agenticdome-python-sdk 1.1.2__py3-none-any.whl → 1.1.4__py3-none-any.whl

{agenticdome_python_sdk-1.1.2.dist-info → agenticdome_python_sdk-1.1.4.dist-info}/METADATA

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: agenticdome-python-sdk
-Version: 1.1.2
+Version: 1.1.4
 Summary: Official Python SDK for AgenticDome security guardrails, DLP, tool authorization, and multi-agent delegation enforcement.
 Author: AgenticDome
 License: Proprietary
-Project-URL: Homepage, https://au.agenticdome.io
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://www.agenticdome.io
 Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/agenticdome/agenticdome-python-sdk
 Project-URL: Documentation, https://github.com/agenticdome/agenticdome-python-sdk#readme
 Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/agenticdome/agenticdome-python-sdk/issues
@@ -27,56 +27,59 @@ License-File: LICENSE
 Requires-Dist: requests>=2.31.0
 Requires-Dist: urllib3>=2.0.0
 Provides-Extra: crewai
-Requires-Dist: crewai; extra == "crewai"
+Requires-Dist: crewai==1.15.5; extra == "crewai"
 Provides-Extra: redis
 Requires-Dist: redis>=4.5.0; extra == "redis"
+Provides-Extra: pop
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=42.0.0; extra == "pop"
 Provides-Extra: pydanticai
-Requires-Dist: pydantic-ai; extra == "pydanticai"
+Requires-Dist: pydantic-ai==2.14.1; extra == "pydanticai"
 Requires-Dist: anyio>=4.0.0; extra == "pydanticai"
 Provides-Extra: pydantic
-Requires-Dist: pydantic-ai; extra == "pydantic"
+Requires-Dist: pydantic-ai==2.14.1; extra == "pydantic"
 Requires-Dist: anyio>=4.0.0; extra == "pydantic"
 Provides-Extra: langgraph
-Requires-Dist: langgraph; extra == "langgraph"
-Requires-Dist: langchain-core; extra == "langgraph"
+Requires-Dist: langgraph==1.2.9; extra == "langgraph"
+Requires-Dist: langchain-core==1.5.0; extra == "langgraph"
 Requires-Dist: anyio>=4.0.0; extra == "langgraph"
 Provides-Extra: microsoft
 Provides-Extra: foundry
-Requires-Dist: azure-ai-projects; extra == "foundry"
-Requires-Dist: azure-identity; extra == "foundry"
+Requires-Dist: azure-ai-projects==2.3.0; extra == "foundry"
+Requires-Dist: azure-identity==1.25.3; extra == "foundry"
 Provides-Extra: agno
-Requires-Dist: agno; extra == "agno"
+Requires-Dist: agno==2.8.0; extra == "agno"
 Provides-Extra: openai-agents
-Requires-Dist: openai-agents; extra == "openai-agents"
+Requires-Dist: openai-agents==0.18.3; extra == "openai-agents"
 Provides-Extra: mcp
-Requires-Dist: mcp; extra == "mcp"
+Requires-Dist: mcp<=1.28.1,>=1.26.0; extra == "mcp"
 Provides-Extra: bedrock
-Requires-Dist: boto3; extra == "bedrock"
+Requires-Dist: boto3==1.43.52; extra == "bedrock"
 Provides-Extra: aws-bedrock
-Requires-Dist: boto3; extra == "aws-bedrock"
+Requires-Dist: boto3==1.43.52; extra == "aws-bedrock"
 Provides-Extra: llamaindex
-Requires-Dist: llama-index; extra == "llamaindex"
+Requires-Dist: llama-index==0.14.23; extra == "llamaindex"
 Provides-Extra: llama-index
-Requires-Dist: llama-index; extra == "llama-index"
+Requires-Dist: llama-index==0.14.23; extra == "llama-index"
 Provides-Extra: google-adk
-Requires-Dist: google-adk; extra == "google-adk"
+Requires-Dist: google-adk==2.5.0; extra == "google-adk"
 Provides-Extra: adk
-Requires-Dist: google-adk; extra == "adk"
+Requires-Dist: google-adk==2.5.0; extra == "adk"
 Provides-Extra: all
-Requires-Dist: crewai; extra == "all"
+Requires-Dist: crewai==1.15.5; extra == "all"
 Requires-Dist: redis>=4.5.0; extra == "all"
-Requires-Dist: pydantic-ai; extra == "all"
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=42.0.0; extra == "all"
+Requires-Dist: pydantic-ai==2.14.1; extra == "all"
 Requires-Dist: anyio>=4.0.0; extra == "all"
-Requires-Dist: langgraph; extra == "all"
-Requires-Dist: langchain-core; extra == "all"
-Requires-Dist: agno; extra == "all"
-Requires-Dist: azure-ai-projects; extra == "all"
-Requires-Dist: azure-identity; extra == "all"
-Requires-Dist: openai-agents; extra == "all"
-Requires-Dist: mcp; extra == "all"
-Requires-Dist: boto3; extra == "all"
-Requires-Dist: llama-index; extra == "all"
-Requires-Dist: google-adk; extra == "all"
+Requires-Dist: langgraph==1.2.9; extra == "all"
+Requires-Dist: langchain-core==1.5.0; extra == "all"
+Requires-Dist: agno==2.8.0; extra == "all"
+Requires-Dist: azure-ai-projects==2.3.0; extra == "all"
+Requires-Dist: azure-identity==1.25.3; extra == "all"
+Requires-Dist: openai-agents==0.18.3; extra == "all"
+Requires-Dist: mcp<=1.28.1,>=1.26.0; extra == "all"
+Requires-Dist: boto3==1.43.52; extra == "all"
+Requires-Dist: llama-index==0.14.23; extra == "all"
+Requires-Dist: google-adk==2.5.0; extra == "all"
 Provides-Extra: dev
 Requires-Dist: pytest>=8.0.0; extra == "dev"
 Requires-Dist: ruff>=0.5.0; extra == "dev"
@@ -155,7 +158,7 @@ Your local Python runtime executes agents, tools, workflows, and framework-speci
 [ LOCAL ENTERPRISE RUNTIME PERIMETER ]                     [ AGENTICDOME CENTRAL PLANE ]
 
