mobintel-probe-encryption 0.1.0__py3-none-any.whl
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- mobintel_probe_encryption/__init__.py +26 -0
- mobintel_probe_encryption/alerts.py +51 -0
- mobintel_probe_encryption/decoder.py +139 -0
- mobintel_probe_encryption/frames.py +111 -0
- mobintel_probe_encryption/keys.py +102 -0
- mobintel_probe_encryption/protocol.py +236 -0
- mobintel_probe_encryption/py.typed +0 -0
- mobintel_probe_encryption-0.1.0.dist-info/METADATA +150 -0
- mobintel_probe_encryption-0.1.0.dist-info/RECORD +12 -0
- mobintel_probe_encryption-0.1.0.dist-info/WHEEL +5 -0
- mobintel_probe_encryption-0.1.0.dist-info/licenses/LICENSE +202 -0
- mobintel_probe_encryption-0.1.0.dist-info/top_level.txt +1 -0
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"""mobintel_probe_encryption: the receiving side of the MobIntel Guardian beacon protocol, and the one
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copy of its wire format (``mobintel_probe_encryption.protocol``, which the device runs too).
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from mobintel_probe_encryption import KeyStore, ProbeDecoder
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decoder = ProbeDecoder(KeyStore.from_file("enrolled.json"))
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reading = decoder.decode_radiotap(frame) # radiotap + 802.11 bytes, as captured
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if reading is not None and reading.usable:
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print(reading.device_id, reading.lat, reading.lon)
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Alerts back to a device: ``AlertSealer(keys).seal(device_id, danger_level, message)``.
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"""
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from .alerts import AlertSealer, advertising_data
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from .decoder import DUPLICATE, FRESH, REPLAY, STALE, ProbeDecoder, Reading
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from .frames import FrameError, ProbeRequest, parse_80211_frame, parse_radiotap_frame
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from .keys import KeyFileWarning, KeyStore
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from .protocol import ALERT_COMPANY_ID, ALERT_MSG_MAX
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__version__ = "0.1.0"
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__all__ = [
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"KeyStore", "KeyFileWarning",
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"ProbeDecoder", "Reading", "FRESH", "DUPLICATE", "REPLAY", "STALE",
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"ProbeRequest", "FrameError", "parse_radiotap_frame", "parse_80211_frame",
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"AlertSealer", "advertising_data", "ALERT_COMPANY_ID", "ALERT_MSG_MAX",
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]
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"""Seal Bluetooth alerts for enrolled devices (the sensor -> device direction).
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An alert travels as manufacturer-specific data in a Bluetooth LE legacy advertisement: company id
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ALERT_COMPANY_ID, then the sealed payload. Only the addressed device can open it, because it is
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sealed with that device's key. Sending the advertisement is the caller's job (BlueZ over D-Bus, raw
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HCI, ...).
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import struct
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from . import protocol
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from .keys import KeyStore
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__all__ = ["AlertSealer", "advertising_data"]
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_LEGACY_ADVERT_MAX = 31 # bytes of advertising data in a Bluetooth LE legacy advertisement
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class AlertSealer:
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def __init__(self, keys: KeyStore):
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self.keys = keys
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def seal(self, device_id: int, danger_level: int, message: str = "") -> bytes:
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"""The alert's manufacturer-specific data (what follows the company id).
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danger_level 1..10 (the device buzzes that many times); message up to ALERT_MSG_MAX ASCII
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characters. Raises ValueError rather than cut or alter a message, KeyError for a device
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that is not enrolled. Every call uses a fresh nonce, so a re-sent alert counts again.
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"""
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try:
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encoded = message.encode("ascii")
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except UnicodeEncodeError:
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raise ValueError("message must be ASCII") from None
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if len(encoded) > protocol.ALERT_MSG_MAX:
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raise ValueError(f"message is {len(encoded)} characters; at most "
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f"{protocol.ALERT_MSG_MAX} fit in an advertisement")
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return protocol.seal_alert(self.keys.master_key(device_id), device_id, danger_level, message)
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def advertising_data(payload: bytes) -> bytes:
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"""A sealed payload as one advertising data structure (length, type 0xFF, company id, payload),
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for senders that build the advertisement themselves. It already uses all 31 bytes with an
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8-character message, so a Flags structure does not fit beside it (none is needed for a
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non-connectable broadcast)."""
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body = struct.pack("<H", protocol.ALERT_COMPANY_ID) + payload
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data = bytes([len(body) + 1, 0xFF]) + body
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if len(data) > _LEGACY_ADVERT_MAX:
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raise ValueError(f"{len(data)} bytes of advertising data; a legacy advertisement "
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f"holds {_LEGACY_ADVERT_MAX}")
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return data
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"""Recognise Guardian probe requests, decrypt them, and judge whether each one is current."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import dataclasses
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import threading
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import time
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from typing import Dict, Optional, Tuple
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from . import protocol
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from .frames import FrameError, ProbeRequest, parse_80211_frame, parse_radiotap_frame
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from .keys import KeyStore
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__all__ = ["ProbeDecoder", "Reading", "FRESH", "DUPLICATE", "REPLAY", "STALE"]
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FRESH = "fresh" # a new message from the device, inside the time window
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DUPLICATE = "duplicate" # another copy of a message received moments ago (e.g. by a second receiver)
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REPLAY = "replay" # a message received before, sent again later; or older than one already taken
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STALE = "stale" # the message's time is too far from the receiver's clock
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@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True)
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class Reading:
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"""One decoded Guardian probe."""
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device_id: int
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lat: float
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lon: float
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timestamp: int # the device's clock when it sent the probe, unix seconds
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age_s: float # receiver time minus timestamp (negative: the device's clock is ahead)
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status: str # FRESH, DUPLICATE, REPLAY or STALE
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source_mac: str # different in every probe; device_id is the stable identity
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rssi_dbm: Optional[int] = None
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nonce: bytes = dataclasses.field(default=b"", repr=False) # the same in every copy of one probe
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@property
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def usable(self) -> bool:
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"""A genuine, current position: FRESH, or a DUPLICATE copy of one."""
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return self.status in (FRESH, DUPLICATE)
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class ProbeDecoder:
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"""Turns captured frames into Readings for the devices in a KeyStore.
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Safe to share between threads. To tell new messages from copies and replays it remembers, per
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device, the newest timestamp it accepted and the nonces it saw inside the time window.
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``now`` (receiver time, unix seconds) defaults to the clock; pass the capture time when decoding
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a recording.
