android-notify 1.60.1__py3-none-any.whl → 1.60.2__py3-none-any.whl

venv/Lib/site-packages/pip/_vendor/urllib3/util/ssl_.py

@@ -0,0 +1,504 @@
+from __future__ import absolute_import
+
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import os
+import sys
+import warnings
+from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify
+
+from ..exceptions import (
+    InsecurePlatformWarning,
+    ProxySchemeUnsupported,
+    SNIMissingWarning,
+    SSLError,
+)
+from ..packages import six
+from .url import BRACELESS_IPV6_ADDRZ_RE, IPV4_RE
+
+SSLContext = None
+SSLTransport = None
+HAS_SNI = False
+IS_PYOPENSSL = False
+IS_SECURETRANSPORT = False
+ALPN_PROTOCOLS = ["http/1.1"]
+
+# Maps the length of a digest to a possible hash function producing this digest
+HASHFUNC_MAP = {
+    length: getattr(hashlib, algorithm, None)
+    for length, algorithm in ((32, "md5"), (40, "sha1"), (64, "sha256"))
+}
+
+
+def _const_compare_digest_backport(a, b):
+    """
+    Compare two digests of equal length in constant time.
+
+    The digests must be of type str/bytes.
+    Returns True if the digests match, and False otherwise.
+    """
+    result = abs(len(a) - len(b))
+    for left, right in zip(bytearray(a), bytearray(b)):
+        result |= left ^ right
+    return result == 0
+
+
+_const_compare_digest = getattr(hmac, "compare_digest", _const_compare_digest_backport)
+
+try:  # Test for SSL features
+    import ssl
+    from ssl import CERT_REQUIRED, wrap_socket
+except ImportError:
+    pass
+
+try:
+    from ssl import HAS_SNI  # Has SNI?
+except ImportError:
+    pass
+
+try:
+    from .ssltransport import SSLTransport
+except ImportError:
+    pass
+
+
+try:  # Platform-specific: Python 3.6
+    from ssl import PROTOCOL_TLS
+
+    PROTOCOL_SSLv23 = PROTOCOL_TLS
+except ImportError:
+    try:
+        from ssl import PROTOCOL_SSLv23 as PROTOCOL_TLS
+
+        PROTOCOL_SSLv23 = PROTOCOL_TLS
+    except ImportError:
+        PROTOCOL_SSLv23 = PROTOCOL_TLS = 2
+
+try:
+    from ssl import PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT
+except ImportError:
+    PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT = PROTOCOL_TLS
+
+
+try:
+    from ssl import OP_NO_COMPRESSION, OP_NO_SSLv2, OP_NO_SSLv3
+except ImportError:
+    OP_NO_SSLv2, OP_NO_SSLv3 = 0x1000000, 0x2000000
+    OP_NO_COMPRESSION = 0x20000
+
+
+try:  # OP_NO_TICKET was added in Python 3.6
+    from ssl import OP_NO_TICKET
+except ImportError:
+    OP_NO_TICKET = 0x4000
+
+
+# A secure default.
+# Sources for more information on TLS ciphers:
+#
+# - https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS
+# - https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/best-practices/index.html
+# - https://hynek.me/articles/hardening-your-web-servers-ssl-ciphers/
+#
+# The general intent is:
+# - prefer cipher suites that offer perfect forward secrecy (DHE/ECDHE),
+# - prefer ECDHE over DHE for better performance,
+# - prefer any AES-GCM and ChaCha20 over any AES-CBC for better performance and
+#   security,
+# - prefer AES-GCM over ChaCha20 because hardware-accelerated AES is common,
+# - disable NULL authentication, MD5 MACs, DSS, and other
+#   insecure ciphers for security reasons.
+# - NOTE: TLS 1.3 cipher suites are managed through a different interface
+#   not exposed by CPython (yet!) and are enabled by default if they're available.
