donationbee-verify 0.1.0__py3-none-any.whl

donationbee_verify-0.1.0.dist-info/METADATA

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.5
+Name: donationbee-verify
+Version: 0.1.0
+Summary: Independent verifier for DonationBee payment ledgers: checks every hash, signature, witness and anchor itself
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://bee.theorycorner.com
+Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/HallowDance/donationbee
+Project-URL: Specification, https://github.com/HallowDance/donationbee/blob/master/docs/LEDGER_SPEC.md
+Author: Ivo Iliev
+License-Expression: Apache-2.0
+License-File: LICENSE
+Keywords: c2sp,donations,merkle-tree,transparency-log,verification
+Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
+Classifier: Environment :: Console
+Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: Apache Software License
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Topic :: Security :: Cryptography
+Requires-Python: >=3.12
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=43
+Requires-Dist: httpx>=0.27
+Requires-Dist: pynacl>=1.5
+Requires-Dist: rfc8785>=0.1.4
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+
+# donationbee-verify
+
+An independent checker for [DonationBee](https://bee.theorycorner.com) payment ledgers. It doesn't
+take the server's word for anything: it downloads the public entries and redoes every check
+itself.
+
+```sh
+pip install donationbee-verify
+vpp-verify --url https://bee.theorycorner.com
+```
+
+## What it checks
+
+- **The chain.** Every entry's hash, its link to the previous entry, and its signature by the key
+  that was in charge at that point. Key changes count only when enough offline root keys signed
+  them.
+- **The Merkle tree.** It recomputes the tree and checks that the log's signed checkpoints match
+  it.
+- **Recipient confirmations.** Every passkey (WebAuthn) signature a recipient made to confirm a
+  payment.
+- **Witnesses** (`--witness <vkey> --min-witnesses k`). Independent witnesses must have cosigned
+  the checkpoint you see, so you know you're seeing the same history as everyone else.
+- **Anchors** (`--anchors-repo <git url> --check-ots`). Checkpoints published in a git repo the
+  operator doesn't control, and their Bitcoin timestamps.
+- **Domains** (`--check-domains`). Each recipient's website still lists the passkey they confirm
+  with.
+- **Receipts** (`--receipt receipt.json`). Your payment is still in the ledger, unchanged. If it
+  isn't, the verifier writes out an evidence file you can show to others.
+
+Pin the ledger you expect with `--pin-genesis <hash>`, so nobody can swap in a different one.
+
+## Why it's separate
+
+This package shares no code with the DonationBee server. It's written from the format
+specification ([LEDGER_SPEC.md](https://github.com/HallowDance/donationbee/blob/master/docs/LEDGER_SPEC.md))
+and tested against shared test vectors. That way a bug or a lie in the server can't hide inside the
+tool meant to catch it.
+
+Its dependencies are small: `pynacl` (Ed25519), `cryptography` (passkey signatures), `rfc8785`
+(canonical JSON) and `httpx`.
+
+## License
+
+Apache-2.0.

donationbee_verify-0.1.0.dist-info/RECORD

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+vpp_verify/__init__.py,sha256=47DEQpj8HBSa-_TImW-5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU,0
+vpp_verify/cli.py,sha256=kgwqq6q0mjnevm7fqhxqdfg0-pr7lKEI7_tRHM3SLHI,12034
+vpp_verify/core.py,sha256=9RPzlmr96HrNQZSHHMe3_vKjiT50cW2ApvCLF_nCqs0,11987
+vpp_verify/merkle.py,sha256=wLQ9PtM44KUenkC8WfXkty5cn79X4FAn7ORpJhNQU-w,2724
+vpp_verify/note.py,sha256=syYV70GchaH4c9xwri8QGGb_NEzoRIJSr60UVBPaI8s,6854
+vpp_verify/webauthn.py,sha256=AmlkD8grh0-Iw233mOyyIKlXdZAN_9QmrdwZJ_7vpoo,2885
+donationbee_verify-0.1.0.dist-info/METADATA,sha256=0VYmnoFMLOk2nRX0czyTT8yML0-7z3j9elufv2yBJ8w,2898
+donationbee_verify-0.1.0.dist-info/WHEEL,sha256=2iZrJkDIkeDh0k9SikKMqFuRP-ua6mb4Ir1AsER4BEw,87
+donationbee_verify-0.1.0.dist-info/entry_points.txt,sha256=XkJlqkZu49yvX-6osnlxQ16iuFgMeimkFsHN1dro3fU,51
+donationbee_verify-0.1.0.dist-info/licenses/LICENSE,sha256=z8d0m5b2O9McPEK1xHG_dWgUBT6EfBDz6wA0F7xSPTA,11358
+donationbee_verify-0.1.0.dist-info/RECORD,,

donationbee_verify-0.1.0.dist-info/WHEEL

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Wheel-Version: 1.0
+Generator: hatchling 1.33.0
+Root-Is-Purelib: true
+Tag: py3-none-any

donationbee_verify-0.1.0.dist-info/entry_points.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+[console_scripts]
+vpp-verify = vpp_verify.cli:main

donationbee_verify-0.1.0.dist-info/licenses/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
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vpp_verify/cli.py

