agentmetry 0.4.0__py3-none-any.whl

agentmetry/policies/dlp/manifest.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+version: "1.0"
+rules:
+  - id: "aws_access_key"
+    name: "AWS Access Key ID"
+    description: "Detects standard AWS access key IDs"
+    pattern: "(?i)\\b((?:AKIA|ABIA|ACCA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16})\\b"
+    category: "credentials"
+    severity: "critical"
+
+  # The 40-char token class alone is useless: every git commit SHA is a 40-char
+  # [a-f0-9] string, so a bare pattern turned `git checkout <sha>` into a
+  # critical match — and in block mode, a denied tool call. Anchor on the
+  # assignment instead, the shape gitleaks uses.
+  #
+  # NOTE the absence of \b around the key name: `_` is a word character, so
+  # `\bsecret` never matches inside `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` and a boundary-based
+  # pattern silently matches nothing at all.
+  #
+  # The \\? before each quote is required, not defensive: scanner.py matches
+  # against json.dumps(arguments), so a quoted value like
+  # `aws_secret_access_key: "AKIA…"` arrives as `\"AKIA…\"`. Same escaping trap
+  # as invisible_unicode_instructions below.
+  - id: "aws_secret_key"
+    name: "AWS Secret Access Key"
+    description: "AWS secret access key assignment (bare 40-char tokens like git SHAs excluded)"
+    pattern: "(?i)(?:aws)?[_\\-]?secret[_\\-]?access[_\\-]?key\\\\?[\"']?\\s*[=:]\\s*\\\\?[\"']?([a-zA-Z0-9+/]{40})"
+    category: "credentials"
+    severity: "critical"
+
+  - id: "github_pat"
+    name: "GitHub Personal Access Token"
+    description: "Detects GitHub PATs (ghp, gho, ghu, ghs, ghb)"
+    pattern: "(?i)\\b(gh[pousb]_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36})\\b"
+    category: "credentials"
+    severity: "critical"
+
+  - id: "huggingface_token"
+    name: "Hugging Face Access Token"
+    description: "Detects Hugging Face user and org access tokens (hf_…)"
+    pattern: "(?i)\\bhf_[a-zA-Z0-9]{34,}\\b"
+    category: "credentials"
+    severity: "critical"
+
+  - id: "tencent_secret_id"
+    name: "Tencent Cloud SecretId"
+    description: "Detects Tencent Cloud API SecretId (AKID prefix)"
+    pattern: "(?i)\\bAKID[A-Za-z0-9]{32}\\b"
+    category: "credentials"
+    severity: "critical"
+
+  - id: "dashscope_api_token"
+    name: "DashScope API Token"
+    description: "Detects bare Alibaba DashScope API tokens (sk- + 32 hex chars)"
+    pattern: "(?i)\\bsk-[a-f0-9]{32}\\b"
+    category: "credentials"
+    severity: "critical"
+
+  - id: "chinese_provider_api_key_assignment"
+    name: "Chinese AI Provider API Key Assignment"
+    description: "Assignment to Moonshot, DashScope, DeepSeek, Zhipu, or MiniMax API keys"
+    pattern: "(?i)\\b(MOONSHOT|DASHSCOPE|DEEPSEEK|ZHIPU|MINIMAX|QWEN|DOUBAO)[_\\s-]*API[_\\s-]*KEY[\"']?\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S+"
+    category: "credentials"
+    severity: "critical"
+
+  - id: "slack_token"
+    name: "Slack Token"
+    description: "Detects Slack bot/user/app tokens"
+    pattern: "(?i)\\b(xox[pbo]-[a-zA-Z0-9-]{10,})\\b"
+    category: "credentials"
+    severity: "critical"
+
+  - id: "bearer_token"
+    name: "Authorization Bearer Token"
+    description: "Detects Bearer tokens in Authorization headers"
+    pattern: "(?i)bearer\\s+[a-z0-9._~+/-]{20,}=*"
+    category: "credentials"
+    severity: "critical"
+
+  - id: "private_key"
+    name: "Private Key Block"
+    description: "Detects PEM private key material (RSA/EC/OpenSSH/PGP)"
+    pattern: "-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |PGP |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----"
+    category: "credentials"
+    severity: "critical"
+
+  - id: "us_ssn"
+    name: "US Social Security Number"
+    description: "Detects standard US SSN format"
+    pattern: "\\b(?!000|666|9\\d{2})\\d{3}-(?!00)\\d{2}-(?!0000)\\d{4}\\b"
+    category: "pii"
+    severity: "high"
+
+  # Rules File Backdoor (Pillar Security, Mar 2025): instructions hidden in
