django-cfg 1.2.31__py3-none-any.whl → 1.3.3__py3-none-any.whl

django_cfg/apps/payments/services/security/webhook_validator.py

@@ -1,474 +0,0 @@
-"""
-Enhanced Webhook Signature Validation Service.
-Critical Foundation Security Component.
-"""
-
-import json
-import hmac
-import hashlib
-from django_cfg.modules.django_logger import get_logger
-import time
-from typing import Dict, Any, Optional, Tuple
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta
-from django.core.cache import cache
-from django.utils import timezone
-from django.conf import settings
-
-from django_cfg.apps.payments.config import get_payments_config
-from django_cfg.apps.payments.models.events import PaymentEvent
-from ...models.payments import UniversalPayment
-
-logger = get_logger("webhook_validator")
-
-
-class WebhookValidator:
-    """
-    Secure webhook signature validation with replay attack protection.
-    
-    Foundation Security Component - CRITICAL for system security.
-    """
-    
-    def __init__(self):
-        self.config = get_payments_config()
-        self.nonce_cache_timeout = 3600  # 1 hour nonce validity
-        self.max_timestamp_drift = 300   # 5 minutes max timestamp drift
-    
-    def validate_webhook(
-        self,
-        provider: str,
-        webhook_data: Dict[str, Any],
-        request_headers: Dict[str, str],
-        raw_body: bytes = None
-    ) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
-        """
-        Comprehensive webhook validation with security checks.
-        
-        Returns:
-            Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]: (is_valid, error_message)
-        """
-        
-        try:
-            # Step 1: Provider-specific signature validation
-            signature_valid, signature_error = self._validate_provider_signature(
-                provider, webhook_data, request_headers, raw_body
-            )
-            
-            if not signature_valid:
-                self._log_security_event('signature_validation_failed', provider, signature_error)
-                return False, signature_error
-            
-            # Step 2: Replay attack protection
-            replay_valid, replay_error = self._validate_against_replay(
-                provider, webhook_data, request_headers
-            )
-            
-            if not replay_valid:
-                self._log_security_event('replay_attack_detected', provider, replay_error)
-                return False, replay_error
-            
-            # Step 3: Timestamp validation
-            timestamp_valid, timestamp_error = self._validate_timestamp(
-                webhook_data, request_headers
-            )
-            
-            if not timestamp_valid:
-                self._log_security_event('timestamp_validation_failed', provider, timestamp_error)
-                return False, timestamp_error
-            
-            # Step 4: Rate limiting check
-            rate_limit_valid, rate_limit_error = self._check_rate_limits(
-                provider, request_headers
-            )
-            
-            if not rate_limit_valid:
-                self._log_security_event('rate_limit_exceeded', provider, rate_limit_error)
-                return False, rate_limit_error
-            
-            # All validations passed
-            self._log_security_event('webhook_validated', provider, 'Validation successful')
-            return True, None
-            
-        except Exception as e:
-            error_msg = f"Webhook validation error: {str(e)}"
-            logger.error(f"Critical validation error for {provider}: {e}", exc_info=True)
-            self._log_security_event('validation_exception', provider, error_msg)
-            return False, error_msg
-    
-    def _validate_provider_signature(
-        self,
-        provider: str,
-        webhook_data: Dict[str, Any],
-        request_headers: Dict[str, str],
-        raw_body: bytes = None
-    ) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
-        """Validate signature based on provider-specific method."""
-        
-        if provider == 'cryptapi':
-            return self._validate_cryptapi_signature(webhook_data, request_headers)
-        elif provider == 'cryptomus':
-            return self._validate_cryptomus_signature(webhook_data, request_headers, raw_body)
-        elif provider == 'nowpayments':
-            return self._validate_nowpayments_signature(webhook_data, request_headers, raw_body)
-        elif provider == 'test':
-            return True, None  # Allow test webhooks in development
-        else:
-            return False, f"Unknown provider: {provider}"
-    
-    def _validate_cryptapi_signature(
-        self,
-        webhook_data: Dict[str, Any],
-        request_headers: Dict[str, str]
-    ) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
-        """
-        CryptAPI signature validation with nonce verification.
