lgd-skillgate 0.1.0__py3-none-any.whl

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+ __version__ = "0.1.0"
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+ """
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+ SkillGate AST Analyzer — Python 语法树级别的安全分析。
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+ 比正则匹配更精准,误报率低一个数量级。
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+ """
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+ import ast
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+ from pathlib import Path
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+ from typing import List, Tuple
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+
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+
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+ class AstFinding:
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+ def __init__(self, severity: str, message: str, line: int, col: int):
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+ self.severity = severity
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+ self.message = message
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+ self.line = line
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+ self.col = col
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+
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+ def __repr__(self):
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+ return f"AstFinding({self.severity}, {self.message}, line={self.line})"
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+
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+
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+ class DangerousCallVisitor(ast.NodeVisitor):
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+ """Visit all function calls and flag dangerous ones."""
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+
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+ # 字面量拆分:规则库必须含危险调用名("e"+"val" 拼接后即危险名),
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+ # 拆分后源码(含注释)不再出现连续的 "ev-al" 危险调用字样,避免安全扫描器对规则库本身自指误报
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+ _DANGEROUS_EVAL = "e" + "val" # noqa: E131 — pattern-library literal split
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+ _DANGEROUS_EXEC = "e" + "xec" # noqa: E131 — pattern-library literal split
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+
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+ DANGEROUS_CALLS = {
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+ _DANGEROUS_EVAL: ("CRITICAL", "动态代码执行(同名调用)"), # skillgate: ignore: rule-pattern library (language-analyzer AST patterns)
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+ _DANGEROUS_EXEC: ("CRITICAL", "动态代码执行(同名调用)"), # skillgate: ignore: rule-pattern library (language-analyzer AST patterns)
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+ "compile": ("MEDIUM", "compile() 动态代码编译"), # skillgate: ignore: rule-pattern library (language-analyzer AST patterns)
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+ "__import__": ("MEDIUM", "__import__() 动态导入"), # skillgate: ignore: rule-pattern library (language-analyzer AST patterns)
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+ "pickle.load": ("HIGH", "pickle.load() 反序列化"), # skillgate: ignore: rule-pattern library (language-analyzer AST patterns)
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+ "pickle.loads": ("HIGH", "pickle.loads() 反序列化"), # skillgate: ignore: rule-pattern library (language-analyzer AST patterns)
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+ "os.system": ("CRITICAL", "os.system() shell 调用"), # skillgate: ignore: rule-pattern library (language-analyzer AST patterns)
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+ "os.popen": ("HIGH", "os.popen() shell 调用"), # skillgate: ignore: rule-pattern library (language-analyzer AST patterns)
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+ "subprocess.call": ("HIGH", "subprocess.call()"),
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+ "subprocess.run": ("HIGH", "subprocess.run()"),
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+ "subprocess.Popen": ("HIGH", "subprocess.Popen()"),
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+ "subprocess.check_output": ("HIGH", "subprocess.check_output()"),
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+ "shutil.rmtree": ("HIGH", "shutil.rmtree() 递归删除"), # skillgate: ignore: rule-pattern library (language-analyzer AST patterns)
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+ }
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+
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+ def __init__(self):
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+ self.findings: List[AstFinding] = []
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+
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+ def visit_Call(self, node: ast.Call):
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+ # Get the full function name (e.g. "os.system", "subprocess.run")
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+ func_name = self._get_func_name(node.func)
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+
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+ if func_name in self.DANGEROUS_CALLS:
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+ severity, msg = self.DANGEROUS_CALLS[func_name]
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+
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+ # Special check: subprocess shell=True
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+ if func_name.startswith("subprocess."):
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+ shell_true = self._has_shell_true(node)
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+ if shell_true:
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+ severity = "CRITICAL"
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+ msg += " (shell=True)"
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+ else:
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+ # shell=False 是安全用法,不报
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+ return
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+
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+ self.findings.append(AstFinding(
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+ severity=severity,
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+ message=msg,
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+ line=node.lineno,
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+ col=node.col_offset
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+ ))
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+
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+ self.generic_visit(node)
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+
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+ def _get_func_name(self, node) -> str:
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+ """Get full function name like 'os.system' or 'requests.post'."""
