empathy-framework 4.9.1__py3-none-any.whl → 5.0.0__py3-none-any.whl
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- {empathy_framework-4.9.1.dist-info → empathy_framework-5.0.0.dist-info}/METADATA +1 -1
- {empathy_framework-4.9.1.dist-info → empathy_framework-5.0.0.dist-info}/RECORD +47 -26
- empathy_os/__init__.py +1 -1
- empathy_os/cache/hash_only.py +6 -3
- empathy_os/cache/hybrid.py +6 -3
- empathy_os/cli_legacy.py +27 -1
- empathy_os/cli_minimal.py +512 -15
- empathy_os/cli_router.py +145 -113
- empathy_os/cli_unified.py +25 -0
- empathy_os/dashboard/__init__.py +42 -0
- empathy_os/dashboard/app.py +512 -0
- empathy_os/dashboard/simple_server.py +403 -0
- empathy_os/dashboard/standalone_server.py +536 -0
- empathy_os/memory/__init__.py +19 -5
- empathy_os/memory/short_term.py +4 -70
- empathy_os/memory/types.py +2 -2
- empathy_os/models/__init__.py +3 -0
- empathy_os/models/adaptive_routing.py +437 -0
- empathy_os/models/registry.py +4 -4
- empathy_os/socratic/ab_testing.py +1 -1
- empathy_os/telemetry/__init__.py +29 -1
- empathy_os/telemetry/agent_coordination.py +478 -0
- empathy_os/telemetry/agent_tracking.py +350 -0
- empathy_os/telemetry/approval_gates.py +563 -0
- empathy_os/telemetry/event_streaming.py +405 -0
- empathy_os/telemetry/feedback_loop.py +557 -0
- empathy_os/vscode_bridge 2.py +173 -0
- empathy_os/workflows/__init__.py +4 -4
- empathy_os/workflows/base.py +495 -43
- empathy_os/workflows/history.py +3 -5
- empathy_os/workflows/output.py +410 -0
- empathy_os/workflows/progress.py +324 -22
- empathy_os/workflows/progressive/README 2.md +454 -0
- empathy_os/workflows/progressive/__init__ 2.py +92 -0
- empathy_os/workflows/progressive/cli 2.py +242 -0
- empathy_os/workflows/progressive/core 2.py +488 -0
- empathy_os/workflows/progressive/orchestrator 2.py +701 -0
- empathy_os/workflows/progressive/reports 2.py +528 -0
- empathy_os/workflows/progressive/telemetry 2.py +280 -0
- empathy_os/workflows/progressive/test_gen 2.py +514 -0
- empathy_os/workflows/progressive/workflow 2.py +628 -0
- empathy_os/workflows/routing.py +5 -0
- empathy_os/workflows/security_audit.py +189 -0
- {empathy_framework-4.9.1.dist-info → empathy_framework-5.0.0.dist-info}/WHEEL +0 -0
- {empathy_framework-4.9.1.dist-info → empathy_framework-5.0.0.dist-info}/entry_points.txt +0 -0
- {empathy_framework-4.9.1.dist-info → empathy_framework-5.0.0.dist-info}/licenses/LICENSE +0 -0
- {empathy_framework-4.9.1.dist-info → empathy_framework-5.0.0.dist-info}/top_level.txt +0 -0
|
@@ -342,11 +342,29 @@ class SecurityAuditWorkflow(BaseWorkflow):
|
|
|
342
342
|
if self._is_detection_code(line_content, match.group()):
|
|
343
343
|
continue
|
|
344
344
|
|
|
345
|
+
# Phase 2: Skip safe SQL parameterization patterns
|
|
346
|
+
if vuln_type == "sql_injection":
|
|
347
|
+
if self._is_safe_sql_parameterization(
|
|
348
|
+
line_content,
|
|
349
|
+
match.group(),
|
|
350
|
+
content,
|
|
351
|
+
):
|
|
352
|
+
continue
|
|
353
|
+
|
|
345
354
|
# Skip fake/test credentials
|
|
346
355
|
if vuln_type == "hardcoded_secret":
|
|
347
356
|
if self._is_fake_credential(match.group()):
|
|
348
357
|
continue
|
|
349
358
|
|
|
359
|
+
# Phase 2: Skip safe random usage (tests, demos, documented)
|
|
360
|
+
if vuln_type == "insecure_random":
|
|
361
|
+
if self._is_safe_random_usage(
|
|
362
|
+
line_content,
|
|
363
|
+
file_name,
|
|
364
|
+
content,
|
|
365
|
+
):
|
|
366
|
+
continue
|
|
367
|
+
|
|
350
368
|
# Skip command_injection in documentation strings
|
|
351
369
|
if vuln_type == "command_injection":
|
|
352
370
|
if self._is_documentation_or_string(
|
|
@@ -380,6 +398,29 @@ class SecurityAuditWorkflow(BaseWorkflow):
|
|
|
380
398
|
except OSError:
|
|
381
399
|
continue
|
|
382
400
|
|
|
401
|
+
# Phase 3: Apply AST-based filtering for command injection
|
|
402
|
+
try:
|
|
403
|
+
from .security_audit_phase3 import apply_phase3_filtering
|
|
404
|
+
|
|
405
|
+
# Separate command injection findings
|
|
406
|
+
cmd_findings = [f for f in findings if f["type"] == "command_injection"]
|
|
407
|
+
other_findings = [f for f in findings if f["type"] != "command_injection"]
|
|
408
|
+
|
|
409
|
+
# Apply Phase 3 filtering to command injection
|
|
410
|
+
filtered_cmd = apply_phase3_filtering(cmd_findings)
|
|
411
|
+
|
|
412
|
+
# Combine back
|
|
413
|
+
findings = other_findings + filtered_cmd
|
|
414
|
+
|
|
415
|
+
logger.info(
|
|
416
|
+