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"""
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def __init__(self, keys: KeyStore, *, window_s: float = 120, duplicate_window_s: float = 2.0):
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self.keys = keys
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self.window_s = window_s
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self.duplicate_window_s = duplicate_window_s
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self._lock = threading.Lock()
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self._newest: Dict[int, int] = {} # device -> newest timestamp taken
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self._seen: Dict[int, Dict[bytes, Tuple[float, int]]] = {} # device -> nonce -> (seen, ts)
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self._stats = dict.fromkeys(
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("frames", "malformed", "probe_requests", "candidates", "recognised"), 0)
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@property
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def stats(self) -> Dict[str, int]:
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"""Counts so far: frames given, malformed frames, probe requests among them, vendor
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elements of a Guardian probe's length ("candidates"), and probes recognised. Candidates well
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above recognised with a Guardian device nearby suggests its key is missing from the key file."""
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with self._lock:
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return dict(self._stats)
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def decode_radiotap(self, frame: bytes, *, now: Optional[float] = None) -> Optional[Reading]:
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"""A radiotap header + 802.11 frame (+ FCS), as captured on a monitor interface. None unless
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it is a probe request from an enrolled device."""
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self._count("frames")
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try:
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probe = parse_radiotap_frame(frame)
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except FrameError:
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self._count("malformed")
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return None
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return self._decode_probe(probe, now, probe.rssi_dbm if probe else None)
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def decode_80211(self, frame: bytes, *, has_fcs: bool = False, now: Optional[float] = None,
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rssi_dbm: Optional[int] = None) -> Optional[Reading]:
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"""An 802.11 frame without radiotap (``has_fcs``: it ends with its 4-byte FCS)."""
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self._count("frames")
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try:
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probe = parse_80211_frame(frame, has_fcs=has_fcs)
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except FrameError:
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self._count("malformed")
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return None
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return self._decode_probe(probe, now, rssi_dbm)
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def decode(self, source_mac: str, vendor_element: bytes, *, now: Optional[float] = None,
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rssi_dbm: Optional[int] = None) -> Optional[Reading]:
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"""The parts already taken out of a probe request: its source address ("aa:bb:..") and the
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data of one vendor-specific element (ID 221)."""
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now = time.time() if now is None else now
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info = protocol.recognize_and_decrypt(source_mac, vendor_element, self.keys._enrolled, now,
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window=self.window_s)
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if info is None or info["device_id"] != info["enrolled_id"]:
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return None # not ours, forged, or decrypted under another device's key
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nonce = bytes(vendor_element[protocol.OUI_LEN:protocol.OUI_LEN + protocol.NONCE_LEN])
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status = self._judge(info["device_id"], info["timestamp"], nonce, now) if info["fresh"] \
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else STALE
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self._count("recognised")
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return Reading(device_id=info["device_id"], lat=info["lat"], lon=info["lon"],
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timestamp=info["timestamp"], age_s=info["age_s"], status=status,
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source_mac=source_mac.lower(), rssi_dbm=rssi_dbm, nonce=nonce)
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def _decode_probe(self, probe: Optional[ProbeRequest], now: Optional[float],
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rssi_dbm: Optional[int]) -> Optional[Reading]:
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if probe is None:
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return None
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self._count("probe_requests")
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for element in probe.vendor_elements:
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if len(element) != protocol.MIN_IE_LEN:
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continue
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self._count("candidates")
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reading = self.decode(probe.source_mac, element, now=now, rssi_dbm=rssi_dbm)
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if reading is not None:
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return reading
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return None
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def _judge(self, device_id: int, timestamp: int, nonce: bytes, now: float) -> str:
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with self._lock:
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seen = self._seen.setdefault(device_id, {})
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# a message whose time has left the window can only come back STALE: forget its nonce
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for old in [n for n, (_, ts) in seen.items() if ts < now - self.window_s]:
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del seen[old]
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if nonce in seen:
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first_seen = seen[nonce][0]
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return DUPLICATE if now - first_seen <= self.duplicate_window_s else REPLAY
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newest = self._newest.get(device_id)
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if newest is not None and timestamp < newest:
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return REPLAY
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seen[nonce] = (now, timestamp)
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self._newest[device_id] = timestamp if newest is None else max(newest, timestamp)
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return FRESH
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def _count(self, name: str) -> None:
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with self._lock:
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self._stats[name] += 1
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"""Find what the decoder needs in a captured Wi-Fi frame.
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A monitor-mode capture is a radiotap header followed by the 802.11 frame, sometimes with its 4-byte
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frame check sequence (FCS) at the end. For a probe request the
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decoder needs the source address (802.11 address 2) and the data of every vendor-specific element
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(ID 221); the radiotap header adds the signal strength and says whether the FCS is attached or failed.
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Only radiotap fields 0-5 are read (TSFT, flags, rate, channel, FHSS, antenna signal). They come first
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in every header, so everything after them is skipped by the header's length. Radiotap rules
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(https://www.radiotap.org): little-endian; fields in bit order, each aligned to its natural size
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counted from the start of the header; bit 31 of a presence word means another word follows.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import dataclasses
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import struct
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from typing import List, Optional, Tuple
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__all__ = ["FrameError", "ProbeRequest", "parse_radiotap_frame", "parse_80211_frame"]
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VENDOR_SPECIFIC = 221
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_PROBE_REQUEST = 0x40 # frame control byte 0: protocol version 0, type management, subtype 4
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_ORDER = 0x80 # frame control byte 1: in a management frame, HT Control (4 bytes) follows
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_FLAG_FCS = 0x10 # radiotap flags: the frame ends with its FCS
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_FLAG_BAD_FCS = 0x40 # radiotap flags: the FCS check failed
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# (alignment, size) of radiotap fields 0-5: TSFT, flags, rate, channel, FHSS, dBm antenna signal
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_FIELDS = ((8, 8), (1, 1), (1, 1), (2, 4), (1, 2), (1, 1))
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class FrameError(ValueError):
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"""The bytes are not a well-formed radiotap header or 802.11 frame."""
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@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True)
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class ProbeRequest:
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source_mac: str # 802.11 address 2, "aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff"
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vendor_elements: Tuple[bytes, ...] # data of every element 221, in frame order
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sequence: int # 802.11 sequence number, 0..4095
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rssi_dbm: Optional[int] = None # radiotap antenna signal, when the header has one
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def parse_radiotap_frame(frame: bytes) -> Optional[ProbeRequest]:
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"""Radiotap header + 802.11 frame (+ FCS) -> ProbeRequest.
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None for any other kind of frame and for frames whose FCS check failed; FrameError if the
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bytes are malformed.