 +-------------------------------------------------+          +-----------------------------+
-| Python Agent Runtime                            |          | https://au.agenticdome.io   |
+| Python Agent Runtime                            |          | https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io   |
 | CrewAI / PydanticAI / LangGraph / Microsoft AF / AI Foundry / Agno / OpenAI Agents / MCP Hosts / Bedrock / Google ADK / LlamaIndex |          | Centralized Policy Engine   |
 +-------------------------------------------------+          +-----------------------------+
      |                         |              ^                            ^
@@ -225,15 +228,48 @@ Authorizes tool calls before execution using:
 
 AgenticDome can transparently authorize multi-agent delegation workflows and issue decision tokens that bind:
 
+- Originating human subject, when present
+- Ordered and nested agent actor chain
 - Source manager agent
 - Target specialist agent
 - Tool name
 - Tool arguments
 - Session ID
+- Trace and lineage root/parent IDs
+- Intent digest, policy binding, authorized scopes, and trust epochs
 - Tenant context
 - Policy decision
 
-This helps prevent unauthorized lateral privilege escalation between agents.
+Execution verification consumes the server-side call budget and checks revocation state. Optional proof-bound decisions use a DPoP-style signed JWT tied to the decision token hash; sending the public-key thumbprint alone is not treated as proof.
+
+Install the proof helper extra and create a runtime-held key:
+
+```bash
+pip install "agenticdome-python-sdk[pop]"
+```
+
+```python
+from agenticdome_sdk import create_dpop_proof, generate_rsa_proof_key
+
+proof_key = generate_rsa_proof_key()
+# Pass proof_key["thumbprint"] as proof_thumbprint when authorizing.
+proof = create_dpop_proof(
+    proof_key["private_key_pem"],
+    access_token=decision_token,
+    method="POST",
+    uri="/a2a",
+)
+client.a2a_verify_decision_token_rpc(
+    decision_token,
+    tool_name=tool_name,
+    tool_args=tool_args,
+    agent_id=worker_id,
+    source_agent_id=manager_id,
+    proof_token=proof,
+)
+```
+
+This helps prevent unauthorized lateral privilege escalation and stolen-token replay between agents.
 
 ### Inline Output Data Loss Prevention, DLP
 
@@ -302,6 +338,7 @@ Install the extra for the framework you use:
 | AWS Bedrock / Bedrock Agents | `pip install "agenticdome-python-sdk[bedrock]"` |
 | MCP host / gateway | `pip install "agenticdome-python-sdk[mcp]"` |
 | Redis token storage | `pip install "agenticdome-python-sdk[redis]"` |
+| Proof-of-possession helpers | `pip install "agenticdome-python-sdk[pop]"` |
 | All optional integrations | `pip install "agenticdome-python-sdk[all]"` |
 
 Some adapters are dependency-light at import time. Google ADK, LlamaIndex, Bedrock, MCP, and Microsoft helpers can wrap local boundaries without forcing one exact runtime stack; install the framework packages your application actually uses.
@@ -315,8 +352,8 @@ Set these environment variables in your local shell, container, CI/CD environmen
 ### Required Variables
 
 ```bash
-# Regional gateway base URL.
-export AGENTICDOME_API_BASE="https://au.agenticdome.io"
+# Tenant runtime sidecar URL. Do not use the control-plane website URL here.
+export AGENTICDOME_API_BASE="https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io"
 
 # Secure access token generated in the AgenticDome console.
 export AGENTICDOME_API_KEY="your_api_key_abc123..."
@@ -409,7 +446,7 @@ Set these values in the same place you configure your Python application runtime
 Minimum production configuration:
 
 ```bash
-export AGENTICDOME_API_BASE="https://au.agenticdome.io"
+export AGENTICDOME_API_BASE="https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io"
 export AGENTICDOME_API_KEY="your_api_key"
 export AGENTICDOME_TENANT_ID="your_tenant_id"
 export AGENTICDOME_FAIL_CLOSED="true"
@@ -569,7 +606,7 @@ secure_refund = firewall.wrap_delegated_tool_handler(
 
 | Environment Variable | Type | Default | Description |
 | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
-| `AGENTICDOME_API_BASE` | string | required | AgenticDome regional API and console endpoint, for example `https://au.agenticdome.io`. |
+| `AGENTICDOME_API_BASE` | string | required | Tenant runtime sidecar origin, for example `https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io`. This is separate from the control-plane console URL. |
 | `AGENTICDOME_API_KEY` | string | required | API key generated in the AgenticDome console. |
 | `AGENTICDOME_TENANT_ID` | string | required | Tenant or organization isolation namespace. |
 | `AGENTICDOME_PLATFORM` | string | framework-specific | Runtime platform label included in policy context. |
@@ -777,7 +814,7 @@ Use the core client when you own the runtime loop or have a custom gateway. This
 from agenticdome_sdk.client import AgentGuardClient
 
 client = AgentGuardClient(
-    api_base="https://au.agenticdome.io",
+    api_base="https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io",
     api_key="your-api-key",
     tenant_id="your-tenant-id",
     timeout=20,
@@ -1132,7 +1169,7 @@ pip install "agenticdome-python-sdk[pydanticai]"
 [ PYDANTICAI AGENT RUNTIME PERIMETER ]            [ AGENTICDOME CONTROL PLANE ]
 
 +-------------------------------------------------+          +-----------------------------+
-| Agent.run() Execution Loop                      |          | https://au.agenticdome.io   |
+| Agent.run() Execution Loop                      |          | https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io   |
 +-------------------------------------------------+          +-----------------------------+
      |                         |              ^                            ^
      | 1. before_runner_init   | 4. after     | Verdict / DLP                |
@@ -1261,7 +1298,7 @@ PydanticAI lifecycle hook APIs have evolved. Current PydanticAI documents `pydan
 - If compatible legacy lifecycle decorators are available, `attach_to_agent()` attaches prompt ingress and egress DLP hooks.
 - If native `Hooks` capabilities are available, `create_hooks()` returns a capability object you can pass into `Agent(..., capabilities=[...])`.
 - If lifecycle decorators are not available, `@firewall.secure_tool(...)` still protects tool execution.
-- In production mode, configure API base, API key, tenant ID, and stable session IDs.
+- In production mode, configure the tenant runtime sidecar, API key, tenant ID, and stable session IDs.
 - `AGENTICDOME_BLOCK_ON_SENSITIVE_OUTPUT=true` means AgenticDome may ask Mesh to block sensitive output; the SDK only blocks when the policy response verdict is `BLOCKED`.
 
