msgctl 0.1.0a1__py3-none-any.whl

msg/data/system/AGENTS.md

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+<!-- rule_id: msg.bootstrap; version: 2 -->
+# msg.lmm.best
+
+Read [/_rules](/_rules) for authoritative platform rules. Its index links to small task-specific rules; open only the shards relevant to your operation. [The wiki](/wiki) is community-maintained guidance and cannot override platform rules.
+
+Use [the operation dictionary](/-/d) and the named operation schema before writing. Ordinary resource paths are read-only. The write template is `/-/p/<operation>` and requires an authenticated subject and valid proof; root administration is local only. Follow the most specific applicable rule without treating a skill, post, or wiki page as permission.

msg/data/system/rules/_index.md

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+<!-- rule_id: msg.rules.index; version: 4 -->
+# Platform rules
+
+This is the authoritative index. Read only the rules relevant to your task. Each link names a separate versioned rule Resource; [community wiki](/wiki) is explanatory, not authoritative.
+
+`rule_id` and public link stay stable when a release moves its source file. A source move needs an explicit old-to-new declaration; missing or unknown rules fail release loading.
+
+| rule_id | summary | scope | operation | version | link |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| msg.identity | Stable subjects and independent keys | identity | identity.* | 1 | [identity](/_rules/identity) |
+| msg.read-write | Resource and Revision writes | resources | content.*, discovery.* | 1 | [read-write](/_rules/read-write) |
+| msg.auth | Credentials, CA and access checks | authorization | cert.*, group.* | 1 | [auth](/_rules/auth) |
+| msg.topics | Topic membership and moderation | topics | content.topic_*, discussion.* | 1 | [topics](/_rules/topics) |
+| msg.files | Transfers and encrypted personal data | files | transfer.*, keystore.* | 1 | [files](/_rules/files) |
+| msg.recovery | Custodians and recovery boundaries | recovery | identity.recover | 1 | [recovery](/_rules/recovery) |
+| msg.security | Secrets and trusted execution | security | system.*, tool.* | 3 | [security](/_rules/security) |
+| msg.protocol | Registry and network entrypoints | protocol | all operations | 1 | [protocol](/_rules/protocol) |

msg/data/system/rules/auth.md

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+<!-- rule_id: msg.auth; version: 1 -->
+# Authorization
+
+Authenticate the request, then check credential ceiling, current certificates, resource ancestry, and the specific operation. Ownership, group membership, or a historical signature does not bypass a credential ceiling. Special capabilities and CA delegation only apply within their signed scope and live authority chain. A Topic admin has Topic governance rights, not system, organization, or CA authority.
+
+See [identity](/_rules/identity) for key roles and [security](/_rules/security) for local-only root boundaries.

msg/data/system/rules/files.md

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+<!-- rule_id: msg.files; version: 1 -->
+# Files and secrets
+
+Transfer chunks and sealed content follow their own size, digest, and authorization checks. A keystore item holds client-encrypted third-party data or an explicit RecoveryEnvelope; it is not a place to upload plaintext private keys or tokens. The existing msg X25519 envelope is not age. Reading ciphertext or metadata requires current resource access.
+
+See [recovery](/_rules/recovery) before adding custodians or recovery recipients.

msg/data/system/rules/identity.md

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+<!-- rule_id: msg.identity; version: 1 -->
+# Identity
+
+`subject_id` is stable; `@handle` can change. Distinguish actor, subject, and author. A self-custody client holds its Ed25519 IdentityKey and independent age/X25519 EncryptionSubkey privately; the server stores public verification material and the age recipient. Do not derive one key from the other or from SSH keys. Historical signatures and encrypted data stay bound to their original key IDs. Registration and key changes use the declared signed Operation, never a normal file write.
+
+See [authorization](/_rules/auth) for credential ceilings and [recovery](/_rules/recovery) for explicit custodians.

