logi-auth 1.0.1__py3-none-any.whl

logi_auth/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+"""logi_auth — server-side "Sign in with logi" for Python / Django backends.
+
+Confidential OAuth 2.0 code exchange + id_token (RS256) verification. Same
+safety contract as the iOS/Android/Web/Flutter/Node/Ruby SDKs (shared golden
+vectors).
+"""
+
+from .errors import IdTokenError, LogiAuthError, ServerError
+from .id_token_verifier import verify_id_token
+from .server import LogiAuthServer, LogiSession
+
+__version__ = "1.0.1"
+
+__all__ = [
+    "LogiAuthServer",
+    "LogiSession",
+    "verify_id_token",
+    "LogiAuthError",
+    "IdTokenError",
+    "ServerError",
+    "__version__",
+]

logi_auth/errors.py

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+"""Error types for logi_auth."""
+
+
+class LogiAuthError(Exception):
+    """Base for all errors raised by this package."""
+
+
+class IdTokenError(LogiAuthError):
+    """id_token verification failure.
+
+    ``code`` mirrors the Web verifier and the golden-vector strings exactly
+    (e.g. ``"bad_signature"``, ``"aud_mismatch"``).
+    """
+
+    CODES = (
+        "malformed",
+        "missing_kid",
+        "unknown_kid",
+        "bad_signature",
+        "iss_mismatch",
+        "aud_mismatch",
+        "expired",
+        "nonce_mismatch",
+        "missing_claim",
+        "at_hash_mismatch",
+    )
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str):
+        self.code = code
+        super().__init__(f"id_token verification failed: {code}")
+
+
+class ServerError(LogiAuthError):
+    """OAuth / transport failure raised by :class:`LogiAuthServer`."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: str, message: str, detail=None):
+        self.code = code
+        self.detail = detail
+        super().__init__(message)