 ---
@@ -1297,7 +1334,7 @@ pip install "agenticdome-python-sdk[langgraph]"
 [ LANGGRAPH STATEGRAPH RUNTIME ]                    [ AGENTICDOME CONTROL PLANE ]
 
 +-----------------------------------------------+     +-----------------------------+
-| StateGraph / CompiledStateGraph               |     | https://au.agenticdome.io   |
+| StateGraph / CompiledStateGraph               |     | https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io   |
 +-----------------------------------------------+     +-----------------------------+
      |                  |                 ^                       ^
      | 1. user message  | 2. tool calls   | 4. verdict / token    | validate
@@ -1512,7 +1549,7 @@ Install the Microsoft Agent Framework packages used by your application separate
 [ MICROSOFT AGENT FRAMEWORK PYTHON RUNTIME ]       [ AGENTICDOME CONTROL PLANE ]
 
 +------------------------------------------------+   +-----------------------------+
-| Agent.run / Workflow.run / Function Tool       |   | https://au.agenticdome.io   |
+| Agent.run / Workflow.run / Function Tool       |   | https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io   |
 +------------------------------------------------+   +-----------------------------+
      |                    |                 ^                     ^
      | 1. input text      | 2. tool args    | verdict / token      | validate
@@ -1709,7 +1746,7 @@ The Foundry integration supports:
 - Direct tool-argument stripping, lightweight JSON-schema validation, and sanitized-argument execution when AgenticDome returns safer arguments
 - Enterprise identity context propagation for Entra IDs, roles/scopes, Foundry project IDs, and Purview or sensitivity labels
 - Production-mode stable session ID enforcement and output-sanitization requirements
-- Output DLP through Mesh using the required AgenticDome API base URL, API key, and tenant ID
+- Output DLP through Mesh using the required tenant runtime sidecar URL, API key, and tenant ID
 - Structured-output preservation by parsing sanitized JSON back to dictionaries/lists where possible
 - Local rate limits, input/output/tool-argument size limits, retries, circuit breaker behavior, audit logging, and OpenTelemetry span events
 - Streaming response sanitization through `sanitize_streaming_response()`
@@ -1735,7 +1772,7 @@ If your application uses Microsoft Agent Framework hosted agents, install the Fo
 Foundry threat-contract calls use bearer authentication:
 
 ```bash
-export AGENTICDOME_API_BASE="https://au.agenticdome.io"
+export AGENTICDOME_API_BASE="https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io"
 export AGENTICDOME_BEARER_TOKEN="your_foundry_threat_contract_bearer_token"
 ```
 
@@ -1894,7 +1931,7 @@ from agenticdome_sdk.microsoft_ai_foundry import (
 - Production deployments should pass a stable `session_id`, `run_id`, `trace_id`, `conversation_id`, or `thread_id`; generated fallback IDs are intended for local development only.
 - Pass Entra identity, roles/scopes, Foundry project IDs, and Purview/sensitivity labels on `ctx` or `policy_context` so server-side policy can make identity-aware decisions.
 - If a Foundry hosted tool executes entirely inside a remote provider runtime, this local Python SDK can protect the local request/response boundary but cannot inspect inside the remote execution environment.
-- Microsoft AI Foundry requires the standard AgenticDome API base URL, API key, and tenant ID. Threat-contract prompt and tool analysis also require `AGENTICDOME_BEARER_TOKEN`.
+- Microsoft AI Foundry requires the tenant runtime sidecar URL, API key, and tenant ID. Threat-contract prompt and tool analysis also require `AGENTICDOME_BEARER_TOKEN`.
 
 Official references:
 
@@ -2991,7 +3028,7 @@ If you need to call AgenticDome APIs manually, use the core SDK client.
 from agenticdome_sdk.client import AgentGuardClient
 
 client = AgentGuardClient(
-    api_base="https://au.agenticdome.io",
+    api_base="https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io",
     api_key="your-api-key",
     tenant_id="your-tenant-id",
     timeout=20,
@@ -3012,7 +3049,7 @@ client.report_incident(
 from agenticdome_sdk.client import AgentGuardClient
 
 client = AgentGuardClient(
-    api_base="https://au.agenticdome.io",
+    api_base="https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io",
     api_key="your-api-key",
     tenant_id="your-tenant-id",
     timeout=20,
@@ -3040,7 +3077,7 @@ print(result)
 from agenticdome_sdk.client import AgentGuardClient
 
 client = AgentGuardClient(
-    api_base="https://au.agenticdome.io",
+    api_base="https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io",
     api_key="your-api-key",
     tenant_id="your-tenant-id",
     timeout=20,
@@ -3076,7 +3113,7 @@ print(result)
 from agenticdome_sdk.client import AgentGuardClient
 
 client = AgentGuardClient(
-    api_base="https://au.agenticdome.io",
+    api_base="https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io",
     api_key="your-api-key",
     tenant_id="your-tenant-id",
     timeout=20,
@@ -3113,7 +3150,7 @@ print(authorization)
 from agenticdome_sdk.client import AgentGuardClient
 