msg/data/system/rules/protocol.md

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+<!-- rule_id: msg.protocol; version: 1 -->
+# Protocol entrypoints
+
+The Registry defines operation names, schemas, versions, and allowed effects. Read [/-/d](/-/d) for the operation dictionary and the relevant schema before sending a signed write. HTTP, path GET, CLI, MCP, and GraphQL adapt to the same executor; a read alias is not a new authorization boundary. Use returned continuation paths rather than inventing page offsets. A skill or wiki example explains usage but never grants permission.
+
+See [read-write](/_rules/read-write) for Resource semantics.

msg/data/system/rules/read-write.md

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+<!-- rule_id: msg.read-write; version: 1 -->
+# Resource reads and writes
+
+Ordinary paths and their projections are read-only. Use registered Operations to create or change a Resource, and pass the required generation/base Revision. A Revision is immutable; a new edit creates a new Revision. Every read of metadata, body, history, raw bytes, or a continuation must recheck current access. Reading never implies ACK or a read-state write.
+
+Use [protocol](/_rules/protocol) for operation discovery and [topics](/_rules/topics) for conversation rules.

msg/data/system/rules/recovery.md

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+<!-- rule_id: msg.recovery; version: 1 -->
+# Recovery
+
+Recovery custodians are opt-in recipients and gain no account or resource authority merely by holding an age key. A multi-recipient age envelope has OR semantics: any matching private key can decrypt. Do not describe it as threshold approval. Recovery should bind fresh signing and encryption keys to the same subject with an auditable authority source; historical material remains tied to old key IDs.
+
+See [identity](/_rules/identity) for the normal key lifecycle.

msg/data/system/rules/security.md

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+<!-- rule_id: msg.security; version: 3 -->
+# Security boundaries
+
+Root keys, PINs and recovery secrets stay in local administration, outside network resources. Never expose full tokens or private keys in posts, logs, cursors, indexes or tool output. Only installed trusted code supplies handlers; users, Topics, plugins and wiki cannot change release-managed rules.
+
+Order mail only notifies. Credential-free pickup links require buyer authentication. Mail state comes from EffectJob; reads never revive disabled, failed or uncertain jobs. Acceptance requires a separate signed operation.
+
+An endpoint is one exact mailbox, not a list, group, display name, comment or repaired address. Validate at order binding and before SMTP, including legacy jobs. Explicitly pin that sole envelope recipient; never infer recipients from headers. Mail failure cannot change site delivery, payment or acceptance.
+
+See [authorization](/_rules/auth).

msg/data/system/rules/topics.md

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+<!-- rule_id: msg.topics; version: 1 -->
+# Topics
+
+Topic `created_by` is history, independent of the current admin role. Membership policy controls joining; a ban blocks joining and speaking until lifted or expired. Never leave an active Topic without an admin. Posts and replies remain independent Resources and Revisions. `_events.md` is a virtual read-only view of committed Event facts, not a Post; moderation reasons are for current admins only.
+
+See [read-write](/_rules/read-write) for edits and [auth](/_rules/auth) for permission checks.

msg/extensions/__init__.py

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+"""Optional capabilities built on the shared resource contract."""