@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+"""vpp-verify: check a VPP ledger without trusting the server that serves it.
+
+Trust comes from: a pinned genesis hash, witness cosignatures (--witness), an independently
+hosted anchors repo (--anchors-repo) and Bitcoin (--check-ots), and recipients' own domains
+(--check-domains). The server only supplies data; every claim is recomputed here.
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import json
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import httpx
+
+from . import merkle
+from .core import ChainState, VerificationError, checkpoint_key, verify_entry
+from .note import Checkpoint, Note, NoteError, Verifier, verify_cosignature, verify_note_signature
+
+
+class Failure(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+# --- data sources ---
+
+
+def _fetch_entries(client: httpx.Client, base: str, up_to: int | None = None):
+    after = 0
+    while up_to is None or after < up_to:
+        page = client.get(f"{base}/api/v1/entries", params={"after": after, "limit": 500}).json()
+        yield from page["entries"]
+        if not page.get("next_after"):
+            return
+        after = page["next_after"]
+
+
+def _fetch_checkpoint(client: httpx.Client, base: str) -> Note:
+    r = client.get(f"{base}/api/v1/checkpoint")
+    r.raise_for_status()
+    return Note.parse(r.text)
+
+
+# --- checks ---
+
+
+def check_log_signature(state: ChainState, note: Note) -> Checkpoint:
+    cp = Checkpoint.parse(note.text)
+    if cp.origin != state.origin:
+        raise Failure(f"checkpoint origin {cp.origin!r} is not this ledger ({state.origin!r})")
+    if cp.size > state.seq:
+        raise Failure(f"checkpoint size {cp.size} is beyond the {state.seq} verified entries")
+    if cp.size == 0:
+        raise Failure("empty checkpoint")
+    v = Verifier(state.origin, 0x01, checkpoint_key(state, cp.size))
+    try:
+        if not verify_note_signature(note, v):
+            raise Failure(f"checkpoint {cp.size} is not signed by the ledger key for that size")
+    except NoteError as e:
+        raise Failure(str(e)) from None
+    if cp.root != state.root_at(cp.size):
+        raise Failure(f"checkpoint {cp.size} root differs from the tree of the served entries")
+    return cp
+
+
+def count_witnesses(note: Note, witnesses: list[Verifier]) -> list[str]:
+    ok = []
+    for w in witnesses:
+        try:
+            if verify_cosignature(note, w) is not None:
+                ok.append(w.name)
+        except NoteError as e:
+            raise Failure(f"witness {w.name}: {e}") from None
+    return ok
+
+
+def _anchors_dir(repo: str, workdir: Path) -> Path:
+    p = Path(repo)
+    if p.is_dir():
+        return p
+    dest = workdir / "anchors"
+    subprocess.run(["git", "clone", "-q", "--depth", "1", repo, str(dest)], check=True)
+    return dest
+
+
+def check_anchors(state: ChainState, repo: Path, check_ots: bool) -> list[str]:
+    lines = []
+    files = sorted(repo.glob("anchors/**/*.checkpoint"), key=lambda f: int(f.stem))
+    if not files:
+        raise Failure(f"no anchors found in {repo}")
+    for f in files:
+        note = Note.parse(f.read_text())
+        cp = check_log_signature(state, note)
+        status = "matches chain"
+        ots_file = f.with_name(f.name + ".ots")
+        if check_ots:
+            status += ", ots " + _ots_verify(f, ots_file)
+        lines.append(f"anchor size {cp.size}: {status}")
+    return lines
+
+
+def _ots_verify(target: Path, proof: Path) -> str:
+    if not proof.exists():
+        return "missing"
+    if not shutil.which("ots"):
+        return "skipped (ots not installed)"
+    r = subprocess.run(
+        ["ots", "verify", "-f", str(target), str(proof)], capture_output=True, text=True
+    )
+    out = (r.stderr or r.stdout).strip()
+    if r.returncode == 0:
+        return "ok (in Bitcoin)"
+    if "Pending confirmation" in out:
+        return "pending (not yet in a Bitcoin block)"
+    # `ots verify` checks complete proofs against a local Bitcoin node.
+    raise Failure(f"OpenTimestamps verification failed for {target.name}: {out[:200]}")
+
+
+def check_domains(state: ChainState, client: httpx.Client) -> list[str]:
+    lines = []
+    for rcpt, keys in state.recipient_keys.items():
+        for body in keys.values():
+            url = f"https://{body['domain']}/.well-known/vpp.json"
+            try:
+                doc = client.get(url, follow_redirects=False, timeout=10).json()
+            except (httpx.HTTPError, ValueError) as e:
+                lines.append(f"{rcpt} @ {body['domain']}: UNREACHABLE ({e.__class__.__name__})")
+                continue
+            listed = (
+                doc.get("log") == state.origin
+                and doc.get("profile") == rcpt
+                and body["fingerprint"] in doc.get("keys", [])
+            )
+            lines.append(
+                f"{rcpt} @ {body['domain']}: {'key listed' if listed else 'KEY NOT LISTED'}"
+            )
+    return lines
+
+
+# --- receipts ---
+
+
+def verify_receipt(
+    receipt: dict,
+    state: ChainState | None,
+    witnesses: list[Verifier],
+    min_witnesses: int,
+    client: httpx.Client | None,
+    base: str | None,
+) -> list[str]:
+    import hashlib
+
+    wire = receipt["entry"]
+    envelope = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(wire["envelope"] + "=" * (-len(wire["envelope"]) % 4))
+    h = hashlib.sha256(b"vpp:entry:v1\x00" + bytes.fromhex(wire["prev_hash"]) + envelope).digest()
+    if h.hex() != wire["hash"]:
+        raise Failure("receipt entry hash does not match its envelope")
+    note = Note.parse(receipt["checkpoint"])
+    cp = Checkpoint.parse(note.text)
+    proof = [base64.b64decode(p) for p in receipt["inclusion_proof"]]
+    if not merkle.verify_inclusion(merkle.leaf_hash(h), wire["seq"] - 1, cp.size, proof, cp.root):
+        raise Failure("receipt inclusion proof is invalid")
+    lines = [f"receipt: entry {wire['seq']} is included in checkpoint size {cp.size}"]
+    names = count_witnesses(note, witnesses)
+    if len(names) < min_witnesses:
+        raise Failure(
+            f"receipt checkpoint has {len(names)} witness cosignatures, need {min_witnesses}"