logi_auth/id_token_verifier.py

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+"""RS256 id_token verification.
+
+Mirrors the server (server/app/lib/oauth/jwt_verifier.rb) and the other SDKs:
+kid -> JWKS -> RS256 signature -> iss / aud / exp / iat / nonce / sub. Passes the
+shared 4-SDK golden vectors (../../test-vectors).
+
+Uses the standard ``cryptography`` library for the RSA primitive (Python has no
+stdlib RSA verify, just as Dart uses pointycastle). The JWS parsing + claim
+checks are implemented here, mirroring verify.ts.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import json
+import time
+from typing import Any
+
+from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding, rsa
+
+from .errors import IdTokenError
+
+
+def verify_id_token(
+    id_token: str,
+    jwks: dict,
+    expected: dict,
+    now: int | None = None,
+    clock_skew_sec: int = 60,
+    access_token: str | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    """Verify ``id_token`` and return ``{"sub", "claims"}``.
+
+    Raises :class:`IdTokenError` on any failure — never returns an unverified
+    subject. Claim order: signature -> iss -> aud -> exp -> iat -> nonce -> sub
+    -> at_hash.
+
+    ``expected`` is ``{"issuer", "client_id", "nonce"}`` (``nonce`` optional).
+    ``now`` is Unix seconds; defaults to now. Injectable for deterministic tests.
+
+    ``access_token`` binds the id_token to the access_token per OIDC §3.1.3.6:
+    when the payload carries ``at_hash`` **and** ``access_token`` is supplied, the
+    left-most 128 bits of ``SHA-256(access_token)`` (base64url, no padding) MUST
+    equal ``at_hash``. When either is absent the check is skipped (backward
+    compatible with callers that only verify the id_token).
+    """
+    now = int(time.time()) if now is None else now
+
+    parts = id_token.split(".")
+    if len(parts) != 3 or not all(parts):
+        raise IdTokenError("malformed")
+
+    header = _decode_json_segment(parts[0])
+    payload = _decode_json_segment(parts[1])
+    if header is None or payload is None:
+        raise IdTokenError("malformed")
+
+    # Only RS256 is accepted — never verify a token whose header declares another
+    # (or no) algorithm, even if the RSA signature happens to match.
+    if header.get("alg") != "RS256":
+        raise IdTokenError("bad_signature")
+
+    kid = header.get("kid")
+    if not isinstance(kid, str) or not kid:
+        raise IdTokenError("missing_kid")
+
+    # Select the signing key by kid, but only among RSA keys usable for RS256
+    # signatures. Filtering on kty/use/alg keeps verification robust if the JWKS
+    # later mixes in EC (or encryption) keys: we still pick the correct RSA key
+    # instead of tripping over an unrelated one that happens to share a kid.
+    jwk = next(
+        (
+            k
+            for k in jwks.get("keys", [])
+            if k.get("kid") == kid
+            and k.get("kty") == "RSA"
+            and k.get("use") in (None, "sig")
+            and k.get("alg") in (None, "RS256")
+        ),
+        None,
+    )
+    if jwk is None:
+        raise IdTokenError("unknown_kid")
+
+    signature = _b64url_decode(parts[2])
+    if signature is None or not _verify_rs256(f"{parts[0]}.{parts[1]}".encode(), signature, jwk):
+        raise IdTokenError("bad_signature")
+
+    if payload.get("iss") != expected["issuer"]:
+        raise IdTokenError("iss_mismatch")
+
+    aud = payload.get("aud")
+    if not _audience_matches(aud, expected["client_id"]):
+        raise IdTokenError("aud_mismatch")
+    # OIDC 3.1.3.7: with multiple audiences an ``azp`` MUST be present; whenever
+    # ``azp`` is present it MUST equal our client_id.
+    azp = payload.get("azp")
+    if isinstance(aud, list) and len(aud) > 1:
+        if azp != expected["client_id"]:
+            raise IdTokenError("aud_mismatch")
+    elif azp is not None:
+        if azp != expected["client_id"]:
+            raise IdTokenError("aud_mismatch")
+
+    exp = _numeric(payload.get("exp"))
+    if exp is None or exp <= now - clock_skew_sec:
+        raise IdTokenError("expired")
+
+    iat = _numeric(payload.get("iat"))
+    # iat missing or in the future -> malformed (mirrors the other verifiers).
+    if iat is None or iat > now + clock_skew_sec:
+        raise IdTokenError("malformed")
+
+    expected_nonce = expected.get("nonce")
+    if expected_nonce is not None and payload.get("nonce") != expected_nonce:
+        raise IdTokenError("nonce_mismatch")
+
+    sub = payload.get("sub")
+    if not isinstance(sub, str) or not sub:
+        raise IdTokenError("missing_claim")
+
+    # OIDC 3.1.3.6 at_hash: present-only binding. Checked last, after every other
+    # claim has been validated and only when the caller supplies the matching
+    # access_token, so id_token-only callers keep their existing behaviour.
+    at_hash = payload.get("at_hash")
+    if isinstance(at_hash, str) and access_token is not None:
+        if _at_hash(access_token) != at_hash:
+            raise IdTokenError("at_hash_mismatch")
+
+    return {"sub": sub, "claims": payload}
+
+
+def _at_hash(access_token: str) -> str:
+    # base64url(no padding) of the left-most 128 bits of SHA-256(access_token).
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(access_token.encode("utf-8")).digest()[:16]
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(digest).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
+
+
+def _verify_rs256(signing_input: bytes, signature: bytes, jwk: dict) -> bool:
+    n_bytes = _b64url_decode(jwk.get("n", ""))
+    e_bytes = _b64url_decode(jwk.get("e", ""))
+    if n_bytes is None or e_bytes is None:
+        return False
+    try:
+        public_key = rsa.RSAPublicNumbers(
+            int.from_bytes(e_bytes, "big"),
+            int.from_bytes(n_bytes, "big"),
+        ).public_key()
+    except (ValueError, TypeError):
+        return False
+    try:
+        public_key.verify(signature, signing_input, padding.PKCS1v15(), hashes.SHA256())
+        return True
+    except InvalidSignature:
+        return False
+
+
+def _decode_json_segment(segment: str) -> dict | None:
+    raw = _b64url_decode(segment)
+    if raw is None:
+        return None
+    try:
+        parsed = json.loads(raw)
+    except (json.JSONDecodeError, UnicodeDecodeError):
+        return None
+    return parsed if isinstance(parsed, dict) else None
+
+
+def _audience_matches(aud: Any, client_id: str) -> bool:
+    if isinstance(aud, str):
+        return aud == client_id
+    if isinstance(aud, list):
+        return client_id in aud
+    return False
+
+
+def _numeric(value: Any) -> int | None:
+    if isinstance(value, bool):
+        return None
+    if isinstance(value, (int, float)):
+        return int(value)
+    return None
+
+
+def _b64url_decode(segment: str) -> bytes | None:
+    if not isinstance(segment, str):
+        return None
+    try:
+        return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(segment + "=" * ((-len(segment)) % 4))
+    except (ValueError, TypeError):
+        return None