+DEFAULT_CIPHERS = ":".join(
+    [
+        "ECDHE+AESGCM",
+        "ECDHE+CHACHA20",
+        "DHE+AESGCM",
+        "DHE+CHACHA20",
+        "ECDH+AESGCM",
+        "DH+AESGCM",
+        "ECDH+AES",
+        "DH+AES",
+        "RSA+AESGCM",
+        "RSA+AES",
+        "!aNULL",
+        "!eNULL",
+        "!MD5",
+        "!DSS",
+    ]
+)
+
+try:
+    from ssl import SSLContext  # Modern SSL?
+except ImportError:
+
+    class SSLContext(object):  # Platform-specific: Python 2
+        def __init__(self, protocol_version):
+            self.protocol = protocol_version
+            # Use default values from a real SSLContext
+            self.check_hostname = False
+            self.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
+            self.ca_certs = None
+            self.options = 0
+            self.certfile = None
+            self.keyfile = None
+            self.ciphers = None
+
+        def load_cert_chain(self, certfile, keyfile):
+            self.certfile = certfile
+            self.keyfile = keyfile
+
+        def load_verify_locations(self, cafile=None, capath=None, cadata=None):
+            self.ca_certs = cafile
+
+            if capath is not None:
+                raise SSLError("CA directories not supported in older Pythons")
+
+            if cadata is not None:
+                raise SSLError("CA data not supported in older Pythons")
+
+        def set_ciphers(self, cipher_suite):
+            self.ciphers = cipher_suite
+
+        def wrap_socket(self, socket, server_hostname=None, server_side=False):
+            warnings.warn(
+                "A true SSLContext object is not available. This prevents "
+                "urllib3 from configuring SSL appropriately and may cause "
+                "certain SSL connections to fail. You can upgrade to a newer "
+                "version of Python to solve this. For more information, see "
+                "https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/1.26.x/advanced-usage.html"
+                "#ssl-warnings",
+                InsecurePlatformWarning,
+            )
+            kwargs = {
+                "keyfile": self.keyfile,
+                "certfile": self.certfile,
+                "ca_certs": self.ca_certs,
+                "cert_reqs": self.verify_mode,
+                "ssl_version": self.protocol,
+                "server_side": server_side,
+            }
+            return wrap_socket(socket, ciphers=self.ciphers, **kwargs)
+
+
+def assert_fingerprint(cert, fingerprint):
+    """
+    Checks if given fingerprint matches the supplied certificate.
+
+    :param cert:
+        Certificate as bytes object.
+    :param fingerprint:
+        Fingerprint as string of hexdigits, can be interspersed by colons.
+    """
+
+    fingerprint = fingerprint.replace(":", "").lower()
+    digest_length = len(fingerprint)
+    if digest_length not in HASHFUNC_MAP:
+        raise SSLError("Fingerprint of invalid length: {0}".format(fingerprint))
+    hashfunc = HASHFUNC_MAP.get(digest_length)
+    if hashfunc is None:
+        raise SSLError(
+            "Hash function implementation unavailable for fingerprint length: {0}".format(
+                digest_length
+            )
+        )
+
+    # We need encode() here for py32; works on py2 and p33.
+    fingerprint_bytes = unhexlify(fingerprint.encode())
+
+    cert_digest = hashfunc(cert).digest()
+
+    if not _const_compare_digest(cert_digest, fingerprint_bytes):
+        raise SSLError(
+            'Fingerprints did not match. Expected "{0}", got "{1}".'.format(
+                fingerprint, hexlify(cert_digest)
+            )
+        )
+
+
+def resolve_cert_reqs(candidate):
+    """
+    Resolves the argument to a numeric constant, which can be passed to
+    the wrap_socket function/method from the ssl module.
+    Defaults to :data:`ssl.CERT_REQUIRED`.
+    If given a string it is assumed to be the name of the constant in the
+    :mod:`ssl` module or its abbreviation.
+    (So you can specify `REQUIRED` instead of `CERT_REQUIRED`.