+        )
+    if names:
+        lines.append(f"receipt: cosigned by {', '.join(names)}")
+
+    if state is None:
+        return lines
+    # Online: the ledger served now must still contain the entry, and agree with the receipt.
+    try:
+        check_log_signature(state, note)
+        if state.hashes.get(wire["seq"]) != h:
+            raise Failure(f"entry {wire['seq']} served now differs from the receipt")
+    except Failure as e:
+        lines.append(misbehaviour(note, client, base, str(e)))
+        raise Failure("\n".join(lines)) from None
+    lines.append("receipt: entry still present and consistent with the current ledger")
+    return lines
+
+
+def misbehaviour(signed: Note, client, base, reason: str) -> str:
+    """A transferable bundle: a checkpoint the ledger signed, and what it serves now."""
+    bundle = {"reason": reason, "signed_checkpoint": str(signed)}
+    if client is not None:
+        try:
+            bundle["current_checkpoint"] = str(_fetch_checkpoint(client, base))
+        except (httpx.HTTPError, NoteError):
+            pass
+    path = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "vpp-misbehaviour.json"
+    path.write_text(json.dumps(bundle, indent=2))
+    return f"MISBEHAVIOUR: {reason}. Evidence bundle written to {path}"
+
+
+# --- main ---
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None, client: httpx.Client | None = None) -> int:
+    """`client` is injectable for tests; normally one is created for --url."""
+    p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawTextHelpFormatter)
+    src = p.add_mutually_exclusive_group(required=True)
+    src.add_argument("--url", help="ledger base URL, e.g. https://proofs.example")
+    src.add_argument("--file", type=Path, help="JSON file with 'entries' (and 'checkpoints')")
+    p.add_argument("--pin-genesis", help="expected genesis entry hash (hex); strongly recommended")
+    p.add_argument("--witness", action="append", default=[], help="witness vkey (repeatable)")
+    p.add_argument("--min-witnesses", type=int, default=0, help="cosignatures required")
+    p.add_argument("--anchors-repo", help="path or git URL of the public anchors repo")
+    p.add_argument("--check-ots", action="store_true", help="verify anchors' Bitcoin timestamps")
+    p.add_argument("--check-domains", action="store_true", help="re-check recipients' domains")
+    p.add_argument("--receipt", type=Path, help="also verify a payer receipt.json")
+    args = p.parse_args(argv)
+
+    owns_client = client is None and args.url is not None
+    if owns_client:
+        client = httpx.Client(timeout=30, follow_redirects=True)
+    base = args.url.rstrip("/") if args.url else None
+    pinned = bytes.fromhex(args.pin_genesis) if args.pin_genesis else None
+    out: list[str] = []
+    try:
+        witnesses = [Verifier.parse(w) for w in args.witness]
+        state = ChainState()
+        latest: Note | None = None
+        file_checkpoints: list[str] = []
+        if args.file:
+            data = json.loads(args.file.read_text())
+            entries = data["entries"]
+            file_checkpoints = [c["note"] for c in data.get("checkpoints", [])]
+        else:
+            latest = _fetch_checkpoint(client, base)  # first, so entries cover it
+            entries = _fetch_entries(client, base)
+        for wire in entries:
+            verify_entry(state, wire)
+            if state.seq == 1 and pinned is not None and state.head != pinned:
+                raise VerificationError(1, "genesis hash does not match the pinned value")
+        if state.seq == 0:
+            raise Failure("ledger is empty")
+        out.append(f"chain: {state.seq} entries verified, root {state.root.hex()[:16]}…")
+        out.append(
+            f"payments confirmed by recipients: {len(state.confirmed)}/{len(state.payments)}"
+        )
+
+        for raw in file_checkpoints:
+            cp = check_log_signature(state, Note.parse(raw))
+            out.append(f"checkpoint size {cp.size}: signed and matches chain")
+        if latest is not None:
+            cp = check_log_signature(state, latest)
+            names = count_witnesses(latest, witnesses)
+            out.append(
+                f"latest checkpoint size {cp.size}: cosigned by {len(names)} of "
+                f"{len(witnesses)} given witnesses {names}"
+            )
+        if len(witnesses) and latest is None:
+            raise Failure("witness checks need --url")
+        if args.min_witnesses:
+            if latest is None or len(count_witnesses(latest, witnesses)) < args.min_witnesses:
+                raise Failure(
+                    f"fewer than {args.min_witnesses} witnesses cosigned the checkpoint;"
+                    " the server may be showing you a private fork"
+                )
+
+        if args.anchors_repo:
+            with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+                out += check_anchors(
+                    state, _anchors_dir(args.anchors_repo, Path(tmp)), args.check_ots
+                )
+        if args.check_domains:
+            out += check_domains(state, client or httpx.Client(timeout=10))
+        if args.receipt:
+            out += verify_receipt(
+                json.loads(args.receipt.read_text()),
+                state,
+                witnesses,
+                args.min_witnesses,
+                client,
+                base,
+            )
+    except VerificationError as e:
+        print("\n".join(out), file=sys.stderr)
+        print(f"FAIL {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    except (Failure, NoteError, httpx.HTTPError) as e:
+        print("\n".join(out), file=sys.stderr)
+        print(f"FAIL {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    finally:
+        if owns_client:
+            client.close()
+
+    print("\n".join(out))
+    print("OK")
+    if pinned is None:
+        print("note: genesis not pinned; pass --pin-genesis to detect a substituted ledger")
+    if not args.min_witnesses and args.url:
+        print("note: no --min-witnesses; a server could show you a fork no one else sees")
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