 client = AgentGuardClient(
-    api_base="https://au.agenticdome.io",
+    api_base="https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io",
     api_key="your-api-key",
     tenant_id="your-tenant-id",
     timeout=20,
@@ -3144,7 +3181,7 @@ print(verification)
 from agenticdome_sdk.client import AgentGuardClient
 
 client = AgentGuardClient(
-    api_base="https://au.agenticdome.io",
+    api_base="https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io",
     api_key="your-api-key",
     tenant_id="your-tenant-id",
     timeout=20,
@@ -3193,7 +3230,7 @@ In-memory token storage is suitable for local development and single-process wor
 ## Recommended Production Settings
 
 ```bash
-export AGENTICDOME_API_BASE="https://au.agenticdome.io"
+export AGENTICDOME_API_BASE="https://demo-sidecar.agenticdome.io"
 export AGENTICDOME_API_KEY="your_api_key"
 export AGENTICDOME_TENANT_ID="your_tenant_id"
 
@@ -3418,7 +3455,7 @@ For strict security-policy validation, add:
 export AGENTICDOME_LIVE_EXPECT_STRICT=1
 ```
 
-The live tenant test performs real `guardrail_validate()` and `mesh_validate()` calls through the core client. Framework-specific behavior remains covered by the offline adapter test matrix above, because those tests assert where each framework boundary calls the shared AgenticDome client and how it handles policy decisions.
+The live tenant suite performs real `guardrail_validate()` and `mesh_validate()` calls, verifies that one request can carry an originating human subject and upstream agent actor together, and queries the tenant's active threat-signature bundle through the public SDK method. With `AGENTICDOME_LIVE_EXPECT_STRICT=1`, it additionally requires sensitive output enforcement plus a signed bundle whose provenance is `agenticdome_private_collection`. Framework-specific behavior remains covered by the offline adapter test matrix above.
 
 ---
 

agenticdome_python_sdk-1.1.4.dist-info/RECORD

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+agenticdome_python_sdk-1.1.4.dist-info/licenses/LICENSE,sha256=lqAH8G9tU2WPK9fzrnM_QMd4XUrh9fsmPqKE_hniKpM,718
+agenticdome_sdk/__init__.py,sha256=6eOHJkY_Ir51dRKTktObXS40PjUsHrWMEQ2V3N0ItN4,576
+agenticdome_sdk/agno.py,sha256=3gbc5URNTAHyNVAaAH882CpQpMecTv0R6S0CNMDOgos,60686
+agenticdome_sdk/aws_bedrock.py,sha256=Z1Rcbps7VgvETmq_wrUbIvg6lJxsoe7YJEPZYkBKr80,69498
+agenticdome_sdk/client.py,sha256=rRFqW5zXVDYGqDrchy3D-HxRaDINttcgYu8VRQXnceU,48658
+agenticdome_sdk/crewai.py,sha256=7o7yapjbGfxfHGrmKtnpERIeJlDKIRgqz2h1WpLQJkQ,52389
+agenticdome_sdk/google_adk.py,sha256=U23uSvUxgeQRUX6fGewls0CU0GI8mru67O1mHti7RkA,57175
+agenticdome_sdk/identity.py,sha256=mrymGgZSVsKJ9THRde54qGmMT7j_uZHmPJ-HtWk7PXE,4635
+agenticdome_sdk/langgraph.py,sha256=9zRAjA2KeDRS28PuPiVj5XrPm2-vONfkqNvXOVoIILY,84234
+agenticdome_sdk/llamaindex.py,sha256=uFDzeYNz4Y72W-5XdluhdHvKAc8xkPJRkPaLFvwhlSk,42777
+agenticdome_sdk/mcp_host.py,sha256=bEGamFhnUEL-V_qP1FLTqrItpx7p9NQWlJyzUzqQcYw,59484
+agenticdome_sdk/microsoft_agent_framework.py,sha256=uSO7cOl9rWC99KaNkLv0ciU7EWpxAxNBGmolP_CVpaA,67140
+agenticdome_sdk/microsoft_ai_foundry.py,sha256=GkfdfW0ajSpRRoLXyo5FYAp5img0JVDUJO52wZvew1I,56803
+agenticdome_sdk/openai_agents.py,sha256=bWoJ2hjCyXDWl5Eo4pjeRr_MOQgNOZW7QE9WRDo6oDw,57243
+agenticdome_sdk/proof.py,sha256=ECKc14xSE0V1HHmcpZjfVz8-Q2H_fooah3BfdblFV8M,2878
+agenticdome_sdk/pydantic.py,sha256=7R6X0JgPIMLcWO682wcpN0X8dSMVEiwvVc4ydUN111s,54882
+agenticdome_sdk/scenarios.py,sha256=QROC_JWKwub5AdpP9pLXdJCpotEACkF-qgKAnDAo8XA,7882
+agenticdome_python_sdk-1.1.4.dist-info/METADATA,sha256=f1Nw3Nh3QRo3WLtYR7dO1QXFBTWqR1DNWxv2zRS853E,165975
+agenticdome_python_sdk-1.1.4.dist-info/WHEEL,sha256=K260EYznzXsJYBQGqmI8VTxEdiZYNvDZwW9cBh9-_MA,91
+agenticdome_python_sdk-1.1.4.dist-info/top_level.txt,sha256=LZbbjXco5mqDrGwlTJpIKI5Sp6R_njzHHjExxAs9c3s,16
+agenticdome_python_sdk-1.1.4.dist-info/RECORD,,

{agenticdome_python_sdk-1.1.2.dist-info → agenticdome_python_sdk-1.1.4.dist-info}/WHEEL

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 Wheel-Version: 1.0
-Generator: setuptools (82.0.1)
+Generator: setuptools (83.0.0)
 Root-Is-Purelib: true
 Tag: py3-none-any
 

agenticdome_sdk/__init__.py

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 from .client import AgentGuardClient, AgentGuardError, AgentGuardHTTPError
+from .identity import IDENTITY_CONTEXT_VERSION, canonicalize_identity_context, enrich_policy_context
+from .proof import create_dpop_proof, generate_rsa_proof_key, jwk_thumbprint
 