+    If it's neither `None` nor a string we assume it is already the numeric
+    constant which can directly be passed to wrap_socket.
+    """
+    if candidate is None:
+        return CERT_REQUIRED
+
+    if isinstance(candidate, str):
+        res = getattr(ssl, candidate, None)
+        if res is None:
+            res = getattr(ssl, "CERT_" + candidate)
+        return res
+
+    return candidate
+
+
+def resolve_ssl_version(candidate):
+    """
+    like resolve_cert_reqs
+    """
+    if candidate is None:
+        return PROTOCOL_TLS
+
+    if isinstance(candidate, str):
+        res = getattr(ssl, candidate, None)
+        if res is None:
+            res = getattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_" + candidate)
+        return res
+
+    return candidate
+
+
+def create_urllib3_context(
+    ssl_version=None, cert_reqs=None, options=None, ciphers=None
+):
+    """All arguments have the same meaning as ``ssl_wrap_socket``.
+
+    By default, this function does a lot of the same work that
+    ``ssl.create_default_context`` does on Python 3.4+. It:
+
+    - Disables SSLv2, SSLv3, and compression
+    - Sets a restricted set of server ciphers
+
+    If you wish to enable SSLv3, you can do::
+
+        from pip._vendor.urllib3.util import ssl_
+        context = ssl_.create_urllib3_context()
+        context.options &= ~ssl_.OP_NO_SSLv3
+
+    You can do the same to enable compression (substituting ``COMPRESSION``
+    for ``SSLv3`` in the last line above).
+
+    :param ssl_version:
+        The desired protocol version to use. This will default to
+        PROTOCOL_SSLv23 which will negotiate the highest protocol that both
+        the server and your installation of OpenSSL support.
+    :param cert_reqs:
+        Whether to require the certificate verification. This defaults to
+        ``ssl.CERT_REQUIRED``.
+    :param options:
+        Specific OpenSSL options. These default to ``ssl.OP_NO_SSLv2``,
+        ``ssl.OP_NO_SSLv3``, ``ssl.OP_NO_COMPRESSION``, and ``ssl.OP_NO_TICKET``.
+    :param ciphers:
+        Which cipher suites to allow the server to select.
+    :returns:
+        Constructed SSLContext object with specified options
+    :rtype: SSLContext
+    """
+    # PROTOCOL_TLS is deprecated in Python 3.10
+    if not ssl_version or ssl_version == PROTOCOL_TLS:
+        ssl_version = PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT
+
+    context = SSLContext(ssl_version)
+
+    context.set_ciphers(ciphers or DEFAULT_CIPHERS)
+
+    # Setting the default here, as we may have no ssl module on import
+    cert_reqs = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED if cert_reqs is None else cert_reqs
+
+    if options is None:
+        options = 0
+        # SSLv2 is easily broken and is considered harmful and dangerous
+        options |= OP_NO_SSLv2
+        # SSLv3 has several problems and is now dangerous
+        options |= OP_NO_SSLv3
+        # Disable compression to prevent CRIME attacks for OpenSSL 1.0+
+        # (issue #309)
+        options |= OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+        # TLSv1.2 only. Unless set explicitly, do not request tickets.
+        # This may save some bandwidth on wire, and although the ticket is encrypted,
+        # there is a risk associated with it being on wire,
+        # if the server is not rotating its ticketing keys properly.
+        options |= OP_NO_TICKET
+
+    context.options |= options
+
+    # Enable post-handshake authentication for TLS 1.3, see GH #1634. PHA is
+    # necessary for conditional client cert authentication with TLS 1.3.