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"""
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length, flags, rssi = _radiotap(frame)
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if flags & _FLAG_BAD_FCS:
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return None
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probe = parse_80211_frame(frame[length:], has_fcs=bool(flags & _FLAG_FCS))
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if probe is None or rssi is None:
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return probe
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return dataclasses.replace(probe, rssi_dbm=rssi)
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def parse_80211_frame(frame: bytes, *, has_fcs: bool = False) -> Optional[ProbeRequest]:
|
|
58
|
+
"""802.11 frame without radiotap -> ProbeRequest; None for any other kind of frame.
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
``has_fcs``: the last 4 bytes are the FCS. FrameError if the frame is cut short.
|
|
61
|
+
"""
|
|
62
|
+
end = len(frame) - 4 if has_fcs else len(frame)
|
|
63
|
+
if end < 2:
|
|
64
|
+
raise FrameError("802.11 frame shorter than its frame control field")
|
|
65
|
+
if frame[0] != _PROBE_REQUEST:
|
|
66
|
+
return None
|
|
67
|
+
header = 28 if frame[1] & _ORDER else 24
|
|
68
|
+
if end < header:
|
|
69
|
+
raise FrameError(f"probe request of {end} bytes is shorter than its {header}-byte header")
|
|
70
|
+
(sequence_control,) = struct.unpack_from("<H", frame, 22)
|
|
71
|
+
elements: List[bytes] = []
|
|
72
|
+
i = header
|
|
73
|
+
while i + 2 <= end:
|
|
74
|
+
element_id, length = frame[i], frame[i + 1]
|
|
75
|
+
if i + 2 + length > end:
|
|
76
|
+
break # a truncated last element: keep the ones before it
|
|
77
|
+
if element_id == VENDOR_SPECIFIC:
|
|
78
|
+
elements.append(bytes(frame[i + 2:i + 2 + length]))
|
|
79
|
+
i += 2 + length
|
|
80
|
+
source = ":".join(f"{b:02x}" for b in frame[10:16])
|
|
81
|
+
return ProbeRequest(source, tuple(elements), sequence_control >> 4)
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
|
|
84
|
+
def _radiotap(frame: bytes) -> Tuple[int, int, Optional[int]]:
|
|
85
|
+
"""-> (header length, flags, dBm antenna signal or None)."""
|
|
86
|
+
if len(frame) < 8:
|
|
87
|
+
raise FrameError("shorter than a radiotap header")
|
|
88
|
+
version, _pad, length, present = struct.unpack_from("<BBHI", frame, 0)
|
|
89
|
+
if version != 0:
|
|
90
|
+
raise FrameError(f"radiotap version {version}, expected 0")
|
|
91
|
+
if not 8 <= length <= len(frame):
|
|
92
|
+
raise FrameError(f"radiotap length {length} does not fit the {len(frame)}-byte frame")
|
|
93
|
+
offset, word = 8, present
|
|
94
|
+
while word & (1 << 31): # another presence word follows; the fields start after the last one
|
|
95
|
+
if offset + 4 > length:
|
|
96
|
+
raise FrameError("radiotap presence words run past the header")
|
|
97
|
+
(word,) = struct.unpack_from("<I", frame, offset)
|
|
98
|
+
offset += 4
|
|
99
|
+
flags, rssi = 0, None
|
|
100
|
+
for bit, (align, size) in enumerate(_FIELDS):
|
|
101
|
+
if not present & (1 << bit):
|
|
102
|
+
continue
|
|
103
|
+
offset += -offset % align
|
|
104
|
+
if offset + size > length:
|
|
105
|
+
raise FrameError("radiotap fields run past the header")
|
|
106
|
+
if bit == 1:
|
|
107
|
+
flags = frame[offset]
|
|
108
|
+
elif bit == 5:
|
|
109
|
+
(rssi,) = struct.unpack_from("<b", frame, offset)
|
|
110
|
+
offset += size
|
|
111
|
+
return length, flags, rssi
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
"""The receiver's key file: one 256-bit master key per enrolled device.
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
The file is JSON, {"<device_id>": "<64 hex characters>", ...}, as written when devices are
|
|
4
|
+
provisioned. Whoever holds it can read every listed device's position, forge its probes and send it
|
|
5
|
+
alerts, so keep it out of version control and readable by its owner only.
|
|
6
|
+
"""
|
|
7
|
+
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
8
|
+
|
|
9
|
+
import json
|
|
10
|
+
import os
|
|
11
|
+
import stat
|
|
12
|
+
import warnings
|
|
13
|
+
from typing import Dict, Mapping, Tuple, Union
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
from . import protocol
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
__all__ = ["KeyStore", "KeyFileWarning"]
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
_MAX_DEVICE_ID = 0xFFFFFFFF # device_id is a uint32 on the wire
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
|
+
class KeyFileWarning(UserWarning):
|
|
23
|
+
"""The key file can be read by other users of this computer."""
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
26
|
+
class KeyStore:
|
|
27
|
+
"""Master keys of the enrolled devices, with the recognition sub-keys derived once.
|
|
28
|
+
|
|
29
|
+
``keys`` maps device id (int, or its decimal string as in the JSON file) to the master key
|
|
30
|
+
(32 bytes, or 64 hex characters). Error messages name the device, never the key.
|
|
31
|
+
"""
|
|
32
|
+
|
|
33
|
+
def __init__(self, keys: Mapping[Union[int, str], Union[bytes, str]]):
|
|
34
|
+
clean: Dict[int, bytes] = {}
|
|
35
|
+
owner: Dict[bytes, int] = {}
|
|
36
|
+
for raw_id, raw_key in keys.items():
|
|
37
|
+
device_id = _device_id(raw_id)
|
|
38
|
+
if device_id in clean:
|
|
39
|
+
raise ValueError(f"device {device_id} is listed twice")
|
|
40
|
+
key = _master_key(device_id, raw_key)
|
|
41
|
+
if key in owner: # a probe would then decode as whichever device comes first
|
|
42
|
+
raise ValueError(f"devices {owner[key]} and {device_id} have the same key")
|
|
43
|
+
clean[device_id], owner[key] = key, device_id
|
|
44
|
+
self._keys = clean
|
|
45
|
+
self._enrolled = protocol.prepare_enrolled(sorted(clean.items()))
|
|
46
|
+
|
|
47
|
+
@classmethod
|
|
48
|
+
def from_file(cls, path: Union[str, "os.PathLike[str]"]) -> "KeyStore":
|
|
49
|
+
"""Load a key file (JSON, see above). Warns if other users can read it."""