 GuardrailClient = AgentGuardClient
 
@@ -7,4 +9,10 @@ __all__ = [
     "GuardrailClient",
     "AgentGuardError",
     "AgentGuardHTTPError",
+    "IDENTITY_CONTEXT_VERSION",
+    "canonicalize_identity_context",
+    "enrich_policy_context",
+    "create_dpop_proof",
+    "generate_rsa_proof_key",
+    "jwk_thumbprint",
 ]

agenticdome_sdk/client.py

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ import requests
 from requests.adapters import HTTPAdapter
 from urllib3.util.retry import Retry
 
+from .identity import enrich_policy_context
+
 
 class AgentGuardError(Exception):
     """Base SDK exception."""
@@ -49,12 +51,13 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
         tenant_id: Optional[Union[str, int]] = None,
         bearer_token: Optional[str] = None,
         timeout: int = 20,
-        user_agent: str = "agenticdome-python-sdk/0.4.0",
+        user_agent: str = "agenticdome-python-sdk/1.1.3",
         max_retries: int = 3,
         connect_timeout: Optional[float] = None,
         pool_connections: int = 20,
         pool_maxsize: int = 100,
         pool_block: bool = False,
+        service_token: Optional[str] = None,
     ):
         self.api_base = self._require_nonempty("api_base", api_base).rstrip("/")
         self.api_key = self._require_nonempty(
@@ -69,6 +72,11 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
             bearer_token
             or os.getenv("AGENTICDOME_BEARER_TOKEN")
         )
+        self.service_token = (
+            service_token
+            or os.getenv("AGENTICDOME_SERVICE_TOKEN")
+            or os.getenv("SERVICE_SECRET")
+        )
         self.timeout = timeout
         self.connect_timeout = self._positive_float(
             "connect_timeout",
@@ -194,7 +202,11 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
         for key, value in top_level_values.items():
             if value is not None:
                 pc[key] = value
-        return pc
+        return enrich_policy_context(
+            pc,
+            platform=pc.get("platform"),
+            target_agent_id=pc.get("target_agent_id") or pc.get("agent_id"),
+        )
 
     def _validate_guardrail_args(
         self,
@@ -226,9 +238,6 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
 
         normalized_direction = self._normalize_direction(direction)
 
-        if source_agent_id and user_id:
-            raise ValueError("Provide either 'source_agent_id' or 'user_id', not both")
-
         if tool_name and tool_args is None:
             raise ValueError("'tool_args' is required when 'tool_name' is provided")
         if tool_args is not None and not tool_name:
@@ -302,6 +311,24 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
         except Exception as exc:
             raise AgentGuardError(f"Failed to decode JSON response from {url}: {exc}") from exc
 
+    def _protected_request(
+        self,
+        method: str,
+        path: str,
+        *,
+        json_body: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
+        tenant_id: Optional[Union[str, int]] = None,
+    ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        headers = {"X-Service-Token": self.service_token} if self.service_token else None
+        return self._request(
+            method,
+            path,
+            json_body=json_body,
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+            use_bearer=bool(not self.service_token and self.bearer_token),
+            extra_headers=headers,
+        )
+
     # ------------------------------------------------------------------
     # SaaS Scan Endpoints
     # ------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -478,6 +505,7 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
 
         merged_policy_context = self._merge_policy_context(
             policy_context,
+            agent_id=agent_id,
             platform=platform,
             source_platform=source_platform,
             tool_platform=tool_platform,
@@ -602,6 +630,7 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
 
         merged_policy_context = self._merge_policy_context(
             policy_context,
+            agent_id=agent_id,
             platform=effective_platform,
             source_platform=source_platform,
             source_agent_id=source_agent_id,
@@ -651,7 +680,33 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
         is_agent: bool = True,
     ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
         path = f"/trust/score/{agent_id}?is_agent={'true' if is_agent else 'false'}"
-        return self._request("GET", path, tenant_id=tenant_id)
+        return self._protected_request("GET", path, tenant_id=tenant_id)
+
+    def get_behavioral_attestation(
+        self,
+        agent_id: str,
+        tenant_id: Optional[Union[str, int]] = None,
+    ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        self._require_nonempty("agent_id", agent_id)
+        return self._protected_request("GET", f"/trust/behavior/{agent_id}", tenant_id=tenant_id)
+
+    def get_behavioral_summary(
+        self,
+        tenant_id: Optional[Union[str, int]] = None,
+        limit: int = 300,
+    ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        bounded_limit = max(1, min(int(limit), 1000))
+        return self._protected_request(
+            "GET",
+            f"/trust/behavior-summary?limit={bounded_limit}",
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+        )
+
+    def get_threat_signature_status(
+        self,
+        tenant_id: Optional[Union[str, int]] = None,
+    ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        return self._protected_request("GET", "/security/threat-signatures/status", tenant_id=tenant_id)
 
     def report_incident(
         self,
@@ -672,7 +727,7 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
             "is_agent": is_agent,
             "platform": platform or "unknown",
         }
-        return self._request("POST", "/trust/report", json_body=payload, tenant_id=tenant_id)
+        return self._protected_request("POST", "/trust/report", json_body=payload, tenant_id=tenant_id)
 
     def reset_trust_score(
         self,
@@ -682,7 +737,7 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
         is_agent: bool = True,
         service_token: Optional[str] = None,
     ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
-        token = service_token or admin_secret or os.getenv("AGENTICDOME_SERVICE_TOKEN") or os.getenv("SERVICE_SECRET")
+        token = service_token or admin_secret or self.service_token
         if not token:
             raise ValueError("reset_trust_score requires service_token or AGENTICDOME_SERVICE_TOKEN")
         path = f"/trust/reset/{agent_id}?is_agent={'true' if is_agent else 'false'}"
@@ -742,6 +797,16 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
         block_on_sensitive_output: Optional[bool] = None,
         trusted_destination_domains: Optional[List[str]] = None,
         allowed_destination_domains: Optional[List[str]] = None,
+        user_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        actor_chain: Optional[List[Dict[str, Any]]] = None,
+        scopes: Optional[List[str]] = None,
+        permissions: Optional[List[str]] = None,
+        parent_jti: Optional[str] = None,
+        root_jti: Optional[str] = None,
+        policy_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        policy_version: Optional[str] = None,
+        policy_hash: Optional[str] = None,
+        proof_thumbprint: Optional[str] = None,
         tenant_id: Optional[Union[str, int]] = None,
         request_id: Union[str, int] = "1",
     ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
@@ -779,6 +844,7 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
 
