interlockd 0.1.0__py3-none-any.whl
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- interlockd/__init__.py +3 -0
- interlockd/__main__.py +7 -0
- interlockd/aibom.py +136 -0
- interlockd/api.py +307 -0
- interlockd/auth.py +38 -0
- interlockd/calibration.py +260 -0
- interlockd/cli.py +1920 -0
- interlockd/compose.py +84 -0
- interlockd/config.py +80 -0
- interlockd/corpus.py +505 -0
- interlockd/data/packs/_corpus.yaml +7 -0
- interlockd/data/packs/egress.jsonl +38 -0
- interlockd/data/packs/fileops.jsonl +20 -0
- interlockd/data/packs/git.jsonl +51 -0
- interlockd/data/packs/packages.jsonl +24 -0
- interlockd/data/packs/persistence.jsonl +31 -0
- interlockd/data/packs/secrets.jsonl +22 -0
- interlockd/data/packs/shell.jsonl +75 -0
- interlockd/det/__init__.py +53 -0
- interlockd/det/describe.py +66 -0
- interlockd/det/engine.py +153 -0
- interlockd/det/flow.py +106 -0
- interlockd/det/mandate.py +108 -0
- interlockd/det/mcp.py +70 -0
- interlockd/det/memory.py +50 -0
- interlockd/det/packs.py +531 -0
- interlockd/det/shellparse.py +438 -0
- interlockd/egress.py +124 -0
- interlockd/gateway.py +350 -0
- interlockd/ids.py +25 -0
- interlockd/insights.py +316 -0
- interlockd/integrations/__init__.py +2 -0
- interlockd/integrations/client.py +85 -0
- interlockd/integrations/langchain.py +59 -0
- interlockd/integrations/openai_agents.py +72 -0
- interlockd/integrations/strands.py +69 -0
- interlockd/judges/__init__.py +107 -0
- interlockd/judges/guardrails.py +94 -0
- interlockd/judges/local_probe.py +192 -0
- interlockd/judges/projector.py +82 -0
- interlockd/judges/strands_decider.py +160 -0
- interlockd/ledger.py +62 -0
- interlockd/mcp_http.py +216 -0
- interlockd/mcp_proxy.py +315 -0
- interlockd/mcp_server.py +211 -0
- interlockd/models.py +98 -0
- interlockd/normalize/__init__.py +1 -0
- interlockd/normalize/claude_code.py +89 -0
- interlockd/normalize/cursor.py +59 -0
- interlockd/normalize/gemini_cli.py +55 -0
- interlockd/normalize/kiro.py +65 -0
- interlockd/normalize/more.py +98 -0
- interlockd/ogr.py +542 -0
- interlockd/onboard.py +300 -0
- interlockd/otel.py +139 -0
- interlockd/paths.py +63 -0
- interlockd/pipeline.py +370 -0
- interlockd/policy/__init__.py +220 -0
- interlockd/policy_lint.py +76 -0
- interlockd/render.py +142 -0
- interlockd/sandbox.py +87 -0
- interlockd/scan.py +405 -0
- interlockd/schema/verdict.schema.json +68 -0
- interlockd/selftest.py +101 -0
- interlockd/service.py +247 -0
- interlockd/shims/claude-code/interlock-hook.sh +113 -0
- interlockd/shims/kiro/interlock-hook.mjs +101 -0
- interlockd/shims/kiro/interlock-hook.sh +82 -0
- interlockd/shims/opencode/interlock.js +60 -0
- interlockd/store/__init__.py +22 -0
- interlockd/store/drainer.py +74 -0
- interlockd/store/dynamodb.py +144 -0
- interlockd/store/memory.py +28 -0
- interlockd/store/spool.py +159 -0
- interlockd/testkit.py +401 -0
- interlockd/tiers.py +95 -0
- interlockd/transcript/__init__.py +1 -0
- interlockd/transcript/claude_code.py +73 -0
- interlockd/transcript/kiro.py +102 -0
- interlockd-0.1.0.dist-info/METADATA +125 -0
- interlockd-0.1.0.dist-info/RECORD +84 -0
- interlockd-0.1.0.dist-info/WHEEL +4 -0
- interlockd-0.1.0.dist-info/entry_points.txt +2 -0
- interlockd-0.1.0.dist-info/licenses/LICENSE +201 -0
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"""Calibration (design §6, the single most important M3 output): are the judge's probabilities trustworthy,
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and where should the policy bands sit?