+    # The attribute is None for OpenSSL <= 1.1.0 or does not exist in older
+    # versions of Python.  We only enable on Python 3.7.4+ or if certificate
+    # verification is enabled to work around Python issue #37428
+    # See: https://bugs.python.org/issue37428
+    if (cert_reqs == ssl.CERT_REQUIRED or sys.version_info >= (3, 7, 4)) and getattr(
+        context, "post_handshake_auth", None
+    ) is not None:
+        context.post_handshake_auth = True
+
+    def disable_check_hostname():
+        if (
+            getattr(context, "check_hostname", None) is not None
+        ):  # Platform-specific: Python 3.2
+            # We do our own verification, including fingerprints and alternative
+            # hostnames. So disable it here
+            context.check_hostname = False
+
+    # The order of the below lines setting verify_mode and check_hostname
+    # matter due to safe-guards SSLContext has to prevent an SSLContext with
+    # check_hostname=True, verify_mode=NONE/OPTIONAL. This is made even more
+    # complex because we don't know whether PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT will be used
+    # or not so we don't know the initial state of the freshly created SSLContext.
+    if cert_reqs == ssl.CERT_REQUIRED:
+        context.verify_mode = cert_reqs
+        disable_check_hostname()
+    else:
+        disable_check_hostname()
+        context.verify_mode = cert_reqs
+
+    # Enable logging of TLS session keys via defacto standard environment variable
+    # 'SSLKEYLOGFILE', if the feature is available (Python 3.8+). Skip empty values.
+    if hasattr(context, "keylog_filename"):
+        sslkeylogfile = os.environ.get("SSLKEYLOGFILE")
+        if sslkeylogfile:
+            context.keylog_filename = sslkeylogfile
+
+    return context
+
+
+def ssl_wrap_socket(
+    sock,
+    keyfile=None,
+    certfile=None,
+    cert_reqs=None,
+    ca_certs=None,
+    server_hostname=None,
+    ssl_version=None,
+    ciphers=None,
+    ssl_context=None,
+    ca_cert_dir=None,
+    key_password=None,
+    ca_cert_data=None,
+    tls_in_tls=False,
+):
+    """
+    All arguments except for server_hostname, ssl_context, and ca_cert_dir have
+    the same meaning as they do when using :func:`ssl.wrap_socket`.
+
+    :param server_hostname:
+        When SNI is supported, the expected hostname of the certificate
+    :param ssl_context:
+        A pre-made :class:`SSLContext` object. If none is provided, one will
+        be created using :func:`create_urllib3_context`.
+    :param ciphers:
+        A string of ciphers we wish the client to support.
+    :param ca_cert_dir:
+        A directory containing CA certificates in multiple separate files, as
+        supported by OpenSSL's -CApath flag or the capath argument to
+        SSLContext.load_verify_locations().
+    :param key_password:
+        Optional password if the keyfile is encrypted.
+    :param ca_cert_data:
+        Optional string containing CA certificates in PEM format suitable for
+        passing as the cadata parameter to SSLContext.load_verify_locations()
+    :param tls_in_tls:
+        Use SSLTransport to wrap the existing socket.
+    """
+    context = ssl_context
+    if context is None:
+        # Note: This branch of code and all the variables in it are no longer
+        # used by urllib3 itself. We should consider deprecating and removing
+        # this code.
+        context = create_urllib3_context(ssl_version, cert_reqs, ciphers=ciphers)
+
+    if ca_certs or ca_cert_dir or ca_cert_data:
+        try:
+            context.load_verify_locations(ca_certs, ca_cert_dir, ca_cert_data)
+        except (IOError, OSError) as e:
+            raise SSLError(e)
+
+    elif ssl_context is None and hasattr(context, "load_default_certs"):
+        # try to load OS default certs; works well on Windows (require Python3.4+)
+        context.load_default_certs()
+
+    # Attempt to detect if we get the goofy behavior of the
+    # keyfile being encrypted and OpenSSL asking for the
+    # passphrase via the terminal and instead error out.