         merged_policy_context = self._merge_policy_context(
             policy_context,
+            agent_id=agent_id,
             platform=platform,
             source_platform=source_platform,
             tool_platform=tool_platform,
@@ -798,6 +864,16 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
             block_on_sensitive_output=block_on_sensitive_output,
             trusted_destination_domains=trusted_destination_domains,
             allowed_destination_domains=allowed_destination_domains,
+            user_id=user_id,
+            actor_chain=actor_chain,
+            scopes=scopes,
+            permissions=permissions,
+            parent_jti=parent_jti,
+            root_jti=root_jti,
+            policy_id=policy_id,
+            policy_version=policy_version,
+            policy_hash=policy_hash,
+            proof_thumbprint=proof_thumbprint,
         )
 
         arguments = self._drop_none(
@@ -826,6 +902,16 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
                 "block_on_sensitive_output": block_on_sensitive_output,
                 "trusted_destination_domains": trusted_destination_domains,
                 "allowed_destination_domains": allowed_destination_domains,
+                "user_id": user_id,
+                "actor_chain": actor_chain,
+                "scopes": scopes,
+                "permissions": permissions,
+                "parent_jti": parent_jti,
+                "root_jti": root_jti,
+                "policy_id": policy_id,
+                "policy_version": policy_version,
+                "policy_hash": policy_hash,
+                "proof_thumbprint": proof_thumbprint,
             }
         )
 
@@ -854,7 +940,12 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
         agent_id: Optional[str] = None,
         source_agent_id: Optional[str] = None,
         platform: Optional[str] = None,
+        user_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        session_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        proof_thumbprint: Optional[str] = None,
+        proof_token: Optional[str] = None,
         require_allowed: bool = True,
+        consume: bool = True,
         tenant_id: Optional[Union[str, int]] = None,
     ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
         """
@@ -881,7 +972,12 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
                 "agent_id": agent_id,
                 "source_agent_id": source_agent_id,
                 "platform": platform,
+                "user_id": user_id,
+                "session_id": session_id,
+                "proof_thumbprint": proof_thumbprint,
+                "proof_token": proof_token,
                 "require_allowed": require_allowed,
+                "consume": consume,
             }
         )
 
@@ -896,7 +992,12 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
         agent_id: Optional[str] = None,
         source_agent_id: Optional[str] = None,
         platform: Optional[str] = None,
+        user_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        session_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        proof_thumbprint: Optional[str] = None,
+        proof_token: Optional[str] = None,
         require_allowed: bool = True,
+        consume: bool = True,
         tenant_id: Optional[Union[str, int]] = None,
         request_id: Union[str, int] = "1",
     ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
@@ -924,7 +1025,12 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
                 "agent_id": agent_id,
                 "source_agent_id": source_agent_id,
                 "platform": platform,
+                "user_id": user_id,
+                "session_id": session_id,
+                "proof_thumbprint": proof_thumbprint,
+                "proof_token": proof_token,
                 "require_allowed": require_allowed,
+                "consume": consume,
             }
         )
 
@@ -935,6 +1041,44 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
             tenant_id=tenant_id,
         )
 
+    def get_decision_token_status(
+        self,
+        jti: str,
+        *,
+        tenant_id: Optional[Union[str, int]] = None,
+    ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        self._require_nonempty("jti", jti)
+        return self._request(
+            "GET",
+            f"/a2a/decision/status/{jti}",
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+        )
+
+    def revoke_decision_token(
+        self,
+        *,
+        jti: Optional[str] = None,
+        root_jti: Optional[str] = None,
+        agent_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        user_id: Optional[str] = None,
+        reason: str = "revoked by tenant administrator",
+        tenant_id: Optional[Union[str, int]] = None,
+    ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+        if not any(self._normalize_optional_string(value) for value in (jti, root_jti, agent_id, user_id)):
+            raise ValueError("revoke_decision_token requires jti, root_jti, agent_id, or user_id")
+        return self._request(
+            "POST",
+            "/a2a/decision/revoke",
+            json_body=self._drop_none({
+                "jti": jti,
+                "root_jti": root_jti,
+                "agent_id": agent_id,
+                "user_id": user_id,
+                "reason": reason,
+            }),
+            tenant_id=tenant_id,
+        )
+
     # ------------------------------------------------------------------
     # MCP JSON-RPC
     # ------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1136,7 +1280,7 @@ class AgentGuardClient:
             "attack_profiles": attack_profiles or ["prompt_injection", "pii_leak"],
             "context": context,
         }
-        return self._request("POST", "/security/", json_body=payload, tenant_id=tenant_id)
+        return self._protected_request("POST", "/security/", json_body=payload, tenant_id=tenant_id)
 
