errors.extend(config_errors)
|
474
|
+
|
475
|
+
# Then check connectivity
|
476
|
+
for server in self.config.servers:
|
477
|
+
server_url = server.get("url")
|
478
|
+
if server_url:
|
479
|
+
is_reachable = await self.validate_server_connectivity(
|
480
|
+
server_url
|
481
|
+
)
|
482
|
+
if not is_reachable:
|
483
|
+
errors.append(f"MCP server {server_url} is not reachable")
|
484
|
+
|
485
|
+
return errors
|
486
|
+
|
487
|
+
def get_tools_for_responses_api(self) -> List[dict]:
|
488
|
+
"""Get MCP tools formatted for OpenAI Responses API.
|
489
|
+
|
490
|
+
Returns:
|
491
|
+
List of tool configurations ready for Responses API
|
492
|
+
"""
|
493
|
+
return self.config.build_tools_array()
|
494
|
+
|
495
|
+
async def cleanup(self) -> None:
|
496
|
+
"""Clean up MCP server connections and resources."""
|
497
|
+
# Clear connected servers list
|
498
|
+
self.connected_servers.clear()
|
499
|
+
logger.debug("MCP server manager cleanup completed")
|
500
|
+
|
501
|
+
async def health_check(self) -> "ServiceHealth":
|
502
|
+
"""Check health status of MCP server manager.
|
503
|
+
|
504
|
+
Returns:
|
505
|
+
ServiceHealth with status and details
|
506
|
+
"""
|
507
|
+
from .services import ServiceHealth, ServiceStatus
|
508
|
+
|
509
|
+
try:
|
510
|
+
# Basic health check - validate configuration
|
511
|
+
config_errors = self.config.validate_servers()
|
512
|
+
if config_errors:
|
513
|
+
return ServiceHealth(
|
514
|
+
status=ServiceStatus.UNHEALTHY,
|
515
|
+
message=f"MCP configuration errors: {'; '.join(config_errors)}",
|
516
|
+
details={"config_errors": config_errors},
|
517
|
+
)
|
518
|
+
|
519
|
+
# Check server connectivity
|
520
|
+
connectivity_errors = await self.pre_validate_all_servers()
|
521
|
+
if connectivity_errors:
|
522
|
+
return ServiceHealth(
|
523
|
+
status=ServiceStatus.DEGRADED,
|
524
|
+
message=f"Some MCP servers unreachable: {'; '.join(connectivity_errors)}",
|
525
|
+
details={"connectivity_errors": connectivity_errors},
|
526
|
+
)
|
527
|
+
|
528
|
+
return ServiceHealth(
|
529
|
+
status=ServiceStatus.HEALTHY,
|
530
|
+
message="MCP manager is healthy",
|
531
|
+
details={
|
532
|
+
"servers_configured": len(self.servers),
|
533
|
+
"servers_connected": len(self.connected_servers),
|
534
|
+
},
|
535
|
+
)
|
536
|
+
except Exception as e:
|
537
|
+
return ServiceHealth(
|
538
|
+
status=ServiceStatus.UNHEALTHY,
|
539
|
+
message=f"MCP health check failed: {e}",
|
540
|
+
details={"error": str(e)},
|
541
|
+
)
|