vpp_verify/core.py

@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+"""Chain verification, implemented from docs/LEDGER_SPEC.md only. Must not import `vpp`."""
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import json
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+
+import rfc8785
+from nacl.exceptions import BadSignatureError
+from nacl.signing import VerifyKey
+
+from . import merkle
+from .webauthn import WebAuthnError, b64url_decode, fingerprint, load_key, verify_assertion
+
+DOMAIN = b"vpp:entry:v1\x00"
+ZERO = bytes(32)
+MAX_SAFE_INT = 2**53 - 1
+
+
+class VerificationError(Exception):
+    def __init__(self, seq: int, message: str):
+        super().__init__(f"seq {seq}: {message}")
+        self.seq = seq
+        self.message = message
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ChainState:
+    """Everything a verifier needs to resume from a trusted point."""
+
+    seq: int = 0
+    head: bytes = ZERO
+    origin: str | None = None
+    online_key: bytes | None = None
+    root_keys: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    root_threshold: int = 0
+    used_online_keys: set[bytes] = field(default_factory=set)
+    used_root_sets: set[tuple] = field(default_factory=set)
+    # seq -> online key that signed it; checkpoints of size n are signed by keys[n].
+    signer_at: dict[int, bytes] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    hashes: dict[int, bytes] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    leaves: list[bytes] = field(default_factory=list)  # RFC 6962 leaf hashes
+    payments: dict[int, dict] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    recipient_keys: dict[str, dict[str, dict]] = field(default_factory=dict)  # rcpt -> cred -> body
+    confirmed: dict[int, list[int]] = field(
+        default_factory=dict
+    )  # payment seq -> confirmation seqs
+
+    @property
+    def root(self) -> bytes:
+        return merkle.root_from_leaves(self.leaves)
+
+    def root_at(self, size: int) -> bytes:
+        return merkle.root_from_leaves(self.leaves[:size])
+
+
+def _b64url_decode(s: str) -> bytes:
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(s + "=" * (-len(s) % 4))
+
+
+def _key_id(public_key: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(public_key).digest()[:8].hex()
+
+
+def _origin_hash(origin: str) -> bytes:
+    return hashlib.sha256(origin.encode()).digest()
+
+
+def _ed25519_ok(pub: bytes, msg: bytes, sig: bytes) -> bool:
+    try:
+        VerifyKey(pub).verify(msg, sig)
+        return True
+    except (BadSignatureError, ValueError):
+        return False
+
+
+def _root_sig_count(stmt: bytes, root_sigs: list[dict], allowed: list[str]) -> int:
+    ok = set()
+    for rs in root_sigs:
+        k = rs["key"]
+        if (
+            k in allowed
+            and k not in ok
+            and _ed25519_ok(bytes.fromhex(k), stmt, bytes.fromhex(rs["sig"]))
+        ):
+            ok.add(k)
+    return len(ok)
+
+
+def confirmation_challenge(origin: str, entry_hashes: list[bytes]) -> bytes:
+    return hashlib.sha256(
+        b"vpp:confirm:v1\x00" + _origin_hash(origin) + b"".join(entry_hashes)
+    ).digest()
+
+
+def _no_floats(value, seq: int) -> None:
+    if isinstance(value, float):
+        raise VerificationError(seq, "envelope contains a float")
+    if isinstance(value, int) and not isinstance(value, bool) and abs(value) > MAX_SAFE_INT:
+        raise VerificationError(seq, "envelope integer exceeds 2^53-1")
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        for v in value.values():
+            _no_floats(v, seq)
+    elif isinstance(value, list):
+        for v in value:
+            _no_floats(v, seq)
+
+
+def verify_entry(state: ChainState, wire: dict) -> None:
+    """Check one wire entry against the state and advance it. Raises VerificationError."""
+    seq = wire.get("seq")
+    expected_seq = state.seq + 1
+    if seq != expected_seq:
+        raise VerificationError(seq if isinstance(seq, int) else -1, f"expected seq {expected_seq}")
+
+    prev_hash = bytes.fromhex(wire["prev_hash"])
+    if prev_hash != state.head:
+        raise VerificationError(seq, "prev_hash does not match previous entry's hash")
+
+    envelope = _b64url_decode(wire["envelope"])
+    try:
+        env = json.loads(envelope)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise VerificationError(seq, f"envelope is not JSON: {e}") from None
+    _no_floats(env, seq)
+    if rfc8785.dumps(env) != envelope:
+        raise VerificationError(seq, "envelope is not RFC 8785 canonical")
+    if env.get("v") != 1:
+        raise VerificationError(seq, f"unsupported version {env.get('v')!r}")
+    if env.get("seq") != seq:
+        raise VerificationError(seq, "envelope seq does not match position")
+
+    computed = hashlib.sha256(DOMAIN + prev_hash + envelope).digest()
+    if computed.hex() != wire["hash"]:
+        raise VerificationError(seq, "hash mismatch")
+
+    entry_type = env.get("type")
+    body = env.get("body", {})
+    try:
+        signer = _authority(state, seq, entry_type, body)
+        if env.get("key_id") != _key_id(signer):
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "key_id is not the authorized key")
+        if not _ed25519_ok(signer, computed, bytes.fromhex(wire["sig"])):
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "bad signature")
+        _check_semantics(state, seq, entry_type, body)
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError) as e:
+        raise VerificationError(seq, f"malformed {entry_type} body: {e!r}") from None
+
+    state.seq = seq
+    state.head = computed
+    state.hashes[seq] = computed
+    state.leaves.append(merkle.leaf_hash(computed))
+    state.signer_at[seq] = signer
+    state.used_online_keys.add(signer)
+
+
+def _authority(state: ChainState, seq: int, entry_type: str, body: dict) -> bytes:
+    """Return the key that must have signed this entry, applying key changes (LEDGER_SPEC §5)."""
+    if seq == 1:
+        if entry_type != "genesis":
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "first entry must be genesis")
+        keys, thr = body["root_keys"], body["root_threshold"]
+        if len(set(keys)) != len(keys) or not 1 <= thr <= len(keys):
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "invalid root key set")
