guardrail-middleware 0.1.0__py3-none-any.whl

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@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
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+ """guardrail-middleware — runtime authorization for AI agent tool calls.
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+
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+ GuardRail sits between an AI agent and its tools. Every proposed action is
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+ checked against a policy — authorization, prompt-injection and taint
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+ detectors, financial and bulk limits — *before* it executes, and every
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+ decision is written to a tamper-evident, hash-chained audit log.
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+
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+ Quick start::
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+
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+ from guardrail_middleware import Guardrail
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+
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+ guard = Guardrail()
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+ decision = guard.evaluate({
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+ "tool": "payments", "operation": "payment",
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+ "target_resource": "vendor/acme",
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+ "parameters": {"amount": 42000},
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+ "agent_role": "support",
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+ })
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+ print(decision.verdict) # ESCALATE_TO_HUMAN
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+
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+ Extracted from the GuardRail project (Infosys Ignite EngNext 2026, special
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+ recognition) so any agent stack can use the same enforcement core.
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+ """
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+
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+ from .audit import AuditLog
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+ from .engine import Guardrail
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+ from .models import ActionRequest, Decision, Finding, TriggeredBy, Verdict
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+ from .policy import DEFAULT_POLICY, Policy
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+
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+ __version__ = "0.1.0"
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+
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+ __all__ = [
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+ "Guardrail",
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+ "Policy",
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+ "DEFAULT_POLICY",
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+ "AuditLog",
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+ "ActionRequest",
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+ "Decision",
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+ "Finding",
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+ "Verdict",
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+ "TriggeredBy",
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+ "__version__",
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+ ]
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
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+ """Append-only, hash-chained audit log.
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+
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+ Every decision GuardRail makes is recorded as one JSON line. Each entry
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+ carries the SHA-256 hash of the previous entry, so any later edit, deletion,
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+ or reordering of the log breaks the chain and is detectable with
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+ :meth:`AuditLog.verify`.
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+
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+ The log is deliberately boring: a file on disk, one line per decision, no
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+ database required. Point it at shared storage if several processes write.
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+ """
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+
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+ from __future__ import annotations
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+
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+ import hashlib
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+ import json
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+ import threading
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+ from datetime import datetime, timezone
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+ from pathlib import Path
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+ from typing import Any, Optional, Union
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+
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+ _GENESIS = "0" * 64
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+
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+
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+ def _entry_hash(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
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+ canonical = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False)
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+ return hashlib.sha256(canonical.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
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+
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+
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+ class AuditLog:
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+ """Thread-safe append-only audit log with a SHA-256 hash chain."""
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+
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+ def __init__(self, path: Union[str, Path]) -> None:
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+ self._path = Path(path)
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+ self._lock = threading.Lock()
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+ self._last_hash = self._read_last_hash()
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+
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+ def _read_last_hash(self) -> str:
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+ if not self._path.exists():
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+ return _GENESIS
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+ last = _GENESIS
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+ with open(self._path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
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+ for line in fh:
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+ line = line.strip()
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+ if line:
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+ try:
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+ last = json.loads(line)["entry_hash"]
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+ except (json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError):
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+ continue
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+ return last
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+
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+ def record(self, *, action: dict[str, Any], decision: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
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+ """Append one decision; returns the new entry's hash."""
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+ with self._lock:
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+ payload = {
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+ "ts": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
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+ "prev_hash": self._last_hash,
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+ "action": action,
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+ "decision": decision,
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+ }
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+ entry_hash = _entry_hash(payload)
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+ entry = {**payload, "entry_hash": entry_hash}
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+ self._path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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+ with open(self._path, "a", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
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+ fh.write(json.dumps(entry, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n")
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+ self._last_hash = entry_hash
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+ return entry_hash
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+
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+ def verify(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
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+ """Recompute the whole chain. Returns {ok, entries, broken_at}."""
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+ prev = _GENESIS
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+ count = 0
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+ if not self._path.exists():
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+ return {"ok": True, "entries": 0, "broken_at": None}
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+ with open(self._path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
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+ for idx, line in enumerate(fh):
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+ line = line.strip()
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+ if not line:
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+ continue
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+ try:
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+ entry = json.loads(line)
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+ except json.JSONDecodeError:
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+ return {"ok": False, "entries": count, "broken_at": idx}
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+ payload = {k: v for k, v in entry.items() if k != "entry_hash"}
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+ if entry.get("prev_hash") != prev or _entry_hash(payload) != entry.get("entry_hash"):
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+ return {"ok": False, "entries": count, "broken_at": idx}
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+ prev = entry["entry_hash"]
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+ count += 1
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+ return {"ok": True, "entries": count, "broken_at": None}
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
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+ """Deterministic detectors for guardrail-middleware.
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+
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+ Each detector inspects one :class:`ActionRequest` and returns zero or more
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+ :class:`Finding` objects. Detectors are pure functions of (action, policy) —
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+ no network, no LLM — so a decision is reproducible and fast enough to sit in
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+ front of every tool call.
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+
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+ The set mirrors the attack classes from the GuardRail red-team benchmark:
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+ prompt injection, taint/PII exfiltration, unauthorized or destructive actions,
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+ financial-limit abuse, and bulk-operation abuse.
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+ """
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+
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+ from __future__ import annotations
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+
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+ import re
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+ from typing import Any, Callable, Iterable, Optional
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+
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+ from .models import ActionRequest, Finding
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+ from .policy import Policy
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+
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+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+ # Operation classification
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+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+
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+ _READ = {"read", "get", "list", "fetch", "search", "query", "select", "view"}
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+ _WRITE = {"write", "create", "update", "insert", "upsert", "patch", "post"}
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+ _DELETE = {"delete", "drop", "purge", "truncate", "wipe", "erase", "destroy", "remove"}
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+ _PAYMENT = {"payment", "pay", "transfer", "wire", "charge", "send money"}
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+ _REFUND = {"refund", "reimburse", "chargeback"}
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+ _SEND = {"send", "email", "post message", "publish", "webhook", "notify"}
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+
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+
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+ def classify_operation(operation: str) -> str:
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+ """Map a free-form operation string to a policy class."""