|
|
50
|
+
path = os.fspath(path)
|
|
51
|
+
if os.stat(path).st_mode & (stat.S_IRWXG | stat.S_IRWXO):
|
|
52
|
+
warnings.warn(f"{path} can be read by other users; chmod 600 it",
|
|
53
|
+
KeyFileWarning, stacklevel=2)
|
|
54
|
+
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
|
|
55
|
+
data = json.load(f)
|
|
56
|
+
if not isinstance(data, dict):
|
|
57
|
+
raise ValueError(f"{path}: expected a JSON object of device id -> key")
|
|
58
|
+
return cls(data)
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
@property
|
|
61
|
+
def device_ids(self) -> Tuple[int, ...]:
|
|
62
|
+
return tuple(sorted(self._keys))
|
|
63
|
+
|
|
64
|
+
def master_key(self, device_id: int) -> bytes:
|
|
65
|
+
try:
|
|
66
|
+
return self._keys[device_id]
|
|
67
|
+
except KeyError:
|
|
68
|
+
raise KeyError(f"device {device_id} is not enrolled") from None
|
|
69
|
+
|
|
70
|
+
def __contains__(self, device_id: object) -> bool:
|
|
71
|
+
return device_id in self._keys
|
|
72
|
+
|
|
73
|
+
def __len__(self) -> int:
|
|
74
|
+
return len(self._keys)
|
|
75
|
+
|
|
76
|
+
def __repr__(self) -> str:
|
|
77
|
+
return f"KeyStore({len(self._keys)} devices)"
|
|
78
|
+
|
|
79
|
+
|
|
80
|
+
def _device_id(raw: Union[int, str]) -> int:
|
|
81
|
+
if isinstance(raw, bool) or not isinstance(raw, (int, str)):
|
|
82
|
+
raise ValueError(f"device id {raw!r} is not a number")
|
|
83
|
+
if isinstance(raw, str) and not raw.strip().isdigit():
|
|
84
|
+
raise ValueError(f"device id {raw!r} is not a number")
|
|
85
|
+
device_id = int(raw)
|
|
86
|
+
if not 0 <= device_id <= _MAX_DEVICE_ID:
|
|
87
|
+
raise ValueError(f"device id {device_id} is outside 0..{_MAX_DEVICE_ID}")
|
|
88
|
+
return device_id
|
|
89
|
+
|
|
90
|
+
|
|
91
|
+
def _master_key(device_id: int, raw: Union[bytes, str]) -> bytes:
|
|
92
|
+
if isinstance(raw, str):
|
|
93
|
+
if len(raw) != 2 * protocol.MASTER_KEY_LEN:
|
|
94
|
+
raise ValueError(f"device {device_id}: key must be {2 * protocol.MASTER_KEY_LEN} "
|
|
95
|
+
"hex characters")
|
|
96
|
+
try:
|
|
97
|
+
return bytes.fromhex(raw)
|
|
98
|
+
except ValueError:
|
|
99
|
+
raise ValueError(f"device {device_id}: key is not hexadecimal") from None
|
|
100
|
+
if isinstance(raw, (bytes, bytearray)) and len(raw) == protocol.MASTER_KEY_LEN:
|
|
101
|
+
return bytes(raw)
|
|
102
|
+
raise ValueError(f"device {device_id}: key must be {protocol.MASTER_KEY_LEN} bytes")
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
"""Guardian wire format + crypto (v1): the one copy, used by the Guardian device and by every sensor.
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
Guardian devices import this module too; sensors use the rest of this package, which builds on it.
|
|
4
|
+
Changing anything here changes what devices send once they update: tests/vectors.json pins the bytes
|
|
5
|
+
the deployed devices produce.
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
Wire format:
|
|
8
|
+
|
|
9
|
+
Plaintext (17 B, big-endian):
|
|
10
|
+
version(1) | device_id(uint32) | lat(int32 microdeg) | lon(int32 microdeg) | ts(uint32 unix s)
|
|
11
|
+
|
|
12
|
+
Vendor-specific IE 221 data (48 B):
|
|
13
|
+
oui(3, random per probe) | nonce(12) | ChaCha20Poly1305_seal(k_aead, nonce, plaintext, aad)
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
Source MAC (802.11 addr2):
|
|
16
|
+
HMAC-SHA256(k_mac, nonce)[:6] with the locally-administered + unicast bits set.
|
|
17
|
+
|
|
18
|
+
Each device has a 256-bit master key -> HKDF-SHA256 -> (k_aead, k_mac) (key separation).
|
|
19
|
+
Recognition: the sensor recomputes the MAC per enrolled key from the probe's nonce; on a
|
|
20
|
+
match it AEAD-decrypts. Nothing is constant across probes, so an outsider cannot link two
|
|
21
|
+
probes to the same device.
|
|
22
|
+
"""
|
|
23
|
+
import hashlib
|
|
24
|
+
import hmac
|
|
25
|
+
import os
|
|
26
|
+
import struct
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
28
|
+
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
|
|
29
|
+
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms
|
|
30
|
+
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import ChaCha20Poly1305
|
|
31
|
+
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
|
|
32
|
+
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.poly1305 import Poly1305
|
|
33
|
+
|
|
34
|
+
__all__ = [
|
|
35
|
+
"VERSION", "MASTER_KEY_LEN", "NONCE_LEN", "OUI_LEN", "TAG_LEN", "PLAINTEXT_LEN", "MIN_IE_LEN",
|
|
36
|
+
"derive_subkeys", "pack_plaintext", "unpack_plaintext", "mac_from_nonce", "seal_probe",
|
|
37
|
+
"prepare_enrolled", "recognize_and_decrypt",
|
|
38
|
+
"ALERT_COMPANY_ID", "ALERT_NONCE_TX_LEN", "ALERT_TAG_LEN", "ALERT_MSG_MAX", "ALERT_MIN_PAYLOAD",
|
|
39
|
+
"derive_alert_key", "pack_alert", "seal_alert", "open_alert",
|
|
40
|
+
]
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
VERSION = 1
|
|
43
|
+
MASTER_KEY_LEN = 32
|
|
44
|
+
NONCE_LEN = 12
|
|
45
|
+
OUI_LEN = 3
|
|
46
|
+
TAG_LEN = 16
|
|
47
|
+
|
|
48
|
+
_PLAINTEXT = struct.Struct(">B I i i I") # version, device_id, lat_udeg, lon_udeg, ts
|
|
49
|
+
PLAINTEXT_LEN = _PLAINTEXT.size # 17
|
|
50
|
+
MIN_IE_LEN = OUI_LEN + NONCE_LEN + PLAINTEXT_LEN + TAG_LEN # 48
|
|
51
|
+
|
|
52
|
+
_AAD = b"guardian-probe-v1" # domain separation (authenticated, not transmitted)
|
|
53
|
+
_HKDF_AEAD_INFO = b"guardian-aead-v1"
|
|
54
|
+
_HKDF_MAC_INFO = b"guardian-mac-v1"
|
|
55
|
+
|
|
56
|
+
|
|
57
|
+
# ---- keys -----------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
58
|
+
def derive_subkeys(master_key):
|
|
59
|
+
"""Derive (k_aead, k_mac) from a 32-byte master key via HKDF-SHA256."""