+        online = bytes.fromhex(body["online_key"])
+        stmt = b"vpp:genesis:v1\x00" + _origin_hash(body["origin"]) + online
+        if _root_sig_count(stmt, body["root_sigs"], keys) < thr:
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "genesis lacks root-key threshold")
+        state.origin, state.online_key = body["origin"], online
+        state.root_keys, state.root_threshold = keys, thr
+        state.used_root_sets.add((tuple(sorted(keys)), thr))
+        return online
+    if entry_type == "genesis":
+        raise VerificationError(seq, "genesis after seq 1")
+
+    if entry_type == "key_rotation":
+        new = bytes.fromhex(body["new_online_key"])
+        if bytes.fromhex(body["from_online_key"]) != state.online_key:
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "rotation does not replace the active key")
+        if new in state.used_online_keys:
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "online key reused")
+        stmt = b"vpp:rotate:v1\x00" + _origin_hash(state.origin) + state.online_key + new
+        if _root_sig_count(stmt, body["root_sigs"], state.root_keys) < state.root_threshold:
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "rotation lacks root-key threshold")
+        state.online_key = new
+        return new  # signed by the new key
+
+    if entry_type == "root_rotation":
+        keys, thr = body["new_root_keys"], body["new_root_threshold"]
+        if len(set(keys)) != len(keys) or not 1 <= thr <= len(keys):
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "invalid new root key set")
+        if (tuple(sorted(keys)), thr) in state.used_root_sets:
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "root key set reused")
+        sets = {
+            "from": {"keys": sorted(state.root_keys), "threshold": state.root_threshold},
+            "to": {"keys": sorted(keys), "threshold": thr},
+        }
+        stmt = b"vpp:root-rotate:v1\x00" + _origin_hash(state.origin) + rfc8785.dumps(sets)
+        if _root_sig_count(stmt, body["root_sigs"], state.root_keys) < state.root_threshold:
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "root rotation lacks old root threshold")
+        state.root_keys, state.root_threshold = keys, thr
+        state.used_root_sets.add((tuple(sorted(keys)), thr))
+    return state.online_key
+
+
+def _check_semantics(state: ChainState, seq: int, entry_type: str, body: dict) -> None:
+    if entry_type == "payment":
+        amt = body["amount"]
+        state.payments[seq] = {
+            "currency": amt["currency"],
+            "value": amt["value"],
+            "reversed": 0,
+            "recipient": body["recipient"],
+        }
+    elif entry_type == "reversal":
+        ref = state.payments.get(body["ref_seq"])
+        if ref is None:
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "reversal does not reference an earlier payment")
+        if body["amount"]["currency"] != ref["currency"]:
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "reversal currency differs from payment")
+        ref["reversed"] += body["amount"]["value"]
+        if ref["reversed"] > ref["value"]:
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "reversals exceed payment amount")
+    elif entry_type == "correction":
+        if not 1 <= body["ref_seq"] < seq:
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "correction must reference an earlier entry")
+    elif entry_type == "recipient_key":
+        spki = b64url_decode(body["public_key_spki"])
+        try:
+            load_key(spki, body["alg"])
+        except (WebAuthnError, ValueError) as e:
+            raise VerificationError(seq, f"recipient key unusable: {e}") from None
+        if body["fingerprint"] != fingerprint(spki):
+            raise VerificationError(seq, "recipient key fingerprint mismatch")
+        state.recipient_keys.setdefault(body["recipient"], {})[body["credential_id"]] = body
+    elif entry_type == "confirmation":
+        _check_confirmation(state, seq, body)
+    elif entry_type not in ("genesis", "key_rotation", "root_rotation"):
+        raise VerificationError(seq, f"unknown entry type {entry_type!r}")
+
+
+def _check_confirmation(state: ChainState, seq: int, body: dict) -> None:
+    rcpt = body["recipient"]
+    key = state.recipient_keys.get(rcpt, {}).get(body["credential_id"])
+    if key is None:
+        raise VerificationError(seq, "confirmation by an unregistered recipient key")
+    refs = body["ref_seqs"]
+    if not refs or len(set(refs)) != len(refs):
+        raise VerificationError(seq, "confirmation needs distinct ref_seqs")
+    for r in refs:
+        p = state.payments.get(r)
+        if p is None or p["recipient"] != rcpt:
+            raise VerificationError(seq, f"seq {r} is not a payment to {rcpt}")
+    challenge = confirmation_challenge(state.origin, [state.hashes[r] for r in refs])
+    try:
+        verify_assertion(
+            spki_der=b64url_decode(key["public_key_spki"]),
+            alg=key["alg"],
+            rp_id=key["rp_id"],
+            origin=key["origin"],
+            challenge=challenge,
+            authenticator_data=b64url_decode(body["authenticator_data"]),
+            client_data_json=b64url_decode(body["client_data_json"]),
+            signature=b64url_decode(body["signature"]),
+        )
+    except WebAuthnError as e:
+        raise VerificationError(seq, f"confirmation assertion invalid: {e}") from None
+    for r in refs:
+        state.confirmed.setdefault(r, []).append(seq)
+
+
+def verify_chain(entries: list[dict], *, pinned_genesis: bytes | None = None) -> ChainState:
+    state = ChainState()
+    for wire in entries:
+        verify_entry(state, wire)
+        if state.seq == 1 and pinned_genesis is not None and state.head != pinned_genesis:
+            raise VerificationError(1, "genesis hash does not match the pinned value")
+    return state
+
+
+def checkpoint_key(state: ChainState, size: int) -> bytes:
+    """The online key that signed the checkpoint for `size` (the signer of entry `size`)."""
+    if size not in state.signer_at:
+        raise VerificationError(size, "checkpoint beyond verified entries")
+    return state.signer_at[size]
+
+
+def verify_commitment(commitment: str, value: str, salt: bytes) -> bool:
+    return commitment == "c1:" + hashlib.sha256(salt + value.encode()).hexdigest()