+  # zero-width joiners / bidi overrides inside .cursor/rules, CLAUDE.md or an
+  # MCP tool description. Invisible in review, but the model obeys them.
+  #
+  # Both halves of this pattern are required. scanner.py matches against
+  # json.dumps(arguments), which defaults to ensure_ascii=True, so a real U+200B
+  # arrives as the six ASCII characters ​. The raw-character classes alone
+  # would compile, ship, and never fire. See test_dlp_invisible_unicode.py.
+  - id: "invisible_unicode_instructions"
+    name: "Invisible Unicode Instructions"
+    description: "Zero-width, bidi-override or Unicode-Tags characters used to hide agent instructions"
+    pattern: "[\\u200b\\u200c\\u200d\\u200e\\u200f\\u202a\\u202b\\u202c\\u202d\\u202e\\u2060\\u2061\\u2062\\u2063\\u2064\\ufeff]|[\\U000e0000-\\U000e007f]|\\\\u(?:200[b-f]|202[a-e]|206[0-4]|feff)|\\\\udb40\\\\udc[0-7][0-9a-f]"
+    category: "prompt_injection"
+    severity: "critical"
+
+  # Nx "s1ngularity" campaign (Aug 2025): harvested secrets were double-base64
+  # encoded into results.b64 and pushed to public s1ngularity-repository repos
+  # on the victim's own GitHub account.
+  - id: "s1ngularity_exfil_ioc"
+    name: "s1ngularity Exfiltration IOC"
+    description: "Known artifact names from the Nx s1ngularity credential-theft campaign"
+    pattern: "(?i)s1ngularity-repository|\\bresults\\.b64\\b"
+    category: "exfiltration"
+    severity: "critical"
+
+  # Thailand Ministry of Finance intrusion (Hunt.io, July 2026). Hermes writes
+  # results to /hermes-results/ with predictable filenames; Hunt.io found 575
+  # such directories exposed on the public internet, which is how the campaign
+  # was discovered. An agent output directory in a tool argument is worth a
+  # record: operators do not know their agent is writing there.
+  - id: "agent_result_dump_dir"
+    name: "Agent Result Dump Directory"
+    description: "Known autonomous-agent output directories (Hermes and similar)"
+    pattern: "(?i)[\\\\/](hermes-results|agent-results|openhands-results|\\.hermes)[\\\\/]"
+    category: "exfiltration"
+    severity: "high"
+
+  - id: "double_base64_encode"
+    name: "Double Base64 Encoding"
+    description: "Encode-twice pipeline used to defeat single-pass secret scanners"
+    pattern: "(?i)\\b(base64|b64encode)\\b[^|;&]*\\|[^|;&]*\\b(base64|b64encode)\\b"
+    category: "exfiltration"
+    severity: "high"
+
+  # Markdown image exfil (Johann Rehberger / CamoLeak class): agent embeds harvested
+  # data in an image URL query string. Log by default; block only on pre-hooks with
+  # AGENTMETRY_DLP_MODE=block. Browser-side CamoLeak egress is out of scope.
+  - id: "markdown_image_exfil"
+    name: "Markdown Image Exfiltration"
+    description: "Markdown image URL with long encoded query parameter (data exfil channel)"
+    pattern: "(?i)!\\[[^\\]]*\\]\\(\\s*https?://[^)\\s]*[?&][^)\\s]*=[A-Za-z0-9+/=_%\\-]{32,}"
+    category: "exfiltration"
+    severity: "critical"
+
+  - id: "image_proxy_exfil_host"
+    name: "Image Proxy Exfil Host"
+    description: "Signed image-proxy hosts used in CamoLeak-style character-by-character exfil"
+    pattern: "(?i)https?://[^\\s\"')]*\\b(camo\\.githubusercontent\\.com|\\.blob\\.core\\.windows\\.net)\\b"
+    category: "exfiltration"
+    severity: "high"
+
+  # CVE-2025-59536 / CVE-2026-21852 env override half: repo-controlled config redirects
+  # API traffic or injects runtime hooks. Complements block_agent_exec_config_write.
+  - id: "agent_env_override"
+    name: "Agent Environment Override"
+    description: "Assignment to agent-critical env vars (API base URL, proxy, NODE_OPTIONS, etc.)"
+    pattern: "(?i)\\b(ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL|ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN|OPENAI_BASE_URL|OPENAI_API_BASE|GEMINI_BASE_URL|MOONSHOT_API_KEY|DASHSCOPE_API_KEY|DEEPSEEK_API_KEY|ZHIPUAI_API_KEY|MINIMAX_API_KEY|QWEN_API_KEY|HTTP_PROXY|HTTPS_PROXY|NODE_OPTIONS|PYTHONSTARTUP|LD_PRELOAD)[\"']?\\s*[=:]"
+    category: "execution_hijack"
+    severity: "critical"