     # ------------------------------------------------------------------
     # Convenience scenario builders

agenticdome_sdk/identity.py

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+from typing import Any
+
+
+IDENTITY_CONTEXT_VERSION = "agenticdome.identity.v1"
+
+
+def _text(value: Any) -> str:
+    return str(value or "").strip()
+
+
+def _list(value: Any) -> list[str]:
+    if value is None:
+        return []
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        value = value.replace(",", " ").split()
+    if not isinstance(value, (list, tuple, set)):
+        value = [value]
+    return sorted({_text(item) for item in value if _text(item)})
+
+
+def _hash(value: Any) -> str:
+    raw = json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), default=str).encode("utf-8")
+    return "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
+
+
+def canonicalize_identity_context(
+    policy_context: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    *,
+    platform: str | None = None,
+    target_agent_id: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    context = dict(policy_context or {})
+    existing = context.get("agenticdome_identity")
+    if isinstance(existing, dict) and existing.get("version") == IDENTITY_CONTEXT_VERSION:
+        return existing
+
+    claims = context.get("verified_identity_claims")
+    claims = dict(claims) if isinstance(claims, dict) else {}
+    asserted_subject = _text(claims.get("oid") or claims.get("sub") or claims.get("user_id"))
+    runtime_subject = _text(context.get("user_id") or context.get("principal_id") or context.get("caller_id"))
+    subject_id = runtime_subject or asserted_subject
+
+    subject = None
+    if subject_id:
+        subject = {
+            "id": subject_id,
+            "type": "human" if runtime_subject or claims.get("oid") else "principal",
+            "tenant_id": _text(claims.get("tid") or context.get("entra_tenant_id") or context.get("tenant_id")) or None,
+            "issuer": _text(claims.get("iss") or context.get("issuer")) or None,
+            "provenance": "runtime_context" if runtime_subject else "client_claim_assertion",
+            "verified": False,
+            "attributes": {
+                "asserted_roles": _list(claims.get("roles") or context.get("roles")),
+                "asserted_scopes": _list(claims.get("scp") or context.get("scp")),
+            },
+        }
+
+    raw_chain = context.get("actor_chain") or context.get("delegation_chain") or []
+    if not isinstance(raw_chain, list):
+        raw_chain = [raw_chain]
+    actors: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for item in raw_chain:
+        if len(actors) >= 32:
+            break
+        if isinstance(item, dict):
+            actor_id = _text(item.get("id") or item.get("sub") or item.get("agent_id"))
+            framework = _text(item.get("framework") or item.get("platform"))
+            verified = False
+            provenance = "client_runtime_assertion"
+        else:
+            actor_id = _text(item)
+            framework = ""
+            verified = False
+            provenance = "runtime_context"
+        if actor_id and len(actor_id) <= 512 and not any(actor["id"] == actor_id for actor in actors):
+            actors.append({
+                "id": actor_id,
+                "type": "agent",
+                "framework": framework or None,
+                "verified": verified,
+                "provenance": provenance,
+            })
+
+    for actor_id, framework in (
+        (context.get("source_agent_id"), context.get("source_platform") or platform),
+        (target_agent_id or context.get("target_agent_id") or context.get("agent_id"), context.get("platform") or platform),
+    ):
+        if len(actors) >= 32:
+            break
+        value = _text(actor_id)
+        if value and not any(actor["id"] == value for actor in actors):
+            actors.append({
+                "id": value,
+                "type": "agent",
+                "framework": _text(framework) or None,
+                "verified": False,
+                "provenance": "request_binding",
+            })
+
+    return {
+        "version": IDENTITY_CONTEXT_VERSION,
+        "framework": _text(platform or context.get("platform")) or "unknown",
+        "subject": subject,
+        "actors": actors,
+        "provenance": {
+            "client_claims_asserted": bool(claims),
+            "verified_claims_present": False,
+            "native_context_hash": _hash(context),
+        },
+    }
+
+
+def enrich_policy_context(
+    policy_context: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    *,
+    platform: str | None = None,
+    target_agent_id: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    context = dict(policy_context or {})
+    context["agenticdome_identity"] = canonicalize_identity_context(
+        context,
+        platform=platform,
+        target_agent_id=target_agent_id,
+    )
+    return context

agenticdome_sdk/langgraph.py

@@ -1111,6 +1111,20 @@ class AgenticDomeLangGraphFirewall:
         ns = _state_ns(state)
         if isinstance(ns.get("policy_context"), dict):
             ctx.update(cast(Dict[str, Any], ns["policy_context"]))
+        lineage = ns.get("lineage_context")
+        if isinstance(lineage, dict):
+            for key in (
+                "user_id",
+                "actor_chain",
+                "root_jti",
+                "parent_jti",
+                "scopes",
+                "policy_id",
+                "policy_version",
+                "policy_hash",
+            ):
+                if lineage.get(key) is not None and key not in ctx:
+                    ctx[key] = lineage[key]
 
         ctx.setdefault("source_agent_id", agent_id)
         ctx.setdefault("request_purpose", default_request_purpose)
@@ -1136,6 +1150,23 @@ class AgenticDomeLangGraphFirewall:
 
         return ctx
 
+    def _capture_verified_lineage(self, state: AgentState, verification: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        claims = verification.get("claims") if isinstance(verification.get("claims"), dict) else {}
+        if not claims:
+            return
+        subject = claims.get("subject") if isinstance(claims.get("subject"), dict) else {}
+        policy = claims.get("policy") if isinstance(claims.get("policy"), dict) else {}
+        _state_ns(state)["lineage_context"] = {
+            "user_id": claims.get("user_id") or subject.get("id"),
+            "actor_chain": claims.get("actor_chain") or [],
+            "root_jti": claims.get("root_jti") or claims.get("jti"),
+            "parent_jti": claims.get("jti"),
+            "scopes": claims.get("scopes") or [],
+            "policy_id": policy.get("id"),
+            "policy_version": policy.get("version"),
+            "policy_hash": policy.get("hash"),
+        }
+
     def _extract_explicit_handoff(self, state: AgentState) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
         ns = _state_ns(state)
         raw = ns.get("handoff") or cast(Dict[str, Any], state).get("handoff")
@@ -1261,6 +1292,7 @@ class AgenticDomeLangGraphFirewall:
             if not valid:
                 raise AgenticDomeDenied(f"AgenticDome blocked delegated execution: {_reason(verification)}")
 
+            self._capture_verified_lineage(state, verification)
             self._clear_delegation_state(state)
             return
 