+    if keyfile and key_password is None and _is_key_file_encrypted(keyfile):
+        raise SSLError("Client private key is encrypted, password is required")
+
+    if certfile:
+        if key_password is None:
+            context.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile)
+        else:
+            context.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile, key_password)
+
+    try:
+        if hasattr(context, "set_alpn_protocols"):
+            context.set_alpn_protocols(ALPN_PROTOCOLS)
+    except NotImplementedError:  # Defensive: in CI, we always have set_alpn_protocols
+        pass
+
+    # If we detect server_hostname is an IP address then the SNI
+    # extension should not be used according to RFC3546 Section 3.1
+    use_sni_hostname = server_hostname and not is_ipaddress(server_hostname)
+    # SecureTransport uses server_hostname in certificate verification.
+    send_sni = (use_sni_hostname and HAS_SNI) or (
+        IS_SECURETRANSPORT and server_hostname
+    )
+    # Do not warn the user if server_hostname is an invalid SNI hostname.
+    if not HAS_SNI and use_sni_hostname:
+        warnings.warn(
+            "An HTTPS request has been made, but the SNI (Server Name "
+            "Indication) extension to TLS is not available on this platform. "
+            "This may cause the server to present an incorrect TLS "
+            "certificate, which can cause validation failures. You can upgrade to "
+            "a newer version of Python to solve this. For more information, see "
+            "https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/1.26.x/advanced-usage.html"
+            "#ssl-warnings",
+            SNIMissingWarning,
+        )
+
+    if send_sni:
+        ssl_sock = _ssl_wrap_socket_impl(
+            sock, context, tls_in_tls, server_hostname=server_hostname
+        )
+    else:
+        ssl_sock = _ssl_wrap_socket_impl(sock, context, tls_in_tls)
+    return ssl_sock
+
+
+def is_ipaddress(hostname):
+    """Detects whether the hostname given is an IPv4 or IPv6 address.
+    Also detects IPv6 addresses with Zone IDs.
+
+    :param str hostname: Hostname to examine.
+    :return: True if the hostname is an IP address, False otherwise.
+    """
+    if not six.PY2 and isinstance(hostname, bytes):
+        # IDN A-label bytes are ASCII compatible.
+        hostname = hostname.decode("ascii")
+    return bool(IPV4_RE.match(hostname) or BRACELESS_IPV6_ADDRZ_RE.match(hostname))
+
+
+def _is_key_file_encrypted(key_file):
+    """Detects if a key file is encrypted or not."""
+    with open(key_file, "r") as f:
+        for line in f:
+            # Look for Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+            if "ENCRYPTED" in line:
+                return True
+
+    return False
+
+
+def _ssl_wrap_socket_impl(sock, ssl_context, tls_in_tls, server_hostname=None):
+    if tls_in_tls:
+        if not SSLTransport:
+            # Import error, ssl is not available.
+            raise ProxySchemeUnsupported(
+                "TLS in TLS requires support for the 'ssl' module"
+            )
+
+        SSLTransport._validate_ssl_context_for_tls_in_tls(ssl_context)
+        return SSLTransport(sock, ssl_context, server_hostname)
+
+    if server_hostname:
+        return ssl_context.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=server_hostname)
+    else:
+        return ssl_context.wrap_socket(sock)

venv/Lib/site-packages/pip/_vendor/urllib3/util/ssl_match_hostname.py

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+"""The match_hostname() function from Python 3.3.3, essential when using SSL."""
+
+# Note: This file is under the PSF license as the code comes from the python
+# stdlib.   http://docs.python.org/3/license.html
+
+import re
+import sys
+
+# ipaddress has been backported to 2.6+ in pypi.  If it is installed on the
+# system, use it to handle IPAddress ServerAltnames (this was added in
+# python-3.5) otherwise only do DNS matching.  This allows
+# util.ssl_match_hostname to continue to be used in Python 2.7.
+try:
+    import ipaddress
+except ImportError:
+    ipaddress = None
+
+__version__ = "3.5.0.1"
+
+
+class CertificateError(ValueError):
+    pass
+
+
+def _dnsname_match(dn, hostname, max_wildcards=1):
+    """Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
+
+    http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
+    """
+    pats = []
+    if not dn:
+        return False
+
+    # Ported from python3-syntax:
+    # leftmost, *remainder = dn.split(r'.')