agentmetry/policies/opa/agent_rules.rego

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# DRAFT. NOT EVALUATED.
+#
+# Agentmetry does not run OPA today. This file is the target for the
+# policy-as-code work listed under "Exploring" in ROADMAP.md. The rules
+# actually applied at runtime are the small built-in set in
+# apps/orchestrator/core/audit/policy.py, which is off by default.
+#
+# Nothing here affects behaviour. Do not read it as a shipped feature.
+
+package agentmetry.authz
+
+import future.keywords.in
+
+default allow = false
+
+# By default, we allow execution unless a tool is explicitly restricted
+allow {
+    not is_restricted_tool
+}
+
+# Example restricted tools
+restricted_tools := {"kubectl.exec", "aws.iam.delete_user", "shell.rm"}
+
+is_restricted_tool {
+    input.tool.qualified in restricted_tools
+}
+
+# Even restricted tools can be allowed if they carry a successful human approval
+allow {
+    is_restricted_tool
+    input.action.type == "approval_response"
+    input.action.outcome == "success"
+}

agentmetry/policies/tool/manifest.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+version: "1.0"
+# default: allow — deny rules block; default: deny — only allow rules pass
+default: allow
+rules:
+  - id: block_shell_rm
+    action: deny
+    description: Block recursive delete via shell tools
+    tools:
+      - "Bash"
+      - "Shell"
+      - "shell.run"
+      - "cursor.Shell"
+      - "powershell"
+      - "antigravity.run_command"
+      - "*.run_command"
+    command_pattern: "(?i)\\brm\\s+-rf\\b"
+
+  - id: block_kubectl_exec
+    action: deny
+    description: Block kubectl exec into running pods
+    tools:
+      - "kubectl.exec"
+      - "*kubectl*exec*"
+
+  - id: block_iam_delete
+    action: deny
+    description: Block IAM user deletion
+    tools:
+      - "aws.iam.delete_user"
+      - "*delete_user*"
+
+  - id: block_mcp_git_push
+    action: deny
+    description: Block direct git push via MCP without review
+    tools:
+      - "mcp__github__push"
+      - "*github*push*"
+
+  # Nx "s1ngularity" (Aug 2025): malicious postinstall invoked locally installed
+  # agent CLIs with guardrails off and prompted THEM to enumerate secrets. A tool
+  # call spawning an agent CLI in non-interactive mode has no benign analogue.
+  #
+  # The leading negative lookahead exempts Agentmetry's own documented Kimi
+  # print-mode ingest (`kimi -p "…" | python scripts/agentmetry_ingest.py kimi
+  # stream-json`), which otherwise trips this rule in block mode and denies the
+  # capture pipeline the operator installed on purpose.
+  - id: block_agent_cli_weaponization
+    action: deny
+    description: Tool call spawning an agent CLI with guardrails disabled
+    tools:
+      - "Bash"
+      - "Shell"
+      - "shell.run"
+      - "cursor.Shell"
+      - "powershell"
+      - "antigravity.run_command"