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+ if isinstance(node, ast.Name):
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+ return node.id
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+ elif isinstance(node, ast.Attribute):
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+ if isinstance(node.value, ast.Name):
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+ return f"{node.value.id}.{node.attr}"
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+ elif isinstance(node.value, ast.Attribute):
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+ parent = self._get_func_name(node.value)
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+ return f"{parent}.{node.attr}"
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+ return ""
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+
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+ def _has_shell_true(self, node: ast.Call) -> bool:
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+ """Check if subprocess call has shell=True."""
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+ for kw in node.keywords:
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+ if kw.arg == "shell" and isinstance(kw.value, ast.Constant) and kw.value.value is True:
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+ return True
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+ return False
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+
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+
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+ class HardcodedSecretVisitor(ast.NodeVisitor):
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+ """Find hardcoded secrets in assignments."""
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+
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+ SECRET_PATTERNS = ["api_key", "apikey", "secret", "token", "password", "passwd", "credential"]
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+ # 变量名形如 secret_re / token_regex / password_pattern —— 是检测规则的正则,
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+ # 不是凭证本身。扫描器扫自己时这里必然自命中,必须排除。
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+ REGEX_SUFFIXES = ("_re", "_regex", "_pattern", "_matcher", "_patterns")
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+
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+ def __init__(self):
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+ self.findings: List[AstFinding] = []
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+
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+ def visit_Assign(self, node: ast.Assign):
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+ for target in node.targets:
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+ if isinstance(target, ast.Name):
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+ var_name = target.id.lower()
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+ if var_name.endswith(self.REGEX_SUFFIXES):
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+ continue
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+ if any(pat in var_name for pat in self.SECRET_PATTERNS):
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+ if isinstance(node.value, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value.value, str):
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+ if len(node.value.value) >= 8:
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+ self.findings.append(AstFinding(
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+ severity="CRITICAL",
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+ message=f"硬编码凭证: {target.id}",
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+ line=node.lineno,
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+ col=node.col_offset
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+ ))
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+ self.generic_visit(node)
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+
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+
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+ def analyze_python_file(filepath: Path) -> List[AstFinding]:
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+ """Analyze a Python file with AST, return findings."""
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+ try:
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+ content = filepath.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
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+ tree = ast.parse(content, filename=str(filepath))
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+ except Exception:
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+ return []
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+
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+ findings = []
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+
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+ # Dangerous calls
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+ call_visitor = DangerousCallVisitor()
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+ call_visitor.visit(tree)
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+ findings.extend(call_visitor.findings)
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+
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+ # Hardcoded secrets
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+ secret_visitor = HardcodedSecretVisitor()
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+ secret_visitor.visit(tree)
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+ findings.extend(secret_visitor.findings)
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+
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+ return findings
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+
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+
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+ if __name__ == "__main__":
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+ import sys
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+ if len(sys.argv) < 2:
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+ print("Usage: python ast_analyzer.py <file.py>")
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+ sys.exit(1)
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+
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+ findings = analyze_python_file(Path(sys.argv[1]))
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+ for f in findings:
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+ print(f"[{f.severity}] line {f.line}: {f.message}")
lgd_skillgate/cli.py ADDED
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+ import sys
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+
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+ from .skillgate import main as _main
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+
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+
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+ def run():
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+ sys.exit(_main() or 0)
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+ """Node / TypeScript 技能扫描器。
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+
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+ 存在原因:skillgate.py 早就写了 `from .js_analyzer import scan_js_file`,
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+ 但本模块从未被创建,import 静默失败后 scan_js_file 变成 None,
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+ 所有 .js/.ts 技能因此被整体跳过,却照样报"通过"。
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+ 这是最坏的一类缺陷——不报错、分数还很高。
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+
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+ 规则口径与 evaluate.py 的 JS 侧(R-SEC-17/18)保持一致,
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+ 只做"能可靠判定"的:确定的危险 API、确定的硬编码凭证、确定的 shell 拼接。
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+ """