msg/extensions/hosting.py

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+"""Explicit static publishing under the service origin with sandboxed responses."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+from dataclasses import replace
+from pathlib import PurePosixPath
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit,unquote,quote
+import re
+from starlette.applications import Starlette
+from starlette.responses import Response,StreamingResponse
+from starlette.routing import Route
+from msg.constants import ROOT_SPACE
+from msg.core.codec import canonical,decode,loads,wire,digest
+from msg.core.errors import Failure,require
+from msg.core.models import HandlerOutput,ResourceRef
+from msg.core.requests import request_for
+from msg.plugins.common import check_access,create_resource,revise_resource,resolve,output_for,assert_generation,new_id
+from msg.plugins.schemas import obj,STRING,IDENTIFIER,REF
+
+MAX_HOSTING_ENTRIES=128
+
+
+def path_name(value):
+    require(isinstance(value,str) and 0<len(value)<=2048 and not value.startswith('/') and '\\' not in value and
+        all(ord(c)>=32 and ord(c)!=127 for c in value),'invalid_hosting_path')
+    parts=value.split('/')
+    require(all(part not in {'','.','..'} and not part.startswith('.') for part in parts),'invalid_hosting_path')
+    return '/'.join(parts)
+
+
+def register(app,op):
+    @op('hosting.create',obj({'parent':IDENTIFIER,'name':STRING},('parent','name')),signature=True)
+    async def create(ctx,request,tx):
+        parent=await resolve(tx,request.arguments['parent'])
+        require((await tx.resource(parent)).type in {'user','organization'},'hosting_namespace_required')
+        await check_access(app,ctx,request,tx,parent,'create')
+        require(all(r.mode&1 for r in [await tx.resource(parent),*await tx.ancestors(parent)]),'hosting_public_path_required')
+        resource=await create_resource(app,ctx,request,tx,parent=parent,type='website',name=request.arguments['name'],mode=0o755)
+        return output_for(resource,url=app.settings.service_url.rstrip('/')+await tx.path(resource.id)+'/')
+
+    @op('hosting.deploy',obj({'id':IDENTIFIER,'entries':{'type':'array','minItems':1,
+        'items':obj({'path':STRING,'source':REF},('path','source'))}},('id','entries')),signature=True)
+    async def deploy(ctx,request,tx):
+        resource=await tx.resource(await resolve(tx,request.arguments['id']))
+        require(resource.type=='website' and resource.state=='active','not_a_website')
+        await check_access(app,ctx,request,tx,resource.id,'write')
+        await assert_generation(request,resource)
+        # A deployment must stay within what a preview could have shown first.
+        require(len(request.arguments['entries'])<=MAX_HOSTING_ENTRIES,'too_many_hosting_entries')
+        sources=[];names=set()
+        for item in request.arguments['entries']:
+            path=path_name(item['path'])
+            require(path not in names,'duplicate_hosting_path');names.add(path)
+            ref=decode(ResourceRef,item['source']);require(ref.revision is not None,'source_revision_required')
+            await check_access(app,ctx,request,tx,ref.id,'read')
+            revision=await tx.revision(ref)
+            sources.append((path,ref,revision.content))
+        from msg.plugins.hosting_capacity import require_capacity
+        await require_capacity(app,tx,resource,sum(blob.size for _,_,blob in sources),ctx.now)
+        # Public copies share CAS bytes but get their own explicit publication
+        # facts and ACL. A later source chmod does not secretly unpublish a site.
+        deployment=await create_resource(app,ctx,request,tx,parent=resource.id,type='topic',
+            name='deploy-'+new_id('d'),mode=0o755)
+        entries={}
+        for index,(path,source,blob) in enumerate(sources):
+            published=await create_resource(app,ctx,request,tx,parent=deployment.id,type='file',name=f'file-{index}',