-        
-        CRITICAL FIX: Proper nonce validation to prevent replay attacks.
-        """
-        
-        # Get security nonce from webhook data
-        security_nonce = webhook_data.get('nonce')
-        if not security_nonce:
-            return False, "Missing security nonce in CryptAPI webhook"
-        
-        # Validate nonce format and uniqueness
-        nonce_valid, nonce_error = self._validate_nonce(security_nonce, 'cryptapi')
-        if not nonce_valid:
-            return False, f"Invalid security nonce: {nonce_error}"
-        
-        # Check required fields
-        required_fields = ['order_id', 'value_coin', 'confirmations']
-        missing_fields = [field for field in required_fields if field not in webhook_data]
-        if missing_fields:
-            return False, f"Missing required fields: {', '.join(missing_fields)}"
-        
-        # Validate order_id format
-        order_id = webhook_data.get('order_id')
-        if not self._validate_order_id_format(order_id):
-            return False, f"Invalid order_id format: {order_id}"
-        
-        # CryptAPI specific validation: check if address exists in our system
-        address_in = webhook_data.get('address')
-        if address_in and not self._validate_payment_address(address_in, 'cryptapi'):
-            return False, f"Unknown payment address: {address_in}"
-        
-        return True, None
-    
-    def _validate_cryptomus_signature(
-        self,
-        webhook_data: Dict[str, Any],
-        request_headers: Dict[str, str],
-        raw_body: bytes = None
-    ) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
-        """
-        Cryptomus webhook signature validation.
-        
-        Uses HMAC-SHA256 signature verification.
-        """
-        
-        # Get webhook secret from configuration
-        if not self.config or not hasattr(self.config, 'providers'):
-            return False, "Cryptomus configuration not found"
-        
-        cryptomus_config = self.config.providers.get('cryptomus')
-        if not cryptomus_config:
-            return False, "Cryptomus provider not configured"
-        
-        webhook_secret = getattr(cryptomus_config, 'webhook_secret', None)
-        if not webhook_secret:
-            logger.warning("Cryptomus webhook secret not configured, skipping validation")
-            return True, None  # Allow if not configured (development mode)
-        
-        # Get signature from headers
-        signature = request_headers.get('HTTP_X_CRYPTOMUS_SIGNATURE')
-        if not signature:
-            return False, "Missing Cryptomus signature header"
-        
-        # Calculate expected signature
-        if raw_body:
-            payload = raw_body
-        else:
-            payload = json.dumps(webhook_data, separators=(',', ':'), sort_keys=True).encode()
-        
-        expected_signature = hmac.new(
-            webhook_secret.encode(),
-            payload,
-            hashlib.sha256
-        ).hexdigest()
-        
-        # Secure comparison
-        if not hmac.compare_digest(signature, expected_signature):
-            return False, "Invalid Cryptomus signature"
-        
-        # Validate required fields
-        required_fields = ['order_id', 'status']
-        missing_fields = [field for field in required_fields if field not in webhook_data]
-        if missing_fields:
-            return False, f"Missing required fields: {', '.join(missing_fields)}"
-        
-        return True, None
-    
-    def _validate_nowpayments_signature(
-        self,
-        webhook_data: Dict[str, Any],
-        request_headers: Dict[str, str],
-        raw_body: bytes = None
-    ) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
-        """
-        NowPayments IPN signature validation.
-        
-        Uses HMAC-SHA512 signature verification.