logi_auth/server.py

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+"""Server-side "Sign in with logi" for Python / Django backends.
+
+Confidential-client OAuth 2.0 code exchange + id_token (RS256) verification.
+
+Why this exists: a backend RP that skips the id_token ``aud`` check can be
+tricked into accepting a token minted for a DIFFERENT client (cross-client
+account takeover). :meth:`LogiAuthServer.exchange_code_and_verify` ALWAYS
+verifies signature + iss + aud + exp + nonce before returning ``sub``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any
+
+from .errors import IdTokenError, ServerError
+from .id_token_verifier import verify_id_token
+
+
+@dataclass
+class LogiSession:
+    """A verified session. ``sub`` is set only after the id_token checks pass."""
+
+    sub: str
+    email: str | None
+    id_token: str
+    access_token: str
+    refresh_token: str | None
+    expires_at: int | None
+    scope: str | None
+    claims: dict
+
+
+class LogiAuthServer:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        client_id: str,
+        redirect_uri: str,
+        client_secret: str | None = None,
+        issuer: str = "https://api.1pass.dev",
+        token_issuer: str = "https://api.1pass.dev",
+        scopes: list[str] | None = None,
+        jwks_cache_ttl: int = 3600,
+    ):
+        if not client_id:
+            raise ValueError("client_id is required")
+        if not redirect_uri:
+            raise ValueError("redirect_uri is required")
+        self.client_id = client_id
+        self.redirect_uri = redirect_uri
+        self.client_secret = client_secret
+        self.issuer = issuer.rstrip("/")
+        self.token_issuer = token_issuer
+        self.default_scopes = scopes or ["openid", "profile:basic", "email"]
+        self.jwks_cache_ttl = jwks_cache_ttl
+        self._jwks_cache: dict | None = None
+        self._jwks_fetched_at = 0.0
+
+    def authorization_url(
+        self,
+        *,
+        state: str,
+        nonce: str,
+        scopes: list[str] | None = None,
+        code_challenge: str | None = None,
+        prompt: str | None = None,
+    ) -> str:
+        params = {
+            "response_type": "code",
+            "client_id": self.client_id,
+            "redirect_uri": self.redirect_uri,
+            "scope": " ".join(scopes or self.default_scopes),
+            "state": state,
+            "nonce": nonce,
+        }
+        if code_challenge:
+            params["code_challenge"] = code_challenge
+            params["code_challenge_method"] = "S256"
+        if prompt:
+            params["prompt"] = prompt
+        return f"{self.issuer}/oauth/authorize?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}"
+
+    def exchange_code_and_verify(
+        self, *, code: str, nonce: str, code_verifier: str | None = None
+    ) -> LogiSession:
+        # The server flow always issued a nonce in authorization_url, so a
+        # missing nonce here (e.g. an expired session) is a bug — never proceed
+        # with the nonce check silently disabled.
+        if not nonce:
+            raise ServerError(
+                "invalid_nonce", "nonce is required — the sign-in session may have expired"
+            )
+
+        form = {
+            "grant_type": "authorization_code",
+            "code": code,
+            "redirect_uri": self.redirect_uri,
+            "client_id": self.client_id,
+        }
+        if self.client_secret:
+            form["client_secret"] = self.client_secret
+        if code_verifier:
+            form["code_verifier"] = code_verifier
+
+        status, body = self._post(f"{self.issuer}/oauth/token", form)
+        if not 200 <= status < 300:
+            raise ServerError(
+                "token_exchange_failed",
+                f"Token exchange failed (HTTP {status})",
+                detail=body[:2048],
+            )
+
+        tokens = self._parse_token_body(body)
+        id_token = tokens.get("id_token")
+        if not isinstance(id_token, str) or not id_token:
+            raise ServerError(
+                "missing_id_token",
+                "Token response had no id_token — was `openid` in the scopes?",
+            )
+
+        # _parse_token_body guarantees access_token is a non-empty str, so the
+        # at_hash binding is always exercised when the id_token carries at_hash.
+        verified = self._verify_with_rotation_retry(id_token, nonce, tokens["access_token"])
+        email = verified["claims"].get("email")