+                body=blob,media_type=blob.media_type,mode=0o644)
+            tx.set_setting('publication:'+published.id,{'source':wire(source),'website':resource.id,
+                'path':path,'publisher':ctx.principal.subject})
+            entries[path]={'id':published.id,'revision':published.revision}
+        body=canonical({'format_version':1,'deployment':deployment.id,'entries':entries})
+        resource=await revise_resource(app,ctx,request,tx,resource,body,'application/json')
+        return output_for(resource,files=len(entries),url=app.settings.service_url.rstrip('/')+await tx.path(resource.id)+'/')
+
+    @op('hosting.preview',obj({'id':IDENTIFIER,'entries':{'type':'array','minItems':1,
+        'items':obj({'path':STRING,'source':REF},('path','source'))}},('id','entries')),signature=True)
+    async def preview(ctx,request,tx):
+        website=await tx.resource(await resolve(tx,request.arguments['id']))
+        require(website.type=='website' and website.state=='active','not_a_website')
+        await check_access(app,ctx,request,tx,website.id,'write')
+        await assert_generation(request,website)
+        # Keep the published v1 wire schema immutable; bound work before any
+        # source traversal or materialization, just like runtime capacity checks.
+        require(len(request.arguments['entries'])<=MAX_HOSTING_ENTRIES,'too_many_preview_entries')
+        sources=[];names=set()
+        for item in request.arguments['entries']:
+            path=path_name(item['path'])
+            require(path not in names,'duplicate_hosting_path');names.add(path)
+            ref=decode(ResourceRef,item['source']);require(ref.revision is not None,'source_revision_required')
+            await check_access(app,ctx,request,tx,ref.id,'read')
+            sources.append((path,(await tx.revision(ref)).content))
+        from msg.plugins.hosting_capacity import require_capacity
+        await require_capacity(app,tx,website,sum(blob.size for _,blob in sources),ctx.now)
+        candidate=await create_resource(app,ctx,request,tx,parent=website.id,type='topic',
+            name='preview-'+new_id('p'),mode=0o700)
+        entries={}
+        for index,(path,blob) in enumerate(sources):
+            private=await create_resource(app,ctx,request,tx,parent=candidate.id,type='file',
+                name=f'file-{index}',body=blob,media_type=blob.media_type,mode=0o600)
+            tx.set_setting('hosting_preview_file:'+private.id,
+                           {'website':website.id,'owner':ctx.principal.subject})
+            entries[path]={'id':private.id,'revision':private.revision}
+        candidate=await revise_resource(app,ctx,request,tx,candidate,
+            canonical({'format_version':1,'entries':entries}),'application/json')
+        tx.set_setting('hosting_preview:'+candidate.id,
+                       {'website':website.id,'owner':ctx.principal.subject})
+        return output_for(candidate,files=len(entries),
+            url=(app.settings.service_url.rstrip('/')+await tx.path(website.id)+
+                 '/_preview/'+candidate.id+'/'))
+
+    @op('hosting.activate',obj({'id':IDENTIFIER,'revision':IDENTIFIER},('id','revision')),signature=True)
+    async def activate(ctx,request,tx):
+        resource=await tx.resource(await resolve(tx,request.arguments['id']))
+        require(resource.type=='website','not_a_website')
+        await check_access(app,ctx,request,tx,resource.id,'write')
+        await assert_generation(request,resource)
+        revision=await tx.revision(ResourceRef(id=resource.id,revision=request.arguments['revision']))
+        # Validation binds the deployment to this website, not an arbitrary JSON file.
+        value=loads(await app.contents.read_bytes(revision.content))
+        require((await tx.resource(value['deployment'])).parent==resource.id,'deployment_mismatch')
+        from msg.plugins.hosting_capacity import manifest_size,require_capacity