vpp_verify/merkle.py

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+"""RFC 6962 / RFC 9162 Merkle tree verification. Written from the RFCs, not from `vpp`."""
+
+import hashlib
+
+EMPTY_ROOT = hashlib.sha256(b"").digest()
+
+
+def leaf_hash(data: bytes) -> bytes:
+    return hashlib.sha256(b"\x00" + data).digest()
+
+
+def node_hash(left: bytes, right: bytes) -> bytes:
+    return hashlib.sha256(b"\x01" + left + right).digest()
+
+
+def root_from_leaves(leaves: list[bytes]) -> bytes:
+    """MTH over leaf *hashes* (already 0x00-prefixed and hashed). O(n), for verifiers that hold
+    every entry anyway."""
+    if not leaves:
+        return EMPTY_ROOT
+    # Stack of (height, hash) for perfect subtrees, merged right to left at the end.
+    stack: list[tuple[int, bytes]] = []
+    for h in leaves:
+        height, cur = 0, h
+        while stack and stack[-1][0] == height:
+            _, left = stack.pop()
+            cur = node_hash(left, cur)
+            height += 1
+        stack.append((height, cur))
+    _, acc = stack.pop()
+    while stack:
+        _, left = stack.pop()
+        acc = node_hash(left, acc)
+    return acc
+
+
+def verify_inclusion(leaf: bytes, index: int, size: int, proof: list[bytes], root: bytes) -> bool:
+    """RFC 9162 §2.1.3.2. `leaf` is the leaf hash."""
+    if index >= size or index < 0:
+        return False
+    fn, sn, r = index, size - 1, leaf
+    for p in proof:
+        if sn == 0:
+            return False
+        if fn & 1 or fn == sn:
+            r = node_hash(p, r)
+            if not fn & 1:
+                while not fn & 1 and fn != 0:
+                    fn >>= 1
+                    sn >>= 1
+        else:
+            r = node_hash(r, p)
+        fn >>= 1
+        sn >>= 1
+    return sn == 0 and r == root
+
+
+def verify_consistency(
+    size1: int, size2: int, root1: bytes, root2: bytes, proof: list[bytes]
+) -> bool:
+    """RFC 9162 §2.1.4.2, plus the trivial cases tlog-witness spells out."""
+    if size1 < 0 or size1 > size2:
+        return False
+    if size1 == size2:
+        return not proof and root1 == root2
+    if size1 == 0:
+        return not proof
+    if not proof:
+        return False
+    if size1 & (size1 - 1) == 0:  # exact power of two: old root is the first node
+        proof = [root1, *proof]
+    fn, sn = size1 - 1, size2 - 1
+    while fn & 1:
+        fn >>= 1
+        sn >>= 1
+    fr = sr = proof[0]
+    for c in proof[1:]:
+        if sn == 0:
+            return False
+        if fn & 1 or fn == sn:
+            fr = node_hash(c, fr)
+            sr = node_hash(c, sr)
+            if not fn & 1:
+                while not fn & 1 and fn != 0:
+                    fn >>= 1
+                    sn >>= 1
+        else:
+            sr = node_hash(sr, c)
+        fn >>= 1
+        sn >>= 1
+    return fr == root1 and sr == root2 and sn == 0