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+ op = operation.strip().lower()
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+ if op in _READ:
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+ return "read"
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+ if op in _DELETE:
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+ return "delete"
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+ if op in _PAYMENT:
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+ return "payment"
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+ if op in _REFUND:
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+ return "refund"
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+ if op in _SEND:
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+ return "external_send"
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+ if op in _WRITE:
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+ return "write"
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+ return "other"
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+
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+
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+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+ # Parameter helpers
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+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+
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+ _AMOUNT_KEYS = ("amount", "total", "total_amount", "price", "value", "sum")
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+ _COUNT_KEYS = ("count", "records", "num_records", "batch_size", "limit", "quantity")
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+ _LIST_KEYS = ("ids", "recipients", "targets", "items", "records", "users")
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+
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+
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+ def extract_amount(params: dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[float]:
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+ for key in _AMOUNT_KEYS:
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+ val = params.get(key)
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+ if isinstance(val, (int, float)) and not isinstance(val, bool):
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+ return float(val)
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+ return None
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+
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+
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+ def extract_record_count(params: dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[int]:
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+ for key in _COUNT_KEYS:
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+ val = params.get(key)
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+ if isinstance(val, int) and not isinstance(val, bool):
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+ return val
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+ for key in _LIST_KEYS:
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+ val = params.get(key)
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+ if isinstance(val, list):
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+ return len(val)
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+ return None
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+
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+
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+ def _flatten_keys(obj: Any, prefix: str = "") -> Iterable[str]:
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+ if isinstance(obj, dict):
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+ for key, value in obj.items():
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+ path = f"{prefix}.{key}" if prefix else str(key)
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+ yield path
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+ yield from _flatten_keys(value, path)
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+ elif isinstance(obj, list):
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+ for item in obj:
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+ yield from _flatten_keys(item, prefix)
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+
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+
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+ def _present_fields(params: dict[str, Any], wanted: set[str]) -> set[str]:
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+ found = set()
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+ for path in _flatten_keys(params):
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+ leaf = path.rsplit(".", 1)[-1].lower()
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+ if leaf in wanted:
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+ found.add(leaf)
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+ return found
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+
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+
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+ def is_external_destination(resource: str, policy: Policy) -> bool:
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+ """A resource is external if it looks like a URL/host outside the internal list."""
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+ res = (resource or "").lower()
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+ if not res:
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+ return False
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+ if not any(marker in res for marker in ("://", ".com", ".io", ".net", ".org", "@")):
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+ return False # internal path / table / id
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+ return not any(host in res for host in policy.internal_hosts)
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+
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+
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+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+ # 1. Prompt-injection detector
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+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+
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+ _INJECTION_PATTERNS: list[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]]] = [
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+ ("instruction override", re.compile(r"ignore (all )?(previous|prior|above) instructions", re.I)),
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+ ("instruction override", re.compile(r"disregard (the )?(system|previous|prior)", re.I)),
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+ ("role hijack", re.compile(r"you are now (a|an|in)\b", re.I)),
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+ ("role hijack", re.compile(r"\bdeveloper mode\b|\bjailbreak\b|\bDAN mode\b", re.I)),
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+ ("secret extraction", re.compile(r"(reveal|print|show|leak|dump).{0,30}(system prompt|api key|password|secret|credentials)", re.I)),
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+ ("policy bypass", re.compile(r"without (telling|notifying|alerting|logging|approval)", re.I)),
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+ ("policy bypass", re.compile(r"(skip|bypass|override) (the )?(approval|check|verification|guardrail|policy)", re.I)),
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+ ("urgency pressure", re.compile(r"(urgent|immediately).{0,40}(transfer|send|pay|delete)", re.I)),
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+ ]
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+
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+
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+ def detect_injection(action: ActionRequest, policy: Policy) -> list[Finding]:
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+ texts = [action.source_text or "", action.stated_reason or ""]
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+ hits = set()
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+ for text in texts:
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+ for label, pattern in _INJECTION_PATTERNS:
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+ if pattern.search(text):
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+ hits.add(label)
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+ if not hits:
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+ return []
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+ labels = ", ".join(sorted(hits))
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+ if action.triggered_by.untrusted:
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+ return [Finding(
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+ detector="injection",
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+ severity="critical",
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+ message=f"Prompt-injection pattern(s) in untrusted {action.triggered_by.value} content: {labels}. "
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+ "Untrusted content is data, never instructions.",
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+ effect="block",
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+ )]
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+ return [Finding(
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+ detector="injection",
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+ severity="medium",
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+ message=f"Injection-like phrasing in the action rationale: {labels}.",
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+ effect="conditions",
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+ )]
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+
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+
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+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+ # 2. Authorization detector