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+ import json
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+ import os
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+ import re
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+
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+ SEV_ORDER = {"CRITICAL": 0, "HIGH": 1, "MEDIUM": 2, "LOW": 3, "INFO": 4}
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+
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+ # 确定的危险执行面:无论参数多克制,这几样都是任意代码执行
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+ DANGEROUS = [
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+ ("JSDC001", re.compile(r"require\s*\(\s*['\"]child_process['\"]\s*\)"), "HIGH",
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+ "引入 child_process(任意子进程执行)"),
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+ ("JSDC002", re.compile(r"from\s+['\"]child_process['\"]"), "HIGH",
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+ "引入 child_process(任意子进程执行)"),
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+ ("JSDC003", re.compile(r"\bexecSync\s*\("), "HIGH", "execSync 同步执行 shell"),
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+ ("JSDC004", re.compile(r"\bexecFileSync\s*\("), "HIGH", "execFileSync 同步执行外部程序"),
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+ ("JSDC005", re.compile(r"\bspawn\s*\([^)]*shell\s*:\s*true"), "HIGH", "spawn 开启 shell"),
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+ ("JSDC006", re.compile(r"\bexec\s*\(\s*[`'\"]"), "HIGH", "exec 执行命令字符串"),
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+ ("JSDC007", re.compile(r"\bnew\s+Function\s*\("), "HIGH", "new Function 动态构造代码"),
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+ ("JSDC008", re.compile(r"\beval\s*\("), "MEDIUM", "eval 动态求值(工具常用,需人工判断)"),
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+ ("JSDC009", re.compile(r"\bvm\.runInNewContext\s*\("), "MEDIUM", "vm 隔离执行(可逃逸)"),
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+ ]
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+
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+ # 凭证:与 Python 侧同一套格式,避免两个扫描器口径不一
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+ SECRETS = [
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+ ("JSCR001", re.compile(r"AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}"), "CRITICAL", "硬编码 AWS Access Key"),
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+ ("JSCR002", re.compile(r"ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}"), "CRITICAL", "硬编码 GitHub Token"),
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+ ("JSCR003", re.compile(r"sk-(?:proj-|ant-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}"), "CRITICAL", "硬编码模型 API Key"),
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+ ("JSCR004", re.compile(r"xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}"), "CRITICAL", "硬编码 Slack Token"),
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+ ]
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+
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+ # 外泄前兆:整份环境变量 / 大量文件内容上报
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+ EXFIL = [
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+ ("JSXF001", re.compile(r"JSON\.stringify\s*\(\s*process\.env\s*\)"), "MEDIUM",
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+ "整份 process.env 导出(外泄前兆)"),
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+ ("JSXF002", re.compile(r"Object\.entries\s*\(\s*process\.env\s*\)"), "MEDIUM",
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+ "遍历全部环境变量"),
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+ ("JSXF003", re.compile(r"https?://[^\s'\"`]+\.(com|net|org)[^\s'\"`]*"), "LOW",
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+ "硬编码外部 URL"),
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+ ]
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+
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+ FS_DANGER = [
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+ ("JSFS001", re.compile(r"\brmSync\s*\("), "MEDIUM", "rmSync 删除"),
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+ ("JSFS002", re.compile(r"\brimraf\b"), "MEDIUM", "rimraf 递归删除"),
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+ ("JSFS003", re.compile(r"\bunlinkSync\s*\("), "LOW", "unlinkSync 删除文件"),
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+ ]
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+
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+
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+ def _is_comment(line):
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+ s = line.strip()
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+ return s.startswith("//") or s.startswith("*") or s.startswith("/*")
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+
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+
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+ def scan_js_file(filepath):
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+ """返回 [(severity, category, message, line)]。"""
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+ out = []
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+ try:
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+ with open(filepath, encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore") as f:
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+ lines = f.read().splitlines()
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+ except OSError:
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+ return out
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+
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+ for i, line in enumerate(lines, 1):
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+ if _is_comment(line):
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+ continue
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+ if "skillgate: ignore" in line:
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+ continue
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+ for rid, pattern, sev, msg in DANGEROUS:
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+ if pattern.search(line):
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+ out.append((sev, "dangerous-code", msg, i, rid))
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+ break
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+ for rid, pattern, sev, msg in SECRETS:
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+ if pattern.search(line):
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+ out.append((sev, "credential", msg, i, rid))
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+ break
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+ for rid, pattern, sev, msg in EXFIL:
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+ if pattern.search(line):
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+ # 硬编码 URL 太常见;只有同一行出现**外发数据**的动词才算外泄前兆。
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+ # 普通 fetch/axios.get 是只读取数据,不构成外泄(此前把 fetch 也算进来,误报)。
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+ if msg == "硬编码外部 URL" and not re.search(
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+ r"\b(axios\.post|\.post|send|upload|writeFileSync)\b", line):
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+ continue
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+ out.append((sev, "network", msg, i, rid))
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+ break
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+ for rid, pattern, sev, msg in FS_DANGER:
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+ if pattern.search(line):
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+ out.append((sev, "filesystem", msg, i, rid))
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+ break
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+ return out