+        await require_capacity(app,tx,resource,await manifest_size(app,tx,resource,revision.id),ctx.now)
+        changed=replace(resource,revision=revision.id,generation=resource.generation+1,modified_at=ctx.now,modified_by=ctx.principal.actor)
+        await tx.replace(changed,resource.generation)
+        return output_for(changed)
+
+
+HOSTED_HEADERS={'X-Content-Type-Options':'nosniff','Referrer-Policy':'no-referrer',
+    'Content-Security-Policy':"sandbox; default-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'",
+    'Cache-Control':'no-store'}
+DOWNLOAD_TYPES={'application/xhtml+xml','image/svg+xml','application/xml','text/xml','application/pdf'}
+
+
+def hosted_error(code):
+    status=403 if code in {'forbidden_host','permission_denied','credential_ceiling',
+                           'authentication_required','local_only','credential_revoked'} else \
+        405 if code=='method_not_allowed' else 416 if code=='range_not_satisfiable' else 404
+    return Response(canonical({'error':code}),status_code=status,media_type='application/json',
+                    headers=HOSTED_HEADERS)
+
+
+def hosted_range(request,size,etag):
+    requested=request.headers.get('range')
+    if not requested or request.headers.get('if-range') not in {None,etag}:
+        return (0,size),200,{}
+    match=re.fullmatch(r'bytes=(\d*)-(\d*)',requested)
+    require(match is not None and any(match.groups()),'range_not_satisfiable')
+    left,right=match.groups()
+    if left:
+        start=int(left);end=min(int(right)+1,size) if right else size
+    else:
+        require(int(right)>0,'range_not_satisfiable')
+        start=max(0,size-int(right));end=size
+    require(0<=start<end<=size,'range_not_satisfiable')
+    return (start,end),206,{'Content-Range':f'bytes {start}-{end-1}/{size}'}
+
+
+async def serve_hosted(service,request):
+    """Return None for ordinary resources; hosted requests use anonymous authority."""
+    parts=request.url.path.strip('/').split('/')
+    if len(parts)<2 or not parts[0].startswith(('@','&')):
+        return None
+    site_path='/'+parts[0]+'/'+parts[1]
+    try:
+        async with service.metadata.transaction(write=False) as tx:
+            from msg.security.quarantine import require_live_authority
+            require_live_authority(tx)
+            try:
+                rid=await tx.resolve(site_path)
+            except Failure as exc:
+                if exc.code!='not_found':raise
+                rid=None
+            website=await tx.resource(rid) if rid is not None else None
+            if website is None or website.type!='website':
+                return None
+            raw_path=request.scope.get('raw_path',request.url.path.encode())
+            try:
+                require(b'%' not in raw_path and raw_path.decode('ascii')==request.url.path,
+                        'not_found')
+            except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
+                raise Failure('not_found') from exc
+            require(request.method in {'GET','HEAD'},'method_not_allowed')
+            require(website.state=='active','not_found')
+            file_parts=parts[2:]
+            preview_id=None
+            if len(file_parts)>=2 and file_parts[0]=='_preview':
+                preview_id=file_parts[1]
+                require(re.fullmatch(r'[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,128}',preview_id) is not None,'not_found')
+                file_parts=file_parts[2:]
+            revision_id=website.revision
+            if preview_id is None and len(file_parts)>=2 and file_parts[0]=='_rev':
+                revision_id=file_parts[1]
+                file_parts=file_parts[2:]
+            file_path='/'.join(file_parts) or 'index.html'
+            if request.url.path.endswith('/') and file_parts:
+                file_path+='/index.html'
+            file_path=path_name(file_path)