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+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+
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+ def detect_unauthorized(action: ActionRequest, policy: Policy) -> list[Finding]:
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+ op_class = classify_operation(action.operation)
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+ allowed = policy.role_allowed(op_class, action.agent_role)
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+ if allowed is False:
160
+ return [Finding(
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+ detector="authorization",
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+ severity="critical",
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+ message=f"Role '{action.agent_role}' is not permitted to perform '{op_class}' operations.",
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+ effect="block",
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+ )]
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+ return []
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+
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+
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+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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+ # 3. Financial-limit detector
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+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
172
+
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+ def detect_financial(action: ActionRequest, policy: Policy) -> list[Finding]:
174
+ op_class = classify_operation(action.operation)
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+ if op_class not in ("payment", "refund"):
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+ return []
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+ amount = extract_amount(action.parameters)
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+ if amount is None:
179
+ return [Finding(
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+ detector="financial_limits",
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+ severity="high",
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+ message=f"{op_class} action carries no amount in its parameters; the value cannot be verified.",
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+ effect="escalate",
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+ )]
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+ findings: list[Finding] = []
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+ hard_block = policy.get("hard_block_amount")
187
+ if hard_block is not None and amount > float(hard_block):
188
+ findings.append(Finding(
189
+ detector="financial_limits",
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+ severity="critical",
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+ message=f"Amount {amount:,.0f} exceeds the hard block ceiling of {float(hard_block):,.0f}.",
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+ effect="block",
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+ ))
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+ return findings
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+ limits = policy.get("approval_limits", op_class, default={}) or {}
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+ block_above = limits.get("block_above")
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+ auto_max = limits.get("auto_approve_max")
198
+ if block_above is not None and amount > float(block_above):
199
+ findings.append(Finding(
200
+ detector="financial_limits",
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+ severity="critical",
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+ message=f"{op_class} of {amount:,.0f} exceeds the policy block threshold of {float(block_above):,.0f}.",
203
+ effect="block",
204
+ ))
205
+ elif auto_max is not None and amount > float(auto_max):
206
+ findings.append(Finding(
207
+ detector="financial_limits",
208
+ severity="high",
209
+ message=f"{op_class} of {amount:,.0f} exceeds the auto-approve limit of {float(auto_max):,.0f}; a human must approve.",
210
+ effect="escalate",
211
+ ))
212
+ return findings
213
+
214
+
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+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
216
+ # 4. Bulk-operation detector
217
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
218
+
219
+ def detect_bulk(action: ActionRequest, policy: Policy) -> list[Finding]:
220
+ count = extract_record_count(action.parameters)
221
+ if count is None:
222
+ return []
223
+ auto_max = policy.get("bulk_operation", "auto_approve_max_records", default=50)
224
+ escalate_above = policy.get("bulk_operation", "escalate_above_records", default=500)
225
+ if count > int(escalate_above):
226
+ return [Finding(
227
+ detector="bulk_operation",
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+ severity="high",
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+ message=f"Bulk operation touches {count} records, above the escalation threshold of {escalate_above}.",
230
+ effect="escalate",
231
+ )]
232
+ if count > int(auto_max):
233
+ return [Finding(
234
+ detector="bulk_operation",
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+ severity="medium",
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+ message=f"Bulk operation touches {count} records (auto-approve max {auto_max}); batch it and dry-run first.",
237
+ effect="conditions",
238
+ )]
239
+ return []
240
+
241
+
242
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
243
+ # 5. Taint / exfiltration detector
244
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
245
+
246
+ def detect_taint(action: ActionRequest, policy: Policy) -> list[Finding]:
247
+ findings: list[Finding] = []
248
+ pii = _present_fields(action.parameters, policy.pii_fields)
249
+ secrets = _present_fields(action.parameters, policy.secret_fields)
250
+ external = is_external_destination(action.target_resource, policy)
251
+ op_class = classify_operation(action.operation)
252
+ outbound = op_class in ("external_send", "payment", "refund", "write")
253
+
254
+ if secrets:
255
+ findings.append(Finding(
256
+ detector="taint",
257
+ severity="critical",
258
+ message=f"Action parameters contain secret field(s): {', '.join(sorted(secrets))}. "
259
+ "Secrets must never travel inside tool-call parameters.",
260
+ effect="block",
261
+ ))
262
+ if pii and external and outbound:
263
+ findings.append(Finding(
264
+ detector="taint",
265
+ severity="critical",
266
+ message=f"PII field(s) {', '.join(sorted(pii))} would flow to external destination "
267
+ f"'{action.target_resource}'. Possible exfiltration chain.",
268
+ effect="block",
269
+ ))
270
+ elif pii and action.triggered_by.untrusted:
271
+ findings.append(Finding(
272
+ detector="taint",
273
+ severity="high",
274
+ message=f"Action touches PII field(s) {', '.join(sorted(pii))} and was triggered by untrusted "
275
+ f"{action.triggered_by.value} content; a human should confirm it matches the user's intent.",
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+ effect="escalate",
277
+ ))
278
+ return findings
279
+
280
+
281
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
282
+ # 6. Destructive / irreversibility detector
283
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
284
+
285
+ def detect_destructive(action: ActionRequest, policy: Policy) -> list[Finding]:
286
+ op = action.operation.strip().lower()
287
+ if op not in policy.irreversible_operations and classify_operation(op) != "delete":
288
+ return []
289
+ params = action.parameters
290
+ confirmed = params.get("confirmed") is True or params.get("dry_run") is True
291
+ backed_up = params.get("backup_taken") is True or params.get("snapshot_id")
292
+ if classify_operation(op) == "delete" and not action.target_resource:
293
+ return [Finding(
294
+ detector="destructive",
295
+ severity="high",
296
+ message="Delete operation has no target resource — scope is unbounded.",
297
+ effect="escalate",
298
+ )]
299
+ if not confirmed and not backed_up:
300
+ return [Finding(
301
+ detector="destructive",
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+ severity="medium",
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+ message=f"'{action.operation}' is irreversible and carries no backup/confirmation marker.",
304
+ effect="conditions",
305
+ )]
306
+ return []
307
+
308
+
309
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
310
+ # 7. Untrusted-source escalation detector
311
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
312
+
313
+ def detect_untrusted_source(action: ActionRequest, policy: Policy) -> list[Finding]:
314
+ if not action.triggered_by.untrusted:
315
+ return []
316
+ op_class = classify_operation(action.operation)
317
+ if op_class in ("payment", "refund", "delete", "external_send"):
318
+ return [Finding(
319
+ detector="untrusted_source",
320
+ severity="high",
321
+ message=f"A {op_class} action was triggered by {action.triggered_by.value} content, not by the user. "
322
+ "Untrusted content must never originate money movement, deletion, or external sends.",
323
+ effect="escalate",
324
+ )]
325
+ return []
326
+
327
+
328
+ ALL_DETECTORS: list[Callable[[ActionRequest, Policy], list[Finding]]] = [
329
+ detect_injection,
330
+ detect_unauthorized,
331
+ detect_financial,
332
+ detect_bulk,
333
+ detect_taint,
334
+ detect_destructive,
335
+ detect_untrusted_source,
336
+ ]
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
1
+ """The GuardRail decision engine.
2
+
3
+ Runs every detector over a proposed action, folds the findings into a single
4
+ verdict, and (optionally) writes the decision to the hash-chained audit log.
5
+
6
+ Verdict rules, in priority order — earlier rules win:
7
+
8
+ 1. Any finding with effect ``block`` → BLOCK
9
+ 2. Any finding with effect ``escalate`` → ESCALATE_TO_HUMAN
10
+ 3. Any finding with effect ``conditions`` → APPROVE_WITH_CONDITIONS
11
+ 4. No findings → APPROVE
12
+
13
+ The engine is deterministic and LLM-free by design: the same action under the
14
+ same policy always gets the same verdict, in well under a millisecond.
