lfx-nightly 0.2.0.dev0__py3-none-any.whl → 0.2.0.dev41__py3-none-any.whl

lfx/utils/ssrf_protection.py

@@ -0,0 +1,384 @@
+"""SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) protection utilities.
+
+This module provides validation to prevent SSRF attacks by blocking requests to:
+- Private IP ranges (RFC 1918)
+- Loopback addresses
+- Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254)
+- Other internal/special-use addresses
+
+IMPORTANT: HTTP Redirects
+    According to OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet, HTTP redirects should be DISABLED
+    to prevent bypass attacks where a public URL redirects to internal resources.
+    The API Request component has (as of v1.7.0) follow_redirects=False by default.
+    See: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
+
+Configuration:
+    LANGFLOW_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED: Enable/disable SSRF protection (default: false)
+        TODO: Change default to true in next major version (2.0)
+    LANGFLOW_SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS: Comma-separated list of allowed hosts/CIDR ranges
+        Examples: "192.168.1.0/24,internal-api.company.local,10.0.0.5"
+
+TODO: In next major version (2.0):
+    - Change LANGFLOW_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED default to "true"
+    - Remove warning-only mode and enforce blocking
+    - Update documentation to reflect breaking change
+"""
+
+import functools
+import ipaddress
+import socket
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+from lfx.logging import logger
+from lfx.services.deps import get_settings_service
+
+
+class SSRFProtectionError(ValueError):
+    """Raised when a URL is blocked due to SSRF protection."""
+
+
+@functools.cache
+def get_blocked_ip_ranges() -> list[ipaddress.IPv4Network | ipaddress.IPv6Network]:
+    """Get the list of blocked IP ranges, initializing lazily on first access.
+
+    This lazy loading avoids the startup cost of creating all ip_network objects
+    at module import time.
+
+    Returns:
+        list: List of blocked IPv4 and IPv6 network ranges.
+    """
+    return [
+        # IPv4 ranges
+        ipaddress.ip_network("0.0.0.0/8"),  # Current network (only valid as source)
+        ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"),  # Private network (RFC 1918)
+        ipaddress.ip_network("100.64.0.0/10"),  # Carrier-grade NAT (RFC 6598)
+        ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"),  # Loopback
+        ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"),  # Link-local / AWS metadata
+        ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),  # Private network (RFC 1918)
+        ipaddress.ip_network("192.0.0.0/24"),  # IETF Protocol Assignments
+        ipaddress.ip_network("192.0.2.0/24"),  # Documentation (TEST-NET-1)
+        ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"),  # Private network (RFC 1918)
+        ipaddress.ip_network("198.18.0.0/15"),  # Benchmarking
+        ipaddress.ip_network("198.51.100.0/24"),  # Documentation (TEST-NET-2)
+        ipaddress.ip_network("203.0.113.0/24"),  # Documentation (TEST-NET-3)
+        ipaddress.ip_network("224.0.0.0/4"),  # Multicast
+        ipaddress.ip_network("240.0.0.0/4"),  # Reserved
+        ipaddress.ip_network("255.255.255.255/32"),  # Broadcast
+        # IPv6 ranges
+        ipaddress.ip_network("::1/128"),  # Loopback
+        ipaddress.ip_network("::/128"),  # Unspecified address
+        ipaddress.ip_network("::ffff:0:0/96"),  # IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses
+        ipaddress.ip_network("100::/64"),  # Discard prefix
+        ipaddress.ip_network("2001::/23"),  # IETF Protocol Assignments
+        ipaddress.ip_network("2001:db8::/32"),  # Documentation
+        ipaddress.ip_network("fc00::/7"),  # Unique local addresses (ULA)
+        ipaddress.ip_network("fe80::/10"),  # Link-local
+        ipaddress.ip_network("ff00::/8"),  # Multicast
+    ]
+
+
+def is_ssrf_protection_enabled() -> bool:
+    """Check if SSRF protection is enabled in settings.
+
+    Returns:
+        bool: True if SSRF protection is enabled, False otherwise.
+    """
+    return get_settings_service().settings.ssrf_protection_enabled
+
+
+def get_allowed_hosts() -> list[str]:
+    """Get list of allowed hosts and/or CIDR ranges for SSRF protection.
+
+    Returns:
+        list[str]: Stripped hostnames or CIDR blocks from settings, or empty list if unset.
+    """
+    allowed_hosts = get_settings_service().settings.ssrf_allowed_hosts
+    if not allowed_hosts:
+        return []
+    # ssrf_allowed_hosts is already a list[str], just clean and filter entries
+    return [host.strip() for host in allowed_hosts if host and host.strip()]
+
+
+def is_host_allowed(hostname: str, ip: str | None = None) -> bool:
+    """Check if a hostname or IP is in the allowed hosts list.
+
+    Args:
+        hostname: Hostname to check
+        ip: Optional IP address to check
+
+    Returns:
+        bool: True if hostname or IP is in the allowed list, False otherwise.
+    """
+    allowed_hosts = get_allowed_hosts()
+    if not allowed_hosts:
+        return False
+
+    # Check hostname match
+    if hostname in allowed_hosts:
+        return True
+
+    # Check if hostname matches any wildcard patterns
+    for allowed in allowed_hosts:
+        if allowed.startswith("*."):
+            # Wildcard domain matching
+            domain_suffix = allowed[1:]  # Remove the *
+            if hostname.endswith(domain_suffix) or hostname == domain_suffix[1:]:
+                return True
+
+    # Check IP-based matching if IP is provided
+    if ip:
+        try:
+            ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
+
+            # Check exact IP match
+            if ip in allowed_hosts:
+                return True
+
+            # Check CIDR range match
+            for allowed in allowed_hosts:
+                try:
+                    # Try to parse as CIDR network
+                    if "/" in allowed:
+                        network = ipaddress.ip_network(allowed, strict=False)
+                        if ip_obj in network:
+                            return True
+                except (ValueError, ipaddress.AddressValueError):
+                    # Not a valid CIDR, skip
+                    continue
+
+        except (ValueError, ipaddress.AddressValueError):
+            # Invalid IP, skip IP-based checks
+            pass
+
+    return False
+
+
+def is_ip_blocked(ip: str | ipaddress.IPv4Address | ipaddress.IPv6Address) -> bool:
+    """Check if an IP address is in a blocked range.
+
+    Args:
+        ip: IP address to check (string or ipaddress object)
+
+    Returns:
+        bool: True if IP is in a blocked range, False otherwise.
+    """
+    try:
+        ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip) if isinstance(ip, str) else ip
+
+        # Check against all blocked ranges
+        return any(ip_obj in blocked_range for blocked_range in get_blocked_ip_ranges())
+    except (ValueError, ipaddress.AddressValueError):
+        # If we can't parse the IP, treat it as blocked for safety
+        return True
+
+
+def resolve_hostname(hostname: str) -> list[str]:
+    """Resolve a hostname to its IP addresses.
+
+    Args:
+        hostname: Hostname to resolve
+
+    Returns:
+        list[str]: List of resolved IP addresses
+
+    Raises:
+        SSRFProtectionError: If hostname cannot be resolved
+    """
+    try:
+        # Get address info for both IPv4 and IPv6
+        addr_info = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)
+
+        # Extract unique IP addresses
+        ips = []
+        for info in addr_info:
+            ip = info[4][0]
+            # Remove IPv6 zone ID if present (e.g., "fe80::1%eth0" -> "fe80::1")
+            if "%" in ip:
+                ip = ip.split("%")[0]
+            if ip not in ips:
+                ips.append(ip)
+
+        if not ips:
+            msg = f"Unable to resolve hostname: {hostname}"
+            raise SSRFProtectionError(msg)
+    except socket.gaierror as e:
+        msg = f"DNS resolution failed for {hostname}: {e}"
+        raise SSRFProtectionError(msg) from e
+    except Exception as e:
+        msg = f"Error resolving hostname {hostname}: {e}"
+        raise SSRFProtectionError(msg) from e
+
+    return ips
+
+
+def _validate_url_scheme(scheme: str) -> None:
+    """Validate that URL scheme is http or https.
+
+    Args:
+        scheme: URL scheme to validate
+
+    Raises:
+        SSRFProtectionError: If scheme is invalid
+    """
+    if scheme not in ("http", "https"):
+        msg = f"Invalid URL scheme '{scheme}'. Only http and https are allowed."
+        raise SSRFProtectionError(msg)
+
+
+def _validate_hostname_exists(hostname: str | None) -> str:
+    """Validate that hostname exists in the URL.
+
+    Args:
+        hostname: Hostname to validate (may be None)
+
+    Returns:
+        str: The validated hostname
+
+    Raises:
+        SSRFProtectionError: If hostname is missing
+    """
+    if not hostname:
+        msg = "URL must contain a valid hostname"
+        raise SSRFProtectionError(msg)
+    return hostname
+
+
+def _validate_direct_ip_address(hostname: str) -> bool:
+    """Validate a direct IP address in the URL.
+
+    Args:
+        hostname: Hostname that may be an IP address
+
+    Returns:
+        bool: True if hostname is a direct IP and validation passed,
+              False if hostname is not an IP (caller should continue with DNS resolution)
+
+    Raises:
+        SSRFProtectionError: If IP is blocked
+    """
+    try:
+        ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
+    except ValueError:
+        # Not an IP address, it's a hostname - caller should continue with DNS resolution
+        return False
+
+    # It's a direct IP address
+    # Check if IP is in allowlist
+    if is_host_allowed(hostname, str(ip_obj)):
+        logger.debug("IP address %s is in allowlist, bypassing SSRF checks", hostname)
+        return True
+
+    if is_ip_blocked(ip_obj):
+        msg = (
+            f"Access to IP address {hostname} is blocked by SSRF protection. "
+            "Requests to private/internal IP ranges are not allowed for security reasons. "
+            "To allow this IP, add it to LANGFLOW_SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS environment variable."
+        )
+        raise SSRFProtectionError(msg)
+
+    # Direct IP is allowed (public IP)
+    return True
+
+
+def _validate_hostname_resolution(hostname: str) -> None:
+    """Resolve hostname and validate resolved IPs are not blocked.
+
+    Args:
+        hostname: Hostname to resolve and validate
+
+    Raises:
+        SSRFProtectionError: If resolved IPs are blocked
+    """
+    # Resolve hostname to IP addresses
+    try:
+        resolved_ips = resolve_hostname(hostname)
+    except SSRFProtectionError:
+        # Re-raise SSRF errors as-is
+        raise
+    except Exception as e:
+        msg = f"Failed to resolve hostname {hostname}: {e}"
+        raise SSRFProtectionError(msg) from e
+
+    # Check if any resolved IP is blocked
+    blocked_ips = []
+    for ip in resolved_ips:
+        # Check if this specific IP is in the allowlist
+        if is_host_allowed(hostname, ip):
+            logger.debug("Resolved IP %s for hostname %s is in allowlist, bypassing SSRF checks", ip, hostname)
+            return
+
+        if is_ip_blocked(ip):
+            blocked_ips.append(ip)
+
+    if blocked_ips:
+        msg = (
+            f"Hostname {hostname} resolves to blocked IP address(es): {', '.join(blocked_ips)}. "
+            "Requests to private/internal IP ranges are not allowed for security reasons. "
+            "This protection prevents access to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints "
+            "(e.g., AWS 169.254.169.254), and other sensitive internal resources. "
+            "To allow this hostname, add it to LANGFLOW_SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS environment variable."
+        )
+        raise SSRFProtectionError(msg)
+
+
+def validate_url_for_ssrf(url: str, *, warn_only: bool = True) -> None:
+    """Validate a URL to prevent SSRF attacks.
+
+    This function performs the following checks:
+    1. Validates the URL scheme (only http/https allowed)
+    2. Validates hostname exists
+    3. Checks if hostname/IP is in allowlist
+    4. If direct IP: validates it's not in blocked ranges
+    5. If hostname: resolves to IPs and validates they're not in blocked ranges
+
+    Args:
+        url: URL to validate
+        warn_only: If True, only log warnings instead of raising errors (default: True)
+            TODO: Change default to False in next major version (2.0)
+
+    Raises:
+        SSRFProtectionError: If the URL is blocked due to SSRF protection (only if warn_only=False)
+        ValueError: If the URL is malformed
+    """
+    # Skip validation if SSRF protection is disabled
+    if not is_ssrf_protection_enabled():
+        return
+
+    # Parse URL
+    try:
+        parsed = urlparse(url)
+    except Exception as e:
+        msg = f"Invalid URL format: {e}"
+        raise ValueError(msg) from e
+
+    try:
+        # Validate scheme
+        _validate_url_scheme(parsed.scheme)
+        if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
+            return
+
+        # Validate hostname exists
+        hostname = _validate_hostname_exists(parsed.hostname)
+
+        # Check if hostname/IP is in allowlist (early return if allowed)
+        if is_host_allowed(hostname):
+            logger.debug("Hostname %s is in allowlist, bypassing SSRF checks", hostname)
+            return
+
+        # Validate direct IP address or resolve hostname
+        is_direct_ip = _validate_direct_ip_address(hostname)
+        if is_direct_ip:
+            # Direct IP was handled (allowed or exception raised)
+            return
+
+        # Not a direct IP, resolve hostname and validate
+        _validate_hostname_resolution(hostname)
+    except SSRFProtectionError as e:
+        if warn_only:
+            logger.warning("SSRF Protection Warning: %s [URL: %s]", str(e), url)
+            logger.warning(
+                "This request will be blocked when SSRF protection is enforced in the next major version. "
+                "Please review your API Request components."
+            )
+            return
+        raise