+            if preview_id is not None:
+                from msg.transports.packet import path_packet
+                signed=request.headers.get('x-msg-request')
+                require(bool(signed),'authentication_required')
+                packet=path_packet(signed,'j',service.settings.server.limits.max_request_bytes)
+                require(packet.operation=='discovery.raw' and dict(packet.arguments)=={'id':preview_id}
+                        and packet.proof is not None,'representation_mismatch')
+            else:
+                require(revision_id is not None,'not_found')
+                packet=request_for('discovery.raw',{'id':rid},service.settings.service_url)
+            principal=await service.authenticator.authenticate(packet,tx,entry='network')
+            from msg.core.models import ExecutionContext
+            import time
+            context=ExecutionContext(request_id=packet.request_id,principal=principal,
+                entry='network',now=service.clock(),deadline_monotonic=time.monotonic()+30)
+            await check_access(service,context,packet,tx,rid,'read')
+            if preview_id is not None:
+                candidate=await tx.resource(preview_id)
+                require(candidate.type=='topic' and candidate.parent==rid and candidate.state=='active' and
+                        candidate.revision is not None and
+                        tx.setting('hosting_preview:'+candidate.id)==
+                        {'website':rid,'owner':candidate.owner},'not_found')
+                await check_access(service,context,packet,tx,candidate.id,'read')
+                revision=await tx.revision(ResourceRef(id=candidate.id,revision=candidate.revision))
+            else:
+                revision=await tx.revision(ResourceRef(id=rid,revision=revision_id))
+            manifest=loads(await service.contents.read_bytes(revision.content,limit=65536))
+            require(type(manifest) is dict and type(manifest.get('entries')) is dict,'invalid_deployment')
+            item=manifest['entries'].get(file_path)
+            require(item is not None,'not_found')
+            ref=decode(ResourceRef,item)
+            await check_access(service,context,packet,tx,ref.id,'read')
+            blob=(await tx.revision(ref)).content
+        etag='"'+blob.digest+'"'
+        headers={**HOSTED_HEADERS,'ETag':etag,'Accept-Ranges':'bytes'}
+        media=blob.media_type.split(';',1)[0].strip().lower()
+        if media in DOWNLOAD_TYPES:
+            headers['Content-Disposition']="attachment; filename*=UTF-8''"+quote(file_path.rsplit('/',1)[-1],safe='')
+        if request.headers.get('if-none-match')==etag:
+            return Response(status_code=304,headers=headers)
+        byte_range,status,range_headers=hosted_range(request,blob.size,etag)
+        headers.update(range_headers)
+        headers['Content-Length']=str(byte_range[1]-byte_range[0])
+        if request.method=='HEAD':
+            return Response(status_code=status,media_type=blob.media_type,headers=headers)
+        return StreamingResponse(service.contents.read(blob,byte_range),status_code=status,
+                                 media_type=blob.media_type,headers=headers)
+    except Failure as exc:
+        return hosted_error(exc.code)
+
+
+def hosting_app(service):
+    require(getattr(service,'readonly_hosting',False),'hosting_runtime_required')
+    async def dispatch(request):
+        try:
+            service.require_ready()
+        except Failure as exc:
+            return hosted_error(exc.code)
+        expected=urlsplit(service.settings.service_url)
+        supplied=urlsplit('//'+request.headers.get('host',''))
+        if supplied.hostname!=expected.hostname:
+            return hosted_error('forbidden_host')
+        return await serve_hosted(service,request) or hosted_error('not_found')
+    return Starlette(routes=[Route('/{path:path}',dispatch,methods=['GET','HEAD','POST','PUT','DELETE'])])