15
+ """
16
+
17
+ from __future__ import annotations
18
+
19
+ from typing import Any, Optional, Union
20
+
21
+ from .audit import AuditLog
22
+ from .detectors import ALL_DETECTORS
23
+ from .models import ActionRequest, Decision, Finding, Verdict
24
+ from .policy import Policy
25
+
26
+ _SEVERITY_WEIGHT = {"low": 5, "medium": 15, "high": 35, "critical": 60}
27
+
28
+ _CONDITIONS: dict[str, str] = {
29
+ "bulk_operation": "Process in batches with a dry-run preview before the full run",
30
+ "destructive": "Take a verified backup or snapshot before executing",
31
+ "injection": "Re-state the instruction in your own words and confirm it matches the user's request",
32
+ }
33
+
34
+
35
+ class Guardrail:
36
+ """Evaluate agent actions against a policy before they execute.
37
+
38
+ Usage::
39
+
40
+ guard = Guardrail() # default policy
41
+ decision = guard.evaluate({
42
+ "tool": "payments", "operation": "payment",
43
+ "parameters": {"amount": 42000}, "agent_role": "support",
44
+ })
45
+ if decision.allowed:
46
+ run_the_tool()
47
+ """
48
+
49
+ def __init__(
50
+ self,
51
+ policy: Optional[Union[Policy, dict[str, Any]]] = None,
52
+ audit_log: Optional[AuditLog] = None,
53
+ *,
54
+ fail_closed: bool = True,
55
+ ) -> None:
56
+ if policy is None:
57
+ policy = Policy()
58
+ elif isinstance(policy, dict):
59
+ policy = Policy(policy)
60
+ self.policy = policy
61
+ self.audit_log = audit_log
62
+ self.fail_closed = fail_closed
63
+
64
+ # ------------------------------------------------------------------ API
65
+
66
+ def evaluate(self, action: Union[ActionRequest, dict[str, Any]]) -> Decision:
67
+ if isinstance(action, dict):
68
+ action = ActionRequest.from_dict(action)
69
+ try:
70
+ findings: list[Finding] = []
71
+ for detector in ALL_DETECTORS:
72
+ findings.extend(detector(action, self.policy))
73
+ decision = self._decide(action, findings)
74
+ except Exception as exc: # never let the guard itself crash the caller
75
+ if not self.fail_closed:
76
+ raise
77
+ decision = Decision(
78
+ action_id=action.action_id,
79
+ verdict=Verdict.ESCALATE_TO_HUMAN,
80
+ risk_score=100,
81
+ findings=[Finding(
82
+ detector="engine",
83
+ severity="high",
84
+ message=f"GuardRail evaluation failed ({exc!r}); failing closed.",
85
+ effect="escalate",
86
+ )],
87
+ explanation="Evaluation error — escalated to a human (fail-closed).",
88
+ )
89
+ if self.audit_log is not None:
90
+ decision.audit_hash = self.audit_log.record(
91
+ action=action.to_dict(), decision=decision.to_dict()
92
+ )
93
+ return decision
94
+
95
+ # -------------------------------------------------------------- internals
96
+
97
+ @staticmethod
98
+ def _decide(action: ActionRequest, findings: list[Finding]) -> Decision:
99
+ effects = {f.effect for f in findings}
100
+ if "block" in effects:
101
+ verdict = Verdict.BLOCK
102
+ elif "escalate" in effects:
103
+ verdict = Verdict.ESCALATE_TO_HUMAN
104
+ elif "conditions" in effects:
105
+ verdict = Verdict.APPROVE_WITH_CONDITIONS
106
+ else:
107
+ verdict = Verdict.APPROVE
108
+
109
+ risk = min(100, sum(_SEVERITY_WEIGHT.get(f.severity, 5) for f in findings))
110
+ if verdict is Verdict.BLOCK:
111
+ risk = max(risk, 80)
112
+ elif verdict is Verdict.ESCALATE_TO_HUMAN:
113
+ risk = max(risk, 50)
114
+
115
+ conditions = []
116
+ for f in findings:
117
+ if verdict in (Verdict.APPROVE_WITH_CONDITIONS, Verdict.ESCALATE_TO_HUMAN) \
118
+ and f.effect == "conditions" and f.detector in _CONDITIONS:
119
+ text = _CONDITIONS[f.detector]
120
+ if text not in conditions:
121
+ conditions.append(text)
122
+
123
+ if not findings:
124
+ explanation = f"{action.operation} on {action.target_resource or action.tool}: no policy issues found."
125
+ else:
126
+ top = max(findings, key=lambda f: _SEVERITY_WEIGHT.get(f.severity, 0))
127
+ explanation = f"{verdict.value}: {top.message}"
128
+
129
+ return Decision(
130
+ action_id=action.action_id,
131
+ verdict=verdict,
132
+ risk_score=risk,
133
+ findings=findings,
134
+ conditions=conditions,
135
+ explanation=explanation,
136
+ )
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
1
+ """FastAPI / Starlette integration.
2
+
3
+ Two ways to protect an app:
4
+
5
+ 1. **Middleware** — guard specific routes that execute agent tool calls. The
6
+ request body is read as an action (``tool``, ``operation``,
7
+ ``target_resource``, ``parameters``, ...). Blocked or escalated actions
8
+ never reach your handler::
9
+
10
+ from guardrail_middleware.fastapi import GuardrailMiddleware
11
+ app.add_middleware(GuardrailMiddleware, paths=["/tools/execute"])
12
+
13
+ Verdicts are exposed to handlers and clients via response headers
14
+ ``X-Guardrail-Verdict`` and ``X-Guardrail-Risk``. A stopped action returns
15
+ HTTP 403 with the full decision as JSON.
16
+
17
+ 2. **Decorator** — guard a plain Python function that performs a tool call::
18
+
19
+ @guard_tool(guard)
20
+ def send_payment(amount: int, to: str): ...
21
+
22
+ The wrapped function's arguments become the action parameters; a BLOCK or
23
+ ESCALATE verdict raises :class:`GuardrailBlocked` instead of running.