f"Phase 3: Filtered command_injection from {len(cmd_findings)} to {len(filtered_cmd)} "
|
|
417
|
+
f"({len(cmd_findings) - len(filtered_cmd)} false positives removed)"
|
|
418
|
+
)
|
|
419
|
+
except ImportError:
|
|
420
|
+
logger.debug("Phase 3 module not available, skipping AST-based filtering")
|
|
421
|
+
except Exception as e:
|
|
422
|
+
logger.warning(f"Phase 3 filtering failed: {e}")
|
|
423
|
+
|
|
383
424
|
input_tokens = len(str(input_data)) // 4
|
|
384
425
|
output_tokens = len(str(findings)) // 4
|
|
385
426
|
|
|
@@ -541,6 +582,154 @@ class SecurityAuditWorkflow(BaseWorkflow):
|
|
|
541
582
|
|
|
542
583
|
return False
|
|
543
584
|
|
|
585
|
+
def _is_safe_sql_parameterization(self, line_content: str, match_text: str, file_content: str) -> bool:
|
|
586
|
+
"""Check if SQL query uses safe parameterization despite f-string usage.
|
|
587
|
+
|
|
588
|
+
Phase 2 Enhancement: Detects safe patterns like:
|
|
589
|
+
- placeholders = ",".join("?" * len(ids))
|
|
590
|
+
- cursor.execute(f"... IN ({placeholders})", ids)
|
|
591
|
+
|
|
592
|
+
This prevents false positives for the SQLite-recommended pattern
|
|
593
|
+
of building dynamic placeholder strings.
|
|
594
|
+
|
|
595
|
+
Args:
|
|
596
|
+
line_content: The line containing the match (may be incomplete for multi-line)
|
|
597
|
+
match_text: The matched text
|
|
598
|
+
file_content: Full file content for context analysis
|
|
599
|
+
|
|
600
|
+
Returns:
|
|
601
|
+
True if this is safe parameterized SQL, False otherwise
|
|
602
|
+
"""
|
|
603
|
+
# Get the position of the match in the full file content
|
|
604
|
+
match_pos = file_content.find(match_text)
|
|
605
|
+
if match_pos == -1:
|
|
606
|
+
# Try to find cursor.execute
|
|
607
|
+
match_pos = file_content.find("cursor.execute")
|
|
608
|
+
if match_pos == -1:
|
|
609
|
+
return False
|
|
610
|
+
|
|
611
|
+
# Extract a larger context (next 200 chars after match)
|
|
612
|
+
context = file_content[match_pos:match_pos + 200]
|
|
613
|
+
|
|
614
|
+
# Also get lines before the match for placeholder detection
|
|
615
|
+
lines_before = file_content[:match_pos].split("\n")
|
|
616
|
+
recent_lines = lines_before[-10:] if len(lines_before) > 10 else lines_before
|
|
617
|
+
|
|
618
|
+
# Pattern 1: Check if this is a placeholder-based parameterized query
|
|
619
|
+
# Look for: cursor.execute(f"... IN ({placeholders})", params)
|
|
620
|
+
if "placeholders" in context or any("placeholders" in line for line in recent_lines[-5:]):
|
|
621
|
+
# Check if context has both f-string and separate parameters
|
|
622
|
+
# Pattern: f"...{placeholders}..." followed by comma and params
|
|
623
|
+
if re.search(r'f["\'][^"\']*\{placeholders\}[^"\']*["\']\s*,\s*\w+', context):
|
|
624
|
+
return True # Safe - has separate parameters
|
|
625
|
+
|
|
626
|
+
# Also check if recent lines built the placeholders
|
|
627
|
+
for prev_line in reversed(recent_lines):
|
|
628
|
+
if "placeholders" in prev_line and '"?"' in prev_line and "join" in prev_line:
|
|
629
|
+
# Found placeholder construction
|
|
630
|
+
# Now check if the execute has separate parameters
|
|
631
|
+
if "," in context and any(param in context for param in ["run_ids", "ids", "params", "values", ")"]):
|
|
632
|
+
return True
|
|
633
|
+
|
|
634
|
+
# Pattern 2: Check if f-string only builds SQL structure with constants
|
|
635
|
+
# Example: f"SELECT * FROM {TABLE_NAME}" where TABLE_NAME is a constant
|
|
636
|
+
f_string_vars = re.findall(r'\{(\w+)\}', context)
|
|
637
|
+
if f_string_vars:
|
|
638
|
+
# Check if all variables are constants (UPPERCASE or table/column names)
|
|
639
|
+
all_constants = all(
|
|
640
|
+
var.isupper() or "TABLE" in var.upper() or "COLUMN" in var.upper()
|
|
641
|
+
for var in f_string_vars
|
|
642
|
+
)
|
|
643
|
+
if all_constants:
|
|
644
|
+
return True # Safe - using constants, not user data
|
|
645
|
+
|
|
646
|
+
# Pattern 3: Check for security note comments nearby
|
|
647
|
+
# If developers added security notes, it's likely safe
|
|
648
|
+
for prev_line in reversed(recent_lines[-3:]):
|
|
649
|
+
if "security note" in prev_line.lower() and "safe" in prev_line.lower():
|
|
650
|
+
return True
|
|
651
|
+
|
|
652
|
+
return False
|
|
653
|
+
|
|
654
|
+
def _is_safe_random_usage(self, line_content: str, file_path: str, file_content: str) -> bool:
|
|
655
|
+
"""Check if random usage is in a safe context (tests, simulations, non-crypto).