+        expires_in = tokens.get("expires_in")
+
+        return LogiSession(
+            sub=verified["sub"],
+            email=email if isinstance(email, str) else None,
+            id_token=id_token,
+            access_token=tokens.get("access_token"),
+            refresh_token=tokens.get("refresh_token"),
+            expires_at=(
+                int(time.time()) + int(expires_in)
+                if isinstance(expires_in, (int, float)) and not isinstance(expires_in, bool)
+                else None
+            ),
+            scope=tokens.get("scope"),
+            claims=verified["claims"],
+        )
+
+    # -- internals -----------------------------------------------------------
+
+    def _verify_with_rotation_retry(self, id_token: str, nonce: str, access_token: str) -> dict:
+        expected = {"issuer": self.token_issuer, "client_id": self.client_id, "nonce": nonce}
+        jwks, from_cache = self._fetch_jwks(force=False)
+        try:
+            return verify_id_token(id_token, jwks, expected, access_token=access_token)
+        except IdTokenError as err:
+            # Key rotation within the cache TTL — bust + refetch once.
+            if err.code == "unknown_kid" and from_cache:
+                fresh, _ = self._fetch_jwks(force=True)
+                try:
+                    return verify_id_token(id_token, fresh, expected, access_token=access_token)
+                except IdTokenError as retry_err:
+                    raise self._as_id_token_invalid(retry_err) from retry_err
+            raise self._as_id_token_invalid(err) from err
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _as_id_token_invalid(err: IdTokenError) -> ServerError:
+        return ServerError(
+            "id_token_invalid", f"id_token verification failed ({err.code})", detail=err.code
+        )
+
+    def _fetch_jwks(self, force: bool) -> tuple[dict, bool]:
+        if (
+            not force
+            and self._jwks_cache is not None
+            and (time.time() - self._jwks_fetched_at) < self.jwks_cache_ttl
+        ):
+            return self._jwks_cache, True
+
+        status, body = self._get(f"{self.issuer}/.well-known/jwks.json")
+        if not 200 <= status < 300:
+            raise ServerError("jwks_fetch_failed", f"JWKS fetch failed (HTTP {status})")
+        try:
+            jwks = json.loads(body)
+            if not isinstance(jwks, dict) or not isinstance(jwks.get("keys"), list):
+                raise ValueError("missing keys")
+        except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as err:
+            raise ServerError("jwks_fetch_failed", "JWKS response was malformed", detail=str(err)) from err
+
+        self._jwks_cache = jwks
+        self._jwks_fetched_at = time.time()
+        return jwks, False
+
+    def _parse_token_body(self, body: str) -> dict:
+        try:
+            tokens = json.loads(body)
+        except json.JSONDecodeError as err:
+            raise ServerError(
+                "token_exchange_failed", "Token response was not valid JSON", detail=str(err)
+            ) from err
+        if not isinstance(tokens, dict) or not isinstance(tokens.get("access_token"), str):
+            raise ServerError("token_exchange_failed", "Token response was missing access_token")
+        return tokens
+
+    def _post(self, url: str, form: dict[str, str]) -> tuple[int, str]:
+        data = urllib.parse.urlencode(form).encode()
+        request = urllib.request.Request(
+            url,
+            data=data,
+            method="POST",
+            headers={"Accept": "application/json", "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"},
+        )
+        return self._perform(request)
+
+    def _get(self, url: str) -> tuple[int, str]:
+        request = urllib.request.Request(url, method="GET", headers={"Accept": "application/json"})
+        return self._perform(request)
+
+    def _perform(self, request: urllib.request.Request) -> tuple[int, str]:
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=15) as resp:  # noqa: S310 (fixed https scheme)
+                return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as err:
+            # Non-2xx: return status + body so the caller handles it uniformly.
+            return err.code, err.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")
+        except urllib.error.URLError as err:
+            raise ServerError("network_error", f"Network error: {err.reason}", detail=str(err)) from err