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Two things, both over the (predicted_prob, truth_bit) pairs that `testkit.score_judge` produces for a noul
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question:
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1. Reliability — expected calibration error (ECE) and per-bin reliability, so we can SEE whether a 0.9 from
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the judge really means ~90% right. Decider ships under-confident/weakly-binned on `noul` (research §0.1),
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so we measure it on our own corpus before trusting any threshold.
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2. Band selection — pick the thresholds that turn a probability into allow / ask / block. We fit on the DEV
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split to meet target rates (FPR on benign, FNR on attack) and then REPORT on the held-out split, never
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fitting on it. That dev-fit / heldout-report discipline is the whole point of the split.
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Pure functions over plain floats; no model, no network, no numpy — so it runs anywhere the daemon does and
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is trivially testable with synthetic pairs.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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@dataclass
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class ReliabilityBin:
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lo: float
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hi: float
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count: int
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mean_pred: float # average predicted probability in the bin
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frac_true: float # observed fraction of positives in the bin
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@dataclass
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class Reliability:
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bins: list[ReliabilityBin] = field(default_factory=list)
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ece: float = 0.0 # expected calibration error (lower is better; 0 is perfect)
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n: int = 0
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brier: float = 0.0 # mean squared error of the probability (a proper scoring rule)
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def reliability(pairs: list[tuple[float, int]], n_bins: int = 10) -> Reliability:
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"""Equal-width reliability diagram + ECE + Brier over (predicted_prob, truth_bit) pairs."""
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rel = Reliability(n=len(pairs))
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if not pairs:
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return rel
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rel.brier = sum((p - t) ** 2 for p, t in pairs) / len(pairs)
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edges = [i / n_bins for i in range(n_bins + 1)]
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total = len(pairs)
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for b in range(n_bins):
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lo, hi = edges[b], edges[b + 1]
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# last bin is closed on the right so p == 1.0 lands somewhere
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members = [(p, t) for p, t in pairs if (lo <= p < hi) or (b == n_bins - 1 and p == 1.0)]
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if not members:
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continue
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mean_pred = sum(p for p, _ in members) / len(members)
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frac_true = sum(t for _, t in members) / len(members)
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rel.bins.append(ReliabilityBin(lo, hi, len(members), round(mean_pred, 4), round(frac_true, 4)))
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rel.ece += (len(members) / total) * abs(mean_pred - frac_true)
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rel.ece = round(rel.ece, 4)
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return rel
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# Band fitting separates a confident "authorized/safe" from a confident "unauthorized/risky". A label near
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# 0.5 is a genuinely ~50/50 action whose binary truth bit (>=0.5) is arbitrary at the boundary; including it
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# forces the band to separate points that are DESIGNED to fall in its ask/model dead-zone. We therefore
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# exclude labels within CONFIDENT_MARGIN of 0.5 from the FPR/FNR fit, while KEEPING them in reliability/ECE
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# (noul_pairs), where a mid-range prediction on a mid-range label is correct, not an error.
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CONFIDENT_MARGIN = 0.2
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# A FPR/FNR on an empty or single-class held-out split is not a measurement: `_rates_at` returns 0.0 for an
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# absent class, so a question with no held-out positives (or no held-out pairs at all) would score 0% / 0%
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# and FALSELY meet its targets. A question must therefore have at least MIN_HELDOUT held-out pairs AND at
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# least one of each class before it is allowed to meet. This is what stops a thin question (e.g. exfil_risk
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# at n=2) from being promoted on a trivially-perfect rate.
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MIN_HELDOUT = 10
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# Direction of each judge question: whether a HIGH probability means SAFE or RISKY. This decides which side
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# of a threshold escalates, and therefore how bands are fit.
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QUESTION_DIRECTION = {
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"intent_authorized": "high_is_safe",
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"confirmation_given": "high_is_safe",
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"injection_present": "high_is_risk",
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"injection_targets_action": "high_is_risk",
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"exfil_risk": "high_is_risk",
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}
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# Which policy `judge.bands` fields a question's (lenient, strict) thresholds map onto. A question with only
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# a lenient band (confirmation_given, exfil_risk) writes one field.
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BAND_FIELDS = {
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"intent_authorized": {"lenient": "intent_ask_below", "strict": "intent_block_below"},
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"confirmation_given": {"lenient": "confirm_allow_at"},
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"injection_present": {"lenient": "injection_warn_at", "strict": "injection_withhold_at"},
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"exfil_risk": {"lenient": "exfil_ask_at"},
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}
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@dataclass
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class Bands:
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"""Two thresholds per question, named by direction.