vpp_verify/note.py

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+"""C2SP signed-note, tlog-checkpoint and tlog-cosignature (Ed25519) verification.
+
+Specs: https://c2sp.org/signed-note, /tlog-checkpoint, /tlog-cosignature. Written from them,
+not from `vpp`.
+"""
+
+import base64
+import binascii
+import hashlib
+import struct
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+from nacl.exceptions import BadSignatureError
+from nacl.signing import VerifyKey
+
+EM_DASH = "—"
+SIG_ED25519 = 0x01
+SIG_COSIGNATURE_ED25519 = 0x04
+
+
+class NoteError(ValueError):
+    pass
+
+
+def b64decode_canonical(s: str) -> bytes:
+    try:
+        raw = base64.b64decode(s, validate=True)
+    except (binascii.Error, ValueError):
+        raise NoteError(f"invalid base64: {s[:20]}") from None
+    if base64.b64encode(raw).decode() != s:
+        raise NoteError("non-canonical base64")
+    return raw
+
+
+def key_id(name: str, sig_type: int, public_key: bytes) -> bytes:
+    return hashlib.sha256(name.encode() + b"\n" + bytes([sig_type]) + public_key).digest()[:4]
+
+
+def check_name(name: str) -> None:
+    if not name or len(name.encode()) > 255 or "+" in name:
+        raise NoteError(f"invalid key name {name!r}")
+    if any(c.isspace() or ord(c) < 0x20 for c in name):
+        raise NoteError(f"invalid key name {name!r}")
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Verifier:
+    """A verifier key: `<name>+<hex key id>+<base64(type || pubkey)>`."""
+
+    name: str
+    sig_type: int
+    public_key: bytes
+
+    @property
+    def key_id(self) -> bytes:
+        return key_id(self.name, self.sig_type, self.public_key)
+
+    @classmethod
+    def parse(cls, vkey: str) -> "Verifier":
+        try:
+            # Names can't contain '+', but base64 can: only the first two '+' are separators.
+            name, hex_id, b64 = vkey.split("+", 2)
+        except ValueError:
+            raise NoteError("vkey must be name+id+key") from None
+        check_name(name)
+        raw = b64decode_canonical(b64)
+        if len(raw) != 33 or raw[0] not in (SIG_ED25519, SIG_COSIGNATURE_ED25519):
+            raise NoteError("only Ed25519 (0x01) and Ed25519 cosignature (0x04) keys supported")
+        v = cls(name, raw[0], raw[1:])
+        if v.key_id.hex() != hex_id:
+            raise NoteError("vkey id does not match key")
+        return v
+
+    def __str__(self) -> str:
+        b64 = base64.b64encode(bytes([self.sig_type]) + self.public_key).decode()
+        return f"{self.name}+{self.key_id.hex()}+{b64}"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Signature:
+    name: str
+    key_id: bytes
+    sig: bytes  # everything after the 4-byte key id
+
+    @property
+    def line(self) -> str:
+        return f"{EM_DASH} {self.name} {base64.b64encode(self.key_id + self.sig).decode()}\n"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Note:
+    text: str  # includes its final newline
+    signatures: tuple[Signature, ...]
+
+    @classmethod
+    def parse(cls, raw: str) -> "Note":
+        if len(raw) > 1_000_000:
+            raise NoteError("note too large")
+        if any(ord(c) < 0x20 and c != "\n" for c in raw):
+            raise NoteError("control character in note")
+        idx = raw.rfind("\n\n")
+        if idx < 0:
+            raise NoteError("missing signature separator")
+        text, sig_block = raw[: idx + 1], raw[idx + 2 :]
+        if not sig_block.endswith("\n"):
+            raise NoteError("signature block must end with newline")
+        sigs = []
+        for line in sig_block[:-1].split("\n"):
+            if not line.startswith(EM_DASH + " "):
+                raise NoteError(f"bad signature line {line[:40]!r}")
+            try:
+                name, b64 = line[2:].split(" ")
+            except ValueError:
+                raise NoteError("bad signature line") from None
+            check_name(name)
+            blob = b64decode_canonical(b64)
+            if len(blob) < 5:
+                raise NoteError("signature too short")
+            sigs.append(Signature(name, blob[:4], blob[4:]))
+        if not sigs:
+            raise NoteError("note has no signatures")
+        if len(sigs) > 64:
+            raise NoteError("too many signatures")
+        return cls(text, tuple(sigs))
+
+    def __str__(self) -> str:
+        return self.text + "\n" + "".join(s.line for s in self.signatures)
+
+    def find(self, v: Verifier) -> Signature | None:
+        for s in self.signatures:
+            if s.name == v.name and s.key_id == v.key_id:
+                return s
+        return None
+
+
+def _ed25519_ok(public_key: bytes, msg: bytes, sig: bytes) -> bool:
+    try:
+        VerifyKey(public_key).verify(msg, sig)
+        return True
+    except (BadSignatureError, ValueError):
+        return False
+
+
+def verify_note_signature(note: Note, v: Verifier) -> bool:
+    """True if `v` signed the note (type 0x01). A matching but invalid signature raises."""
+    if v.sig_type != SIG_ED25519:
+        raise NoteError("not a note-signing key")
+    s = note.find(v)
+    if s is None:
+        return False
+    if len(s.sig) != 64 or not _ed25519_ok(v.public_key, note.text.encode(), s.sig):
+        raise NoteError(f"invalid signature from {v.name}")
+    return True
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Checkpoint:
+    origin: str
+    size: int
+    root: bytes
+    extensions: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    @classmethod
+    def parse(cls, text: str) -> "Checkpoint":
+        if not text.endswith("\n"):
+            raise NoteError("checkpoint must end with newline")
+        lines = text[:-1].split("\n")
+        if len(lines) < 3 or any(not ln for ln in lines):
+            raise NoteError("checkpoint needs origin, size, root")
+        origin, size_s, root_b64, *ext = lines
+        check_name(origin)
+        if not size_s.isdigit() or (size_s != "0" and size_s.startswith("0")):
+            raise NoteError("bad tree size")
+        root = b64decode_canonical(root_b64)
+        if len(root) != 32:
+            raise NoteError("root must be 32 bytes")
+        return cls(origin, int(size_s), root, tuple(ext))
+
+    @property
+    def text(self) -> str:
+        lines = [
+            self.origin,
+            str(self.size),
+            base64.b64encode(self.root).decode(),
+            *self.extensions,
+        ]
+        return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
+
+
+def cosignature_message(checkpoint_text: str, timestamp: int) -> bytes:
+    return f"cosignature/v1\ntime {timestamp}\n".encode() + checkpoint_text.encode()
+
+
+def verify_cosignature(note: Note, v: Verifier) -> int | None:
+    """Returns the cosignature timestamp if `v` cosigned this checkpoint (type 0x04)."""
+    if v.sig_type != SIG_COSIGNATURE_ED25519:
+        raise NoteError("not a cosigner key")
+    s = note.find(v)
+    if s is None:
+        return None
+    if len(s.sig) != 8 + 64:
+        raise NoteError(f"bad cosignature length from {v.name}")
+    (ts,) = struct.unpack(">Q", s.sig[:8])
+    if not _ed25519_ok(v.public_key, cosignature_message(note.text, ts), s.sig[8:]):
+        raise NoteError(f"invalid cosignature from {v.name}")
+    return ts