24
+ """
25
+
26
+ from __future__ import annotations
27
+
28
+ import functools
29
+ import json
30
+ from typing import Any, Callable, Optional
31
+
32
+ from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
33
+ from starlette.requests import Request
34
+ from starlette.responses import JSONResponse, Response
35
+
36
+ from .engine import Guardrail
37
+ from .models import ActionRequest, Decision
38
+
39
+
40
+ class GuardrailBlocked(Exception):
41
+ """Raised by @guard_tool when GuardRail stops an action."""
42
+
43
+ def __init__(self, decision: Decision) -> None:
44
+ super().__init__(f"GuardRail {decision.verdict.value}: {decision.explanation}")
45
+ self.decision = decision
46
+
47
+
48
+ class GuardrailMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
49
+ """Starlette middleware that vets tool-call requests before execution."""
50
+
51
+ def __init__(
52
+ self,
53
+ app,
54
+ guard: Optional[Guardrail] = None,
55
+ *,
56
+ paths: Optional[list[str]] = None,
57
+ path_prefix: Optional[str] = None,
58
+ ) -> None:
59
+ super().__init__(app)
60
+ self.guard = guard or Guardrail()
61
+ self.paths = set(paths or [])
62
+ self.path_prefix = path_prefix
63
+
64
+ def _guarded(self, path: str) -> bool:
65
+ if self.paths:
66
+ return path in self.paths
67
+ if self.path_prefix:
68
+ return path.startswith(self.path_prefix)
69
+ return True
70
+
71
+ async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable) -> Response:
72
+ if request.method not in ("POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE") or not self._guarded(request.url.path):
73
+ return await call_next(request)
74
+
75
+ raw = await request.body()
76
+ try:
77
+ payload = json.loads(raw) if raw else {}
78
+ if not isinstance(payload, dict):
79
+ raise ValueError("action body must be a JSON object")
80
+ action = ActionRequest.from_dict(payload)
81
+ except Exception:
82
+ # Not an action-shaped body — not ours to judge; pass through.
83
+ return await call_next(request)
84
+
85
+ if not action.tool and not action.operation:
86
+ return await call_next(request)
87
+
88
+ decision = self.guard.evaluate(action)
89
+ if not decision.allowed:
90
+ return JSONResponse(
91
+ status_code=403,
92
+ content={
93
+ "error": "guardrail_stopped",
94
+ "decision": decision.to_dict(),
95
+ },
96
+ headers={
97
+ "X-Guardrail-Verdict": decision.verdict.value,
98
+ "X-Guardrail-Risk": str(decision.risk_score),
99
+ },
100
+ )
101
+
102
+ response = await call_next(request)
103
+ response.headers["X-Guardrail-Verdict"] = decision.verdict.value
104
+ response.headers["X-Guardrail-Risk"] = str(decision.risk_score)
105
+ return response
106
+
107
+
108
+ def guard_tool(
109
+ guard: Guardrail,
110
+ *,
111
+ tool: str,
112
+ operation: str,
113
+ agent_role: str = "agent",
114
+ target_param: Optional[str] = None,
115
+ ):
116
+ """Decorator: vet a function's arguments as an action before it runs."""
117
+
118
+ def decorator(fn: Callable) -> Callable:
119
+ @functools.wraps(fn)
120
+ def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
121
+ import inspect
122
+
123
+ bound = inspect.signature(fn).bind_partial(*args, **kwargs).arguments
124
+ params = {k: v for k, v in bound.items() if k != target_param}
125
+ action = ActionRequest(
126
+ tool=tool,
127
+ operation=operation,
128
+ target_resource=str(bound.get(target_param, "")) if target_param else "",
129
+ parameters=params,
130
+ agent_role=agent_role,
131
+ )
132
+ decision = guard.evaluate(action)
133
+ if not decision.allowed:
134
+ raise GuardrailBlocked(decision)
135
+ return fn(*args, **kwargs)
136
+
137
+ return wrapper
138
+
139
+ return decorator
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
1
+ """Core data models for guardrail-middleware.
2
+
3
+ An *action* is one proposed tool call by an AI agent: which tool, which
4
+ operation, on what resource, with what parameters, and where the instruction
5
+ came from. GuardRail evaluates the action *before* it executes and returns a
6
+ :class:`Decision`.
7
+ """
8
+
9
+ from __future__ import annotations
10
+
11
+ import uuid
12
+ from dataclasses import dataclass, field
13
+ from enum import Enum
14
+ from typing import Any, Optional
15
+
16
+
17
+ class Verdict(str, Enum):
18
+ """Final decision for a proposed action."""
19
+
20
+ APPROVE = "APPROVE"
21
+ APPROVE_WITH_CONDITIONS = "APPROVE_WITH_CONDITIONS"
22
+ ESCALATE_TO_HUMAN = "ESCALATE_TO_HUMAN"
23
+ BLOCK = "BLOCK"
24
+
25
+ @property
26
+ def allowed(self) -> bool:
27
+ """True when the action may proceed (possibly with conditions)."""
28
+ return self in (Verdict.APPROVE, Verdict.APPROVE_WITH_CONDITIONS)
29
+
30
+
31
+ class TriggeredBy(str, Enum):
32
+ """Origin of the instruction that produced this action.
33
+
34
+ Anything other than a direct user instruction is *untrusted*: content from
35
+ emails, webpages and tool outputs is data, never instructions.
36
+ """
37
+
38
+ USER = "user"
39
+ EMAIL = "email"
40
+ WEBPAGE = "webpage"
41
+ TOOL_OUTPUT = "tool_output"
42
+ OTHER = "other"
43
+
44
+ @property
45
+ def untrusted(self) -> bool:
46
+ return self is not TriggeredBy.USER
47
+
48
+
49
+ @dataclass
50
+ class ActionRequest:
51
+ """A single proposed agent action, submitted for pre-execution validation."""