+      - "*.run_command"
+    command_pattern: '(?i)^(?!.*agentmetry_ingest).*\b(claude|gemini|codex|cursor-agent|kimi|qwen|deepseek|hermes|openhands|aider|goose|opencode)\b[^|;&\n]*?(--dangerously-skip-permissions|--yolo|--auto|--allowedTools|\s-p\s|--print\b|--prompt\b)'
+
+  # Thailand Ministry of Finance intrusion (Hunt.io, July 2026): the operator ran
+  # Nous Research's Hermes assistant unattended with YOLO mode on, via its own
+  # documented command-line flag, and let it sweep for privilege escalation.
+  # These flags disable the human gate on ANY binary, so this rule deliberately
+  # does not enumerate agent names — a new agent CLI ships every month, and the
+  # flag is the behaviour worth denying, not the vendor.
+  - id: block_unattended_agent_flags
+    action: deny
+    description: Any command disabling the human approval gate (YOLO / auto-approve)
+    tools:
+      - "Bash"
+      - "Shell"
+      - "shell.run"
+      - "cursor.Shell"
+      - "powershell"
+      - "antigravity.run_command"
+      - "*.run_command"
+    command_pattern: '(?i)^(?!.*agentmetry_ingest).*(--yolo\b|--dangerously-skip-permissions\b|--auto-approve\b|--unattended\b|--no-confirm\b|--skip-permissions\b)'
+
+  # Agent execution config is attacker-controlled in an untrusted repo
+  # (CVE-2025-59536 / CVE-2026-21852). These files grant code execution: hooks,
+  # MCP server definitions, env overrides. Deliberately excludes CLAUDE.md and
+  # .cursor/rules — agents edit those legitimately, and the real threat there is
+  # hidden Unicode, which the invisible_unicode_instructions DLP rule catches.
+  - id: block_agent_exec_config_write
+    action: deny
+    description: Block writes to agent execution config (hooks, MCP servers, env)
+    tools:
+      - "Write"
+      - "Edit"
+      - "edit_file"
+      - "write"
+      - "str_replace_editor"
+      - "*.write_file"
+      - "*.edit_file"
+    command_pattern: '(?i)(^|[\\/])(\.claude[\\/]settings(\.local)?\.json|\.mcp\.json|\.claude[\\/]hooks?[\\/]|\.qwen[\\/]settings|\.qoder[\\/]settings|\.codebuddy[\\/]settings|\.kimi-code[\\/]config\.toml)'
+
+  # Git hook persistence: agent plants .git/hooks/* or repoints core.hooksPath.
+  # Deny only on pre-hooks when AGENTMETRY_TOOL_POLICY_MODE=block.
+  - id: block_git_hook_persistence
+    action: deny
+    description: Block agent writes to git hooks or core.hooksPath repointing
+    tools:
+      - "Write"
+      - "Edit"
+      - "edit_file"
+      - "write"
+      - "str_replace_editor"
+      - "*.write_file"
+      - "*.edit_file"
+      - "Bash"
+      - "Shell"
+      - "shell.run"
+      - "cursor.Shell"
+      - "powershell"
+      - "antigravity.run_command"
+      - "*.run_command"
+    command_pattern: '(?i)(^|[\\/])\.git[\\/]hooks[\\/](pre-commit|post-commit|pre-push|post-merge|post-checkout|prepare-commit-msg)|\bcore\.hooksPath\b'