|
|
60
|
+
if len(master_key) != MASTER_KEY_LEN:
|
|
61
|
+
raise ValueError(f"master key must be {MASTER_KEY_LEN} bytes, got {len(master_key)}")
|
|
62
|
+
k_aead = HKDF(algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), length=32, salt=None,
|
|
63
|
+
info=_HKDF_AEAD_INFO).derive(master_key)
|
|
64
|
+
k_mac = HKDF(algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), length=32, salt=None,
|
|
65
|
+
info=_HKDF_MAC_INFO).derive(master_key)
|
|
66
|
+
return k_aead, k_mac
|
|
67
|
+
|
|
68
|
+
|
|
69
|
+
# ---- plaintext ------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
70
|
+
def pack_plaintext(device_id, lat, lon, timestamp):
|
|
71
|
+
return _PLAINTEXT.pack(
|
|
72
|
+
VERSION,
|
|
73
|
+
device_id & 0xFFFFFFFF,
|
|
74
|
+
int(round(lat * 1e6)),
|
|
75
|
+
int(round(lon * 1e6)),
|
|
76
|
+
int(timestamp) & 0xFFFFFFFF,
|
|
77
|
+
)
|
|
78
|
+
|
|
79
|
+
|
|
80
|
+
def unpack_plaintext(data):
|
|
81
|
+
version, device_id, lat_u, lon_u, ts = _PLAINTEXT.unpack(data)
|
|
82
|
+
return {"version": version, "device_id": device_id,
|
|
83
|
+
"lat": lat_u / 1e6, "lon": lon_u / 1e6, "timestamp": ts}
|
|
84
|
+
|
|
85
|
+
|
|
86
|
+
# ---- MAC tag --------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
87
|
+
def mac_from_nonce(k_mac, nonce):
|
|
88
|
+
"""Source MAC = HMAC-SHA256(k_mac, nonce)[:6], locally-administered + unicast."""
|
|
89
|
+
digest = hmac.new(k_mac, nonce, hashlib.sha256).digest()
|
|
90
|
+
first = (digest[0] & 0xFE) | 0x02 # clear I/G (unicast), set U/L (locally administered)
|
|
91
|
+
return ":".join("%02x" % b for b in bytes([first]) + digest[1:6])
|
|
92
|
+
|
|
93
|
+
|
|
94
|
+
# ---- seal (device TX) -----------------------------------------------------
|
|
95
|
+
def seal_probe(k_aead, k_mac, device_id, lat, lon, timestamp):
|
|
96
|
+
"""Return (src_mac_str, ie221_data_bytes) for one probe."""
|
|
97
|
+
plaintext = pack_plaintext(device_id, lat, lon, timestamp)
|
|
98
|
+
nonce = os.urandom(NONCE_LEN)
|
|
99
|
+
ct = ChaCha20Poly1305(k_aead).encrypt(nonce, plaintext, _AAD)
|
|
100
|
+
ie_data = os.urandom(OUI_LEN) + nonce + ct # random OUI => no constant
|
|
101
|
+
return mac_from_nonce(k_mac, nonce), ie_data
|
|
102
|
+
|
|
103
|
+
|
|
104
|
+
# ---- recognize + decrypt (sensor RX) --------------------------------------
|
|
105
|
+
def prepare_enrolled(devices):
|
|
106
|
+
"""devices: iterable of (device_id, master_key_bytes). Returns precomputed subkey list."""
|
|
107
|
+
out = []
|
|
108
|
+
for device_id, master_key in devices:
|
|
109
|
+
k_aead, k_mac = derive_subkeys(master_key)
|
|
110
|
+
out.append({"device_id": device_id, "k_aead": k_aead, "k_mac": k_mac})
|
|
111
|
+
return out
|
|
112
|
+
|
|
113
|
+
|
|
114
|
+
def recognize_and_decrypt(observed_mac, ie_data, enrolled, now, window=120):
|
|
115
|
+
"""Recognize + decrypt one probe's vendor-IE data.
|
|
116
|
+
|
|
117
|
+
enrolled: output of prepare_enrolled(). Returns a decoded dict (device_id, lat, lon,
|
|
118
|
+
timestamp, enrolled_id, age_s, fresh) on success, or None if not ours / forged / malformed.
|
|
119
|
+
"""
|
|
120
|
+
if len(ie_data) < MIN_IE_LEN:
|
|
121
|
+
return None
|
|
122
|
+
nonce = ie_data[OUI_LEN:OUI_LEN + NONCE_LEN]
|
|
123
|
+
ct = ie_data[OUI_LEN + NONCE_LEN:]
|
|
124
|
+
obs = observed_mac.lower()
|
|
125
|
+
for dev in enrolled:
|
|
126
|
+
if not hmac.compare_digest(mac_from_nonce(dev["k_mac"], nonce), obs):
|
|
127
|
+
continue
|
|
128
|
+
try:
|
|
129
|
+
plaintext = ChaCha20Poly1305(dev["k_aead"]).decrypt(nonce, ct, _AAD)
|
|
130
|
+
except Exception:
|
|
131
|
+
return None # MAC matched but AEAD failed -> tampered/forged
|
|
132
|
+
info = unpack_plaintext(plaintext)
|
|
133
|
+
info["enrolled_id"] = dev["device_id"]
|
|
134
|
+
info["age_s"] = now - info["timestamp"]