lfx/utils/validate_cloud.py

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+"""Cloud environment validation utilities.
+
+This module contains validation functions for cloud-specific constraints,
+such as disabling certain features when running in Astra cloud environment.
+"""
+
+import os
+
+
+def raise_error_if_astra_cloud_disable_component(msg: str):
+    """Validate that we're not in an Astra cloud environment and certain components/features need to be disabled.
+
+    Check if the environment variable ASTRA_CLOUD_DISABLE_COMPONENT is set to true.
+    IF it is, then we know we are in an Astra cloud environment and
+    that certain components or component-features need to be disabled.
+
+    Args:
+        msg: The error message to raise if we're in an Astra cloud environment.
+
+    Raises:
+        ValueError: If running in an Astra cloud environment.
+    """
+    if (
+        disable_component := os.getenv("ASTRA_CLOUD_DISABLE_COMPONENT", "false")
+    ) and disable_component.lower().strip() == "true":
+        raise ValueError(msg)

{lfx_nightly-0.2.0.dev0.dist-info → lfx_nightly-0.2.0.dev41.dist-info}/METADATA

@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: lfx-nightly
-Version: 0.2.0.dev0
+Version: 0.2.0.dev41
 Summary: Langflow Executor - A lightweight CLI tool for executing and serving Langflow AI flows
 Author-email: Gabriel Luiz Freitas Almeida <gabriel@langflow.org>
 Requires-Python: <3.14,>=3.10
 Requires-Dist: aiofile<4.0.0,>=3.8.0
 Requires-Dist: aiofiles<25.0.0,>=24.1.0
 Requires-Dist: asyncer<1.0.0,>=0.0.8
-Requires-Dist: cachetools<6.0.0,>=5.5.2
+Requires-Dist: cachetools>=6.0.0
 Requires-Dist: chardet<6.0.0,>=5.2.0
 Requires-Dist: defusedxml<1.0.0,>=0.7.1
 Requires-Dist: docstring-parser<1.0.0,>=0.16
 Requires-Dist: emoji<3.0.0,>=2.14.1
 Requires-Dist: fastapi<1.0.0,>=0.115.13
+Requires-Dist: filelock>=3.20.0
 Requires-Dist: httpx[http2]<1.0.0,>=0.24.0
 Requires-Dist: json-repair<1.0.0,>=0.30.3
 Requires-Dist: langchain-core<1.0.0,>=0.3.66
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ Requires-Dist: pillow<13.0.0,>=10.0.0
 Requires-Dist: platformdirs<5.0.0,>=4.3.8
 Requires-Dist: pydantic-settings<3.0.0,>=2.10.1
 Requires-Dist: pydantic<3.0.0,>=2.0.0
+Requires-Dist: pypdf>=5.1.0
 Requires-Dist: python-dotenv<2.0.0,>=1.0.0
 Requires-Dist: rich<14.0.0,>=13.0.0
 Requires-Dist: structlog<26.0.0,>=25.4.0
@@ -198,6 +200,7 @@ Features:
 - Creates an agent with OpenAI GPT model
 - Provides web search tools via URLComponent
 - Connects ChatInput → Agent → ChatOutput
+- Uses async get_graph() function for proper async handling
 
 Usage:
     uv run lfx run simple_agent.py "How are you?"
@@ -211,27 +214,40 @@ from lfx import components as cp
 from lfx.graph import Graph
 from lfx.log.logger import LogConfig
 
-log_config = LogConfig(
-    log_level="INFO",
-    log_file=Path("langflow.log"),
-)
 
-# Showcase the new flattened component access - no need for deep imports!
-chat_input = cp.ChatInput()
-agent = cp.AgentComponent()
-url_component = cp.URLComponent()
-tools = url_component.to_toolkit()
-
-agent.set(
-    model_name="gpt-4.1-mini",
-    agent_llm="OpenAI",
-    api_key=os.getenv("OPENAI_API_KEY"),
-    input_value=chat_input.message_response,
-    tools=tools,
-)
-chat_output = cp.ChatOutput().set(input_value=agent.message_response)
-
-graph = Graph(chat_input, chat_output, log_config=log_config)
+async def get_graph() -> Graph:
+    """Create and return the graph with async component initialization.
+
+    This function properly handles async component initialization without
+    blocking the module loading process. The script loader will detect this
+    async function and handle it appropriately.
+
+    Returns:
+        Graph: The configured graph with ChatInput → Agent → ChatOutput flow
+    """
+    log_config = LogConfig(
+        log_level="INFO",
+        log_file=Path("langflow.log"),
+    )
+
+    # Showcase the new flattened component access - no need for deep imports!
+    chat_input = cp.ChatInput()
+    agent = cp.AgentComponent()
+
+    # Use URLComponent for web search capabilities
+    url_component = cp.URLComponent()
+    tools = await url_component.to_toolkit()
+
+    agent.set(
+        model_name="gpt-4.1-mini",
+        agent_llm="OpenAI",
+        api_key=os.getenv("OPENAI_API_KEY"),
+        input_value=chat_input.message_response,
+        tools=tools,
+    )
+    chat_output = cp.ChatOutput().set(input_value=agent.message_response)
+
+    return Graph(chat_input, chat_output, log_config=log_config)
 ```
 
 **Step 2: Install dependencies**