@@ -1287,6 +1319,7 @@ class AgenticDomeLangGraphFirewall:
             )
             if not valid:
                 raise AgenticDomeDenied(f"AgenticDome blocked delegated execution: {_reason(verification)}")
+            self._capture_verified_lineage(state, verification)
             return
 
         pending = self.token_store.consume(
@@ -1312,6 +1345,7 @@ class AgenticDomeLangGraphFirewall:
             )
             if not valid:
                 raise AgenticDomeDenied(f"AgenticDome blocked delegated execution: {_reason(verification)}")
+            self._capture_verified_lineage(state, verification)
             self._audit("delegated_execution_allowed", agent_id=agent_id, source_agent_id=pending.source_agent_id, tool_name=tool_name)
             return
 

agenticdome_sdk/microsoft_agent_framework.py

@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ class AgenticDomeMicrosoftAgentFirewall:
             "upn",
             "username",
             "email",
+            "user_id",
+            "principal_id",
+            "caller_id",
             "roles",
             "scp",
             "azp",

agenticdome_sdk/microsoft_ai_foundry.py

@@ -562,6 +562,7 @@ class AgenticDomeMicrosoftAIFoundryFirewall:
         for key in (
             "tenant_id", "entra_tenant_id", "oid", "object_id", "appid", "app_id", "client_id",
             "upn", "username", "email", "roles", "scp", "azp", "purview_label",
+            "user_id", "principal_id", "caller_id",
             "sensitivity_label", "data_classification", "foundry_project_id", "foundry_agent_id",
         ):
             value = self._ctx_attr(ctx, key, default=None)

agenticdome_sdk/proof.py

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import json
+import time
+import uuid
+from typing import Any
+
+
+def _crypto():
+    try:
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding, rsa
+    except ImportError as exc:
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            "Proof-of-possession helpers require: pip install 'agenticdome-python-sdk[pop]'"
+        ) from exc
+    return hashes, serialization, padding, rsa
+
+
+def _b64u(data: bytes) -> str:
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).decode("ascii").rstrip("=")
+
+
+def _public_jwk(private_key) -> dict[str, str]:
+    numbers = private_key.public_key().public_numbers()
+    return {
+        "kty": "RSA",
+        "n": _b64u(numbers.n.to_bytes((numbers.n.bit_length() + 7) // 8, "big")),
+        "e": _b64u(numbers.e.to_bytes((numbers.e.bit_length() + 7) // 8, "big")),
+    }
+
+
+def jwk_thumbprint(jwk: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    canonical = json.dumps(
+        {key: jwk[key] for key in ("e", "kty", "n")},
+        sort_keys=True,
+        separators=(",", ":"),
+    ).encode("utf-8")
+    return _b64u(hashlib.sha256(canonical).digest())
+
+
+def generate_rsa_proof_key(*, key_size: int = 2048) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    _, serialization, _, rsa = _crypto()
+    private_key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=max(2048, key_size))
+    private_pem = private_key.private_bytes(
+        encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
+        format=serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
+        encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption(),
+    ).decode("ascii")
+    jwk = _public_jwk(private_key)
+    return {"private_key_pem": private_pem, "public_jwk": jwk, "thumbprint": jwk_thumbprint(jwk)}
+
+
+def create_dpop_proof(
+    private_key_pem: str,
+    *,
+    access_token: str,
+    method: str,
+    uri: str,
+    proof_jti: str | None = None,
+    issued_at: int | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    hashes, serialization, padding, _ = _crypto()
+    private_key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(private_key_pem.encode("ascii"), password=None)
+    jwk = _public_jwk(private_key)
+    header = {"typ": "dpop+jwt", "alg": "RS256", "jwk": jwk}
+    payload = {
+        "jti": proof_jti or uuid.uuid4().hex,
+        "iat": int(issued_at or time.time()),
+        "htm": str(method).upper(),
+        "htu": str(uri),
+        "ath": _b64u(hashlib.sha256(access_token.encode("utf-8")).digest()),
+    }
+    encoded_header = _b64u(json.dumps(header, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8"))
+    encoded_payload = _b64u(json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8"))
+    signing_input = f"{encoded_header}.{encoded_payload}".encode("ascii")
+    signature = private_key.sign(signing_input, padding.PKCS1v15(), hashes.SHA256())
+    return f"{encoded_header}.{encoded_payload}.{_b64u(signature)}"

agenticdome_python_sdk-1.1.2.dist-info/RECORD

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-agenticdome_python_sdk-1.1.2.dist-info/licenses/LICENSE,sha256=lqAH8G9tU2WPK9fzrnM_QMd4XUrh9fsmPqKE_hniKpM,718
-agenticdome_sdk/__init__.py,sha256=87__SX3oTttDLur7z8BhzAe6QMOSK1GXjoaTZRVTbc0,223
-agenticdome_sdk/agno.py,sha256=3gbc5URNTAHyNVAaAH882CpQpMecTv0R6S0CNMDOgos,60686
-agenticdome_sdk/aws_bedrock.py,sha256=Z1Rcbps7VgvETmq_wrUbIvg6lJxsoe7YJEPZYkBKr80,69498
-agenticdome_sdk/client.py,sha256=9OJqaE5OMr7_mcqFI5b_QodQU-ZP9LxgRRoUU38rYW0,43513
-agenticdome_sdk/crewai.py,sha256=7o7yapjbGfxfHGrmKtnpERIeJlDKIRgqz2h1WpLQJkQ,52389
-agenticdome_sdk/google_adk.py,sha256=U23uSvUxgeQRUX6fGewls0CU0GI8mru67O1mHti7RkA,57175
-agenticdome_sdk/langgraph.py,sha256=Eyaq-zcScLVlvT4VBHPN1H_K1An45LI7lKi0YgsXCOs,82660
-agenticdome_sdk/llamaindex.py,sha256=uFDzeYNz4Y72W-5XdluhdHvKAc8xkPJRkPaLFvwhlSk,42777
-agenticdome_sdk/mcp_host.py,sha256=bEGamFhnUEL-V_qP1FLTqrItpx7p9NQWlJyzUzqQcYw,59484
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