vpp_verify/webauthn.py

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+"""WebAuthn assertion verification (W3C WebAuthn L2 §7.2, steps relevant to a third party)."""
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import json
+
+from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, padding, rsa
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PublicKey
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import load_der_public_key
+
+FLAG_UP = 0x01  # user present
+FLAG_UV = 0x04  # user verified
+
+
+class WebAuthnError(ValueError):
+    pass
+
+
+def b64url(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode()
+
+
+def b64url_decode(s: str) -> bytes:
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(s + "=" * (-len(s) % 4))
+
+
+def fingerprint(spki_der: bytes) -> str:
+    return "k1:" + hashlib.sha256(spki_der).hexdigest()
+
+
+def load_key(spki_der: bytes, alg: int):
+    key = load_der_public_key(spki_der)
+    expected = {-7: ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey, -8: Ed25519PublicKey, -257: rsa.RSAPublicKey}
+    if alg not in expected or not isinstance(key, expected[alg]):
+        raise WebAuthnError(f"key type does not match alg {alg}")
+    if alg == -7 and not isinstance(key.curve, ec.SECP256R1):
+        raise WebAuthnError("ES256 requires P-256")
+    return key
+
+
+def verify_assertion(
+    *,
+    spki_der: bytes,
+    alg: int,
+    rp_id: str,
+    origin: str,
+    challenge: bytes,
+    authenticator_data: bytes,
+    client_data_json: bytes,
+    signature: bytes,
+) -> None:
+    try:
+        cd = json.loads(client_data_json)
+    except ValueError:
+        raise WebAuthnError("clientDataJSON is not JSON") from None
+    if cd.get("type") != "webauthn.get":
+        raise WebAuthnError("not an assertion")
+    if cd.get("challenge") != b64url(challenge):
+        raise WebAuthnError("challenge mismatch")
+    if cd.get("origin") != origin:
+        raise WebAuthnError(f"origin mismatch: {cd.get('origin')!r}")
+    if cd.get("crossOrigin") is True:
+        raise WebAuthnError("cross-origin assertion")
+
+    if len(authenticator_data) < 37:
+        raise WebAuthnError("authenticatorData too short")
+    if authenticator_data[:32] != hashlib.sha256(rp_id.encode()).digest():
+        raise WebAuthnError("rpIdHash mismatch")
+    flags = authenticator_data[32]
+    if not flags & FLAG_UP or not flags & FLAG_UV:
+        raise WebAuthnError("user presence and verification are required")
+
+    msg = authenticator_data + hashlib.sha256(client_data_json).digest()
+    key = load_key(spki_der, alg)
+    try:
+        if alg == -7:
+            key.verify(signature, msg, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
+        elif alg == -8:
+            key.verify(signature, msg)
+        else:
+            key.verify(signature, msg, padding.PKCS1v15(), hashes.SHA256())
+    except InvalidSignature:
+        raise WebAuthnError("bad assertion signature") from None