agentmetry-0.4.0.dist-info/METADATA

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: agentmetry
+Version: 0.4.0
+Summary: Local-first flight recorder for AI coding agents: hash-chained audit trail, MITRE-mapped sequence detection, DLP
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://agentmetry.ai
+Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/blitzcrieg1/agentmetry
+Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/blitzcrieg1/agentmetry/issues
+Project-URL: Changelog, https://github.com/blitzcrieg1/agentmetry/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md
+Author: Ioannis L.
+License: Apache-2.0
+Keywords: agentic-ai,ai-agents,ai-security,audit-log,claude-code,cursor,devsecops,dlp,local-first,mitre-attack,siem
+Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: System Administrators
+Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: Apache Software License
+Classifier: Operating System :: Microsoft :: Windows
+Classifier: Operating System :: POSIX :: Linux
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
+Classifier: Topic :: Security
+Classifier: Topic :: System :: Logging
+Classifier: Topic :: System :: Monitoring
+Requires-Python: >=3.11
+Requires-Dist: aiosqlite>=0.20.0
+Requires-Dist: fastapi>=0.115.0
+Requires-Dist: httpx>=0.28.0
+Requires-Dist: mcp>=1.2
+Requires-Dist: pydantic-settings>=2.6.0
+Requires-Dist: pydantic>=2.9.0
+Requires-Dist: pyyaml>=6.0
+Requires-Dist: sqlalchemy>=2.0.0
+Requires-Dist: tzdata; sys_platform == 'win32'
+Requires-Dist: uvicorn[standard]>=0.32.0
+Requires-Dist: websockets>=14.0
+Provides-Extra: dev
+Requires-Dist: pytest-asyncio>=0.24; extra == 'dev'
+Requires-Dist: pytest>=8.0; extra == 'dev'
+Requires-Dist: ruff==0.16.0; extra == 'dev'
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+
+# Agentmetry
+
+A local-first flight recorder for AI coding agents.
+
+Agentmetry hooks the tool lifecycle of Claude Code, Cursor, Codex and Antigravity,
+writes every tool call, approval and denial to a hash-chained JSONL trail on your
+machine, and runs sequence detection over the session. A credential read followed
+by network egress becomes one finding rather than two unremarkable log lines.
+
+Everything runs locally. There are no cloud calls and no telemetry. Forwarding to
+Elastic ECS, Splunk HEC or a webhook exists and is off unless you configure it.
+
+```bash
+pip install agentmetry
+agentmetry doctor
+```
+
+## Check the detection claims yourself
+
+The corpus ships inside the package, so this works from a clean install:
+
+```bash
+agentmetry benchmark
+```
+
+It replays recorded sessions through the real rule engine and exits non-zero on
+any missed rule or any false positive. The benign half is the number that
+matters: any tool can fire on an attack, and a feed that cries wolf gets muted.
+
+## What it does not do
+
+- **It is not a CASB.** It records the agents you wire in. An unmanaged browser
+  assistant is invisible to it.
+- **It is a recorder, not a sandbox.** The only enforcement path is pre-execution
+  DLP blocking in the hook.
+- **The DLP is regex, not ML.** A starting pack you extend in YAML.
+- **It is a public alpha.** Integration surfaces may still change.
+
+Full documentation, the event schema, and the SIEM integration guides are in the
+repository.
+
+- Source and issues: https://github.com/blitzcrieg1/agentmetry
+- Website: https://agentmetry.ai
+
+Apache-2.0.

agentmetry-0.4.0.dist-info/RECORD

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
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agentmetry-0.4.0.dist-info/entry_points.txt

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