|
|
135
|
+
info["fresh"] = abs(info["age_s"]) <= window
|
|
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|
+
return info
|
|
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|
+
return None
|
|
138
|
+
|
|
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|
+
|
|
140
|
+
# ===========================================================================
|
|
141
|
+
# BLE alert downlink (v1) -- sensor/host -> device, encrypted + targeted.
|
|
142
|
+
#
|
|
143
|
+
# Same primitives and the SAME per-device master key as the probe uplink, but a
|
|
144
|
+
# domain-separated subkey so no (key, nonce) pair is ever shared across directions.
|
|
145
|
+
# BLE legacy advertising caps the whole frame at 31 bytes, so the AEAD is compacted:
|
|
146
|
+
# a 6-byte transmitted nonce (zero-padded to 12) and an 8-byte truncated Poly1305 tag.
|
|
147
|
+
#
|
|
148
|
+
# Manufacturer-specific AD (company 0xFFFF), data after the company id:
|
|
149
|
+
# nonce(6) | ciphertext(P) | tag8(8) (<= 27 B; whole advert = 31 B)
|
|
150
|
+
# Plaintext (P = 5..13 B, big-endian):
|
|
151
|
+
# device_id(uint32) | danger_level(uint8) | message(0..8 ASCII)
|
|
152
|
+
#
|
|
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|
+
# Targeting *is* the encryption: the host seals with the target device's key, so only
|
|
154
|
+
# that device can open it; device_id in the plaintext is an authenticated cross-check.
|
|
155
|
+
# RFC 8439 ChaCha20-Poly1305 (validated == library output for the full 16-byte tag,
|
|
156
|
+
# then truncated to 8 bytes to fit the advert).
|
|
157
|
+
# ===========================================================================
|
|
158
|
+
ALERT_COMPANY_ID = 0xFFFF # Bluetooth SIG "test" company id; our recognizer pre-filter
|
|
159
|
+
ALERT_NONCE_TX_LEN = 6 # nonce bytes on air (zero-padded to NONCE_LEN for the cipher)
|
|
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|
+
ALERT_TAG_LEN = 8 # truncated Poly1305 tag
|
|
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|
+
ALERT_MSG_MAX = 8 # max message bytes that still fit the 31-byte legacy advert
|
|
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|
+
_ALERT_HEADER = struct.Struct(">I B") # device_id, danger_level
|
|
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|
+
ALERT_MIN_PAYLOAD = ALERT_NONCE_TX_LEN + _ALERT_HEADER.size + ALERT_TAG_LEN # 19
|
|
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|
+
_ALERT_AAD = b"guardian-alert-v1"
|
|
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|
+
_HKDF_ALERT_INFO = b"guardian-alert-v1"
|
|
166
|
+
|
|
167
|
+
|
|
168
|
+
def derive_alert_key(master_key):
|
|
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|
+
"""Downlink AEAD key: HKDF-SHA256(master, info='guardian-alert-v1'). Same master key as the
|
|
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|
+
uplink, separate subkey -> the uplink k_aead and this key never share a (key, nonce) pair."""
|
|
171
|
+
if len(master_key) != MASTER_KEY_LEN:
|
|
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|
+
raise ValueError(f"master key must be {MASTER_KEY_LEN} bytes, got {len(master_key)}")
|
|
173
|
+
return HKDF(algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), length=32, salt=None,
|
|
174
|
+
info=_HKDF_ALERT_INFO).derive(master_key)
|
|
175
|
+
|
|
176
|
+
|
|
177
|
+
def _chacha20(key, counter, nonce12, data):
|
|
178
|
+
"""Raw ChaCha20 (RFC 8439). cryptography's 16-byte nonce = counter(4, LE) || nonce(12)."""
|
|
179
|
+
enc = Cipher(algorithms.ChaCha20(key, struct.pack("<I", counter) + nonce12),
|
|
180
|
+
mode=None).encryptor()
|
|
181
|
+
return enc.update(data) + enc.finalize()
|
|
182
|
+
|
|
183
|
+
|
|
184
|
+
def _pad16(x):
|
|
185
|
+
return b"\x00" * ((16 - (len(x) % 16)) % 16)
|
|
186
|
+
|
|
187
|
+
|
|
188
|
+
def _poly1305_tag(key, nonce12, aad, ct):
|
|
189
|
+
"""Full 16-byte RFC 8439 ChaCha20-Poly1305 tag over (aad, ct)."""
|
|
190
|
+
poly_key = _chacha20(key, 0, nonce12, b"\x00" * 32)[:32]
|
|
191
|
+
mac_data = (aad + _pad16(aad) + ct + _pad16(ct)
|
|
192
|
+
+ struct.pack("<Q", len(aad)) + struct.pack("<Q", len(ct)))
|
|
193
|
+
p = Poly1305(poly_key)
|
|
194
|
+
p.update(mac_data)
|
|
195
|
+
return p.finalize()
|
|
196
|
+
|
|
197
|
+
|
|
198
|
+
def pack_alert(device_id, danger_level, message):
|
|
199
|
+
"""Pack the alert plaintext. message is truncated to ALERT_MSG_MAX bytes (see fits_alert)."""
|
|
200
|
+
if not 1 <= int(danger_level) <= 10:
|
|
201
|
+
raise ValueError("danger_level must be 1..10")
|
|
202
|
+
msg = message.encode("ascii", "replace")[:ALERT_MSG_MAX]
|
|
203
|
+
return _ALERT_HEADER.pack(device_id & 0xFFFFFFFF, int(danger_level)) + msg
|
|
204
|
+
|
|
205
|
+
|
|
206
|
+
def seal_alert(master_key, device_id, danger_level, message):
|
|
207
|
+
"""Seal one alert -> the manufacturer-data payload (after the company id): nonce(6)|ct|tag(8).
|
|
208
|
+
The caller advertises it as Manufacturer-Specific Data with company id ALERT_COMPANY_ID."""
|
|
209
|
+
k = derive_alert_key(master_key)
|
|
210
|
+
plaintext = pack_alert(device_id, danger_level, message)
|
|
211
|
+
nonce_tx = os.urandom(ALERT_NONCE_TX_LEN)
|
|
212
|
+
nonce12 = nonce_tx + b"\x00" * (NONCE_LEN - ALERT_NONCE_TX_LEN)
|
|
213
|
+
ct = _chacha20(k, 1, nonce12, plaintext)
|
|
214
|
+
tag = _poly1305_tag(k, nonce12, _ALERT_AAD, ct)[:ALERT_TAG_LEN]
|
|
215
|
+
return nonce_tx + ct + tag
|
|
216
|
+
|
|
217
|
+
|
|
218
|
+
def open_alert(master_key, payload, expect_id=None):
|
|
219
|
+
"""Inverse of seal_alert. payload is the manufacturer data after the company id.
|
|
220
|
+
Returns {device_id, danger_level, message, nonce} or None if not ours / forged / malformed."""