logi_auth-1.0.1.dist-info/METADATA

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: logi-auth
+Version: 1.0.1
+Summary: Server-side "Sign in with logi" for Python/Django — confidential OAuth 2.0 + id_token (RS256) verification.
+Author: Dcode
+License-Expression: Apache-2.0
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/dcode-co/logi-auth-python
+Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/dcode-co/logi-auth-python/issues
+Keywords: logi,1pass,oauth,oidc,django,auth,openid,id-token
+Requires-Python: >=3.9
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+License-File: NOTICE
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=41.0
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# logi-auth (Python)
+
+Server-side **"Sign in with logi"** for Python / Django backends — confidential
+OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code exchange + **id_token (RS256) verification**. Only
+dependency: `cryptography` (no HTTP client dependency — stdlib `urllib`).
+
+This is the **confidential / backend** counterpart to the public-client SDKs
+(browser, iOS, Android, Flutter). If your RP has a backend, verify on the
+server with this package — do **not** rely on a client-side check.
+
+> **Why it matters:** a backend that skips the id_token `aud` check can be
+> tricked into accepting a token minted for a *different* client (cross-client
+> account takeover — the launchcrew/krx incident). `exchange_code_and_verify`
+> always verifies signature + iss + aud + exp + nonce before returning `sub`.
+
+## Supported versions
+
+| Requirement | Version |
+|-------------|---------|
+| **Python** | **>= 3.9** |
+| **Django** | any — the package is framework-agnostic; use it from any view |
+| Flask / FastAPI / etc. | any |
+| Dependencies | `cryptography >= 41.0` |
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+pip install logi-auth
+```
+
+## Django view example
+
+```python
+# settings.py (or a dedicated logi_auth.py config module)
+import os
+from logi_auth import LogiAuthServer
+
+LOGI = LogiAuthServer(
+    client_id=os.environ["LOGI_CLIENT_ID"],
+    client_secret=os.environ["LOGI_CLIENT_SECRET"],  # confidential client
+    redirect_uri="https://app.example.com/auth/logi/callback",
+)
+```
+
+```python
+# views.py
+import secrets
+
+from django.http import HttpResponseBadRequest
+from django.shortcuts import redirect
+
+from logi_auth import ServerError
+
+from .settings import LOGI
+from .models import User
+
+
+def logi_start(request):
+    state = secrets.token_hex(16)
+    nonce = secrets.token_hex(16)
+    request.session["logi_state"] = state
+    request.session["logi_nonce"] = nonce
+    return redirect(LOGI.authorization_url(state=state, nonce=nonce))
+
+
+def logi_callback(request):
+    if request.GET.get("state") != request.session.pop("logi_state", None):
+        return HttpResponseBadRequest("state mismatch")
+
+    # The provider may redirect back with ?error=access_denied (user cancelled)
+    # and no `code` — handle that before the exchange instead of 500-ing.
+    if request.GET.get("error"):
+        return redirect(f"/login?error={request.GET['error']}")
+    code = request.GET.get("code")
+    if not code:
+        return HttpResponseBadRequest("missing authorization code")
+
+    try:
+        result = LOGI.exchange_code_and_verify(
+            code=code,
+            nonce=request.session.pop("logi_nonce", None),
+        )
+    except ServerError as e:
+        # result.sub is only ever set after signature+iss+aud+exp+nonce all pass.
+        return redirect(f"/login?error={e.code}")
+
+    # result.sub is the verified pairwise subject — key your User record on it.
+    user, _ = User.objects.get_or_create(logi_sub=result.sub, defaults={"email": result.email})
+    request.session["user_id"] = user.id
+    return redirect("/")
+```
+
+Identity claims (email/name) are **not** guaranteed on the id_token — fetch
+them from `GET {issuer}/oauth/userinfo` with the returned `access_token` as a
+Bearer token if you need more than `sub`/`email`.
+
+## Public client (PKCE, no secret)
+
+Omit `client_secret` and pass a `code_challenge` / `code_verifier`:
+
+```python
+logi = LogiAuthServer(client_id=client_id, redirect_uri=redirect_uri)  # no secret