-        """
-        
-        # Get IPN secret from configuration
-        if not self.config or not hasattr(self.config, 'providers'):
-            return False, "NowPayments configuration not found"
-        
-        nowpayments_config = self.config.providers.get('nowpayments')
-        if not nowpayments_config:
-            return False, "NowPayments provider not configured"
-        
-        ipn_secret = getattr(nowpayments_config, 'ipn_secret', None)
-        if not ipn_secret:
-            logger.warning("NowPayments IPN secret not configured, skipping validation")
-            return True, None  # Allow if not configured (development mode)
-        
-        # Get signature from headers
-        signature = request_headers.get('HTTP_X_NOWPAYMENTS_SIG')
-        if not signature:
-            return False, "Missing NowPayments signature header"
-        
-        # Calculate expected signature
-        if raw_body:
-            payload = raw_body.decode('utf-8')
-        else:
-            payload = json.dumps(webhook_data, separators=(',', ':'), sort_keys=True)
-        
-        expected_signature = hmac.new(
-            ipn_secret.encode(),
-            payload.encode(),
-            hashlib.sha512
-        ).hexdigest()
-        
-        # Secure comparison
-        if not hmac.compare_digest(signature, expected_signature):
-            return False, "Invalid NowPayments signature"
-        
-        return True, None
-    
-    def _validate_against_replay(
-        self,
-        provider: str,
-        webhook_data: Dict[str, Any],
-        request_headers: Dict[str, str]
-    ) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
-        """
-        Protect against replay attacks using idempotency keys.
-        """
-        
-        # Generate idempotency key
-        idempotency_key = self._generate_idempotency_key(provider, webhook_data, request_headers)
-        
-        # Check if we've seen this webhook before
-        cache_key = f"webhook_idempotency:{idempotency_key}"
-        if cache.get(cache_key):
-            return False, f"Replay attack detected: duplicate webhook {idempotency_key}"
-        
-        # Store idempotency key to prevent replays
-        cache.set(cache_key, True, timeout=self.nonce_cache_timeout)
-        
-        return True, None
-    
-    def _validate_timestamp(
-        self,
-        webhook_data: Dict[str, Any],
-        request_headers: Dict[str, str]
-    ) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
-        """
-        Validate webhook timestamp to prevent old webhook replay.
-        """
-        
-        # Try different timestamp fields
-        timestamp_fields = ['timestamp', 'created_at', 'updated_at', 'time']
-        webhook_timestamp = None
-        
-        for field in timestamp_fields:
-            if field in webhook_data:
-                webhook_timestamp = webhook_data[field]
-                break
-        
-        # Also check headers
-        if not webhook_timestamp:
-            webhook_timestamp = request_headers.get('HTTP_X_TIMESTAMP')
-        
-        if not webhook_timestamp:
-            # If no timestamp provided, skip validation (some providers don't include it)
-            return True, None
-        
-        try:
-            # Parse timestamp (support multiple formats)
-            if isinstance(webhook_timestamp, (int, float)):
-                webhook_time = datetime.fromtimestamp(webhook_timestamp, tz=timezone.utc)
-            else:
-                # Try to parse ISO format
-                webhook_time = datetime.fromisoformat(webhook_timestamp.replace('Z', '+00:00'))
-            
-            current_time = timezone.now()
-            time_diff = abs((current_time - webhook_time).total_seconds())
-            
-            if time_diff > self.max_timestamp_drift:
-                return False, f"Webhook timestamp too old or too new: {time_diff}s drift"
-            
-            return True, None
-            
-        except Exception as e:
-            logger.warning(f"Could not validate timestamp: {e}")
-            return True, None  # Skip validation if timestamp format is unknown
-    
-    def _check_rate_limits(
-        self,
-        provider: str,
-        request_headers: Dict[str, str]
-    ) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
-        """
-        Check webhook rate limits to prevent abuse.
-        """
-        
-        # Extract IP address
-        ip_address = (
-            request_headers.get('HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR', '').split(',')[0].strip() or
-            request_headers.get('HTTP_X_REAL_IP', '') or
-            request_headers.get('REMOTE_ADDR', 'unknown')
-        )
-        
-        # Rate limit key
-        rate_limit_key = f"webhook_rate_limit:{provider}:{ip_address}"
-        
-        # Check current rate
-        current_count = cache.get(rate_limit_key, 0)
-        max_webhooks_per_minute = 60  # Configurable limit
-        
-        if current_count >= max_webhooks_per_minute:
-            return False, f"Rate limit exceeded: {current_count} webhooks/minute from {ip_address}"
-        
-        # Increment counter
-        cache.set(rate_limit_key, current_count + 1, timeout=60)
-        
-        return True, None
-    
-    def _validate_nonce(self, nonce: str, provider: str) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
-        """
-        Validate nonce format and uniqueness.