52
+
53
+ tool: str
54
+ operation: str
55
+ target_resource: str = ""
56
+ parameters: dict[str, Any] = field(default_factory=dict)
57
+ agent_id: str = "agent"
58
+ agent_role: str = "agent"
59
+ stated_reason: str = ""
60
+ task_context: str = ""
61
+ triggered_by: TriggeredBy = TriggeredBy.USER
62
+ source_text: Optional[str] = None
63
+ action_id: str = field(default_factory=lambda: f"act-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}")
64
+
65
+ @classmethod
66
+ def from_dict(cls, data: dict[str, Any]) -> "ActionRequest":
67
+ triggered = data.get("triggered_by", TriggeredBy.USER)
68
+ if isinstance(triggered, str):
69
+ triggered = TriggeredBy(triggered.lower())
70
+ return cls(
71
+ tool=str(data.get("tool", "")),
72
+ operation=str(data.get("operation", "")),
73
+ target_resource=str(data.get("target_resource", "")),
74
+ parameters=dict(data.get("parameters") or {}),
75
+ agent_id=str(data.get("agent_id", "agent")),
76
+ agent_role=str(data.get("agent_role", "agent")),
77
+ stated_reason=str(data.get("stated_reason", "")),
78
+ task_context=str(data.get("task_context", "")),
79
+ triggered_by=triggered,
80
+ source_text=data.get("source_text"),
81
+ action_id=str(data.get("action_id") or f"act-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"),
82
+ )
83
+
84
+ def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
85
+ return {
86
+ "action_id": self.action_id,
87
+ "agent_id": self.agent_id,
88
+ "agent_role": self.agent_role,
89
+ "tool": self.tool,
90
+ "operation": self.operation,
91
+ "target_resource": self.target_resource,
92
+ "parameters": self.parameters,
93
+ "stated_reason": self.stated_reason,
94
+ "task_context": self.task_context,
95
+ "triggered_by": self.triggered_by.value,
96
+ }
97
+
98
+
99
+ @dataclass
100
+ class Finding:
101
+ """One detector hit: what fired, how bad it is, and what to do about it."""
102
+
103
+ detector: str
104
+ severity: str # "low" | "medium" | "high" | "critical"
105
+ message: str
106
+ effect: str = "warn" # "warn" | "conditions" | "escalate" | "block"
107
+
108
+
109
+ @dataclass
110
+ class Decision:
111
+ """The verdict on an action, with the evidence behind it."""
112
+
113
+ action_id: str
114
+ verdict: Verdict
115
+ risk_score: int # 0 (safe) .. 100 (certain harm)
116
+ findings: list[Finding] = field(default_factory=list)
117
+ conditions: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
118
+ explanation: str = ""
119
+ audit_hash: Optional[str] = None
120
+
121
+ @property
122
+ def allowed(self) -> bool:
123
+ return self.verdict.allowed
124
+
125
+ def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
126
+ return {
127
+ "action_id": self.action_id,
128
+ "verdict": self.verdict.value,
129
+ "allowed": self.allowed,
130
+ "risk_score": self.risk_score,
131
+ "findings": [
132
+ {
133
+ "detector": f.detector,
134
+ "severity": f.severity,
135
+ "message": f.message,
136
+ "effect": f.effect,
137
+ }
138
+ for f in self.findings
139
+ ],
140
+ "conditions": self.conditions,
141
+ "explanation": self.explanation,
142
+ "audit_hash": self.audit_hash,
143
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
1
+ """Policy configuration for guardrail-middleware.
2
+
3
+ The policy is a plain dict (loaded from YAML if PyYAML is installed, or built
4
+ in code). Every threshold the detectors use lives here, so a team can tighten
5
+ or loosen GuardRail without touching code.
6
+
7
+ The defaults mirror the reference GuardRail policy used in the original
8
+ project's red-team benchmark.
9
+ """
10
+
11
+ from __future__ import annotations
12
+
13
+ import copy
14
+ from pathlib import Path
15
+ from typing import Any, Optional, Union
16
+
17
+ DEFAULT_POLICY: dict[str, Any] = {
18
+ # Roles allowed to perform each operation class. "*" = any role.
19
+ "role_permissions": {
20
+ "read": ["*"],
21
+ "write": ["*"],
22
+ "delete": ["admin", "operator"],
23
+ "payment": ["admin", "finance"],
24
+ "external_send": ["admin", "operator", "support"],
25
+ },
26
+ # Money limits (in the policy's currency unit, INR by default).
27
+ "approval_limits": {
28
+ "payment": {"auto_approve_max": 5_000, "block_above": 50_000},
29
+ "refund": {"auto_approve_max": 10_000, "block_above": 100_000},
30
+ },
31
+ # Bulk-operation limits, by record count found in parameters.
32
+ "bulk_operation": {"auto_approve_max_records": 50, "escalate_above_records": 500},
33
+ # Parameter keys that count as PII / secrets for taint tracking.
34
+ "pii_fields": [
35
+ "email", "phone", "address", "ssn", "national_id", "passport",
36
+ "credit_card", "bank_account", "date_of_birth", "salary", "medical",
37
+ ],
38
+ "secret_fields": ["api_key", "password", "secret", "token", "private_key"],
39
+ # Operations considered irreversible (no undo). The destructive detector
40
+ # attaches backup/confirmation conditions to these. Money movement is
41
+ # governed by approval_limits instead, so payment/refund are not listed.
42
+ "irreversible_operations": ["delete", "drop", "purge", "truncate", "wipe", "send"],
43
+ # Hosts/patterns treated as internal; anything else is an external destination.
44
+ "internal_hosts": ["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "internal", ".local", ".corp", ".internal"],
45
+ # Hard ceiling: a single action may never move more than this, whatever the role.
46
+ "hard_block_amount": 100_000,
47
+ }
48
+
49
+
50
+ class Policy:
51
+ """Thin wrapper around the policy dict with typed helpers."""
52
+
53
+ def __init__(self, data: Optional[dict[str, Any]] = None) -> None:
54
+ self._data: dict[str, Any] = copy.deepcopy(DEFAULT_POLICY)
55
+ if data:
56
+ self._deep_merge(self._data, data)
57
+
58
+ # ------------------------------------------------------------------ I/O
59
+
60
+ @classmethod
61
+ def from_yaml(cls, path: Union[str, Path]) -> "Policy":
62
+ try:
63
+ import yaml
64
+ except ImportError as exc: # pragma: no cover
65
+ raise RuntimeError(
66
+ "Loading a YAML policy needs PyYAML: pip install pyyaml"
67
+ ) from exc
68
+ with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
69
+ data = yaml.safe_load(fh) or {}
70
+ if not isinstance(data, dict):
71
+ raise ValueError("Policy YAML must be a mapping at the top level")
72
+ return cls(data)
73
+
74
+ @classmethod
75
+ def from_dict(cls, data: dict[str, Any]) -> "Policy":
76
+ return cls(data)
77
+
78
+ @staticmethod
79
+ def _deep_merge(target: dict[str, Any], source: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
80
+ for key, value in source.items():
81
+ if isinstance(value, dict) and isinstance(target.get(key), dict):
82
+ Policy._deep_merge(target[key], value)
83
+ else:
84
+ target[key] = value
85
+
86
+ # -------------------------------------------------------------- helpers
87
+
88
+ def get(self, *keys: str, default: Any = None) -> Any:
89
+ node: Any = self._data
90
+ for key in keys:
91
+ if not isinstance(node, dict) or key not in node:
92
+ return default
93
+ node = node[key]
94
+ return node
95
+
96
+ def role_allowed(self, operation_class: str, role: str) -> Optional[bool]:
97
+ """True/False if the policy names this class; None if unlisted."""