+    parts = dn.split(r".")
+    leftmost = parts[0]
+    remainder = parts[1:]
+
+    wildcards = leftmost.count("*")
+    if wildcards > max_wildcards:
+        # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
+        # than one wildcard per fragment.  A survey of established
+        # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
+        # reasonable choice.
+        raise CertificateError(
+            "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn)
+        )
+
+    # speed up common case w/o wildcards
+    if not wildcards:
+        return dn.lower() == hostname.lower()
+
+    # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
+    # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
+    # the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
+    if leftmost == "*":
+        # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
+        # fragment.
+        pats.append("[^.]+")
+    elif leftmost.startswith("xn--") or hostname.startswith("xn--"):
+        # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
+        # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
+        # where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
+        # U-label of an internationalized domain name.
+        pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
+    else:
+        # Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
+        pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r"\*", "[^.]*"))
+
+    # add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
+    for frag in remainder:
+        pats.append(re.escape(frag))
+
+    pat = re.compile(r"\A" + r"\.".join(pats) + r"\Z", re.IGNORECASE)
+    return pat.match(hostname)
+
+
+def _to_unicode(obj):
+    if isinstance(obj, str) and sys.version_info < (3,):
+        # ignored flake8 # F821 to support python 2.7 function
+        obj = unicode(obj, encoding="ascii", errors="strict")  # noqa: F821
+    return obj
+
+
+def _ipaddress_match(ipname, host_ip):
+    """Exact matching of IP addresses.
+
+    RFC 6125 explicitly doesn't define an algorithm for this
+    (section 1.7.2 - "Out of Scope").
+    """
+    # OpenSSL may add a trailing newline to a subjectAltName's IP address
+    # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
+    ip = ipaddress.ip_address(_to_unicode(ipname).rstrip())
+    return ip == host_ip
+
+
+def match_hostname(cert, hostname):
+    """Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
+    SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*.  RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
+    rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
+
+    CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
+    returns nothing.
+    """
+    if not cert:
+        raise ValueError(
+            "empty or no certificate, match_hostname needs a "
+            "SSL socket or SSL context with either "
+            "CERT_OPTIONAL or CERT_REQUIRED"
+        )
+    try:
+        # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
+        host_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(_to_unicode(hostname))
+    except (UnicodeError, ValueError):
+        # ValueError: Not an IP address (common case)
+        # UnicodeError: Divergence from upstream: Have to deal with ipaddress not taking
+        # byte strings.  addresses should be all ascii, so we consider it not
+        # an ipaddress in this case
+        host_ip = None
+    except AttributeError:
+        # Divergence from upstream: Make ipaddress library optional
+        if ipaddress is None:
+            host_ip = None
+        else:  # Defensive
+            raise
+    dnsnames = []
+    san = cert.get("subjectAltName", ())
+    for key, value in san:
+        if key == "DNS":
+            if host_ip is None and _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
+                return
+            dnsnames.append(value)
+        elif key == "IP Address":
+            if host_ip is not None and _ipaddress_match(value, host_ip):
+                return
+            dnsnames.append(value)
+    if not dnsnames:
+        # The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry
+        # in subjectAltName
+        for sub in cert.get("subject", ()):
+            for key, value in sub:
+                # XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
+                # must be used.
+                if key == "commonName":
+                    if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
+                        return
+                    dnsnames.append(value)
+    if len(dnsnames) > 1:
+        raise CertificateError(
+            "hostname %r "
+            "doesn't match either of %s" % (hostname, ", ".join(map(repr, dnsnames)))
+        )
+    elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
+        raise CertificateError("hostname %r doesn't match %r" % (hostname, dnsnames[0]))
+    else:
+        raise CertificateError(
+            "no appropriate commonName or subjectAltName fields were found"
+        )