|
|
656
|
+
|
|
657
|
+
Phase 2 Enhancement: Reduces false positives for random module usage
|
|
658
|
+
in test fixtures, A/B testing simulations, and demo code.
|
|
659
|
+
|
|
660
|
+
Args:
|
|
661
|
+
line_content: The line containing the match
|
|
662
|
+
file_path: Path to the file being scanned
|
|
663
|
+
file_content: Full file content for context analysis
|
|
664
|
+
|
|
665
|
+
Returns:
|
|
666
|
+
True if random usage is safe/documented, False if potentially insecure
|
|
667
|
+
"""
|
|
668
|
+
# Check if file is a test file
|
|
669
|
+
is_test = any(pattern in file_path.lower() for pattern in ["/test", "test_", "conftest"])
|
|
670
|
+
|
|
671
|
+
# Check for explicit security notes nearby
|
|
672
|
+
lines = file_content.split("\n")
|
|
673
|
+
line_index = None
|
|
674
|
+
for i, line in enumerate(lines):
|
|
675
|
+
if line_content.strip() in line:
|
|
676
|
+
line_index = i
|
|
677
|
+
break
|
|
678
|
+
|
|
679
|
+
if line_index is not None:
|
|
680
|
+
# Check 5 lines before and after for security notes
|
|
681
|
+
context_start = max(0, line_index - 5)
|
|
682
|
+
context_end = min(len(lines), line_index + 5)
|
|
683
|
+
context = "\n".join(lines[context_start:context_end]).lower()
|
|
684
|
+
|
|
685
|
+
# Look for clarifying comments
|
|
686
|
+
safe_indicators = [
|
|
687
|
+
"security note",
|
|
688
|
+
"not cryptographic",
|
|
689
|
+
"not for crypto",
|
|
690
|
+
"test data",
|
|
691
|
+
"demo data",
|
|
692
|
+
"simulation",
|
|
693
|
+
"reproducible",
|
|
694
|
+
"deterministic",
|
|
695
|
+
"fixed seed",
|
|
696
|
+
"not used for security",
|
|
697
|
+
"not used for secrets",
|
|
698
|
+
"not used for tokens",
|
|
699
|
+
]
|
|
700
|
+
|
|
701
|
+
if any(indicator in context for indicator in safe_indicators):
|
|
702
|
+
return True # Documented as safe
|
|
703
|
+
|
|
704
|
+
# Check for common safe random patterns
|
|
705
|
+
line_lower = line_content.lower()
|
|
706
|
+
|
|
707
|
+
# Pattern 1: Fixed seed (reproducible tests)
|
|
708
|
+
if "random.seed(" in line_lower:
|
|
709
|
+
return True # Fixed seed is for reproducibility, not security
|
|
710
|
+
|
|
711
|
+
# Pattern 2: A/B testing, simulations, demos
|
|
712
|
+
safe_contexts = [
|
|
713
|
+
"simulation",
|
|
714
|
+
"demo",
|
|
715
|
+
"a/b test",
|
|
716
|
+
"ab_test",
|
|
717
|
+
"fixture",
|
|
718
|
+
"mock",
|
|
719
|
+
"example",
|
|
720
|
+
"sample",
|
|
721
|
+
]
|
|
722
|
+
if any(context in file_path.lower() for context in safe_contexts):
|
|
723
|
+
return True
|
|
724
|
+
|
|
725
|
+
# If it's a test file without crypto indicators, it's probably safe
|
|
726
|
+
if is_test:
|
|
727
|
+
crypto_indicators = ["password", "secret", "token", "key", "crypto", "auth"]
|
|
728
|
+
if not any(indicator in file_path.lower() for indicator in crypto_indicators):
|
|
729
|
+
return True
|
|
730
|
+
|
|
731
|
+
return False
|
|
732
|
+
|
|
544
733
|
async def _assess(self, input_data: dict, tier: ModelTier) -> tuple[dict, int, int]:
|
|
545
734
|
"""Risk scoring and severity classification.
|
|
546
735
|
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|