-        
-        CRITICAL: Prevents replay attacks for CryptAPI.
-        """
-        
-        # Validate nonce format
-        if not nonce or len(nonce) < 8:
-            return False, "Nonce too short"
-        
-        if len(nonce) > 64:
-            return False, "Nonce too long"
-        
-        # Check nonce uniqueness
-        nonce_key = f"webhook_nonce:{provider}:{nonce}"
-        if cache.get(nonce_key):
-            return False, "Nonce already used (replay attack)"
-        
-        # Store nonce to prevent reuse
-        cache.set(nonce_key, True, timeout=self.nonce_cache_timeout)
-        
-        return True, None
-    
-    def _validate_order_id_format(self, order_id: str) -> bool:
-        """Validate order ID format."""
-        if not order_id:
-            return False
-        
-        # Basic validation (customize per your order ID format)
-        if len(order_id) < 3 or len(order_id) > 50:
-            return False
-        
-        # Allow alphanumeric, dash, underscore
-        import re
-        if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$', order_id):
-            return False
-        
-        return True
-    
-    def _validate_payment_address(self, address: str, provider: str) -> bool:
-        """
-        Validate that payment address exists in our system.
-        
-        CRITICAL: Prevents webhooks for unknown addresses.
-        """
-        try:
-            # Check if address exists in our payments
-            return UniversalPayment.objects.filter(
-                provider=provider,
-                pay_address=address
-            ).exists()
-        except Exception as e:
-            logger.error(f"Error validating payment address: {e}")
-            return True  # Allow if validation fails (avoid false negatives)
-    
-    def _generate_idempotency_key(
-        self,
-        provider: str,
-        webhook_data: Dict[str, Any],
-        request_headers: Dict[str, str]
-    ) -> str:
-        """Generate secure idempotency key for webhook deduplication."""
-        
-        # Use multiple fields for uniqueness
-        payment_id = (
-            webhook_data.get('payment_id') or
-            webhook_data.get('order_id') or
-            webhook_data.get('id') or
-            webhook_data.get('uuid') or
-            'unknown'
-        )
-        
-        # Include status to allow multiple status updates for same payment
-        status = webhook_data.get('status', 'unknown')
-        
-        # Include timestamp for additional uniqueness
-        timestamp = (
-            webhook_data.get('timestamp') or
-            webhook_data.get('created_at') or
-            webhook_data.get('updated_at') or
-            str(int(time.time()))
-        )
-        
-        # Create secure hash
-        key_data = f"{provider}:{payment_id}:{status}:{timestamp}"
-        return hashlib.sha256(key_data.encode()).hexdigest()[:32]
-    
-    def _log_security_event(self, event_type: str, provider: str, details: str):
-        """Log security events for monitoring and alerting."""
-        
-        try:
-            # Create security event log
-            PaymentEvent.objects.create(
-                event_type=f'security_{event_type}',
-                provider=provider,
-                metadata={
-                    'event_type': event_type,
-                    'provider': provider,
-                    'details': details,
-                    'timestamp': timezone.now().isoformat(),
-                    'severity': 'HIGH' if 'attack' in event_type else 'MEDIUM'
-                }
-            )
-            
-            # Log to application logger
-            if 'attack' in event_type or 'failed' in event_type:
-                logger.warning(f"🚨 Security Event [{event_type}] {provider}: {details}")
-            else:
-                logger.info(f"🔒 Security Event [{event_type}] {provider}: {details}")
-                
-        except Exception as e:
-            logger.error(f"Failed to log security event: {e}")
-
-
-# Singleton instance for import
-webhook_validator = WebhookValidator()