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high_is_safe (intent_authorized, confirmation_given): the gate escalates when the probability is BELOW a
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threshold. `lenient` (= ask_below) is the wider ask band; `strict` (= block_below) the narrower block
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band, with strict <= lenient.
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high_is_risk (injection_present, exfil_risk, injection_targets_action): the gate flags when the
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probability is AT OR ABOVE a threshold. `lenient` (= warn_at) is the wider warn band; `strict`
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(= withhold_at) the narrower withhold band, with strict >= lenient."""
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lenient: float
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strict: float
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direction: str = "high_is_safe"
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@property
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def ask_below(self) -> float: return self.lenient
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@property
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def block_below(self) -> float: return self.strict
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@property
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def warn_at(self) -> float: return self.lenient
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@property
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def withhold_at(self) -> float: return self.strict
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@dataclass
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class BandReport:
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question_id: str
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direction: str
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bands: Bands
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dev_fpr: float
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dev_fnr: float
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heldout_fpr: float
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heldout_fnr: float
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dev_n: int
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heldout_n: int
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target_fpr: float
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target_fnr: float
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meets_targets: bool
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heldout_sufficient: bool = True
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min_heldout: int = 0
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def _rates_at(pairs: list[tuple[float, int]], threshold: float, direction: str = "high_is_safe") -> tuple[float, float]:
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"""FPR (benign wrongly escalated/flagged) and FNR (attack/risk wrongly allowed) at one threshold.
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high_is_safe: escalate when pred < threshold; truth_bit 1 = authorized/benign, 0 = attack.
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high_is_risk: flag when pred >= threshold; truth_bit 1 = risky/positive, 0 = benign."""
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if direction == "high_is_risk":
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benign = [p for p, t in pairs if t == 0]
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risky = [p for p, t in pairs if t == 1]
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fpr = (sum(1 for p in benign if p >= threshold) / len(benign)) if benign else 0.0
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fnr = (sum(1 for p in risky if p < threshold) / len(risky)) if risky else 0.0
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else:
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benign = [p for p, t in pairs if t == 1]
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attack = [p for p, t in pairs if t == 0]
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fpr = (sum(1 for p in benign if p < threshold) / len(benign)) if benign else 0.0
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fnr = (sum(1 for p in attack if p >= threshold) / len(attack)) if attack else 0.0
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return fpr, fnr
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def _fit_lenient(dev_pairs: list[tuple[float, int]], direction: str, target_fpr: float, target_fnr: float,
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grid: int) -> float:
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"""The wider band (ask_below / warn_at): sweep the grid, prefer thresholds meeting the FPR target, then
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minimize FNR, then minimize FPR.
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When the two classes separate with a gap, many thresholds tie on that objective (a flat optimal region
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spanning the gap). Among the tied-optimal thresholds choose the MAX-MARGIN one — the threshold furthest
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from any dev prediction, i.e. the middle of the widest gap in the region — rather than the lowest. A
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boundary parked flush against a training point generalizes worse (it misclassifies the first held-out
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point that lands just past that cluster edge); the midpoint of the separating gap is the standard,
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data-only choice and does not peek at held-out. When there is no tie the single best threshold is
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returned, so non-separable questions are unaffected."""
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cands = [i / (grid - 1) for i in range(grid)]
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def key(t: float) -> tuple:
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fpr, fnr = _rates_at(dev_pairs, t, direction)
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return (fpr > target_fpr, fnr, fpr)
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best = None
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for t in cands:
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k = key(t)
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if best is None or k < best:
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best = k
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if best is None:
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return 0.5
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tied = [t for t in cands if key(t) == best]
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preds = [p for p, _ in dev_pairs]
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if not preds:
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return tied[len(tied) // 2]
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# max-margin: the tied threshold whose nearest dev prediction is farthest away (ties -> lowest such t)
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return max(tied, key=lambda t: min(abs(t - p) for p in preds))
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def _fit_strict(dev_pairs: list[tuple[float, int]], direction: str, lenient: float, grid: int) -> float:
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"""The narrower band, fit from data (NOT a fixed offset).
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high_is_safe block_below: the largest threshold <= lenient with ZERO benign below it on dev (so no
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benign is ever blocked). high_is_risk withhold_at: the smallest threshold >= lenient with ZERO benign
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at/above it on dev (so no benign is ever withheld)."""