+url = logi.authorization_url(state=state, nonce=nonce, code_challenge=code_challenge)
+result = logi.exchange_code_and_verify(code=code, nonce=nonce, code_verifier=code_verifier)
+```
+
+## API
+
+```python
+from logi_auth import LogiAuthServer, LogiSession, verify_id_token, LogiAuthError, IdTokenError, ServerError
+```
+
+### `LogiAuthServer(...)`
+
+```python
+LogiAuthServer(
+    *,
+    client_id: str,
+    redirect_uri: str,
+    client_secret: str | None = None,
+    issuer: str = "https://api.1pass.dev",
+    token_issuer: str = "https://api.1pass.dev",
+    scopes: list[str] | None = None,        # default: ["openid", "profile:basic", "email"]
+    jwks_cache_ttl: int = 3600,
+)
+```
+
+- **`.authorization_url(*, state, nonce, scopes=None, code_challenge=None, prompt=None) -> str`**
+  Builds the `/oauth/authorize` redirect URL.
+- **`.exchange_code_and_verify(*, code, nonce, code_verifier=None) -> LogiSession`**
+  Exchanges the authorization `code` for tokens, then verifies the returned
+  `id_token` (signature via JWKS + `iss` + `aud` + `exp` + `nonce`, with a
+  transparent single JWKS refetch on key rotation) before returning a
+  `LogiSession`.
+
+### `LogiSession`
+
+Returned only once id_token verification has fully passed:
+
+| Field | Type |
+|-------|------|
+| `sub` | `str` — verified pairwise subject |
+| `email` | `str \| None` |
+| `id_token` | `str` |
+| `access_token` | `str` |
+| `refresh_token` | `str \| None` |
+| `expires_at` | `int \| None` — unix timestamp |
+| `scope` | `str \| None` |
+| `claims` | `dict` — full verified id_token claim set |
+
+## Error handling
+
+Both error types carry a `.code` string for programmatic branching (same
+codes as the Ruby/Node/Web SDKs and the shared golden vectors).
+
+`ServerError.code`:
+
+| Code | Meaning |
+|------|---------|
+| `invalid_nonce` | Missing nonce — the sign-in session likely expired |
+| `token_exchange_failed` | `/oauth/token` returned a non-2xx status or malformed body |
+| `missing_id_token` | Token response had no `id_token` (was `openid` in scopes?) |
+| `id_token_invalid` | id_token failed verification — `.detail` carries the underlying `IdTokenError.code` |
+| `jwks_fetch_failed` | JWKS endpoint unreachable or returned a malformed document |
+| `network_error` | Transport-level failure talking to the issuer |
+
+`IdTokenError.code` (raised by `verify_id_token` directly, or wrapped into
+`ServerError("id_token_invalid", ...)` by `exchange_code_and_verify`):
+
+`malformed`, `missing_kid`, `unknown_kid`, `bad_signature`, `iss_mismatch`,
+`aud_mismatch`, `expired`, `nonce_mismatch`, `missing_claim`, `at_hash_mismatch`.
+
+```python
+from logi_auth import ServerError
+
+try:
+    result = LOGI.exchange_code_and_verify(code=code, nonce=nonce)
+except ServerError as e:
+    logger.warning("logi sign-in failed: %s (%s)", e.code, e.detail)
+    return redirect(f"/login?error={e.code}")
+```
+
+## Security
+
+`exchange_code_and_verify` performs the full id_token verification —
+signature against the issuer's JWKS, `iss`, `aud` (against your `client_id`),
+`exp`, and `nonce` — **before** it ever returns a `sub`. Verifying on the
+server, not just trusting a client-supplied token, is what closes the
+cross-client account-takeover class of bug: a frontend alone cannot prove that
+an id_token it received was actually minted for *your* `client_id`.
+
+## License
+
+Apache-2.0

logi_auth-1.0.1.dist-info/RECORD

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+logi_auth-1.0.1.dist-info/top_level.txt,sha256=__nvIQqjp6LD7CIuBEMrxuco3OrRwW-lfTa_ydZp5N8,10
+logi_auth-1.0.1.dist-info/RECORD,,

logi_auth-1.0.1.dist-info/WHEEL

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Wheel-Version: 1.0
+Generator: setuptools (83.0.0)
+Root-Is-Purelib: true
+Tag: py3-none-any
+

logi_auth-1.0.1.dist-info/licenses/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
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logi_auth-1.0.1.dist-info/licenses/NOTICE

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+logi auth SDK
+Copyright 2026 Dcode
+
+This product is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0.

logi_auth-1.0.1.dist-info/top_level.txt

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+logi_auth