98
+ perms = self.get("role_permissions", operation_class)
99
+ if perms is None:
100
+ return None
101
+ return "*" in perms or role in perms
102
+
103
+ @property
104
+ def pii_fields(self) -> set[str]:
105
+ return {str(f).lower() for f in self.get("pii_fields", default=[])}
106
+
107
+ @property
108
+ def secret_fields(self) -> set[str]:
109
+ return {str(f).lower() for f in self.get("secret_fields", default=[])}
110
+
111
+ @property
112
+ def irreversible_operations(self) -> set[str]:
113
+ return {str(o).lower() for o in self.get("irreversible_operations", default=[])}
114
+
115
+ @property
116
+ def internal_hosts(self) -> list[str]:
117
+ return [str(h).lower() for h in self.get("internal_hosts", default=[])]
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
1
+ Metadata-Version: 2.4
2
+ Name: guardrail-middleware
3
+ Version: 0.1.0
4
+ Summary: Runtime authorization middleware for AI agent tool calls — policy checks, injection/taint detectors, and a hash-chained audit log, before any action executes.
5
+ Author: Niraj Sanjay Karnawat
6
+ License: MIT
7
+ Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/Niraj21-star/guardrail-middleware
8
+ Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/Niraj21-star/guardrail-middleware
9
+ Keywords: ai-agents,guardrails,llm-security,middleware,fastapi,authorization
10
+ Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
11
+ Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
12
+ Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License
13
+ Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
14
+ Classifier: Topic :: Security
15
+ Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Libraries
16
+ Requires-Python: >=3.10
17
+ Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
18
+ License-File: LICENSE
19
+ Provides-Extra: fastapi
20
+ Requires-Dist: starlette>=0.27; extra == "fastapi"
21
+ Requires-Dist: fastapi>=0.100; extra == "fastapi"
22
+ Provides-Extra: yaml
23
+ Requires-Dist: pyyaml>=6; extra == "yaml"
24
+ Provides-Extra: dev
25
+ Requires-Dist: pytest>=7; extra == "dev"
26
+ Requires-Dist: fastapi>=0.100; extra == "dev"
27
+ Requires-Dist: httpx>=0.24; extra == "dev"
28
+ Dynamic: license-file
29
+
30
+ # guardrail-middleware
31
+
32
+ **Runtime authorization for AI agent tool calls.** GuardRail sits between an AI agent and its tools: every proposed action is checked against a policy *before* it executes — and every decision is written to a tamper-evident audit log.
33
+
34
+ An agent that can call tools can also be talked into misusing them — by a prompt injection in an email, a poisoned webpage, or its own overconfidence. GuardRail is the checkpoint that asks, deterministically and in under a millisecond: *is this role allowed to do this, to this resource, with these parameters, on the say-so of this source?*
35
+
36
+ ```
37
+ pip install guardrail-middleware # core, zero dependencies
38
+ pip install guardrail-middleware[fastapi] # + FastAPI/Starlette middleware
39
+ ```
40
+
41
+ ## Quick start — framework-agnostic
42
+
43
+ ```python
44
+ from guardrail_middleware import Guardrail
45
+
46
+ guard = Guardrail() # built-in default policy
47
+
48
+ decision = guard.evaluate({
49
+ "tool": "payments",
50
+ "operation": "payment",
51
+ "target_resource": "vendor/acme",
52
+ "parameters": {"amount": 42000},
53
+ "agent_role": "support",
54
+ })
55
+
56
+ decision.verdict # Verdict.BLOCK — role 'support' may not run payments
57
+ decision.allowed # False
58
+ decision.explanation
59
+ ```
60
+
61
+ Works anywhere an agent proposes an action: LangChain/LangGraph tool wrappers, MCP servers, custom agent loops, job queues.
62
+
63
+ ## Quick start — FastAPI / Starlette middleware
64
+
65
+ ```python
66
+ from fastapi import FastAPI
67
+ from guardrail_middleware import Guardrail, AuditLog
68
+ from guardrail_middleware.fastapi import GuardrailMiddleware
69
+
70
+ app = FastAPI()
71
+ app.add_middleware(
72
+ GuardrailMiddleware,
73
+ guard=Guardrail(audit_log=AuditLog("audit.jsonl")),
74
+ paths=["/tools/execute"],
75
+ )
76
+ ```
77
+
78
+ Requests to guarded paths are read as actions. **Blocked or escalated actions never reach your handler** — the client gets HTTP 403 with the full decision as JSON. Allowed actions pass through with `X-Guardrail-Verdict` and `X-Guardrail-Risk` headers set.
79
+
80
+ ## Quick start — decorator
81
+
82
+ ```python
83
+ from guardrail_middleware.fastapi import guard_tool, GuardrailBlocked
84
+
85
+ @guard_tool(guard, tool="payments", operation="payment", agent_role="support")
86
+ def send_payment(amount: int, to: str):
87
+ ... # only runs if GuardRail approves
88
+
89
+ try:
90
+ send_payment(amount=42_000, to="vendor/acme")
91
+ except GuardrailBlocked as stopped:
92
+ print(stopped.decision.explanation)
93
+ ```
94
+
95
+ ## Verdicts
96
+
97
+ | Verdict | Meaning |
98
+ |---|---|
99
+ | `APPROVE` | No policy issues — execute. |
100
+ | `APPROVE_WITH_CONDITIONS` | Execute only with the attached conditions (batch it, back up first, dry-run). |
101
+ | `ESCALATE_TO_HUMAN` | A person must approve first (over-limit payment, untrusted source, unbounded delete). |
102
+ | `BLOCK` | Never execute (injection, unauthorized role, PII exfiltration, hard money ceiling). |
103
+
104
+ Priority is fail-safe: any `block` finding wins, then `escalate`, then `conditions`.