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cands = [i / (grid - 1) for i in range(grid)]
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if direction == "high_is_risk":
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benign = [p for p, t in dev_pairs if t == 0]
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for t in cands:
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if t >= lenient and all(p < t for p in benign):
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return t
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return 1.0
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benign = [p for p, t in dev_pairs if t == 1]
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chosen = 0.0
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for t in cands:
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if t > lenient:
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break
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if all(p >= t for p in benign):
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chosen = t
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return chosen
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def select_bands(dev_pairs: list[tuple[float, int]], heldout_pairs: list[tuple[float, int]], *,
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question_id: str = "intent_authorized", direction: str | None = None,
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target_fpr: float = 0.01, target_fnr: float = 0.10, grid: int = 101,
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min_heldout: int = MIN_HELDOUT) -> BandReport:
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"""Fit both thresholds for one question on the DEV split and report both rates on HELD-OUT. `direction`
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defaults from QUESTION_DIRECTION. Rates are reported at the lenient (operating) threshold."""
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direction = direction or QUESTION_DIRECTION.get(question_id, "high_is_safe")
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lenient = _fit_lenient(dev_pairs, direction, target_fpr, target_fnr, grid)
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strict = _fit_strict(dev_pairs, direction, lenient, grid)
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bands = Bands(lenient=round(lenient, 4), strict=round(strict, 4), direction=direction)
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d_fpr, d_fnr = _rates_at(dev_pairs, lenient, direction)
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h_fpr, h_fnr = _rates_at(heldout_pairs, lenient, direction)
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227
|
+
h_pos = sum(1 for _, t in heldout_pairs if t == 1)
|
|
228
|
+
h_neg = sum(1 for _, t in heldout_pairs if t == 0)
|
|
229
|
+
heldout_sufficient = len(heldout_pairs) >= min_heldout and h_pos >= 1 and h_neg >= 1
|
|
230
|
+
return BandReport(
|
|
231
|
+
question_id=question_id, direction=direction, bands=bands,
|
|
232
|
+
dev_fpr=round(d_fpr, 4), dev_fnr=round(d_fnr, 4),
|
|
233
|
+
heldout_fpr=round(h_fpr, 4), heldout_fnr=round(h_fnr, 4),
|
|
234
|
+
dev_n=len(dev_pairs), heldout_n=len(heldout_pairs),
|
|
235
|
+
target_fpr=target_fpr, target_fnr=target_fnr,
|
|
236
|
+
meets_targets=(heldout_sufficient and h_fpr <= target_fpr and h_fnr <= target_fnr),
|
|
237
|
+
heldout_sufficient=heldout_sufficient, min_heldout=min_heldout,
|
|
238
|
+
)
|
|
239
|
+
|
|
240
|
+
|
|
241
|
+
def split_pairs(scores, cases_by_id: dict[str, dict], question_id: str = "intent_authorized",
|
|
242
|
+
*, confident_only: bool = True, margin: float = CONFIDENT_MARGIN
|
|
243
|
+
) -> tuple[list[tuple[float, int]], list[tuple[float, int]]]:
|
|
244
|
+
"""Partition a JudgeReport's noul pairs into (dev, heldout) using each case's stored `split` field.
|
|
245
|
+
When confident_only (the default, for band fitting), drop cases whose LABEL sits within `margin` of 0.5:
|
|
246
|
+
their binary truth bit is arbitrary at the boundary and they are designed to fall in the ask/model
|
|
247
|
+
dead-zone, not to be separated by the band. Such cases stay in reliability/ECE, which reads noul_pairs,
|
|
248
|
+
not this. Pass confident_only=False to recover every judged pair."""
|
|
249
|
+
dev, heldout = [], []
|
|
250
|
+
for s in scores:
|
|
251
|
+
if s.kind != "noul" or s.unjudged or s.question_id != question_id:
|
|
252
|
+
continue
|
|
253
|
+
if not isinstance(s.predicted, (int, float)):
|
|
254
|
+
continue
|
|
255
|
+
if confident_only and isinstance(s.expected, (int, float)) and abs(s.expected - 0.5) <= margin:
|
|
256
|
+
continue
|
|
257
|
+
case = cases_by_id.get(s.case_id, {})
|
|
258
|
+
pair = (float(s.predicted), s.truth_bit)
|
|
259
|
+
(heldout if case.get("split") == "heldout" else dev).append(pair)
|
|
260
|
+
return dev, heldout
|