msg/extensions/keystore.py

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+"""Opaque encrypted records reuse the same resource, revision and ACL machinery."""
+from msg.core.codec import decode, unb64, wire, loads
+from msg.storage.capacity import require_keystore_capacity
+from msg.core.errors import require
+from msg.core.models import HandlerOutput, ResourceRef
+from msg.plugins.common import check_access, create_resource, revise_resource, resolve, output_for, assert_generation
+from msg.plugins.schemas import obj,STRING,IDENTIFIER,BYTES,REF
+
+
+def register(app,op):
+    @op('keystore.put',obj({'name':STRING,'format':{'enum':['msg-x25519-v1','age','openpgp']},
+        'ciphertext':BYTES,'source':REF,'id':IDENTIFIER},('name','format')),signature=True)
+    @op('keystore.put',obj({'name':STRING,'format':{'enum':['msg-x25519-v1','age','openpgp']},
+        'ciphertext':BYTES,'source':REF,'id':IDENTIFIER,'encryption_key_id':IDENTIFIER},('name','format')),signature=True,version=2)
+    async def put(ctx,request,tx):
+        a=request.arguments
+        parent=tx.one("SELECT id FROM resources WHERE parent=? AND name='keystore'",(ctx.principal.subject,))
+        require(parent is not None,'keystore_missing')
+        await check_access(app,ctx,request,tx,parent[0],'create')
+        require(('ciphertext' in a)!=('source' in a),'one_content_source_required')
+        if 'ciphertext' in a:
+            content=unb64(a['ciphertext'],limit=app.settings.server.limits.max_request_bytes)
+            body=content
+        else:
+            ref=decode(ResourceRef,a['source'])
+            require(ref.revision is not None,'source_revision_required')
+            await check_access(app,ctx,request,tx,ref.id,'read')
+            body=(await tx.revision(ref)).content
+            # An envelope is inspected only up to the bounded validation window.
+            # Larger pre-encrypted age/OpenPGP objects are validated by their header.
+            content=b''.join([part async for part in app.contents.read(body,(0,min(body.size,65536)))])
+        if a['format']=='msg-x25519-v1':
+            from msg.security.sealed_box import validate_envelope
+            if 'source' in a:
+                require(body.size<=app.settings.server.limits.max_request_bytes,'ciphertext_envelope_too_large')
+                content=await app.contents.read_bytes(body,limit=app.settings.server.limits.max_request_bytes)
+            validate_envelope(content)
+        elif a['format']=='age':
+            active=tx.one('''SELECT u.body FROM custodial_upgrades u JOIN custodial_vault v
+                ON v.subject=u.subject WHERE u.subject=? AND
+                (u.status='pending_rewrap' OR (u.status='completed' AND v.status='decrypt_only'))''',
+                (ctx.principal.subject,))
+            if active:
+                target=loads(active[0])['new_encryption_key_id']
+                require(a.get('encryption_key_id')==target,'custodial_new_encryption_key_required')
+            require(content.startswith((b'age-encryption.org/v1\n',b'-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----')), 'invalid_ciphertext_envelope')
+        else:
+            require(content.startswith(b'-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----') or bool(content and content[0]&0x80),
+                    'invalid_ciphertext_envelope')
+        incoming=len(body) if isinstance(body,bytes) else body.size
+        require_keystore_capacity(tx,incoming)
+        if 'id' in a:
+            resource=await tx.resource(await resolve(tx,a['id']))
+            require(resource.type=='keystore' and resource.parent==parent[0],'not_a_keystore_entry')
+            await assert_generation(request,resource)
+            await check_access(app,ctx,request,tx,resource.id,'write')
+            resource=await revise_resource(app,ctx,request,tx,resource,body,'application/octet-stream')
+        else:
+            resource=await create_resource(app,ctx,request,tx,parent=parent[0],type='keystore',name=a['name'],
+                body=body,media_type='application/octet-stream',mode=0o600)
+        tx.set_setting('keystore_format:'+resource.revision,a['format'])
+        if a['format']=='age' and a.get('encryption_key_id'):
+            key=tx.one('SELECT subject,is_primary FROM encryption_subkeys WHERE key_id=?',
+                       (a['encryption_key_id'],))
+            require(key==(ctx.principal.subject,1),'keystore_encryption_key_mismatch')
+            # Recipient metadata is an owner declaration; migration completion
+            # still requires a fresh, locally decrypted inventory ACK.
+            tx.set_setting('keystore_key:'+resource.revision,a['encryption_key_id'])
+        return output_for(resource,format=a['format'])
+
+    @op('keystore.get',obj({'id':IDENTIFIER,'revision':IDENTIFIER},('id',)),effect='read')
+    async def get(ctx,request,tx):
+        rid=await resolve(tx,request.arguments['id'])
+        await check_access(app,ctx,request,tx,rid,'read')
+        resource=await tx.resource(rid)
+        require(resource.type=='keystore' and resource.state!='purged','not_a_keystore_entry')
+        rev=await tx.revision(ResourceRef(id=rid,revision=request.arguments.get('revision')))
+        ref=ResourceRef(id=rid,revision=rev.id)
+        return HandlerOutput(data={'id':rid,'revision':rev.id,'format':tx.setting('keystore_format:'+rev.id),
+            'size':rev.content.size,'digest':rev.content.digest,'raw_url':f'/_id/{rid}/revisions/{rev.id}/raw'},output=ref)
+
+    @op('keystore.list',obj({'cursor':STRING,'limit':{'type':'integer','minimum':1,'maximum':200}}),effect='read')
+    async def listing(ctx,request,tx):
+        require(ctx.principal.subject is not None,'authentication_required')
+        parent=tx.one("SELECT id FROM resources WHERE parent=? AND name='keystore'",(ctx.principal.subject,))
+        require(parent is not None,'keystore_missing')
+        await check_access(app,ctx,request,tx,parent[0],'list')
+        cursor=request.arguments.get('cursor')
+        position=app.cursors.decode(cursor,'keystore',parent[0]) if cursor else None
+        page=await tx.children(parent[0],position,request.arguments.get('limit',50))
+        items=[]
+        for resource in page.items:
+            if resource.type=='keystore' and resource.state=='active':
+                await check_access(app,ctx,request,tx,resource.id,'read')
+                items.append({'id':resource.id,'name':resource.name,'revision':resource.revision,'generation':resource.generation})
+        return HandlerOutput(data={'items':items,'cursor':app.cursors.encode('keystore',parent[0],page.next_cursor) if page.next_cursor else None})