105
+
106
+ ## What it checks — 7 deterministic detectors
107
+
108
+ No LLM in the decision path: the same action under the same policy always gets the same verdict, reproducibly and fast.
109
+
110
+ 1. **Injection** — instruction-override / role-hijack / secret-extraction / policy-bypass patterns in untrusted content (email, webpage, tool output). Untrusted content is data, never instructions.
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+ 2. **Authorization** — role × operation-class permissions (an `intern` role cannot delete, a `support` role cannot pay).
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+ 3. **Financial limits** — per-class auto-approve and block thresholds, plus a hard ceiling no role can exceed; a payment with no verifiable amount escalates.
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+ 4. **Bulk operations** — record-count thresholds: conditions (batch + dry-run) above the auto-approve max, escalation above the bulk ceiling.
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+ 5. **Taint / exfiltration** — PII or secret fields flowing to an external destination is blocked; secrets inside tool-call parameters are blocked outright.
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+ 6. **Destructive actions** — irreversible operations without a backup/confirmation marker get conditions; a delete with no target escalates.
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+ 7. **Untrusted source** — money movement, deletion, or external sends *triggered by* email/webpage/tool-output content escalate to a human.
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+
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+ ## Policy
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+
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+ Every threshold lives in one policy dict — tune it without touching code, or load it from YAML:
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+
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+ ```python
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+ from guardrail_middleware import Guardrail, Policy
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+
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+ policy = Policy.from_yaml("policy.yaml") # see policy.example.yaml
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+ guard = Guardrail(policy=policy)
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+
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+ # …or inline
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+ guard = Guardrail(policy={"approval_limits": {"payment": {"auto_approve_max": 500}}})
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+ ```
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+
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+ ## Audit log
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+
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+ Pass an `AuditLog` and every decision is appended as one JSON line, hash-chained with SHA-256: each entry commits to the previous entry's hash, so editing, deleting, or reordering history breaks the chain.
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+
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+ ```python
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+ from guardrail_middleware import AuditLog
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+ AuditLog("audit.jsonl").verify() # {'ok': True, 'entries': 128, 'broken_at': None}
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+ ```
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+
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+ ## Demo & tests
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ python examples/demo.py # 5 scenarios, all four verdicts, audit verification
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+ pytest # 18 tests: engine, detectors, middleware, decorator, audit tampering
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+ ```
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+
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+ ## Where this comes from
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+
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+ `guardrail-middleware` is the reusable enforcement core extracted from **[GuardRail](https://github.com/Niraj21-star/guard_ai)** — a runtime action-authorization and behavioral-safety layer for agentic AI built at Infosys Ignite EngNext 2026 (special recognition), where the full system adds multi-step plan validation, an action-passport execution gateway, and a 42-scenario adversarial red-team benchmark. This package packages the single-action checkpoint from that system so any agent stack can adopt it in minutes.
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+
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+ ## Status & honesty notes
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+
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+ - v0.1.0, alpha. The API may still move.
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+ - Detectors are deterministic heuristics, not a proof of safety — pair them with least-privilege credentials and human review for high-impact tools.
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+ - Plan-level (multi-step) validation lives in the main GuardRail project, not in this package yet.
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+
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+ ## License
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+
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+ MIT © Niraj Sanjay Karnawat
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
1
+ guardrail_middleware/__init__.py,sha256=bblsBe7JKby91ejrzcHllvch6gIQnvUa4xLvUMia3Pk,1241
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+ guardrail_middleware/audit.py,sha256=3mMdhc_FHdlgFqqmeqy1F8P_s7gZXfo82fJoASWUh7Y,3398
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+ guardrail_middleware/detectors.py,sha256=J5TIQYrsYSpMql3YgdYGtUxT0W7f3PRNzn4_bWn1jC0,13575
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+ guardrail_middleware/engine.py,sha256=zH13mi3tEdet9RP2AvK_N3OoMLaWvGqBoyB1lzOAtb4,5072
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+ guardrail_middleware/fastapi.py,sha256=dgmRFXQ8SFEv5Zuz1IdjU1q3vofvuwVV2--B2rodgHc,4732
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+ guardrail_middleware/models.py,sha256=NDv18CitqJ3Nca96nplotjoLkdJOtNBiziylCgrlqGk,4619
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+ guardrail_middleware/policy.py,sha256=e48YUr-vdHjfI079k_ZxEAhdwSghTLFJOyHaLUaoB6U,4666
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+ guardrail_middleware-0.1.0.dist-info/licenses/LICENSE,sha256=03WQ9QB-hNJKrczHIH2ydPVc4sjNkBlqhL6rfw_O1XA,1078
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+ guardrail_middleware-0.1.0.dist-info/METADATA,sha256=ZbfLmzzDDyvRnw5mv6irAtOTYwgh5tzt63aywXRv2Jw,7197
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+ guardrail_middleware-0.1.0.dist-info/WHEEL,sha256=mOdXR9C3wMVov7cSY8PY-XCzo3SmmWCHvGQr5csJoao,91
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+ guardrail_middleware-0.1.0.dist-info/top_level.txt,sha256=QM0tas-zJLMY2xe68wlpKGEonyu6I_8wm_4Ui6JUB4w,21
12
+ guardrail_middleware-0.1.0.dist-info/RECORD,,
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
1
+ Wheel-Version: 1.0
2
+ Generator: setuptools (84.2.1)
3
+ Root-Is-Purelib: true
4
+ Tag: py3-none-any
5
+
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
1
+ MIT License
2
+
3
+ Copyright (c) 2026 Niraj Sanjay Karnawat
4
+
5
+ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
6
+ of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
7
+ in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
8
+ to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
9
+ copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
10
+ furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
11
+
12
+ The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
13
+ copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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+
15
+ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
16
+ IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
17
+ FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
18
+ AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
19
+ LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
20
+ OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
21
+ SOFTWARE.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ guardrail_middleware