|
|
221
|
+
if len(payload) < ALERT_MIN_PAYLOAD:
|
|
222
|
+
return None
|
|
223
|
+
k = derive_alert_key(master_key)
|
|
224
|
+
nonce_tx = payload[:ALERT_NONCE_TX_LEN]
|
|
225
|
+
tag = payload[-ALERT_TAG_LEN:]
|
|
226
|
+
ct = payload[ALERT_NONCE_TX_LEN:-ALERT_TAG_LEN]
|
|
227
|
+
nonce12 = nonce_tx + b"\x00" * (NONCE_LEN - ALERT_NONCE_TX_LEN)
|
|
228
|
+
if not hmac.compare_digest(_poly1305_tag(k, nonce12, _ALERT_AAD, ct)[:ALERT_TAG_LEN], tag):
|
|
229
|
+
return None # not ours, or forged/tampered
|
|
230
|
+
plaintext = _chacha20(k, 1, nonce12, ct)
|
|
231
|
+
device_id, danger_level = _ALERT_HEADER.unpack(plaintext[:_ALERT_HEADER.size])
|
|
232
|
+
if expect_id is not None and device_id != expect_id:
|
|
233
|
+
return None
|
|
234
|
+
return {"device_id": device_id, "danger_level": danger_level,
|
|
235
|
+
"message": plaintext[_ALERT_HEADER.size:].decode("ascii", "replace"),
|
|
236
|
+
"nonce": nonce_tx.hex()}
|
|
File without changes
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
Metadata-Version: 2.4
|
|
2
|
+
Name: mobintel-probe-encryption
|
|
3
|
+
Version: 0.1.0
|
|
4
|
+
Summary: Encrypted, unlinkable Wi-Fi probe-request beacons for MobIntel Guardian: decode them on a sensor, seal Bluetooth alerts back
|
|
5
|
+
Author-email: Stepan Mazokha <smazokha2016@fau.edu>
|
|
6
|
+
License-Expression: Apache-2.0
|
|
7
|
+
Keywords: mobintel,probe,encryption
|
|
8
|
+
Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
|
|
9
|
+
Classifier: Intended Audience :: Science/Research
|
|
10
|
+
Classifier: Operating System :: OS Independent
|
|
11
|
+
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
|
|
12
|
+
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3 :: Only
|
|
13
|
+
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.9
|
|
14
|
+
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.10
|
|
15
|
+
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11
|
|
16
|
+
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
|
|
17
|
+
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.13
|
|
18
|
+
Classifier: Topic :: Security :: Cryptography
|
|
19
|
+
Classifier: Topic :: System :: Networking
|
|
20
|
+
Classifier: Typing :: Typed
|
|
21
|
+
Requires-Python: >=3.9
|
|
22
|
+
Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
|
|
23
|
+
License-File: LICENSE
|
|
24
|
+
Requires-Dist: cryptography>=3.3
|
|
25
|
+
Provides-Extra: test
|
|
26
|
+
Requires-Dist: pytest>=6; extra == "test"
|
|
27
|
+
Requires-Dist: scapy; extra == "test"
|
|
28
|
+
Dynamic: license-file
|
|
29
|
+
|
|
30
|
+
# mobintel-probe-encryption
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
Encrypted, unlinkable Wi-Fi beacons for the MobIntel Guardian pedestrian device, and the code a
|
|
33
|
+
roadside sensor needs to read them.
|
|
34
|
+
|
|
35
|
+
Once a second, a Guardian device broadcasts a Wi-Fi probe request carrying its id, its GPS position
|
|
36
|
+
and the time, encrypted with a key that only the device and the enrolled sensors hold. Its source
|
|
37
|
+
address and every other field change with each probe, so an outsider cannot tell that two probes
|
|
38
|
+
came from the same device. This package is the one implementation of that format: the device runs
|
|
39
|
+
`protocol.py` itself, and sensors use the rest of the package to
|
|
40
|
+
|
|
41
|
+
- **read probes:** pick a Guardian device's probes out of everything a receiver captures, decrypt
|
|
42
|
+
them, and judge whether each one is current;
|
|
43
|
+
- **send alerts:** seal a Bluetooth LE alert so that only the addressed device can open it.
|
|
44
|
+
|
|
45
|
+
It does not capture frames or transmit advertisements (bring your own monitor interface and Bluetooth
|
|
46
|
+
stack), and it does not make keys.
|
|
47
|
+
|
|
48
|
+
## Install
|
|
49
|
+
|
|
50
|
+
```bash
|
|
51
|
+
pip install mobintel-probe-encryption
|
|
52
|
+
```
|
|
53
|
+
|
|
54
|
+
Python 3.9 or newer. The only dependency is `cryptography` (3.3 or newer).
|
|
55
|
+
|
|
56
|
+
## Keys
|
|
57
|
+
|
|
58
|
+
The decoder needs the enrolled devices' keys in a JSON file, `{"<device id>": "<64 hex characters>",
|
|
59
|
+
...}`. Each is the same key the device holds (there is no public/private pair), so anyone with the
|
|
60
|
+
file can read every listed device's position, pretend to be one of them, and send them alerts. Keep
|
|
61
|
+
it out of version control and readable by its owner only; the library warns when other users can
|
|
62
|
+
read it.
|
|
63
|
+
|
|
64
|
+
## Reading probes
|
|
65
|
+
|
|
66
|
+
```python
|
|
67
|
+
from mobintel_probe_encryption import KeyStore, ProbeDecoder
|
|
68
|
+
|
|
69
|
+
decoder = ProbeDecoder(KeyStore.from_file("/path/to/enrolled.json"))
|
|
70
|
+
|
|
71
|
+
reading = decoder.decode_radiotap(frame) # bytes: radiotap header + 802.11 frame (+ FCS)
|
|
72
|
+
if reading is not None and reading.usable:
|
|
73
|
+
print(reading.device_id, reading.lat, reading.lon, reading.rssi_dbm)
|
|
74
|
+
```
|
|
75
|
+
|
|
76
|
+
`decode_radiotap` takes the bytes exactly as a monitor-mode capture delivers them: the radiotap
|
|
77
|
+
header (signal strength, channel, and whether the frame's checksum is attached) followed by the
|
|
78
|
+
802.11 frame. When decoding a recording, pass the capture time as `now` (unix seconds). Other
|
|
79
|
+
inputs: `decode_80211(frame, has_fcs=...)` for a frame without radiotap, and
|
|
80
|
+
`decode(source_mac, vendor_element)` when the frame is already taken apart. Each returns `None`
|
|
81
|
+
unless the frame is a probe request from an enrolled device.
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
A `Reading` has `device_id`, `lat`, `lon`, `timestamp` (the device's clock), `age_s` (receiver time
|
|
84
|
+
minus that), `rssi_dbm`, `source_mac`, and `status`:
|
|
85
|
+
|
|
86
|
+
| status | meaning | `usable` |
|
|
87
|
+
|---|---|---|
|
|
88
|
+
| `fresh` | a new message from the device | yes |
|
|
89
|
+
| `duplicate` | another copy of a message received within the last 2 s, e.g. by a second receiver | yes |
|
|
90
|
+
| `replay` | a message received before and sent again later, or older than one already accepted | no |
|
|
91
|
+
| `stale` | its time is more than 120 s from the receiver's clock (a wrong clock, or an old recording) | no |
|
|
92
|
+
|
|
93
|
+
The source address changes with every probe, so `device_id` is the only stable identity. A decoder
|
|
94
|
+
is safe to share between threads. `decoder.stats` counts frames, probe requests, elements of a
|
|
95
|
+
Guardian probe's length ("candidates") and recognised probes; candidates without recognised probes
|
|
96
|
+
while a device is nearby mean its key is missing from the file.
|
|
97
|
+
|
|
98
|
+
## Sending alerts
|
|
99
|
+
|
|
100
|
+
```python
|
|
101
|
+
from mobintel_probe_encryption import ALERT_COMPANY_ID, AlertSealer, advertising_data
|
|
102
|
+
|
|
103
|
+
payload = AlertSealer(keys).seal(device_id=10, danger_level=7, message="CAR LEFT")
|
|
104
|
+
# BlueZ: advertise ManufacturerData {ALERT_COMPANY_ID: payload}.
|
|
105
|
+
# Raw HCI: advertising_data(payload) is the complete advertising data (up to 31 bytes).
|
|
106
|
+
```
|
|
107
|
+
|
|
108
|
+
`danger_level` is 1 to 10 (the device buzzes that many times) and the message at most 8 ASCII
|
|
109
|
+
characters; anything else raises `ValueError` rather than being cut or changed.
|
|
110
|
+
|
|
111
|
+
## Wire format (version 1)
|
|
112
|
+
|
|
113
|
+
Every device has a 256-bit master key. HKDF-SHA256 derives one key per job from it: `guardian-aead-v1`
|
|
114
|
+
(probe encryption), `guardian-mac-v1` (the source address) and `guardian-alert-v1` (alerts).
|
|
115
|
+
|
|
116
|
+
**Probe.** Plaintext, 17 bytes, big-endian: version (1) · device id (uint32) · latitude and longitude
|
|
117
|
+
(int32, microdegrees) · timestamp (uint32, unix seconds). It travels in a vendor-specific element
|
|
118
|
+
(ID 221) of 48 bytes: a random 3-byte OUI · a random 12-byte nonce · the ChaCha20-Poly1305
|
|
119
|
+
ciphertext and 16-byte tag (associated data `guardian-probe-v1`). The source address is the first 6
|
|
120
|
+
bytes of HMAC-SHA256(address key, nonce), marked locally administered and unicast. A receiver
|
|
121
|
+
recomputes that address for each enrolled key to recognise the device, then decrypts.
|
|
122
|
+
|
|
123
|
+
**Alert.** Manufacturer-specific data, company id 0xFFFF: a 6-byte nonce · the ChaCha20 ciphertext
|
|
124
|
+
of device id (uint32) · danger level (uint8) · message (0–8 ASCII) · the first 8 bytes of the
|
|
125
|
+
Poly1305 tag (RFC 8439 construction, associated data `guardian-alert-v1`). It fits one 31-byte
|
|
126
|
+
Bluetooth LE legacy advertisement.
|
|
127
|
+
|
|
128
|
+
## Development
|
|
129
|
+
|
|
130
|
+
```bash
|
|
131
|
+
pip install -e ".[test]"
|
|
132
|
+
pytest
|
|
133
|
+
```
|
|
134
|
+
|
|
135
|
+
`tests/vectors.json` holds probes and alerts recorded from the code running on deployed devices.
|
|
136
|
+
If a change to `protocol.py` alters those bytes, devices and sensors no longer understand each
|
|
137
|
+
other: that is a new major version and a device update, not a fix.
|
|
138
|
+
|
|
139
|
+
Releasing: raise `__version__` in `src/mobintel_probe_encryption/__init__.py`, then push a tag
|
|
140
|
+
`v<version>`. The GitHub workflow runs the tests (Python 3.9 with cryptography 3.3.2, as on the
|
|
141
|
+
device, up to Python 3.13), builds the package, and publishes it to PyPI through trusted publishing,
|
|
142
|
+
so no upload token is stored anywhere.
|
|
143
|
+
|
|
144
|
+
## Author
|
|
145
|
+
|
|
146
|
+
Stepan Mazokha (smazokha2016@fau.edu), I-SENSE, Florida Atlantic University.
|
|
147
|
+
|
|
148
|
+
## License
|
|
149
|
+
|
|
150
|
+
Apache License 2.0; see [LICENSE](LICENSE).
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
mobintel_probe_encryption/__init__.py,sha256=K0lKyYArHtxN2JofyyvWIEarpAPow8mJQ7Bd_gt-674,1224
|
|
2
|
+
mobintel_probe_encryption/alerts.py,sha256=au8jDN7wCZe6oGKOu2LBkQbv_K8bGJN-9AE79khpoUs,2339
|
|
3
|
+
mobintel_probe_encryption/decoder.py,sha256=7f6PH37BQJJ4ZQ5Ms-BSIvg9Q9NqpxUliwrHdrktVwg,6732
|
|
4
|
+
mobintel_probe_encryption/frames.py,sha256=CA-ADS_bsR2vbns70meFHFcRPfvnj72OKHOzbFuEt5g,5031
|
|
5
|
+
mobintel_probe_encryption/keys.py,sha256=-sOxt2fZhPW57xc-7-WBkAEgrMT5rT0p9oV36Y5vqCo,4056
|
|
6
|
+
mobintel_probe_encryption/protocol.py,sha256=BoFoYt1mCl0SlHPmktET9RyL9Jii2UEeiAS_UTRTt5o,10845
|
|
7
|
+
mobintel_probe_encryption/py.typed,sha256=47DEQpj8HBSa-_TImW-5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU,0
|
|
8
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mobintel_probe_encryption-0.1.0.dist-info/top_level.txt,sha256=rjNGZoUpoBuSgKrgQm9653KQxYudnb__9ELP0CfgFiA,26
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