zen-gitsync 2.15.33 → 2.16.1

package/src/cli/ai/agent.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+// Copyright 2026 xz333221
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+//
+// src/cli/ai/agent.js 中 truncateDisplay(回显截断)的单元测试。
+// 源自实测踩坑:git status 输出 614 字符被截断 —— 只省 14 字符没意义,
+// 且切口把 "src/cli/ai/agent.js" 从中间切断显示成 "rc/cli/ai/agent.js"。
+import { test } from 'node:test'
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import { truncateDisplay, stripStaleImages } from './agent.js'
+
+const LIMIT = 600
+
+test('短文本原样返回', () => {
+  assert.equal(truncateDisplay('hello'), 'hello')
+  assert.equal(truncateDisplay(''), '')
+  assert.equal(truncateDisplay(null), '')
+  assert.equal(truncateDisplay(undefined), '')
+})
+
+test('只超出一点点(<200 字符)不截断 — git status 614 字符回归', () => {
+  // 构造恰好超过 limit 14 字符的文本(复现实测场景)
+  const text = 'x'.repeat(LIMIT + 14)
+  assert.equal(truncateDisplay(text, LIMIT), text)
+})
+
+test('超过阈值才截断,且包含省略标记', () => {
+  const text = 'a'.repeat(LIMIT + 500)
+  const r = truncateDisplay(text, LIMIT)
+  assert.match(r, /回显省略 \d+ 字符/)
+  assert.ok(r.length < text.length)
+})
+
+test('切口对齐整行边界,不把路径/单词从中间切断', () => {
+  // 每行 50 字符,构造 30 行的文本
+  const lines = Array.from({ length: 30 }, (_, i) => `line-${String(i).padStart(2, '0')}-${'x'.repeat(41)}`)
+  const text = lines.join('\n')   // 30 * 50 + 29 ≈ 1529 字符,远超 limit
+  const r = truncateDisplay(text, LIMIT)
+  const parts = r.split('\n')
+  const markerIdx = parts.findIndex(l => l.includes('回显省略'))
+  assert.ok(markerIdx > 0, '应有省略标记行')
+  // 标记行之前的那行,必须是原文里的某一整行(不是半拉行)
+  const headLine = parts[markerIdx - 1]
+  assert.ok(lines.includes(headLine), `头部末行应为完整行,实际: ${headLine}`)
+  // 标记行之后的那行,也必须是原文里的某一整行
+  const tailLine = parts[markerIdx + 1]
+  assert.ok(lines.includes(tailLine), `尾部首行应为完整行,实际: ${tailLine}`)
+  // 尾部最后一行是原文最后一行
+  assert.ok(r.endsWith(lines[lines.length - 1]))
+})
+
+test('单行超长文本也能截断(无换行可对齐时按字符截)', () => {
+  const text = 'y'.repeat(LIMIT + 500)
+  const r = truncateDisplay(text, LIMIT)
+  assert.match(r, /回显省略/)
+  assert.ok(r.startsWith('yyy'))
+  assert.ok(r.endsWith('yyy'))
+})
+
+// ── stripStaleImages:多模态历史的图片瘦身 ──
+test('stripStaleImages: 只保留最近一条带图消息的图片,更早的降级为占位文字', () => {
+  const img = (n) => ({ type: 'image_url', image_url: { url: `data:image/png;base64,${n}` } })
+  const messages = [
+    { role: 'system', content: 'sys' },
+    { role: 'user', content: [{ type: 'text', text: '第一问' }, img('AAA')] },
+    { role: 'assistant', content: '第一答' },
+    { role: 'user', content: [{ type: 'text', text: '第二问' }, img('BBB')] },
+    { role: 'assistant', content: '第二答' },
+    { role: 'user', content: [{ type: 'text', text: '第三问' }, img('CCC')] },
+  ]
+  stripStaleImages(messages, 'zh-CN')
+  // 最近一条(第三问)图片原样保留
+  assert.equal(messages[5].content[1].type, 'image_url')
+  // 更早的图片变成文字占位
+  for (const i of [1, 3]) {
+    assert.equal(messages[i].content[1].type, 'text')
+    assert.match(messages[i].content[1].text, /图片/)
+  }
+  // 文本部件不动
+  assert.equal(messages[1].content[0].text, '第一问')
+  // 纯字符串 content 的消息不受影响
+  assert.equal(messages[0].content, 'sys')
+})
+
+test('stripStaleImages: 没有图片时完全不动', () => {
+  const messages = [
+    { role: 'system', content: 'sys' },
+    { role: 'user', content: '纯文本问题' },
+    { role: 'user', content: [{ type: 'text', text: '多部件但没图' }] },
+  ]
+  const snapshot = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(messages))
+  stripStaleImages(messages, 'zh-CN')
+  assert.deepEqual(messages, snapshot)
+})
+
+test('stripStaleImages: en locale 用英文占位符', () => {
+  const messages = [
+    { role: 'user', content: [{ type: 'image_url', image_url: { url: 'data:...' } }] },
+    { role: 'user', content: [{ type: 'image_url', image_url: { url: 'data:...' } }] },
+  ]
+  stripStaleImages(messages, 'en-US')
+  assert.equal(messages[0].content[0].text, '[image omitted from history]')
+  assert.equal(messages[1].content[0].type, 'image_url')
+})

package/src/cli/ai/images.js

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+// Copyright 2026 xz333221
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+//
+// g ai 图片附件 — 剪贴板图片读取 + 本地图片转 data URL。
+//
+// 触发方式:REPL 里按 Alt+V(或 /image <路径> 附加本地文件)。
+// 图片保存到 ~/.git-commit-tool/ai-images/,发送时编码为 base64 data URL,
+// 以 OpenAI 多模态格式(image_url)拼进 user 消息。
+//
+// 平台实现:
+//   - Windows: powershell.exe -STA 调 System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard.GetImage()
+//     (Win10+ 自带 PowerShell 5.1,-STA 是剪贴板访问的必要条件)
+//   - macOS:   osascript 读 «class PNGf» 剪贴板数据
+//   - Linux:   Wayland 用 wl-paste,X11 用 xclip(都没有则报不支持)
+//
+// 注意:读的是**本机**剪贴板 — ssh/远程终端里剪贴板通常没有图片,
+// 此时返回空,由调用方提示用户改用 /image <路径>。
+
+import { execFile } from 'node:child_process'
+import { promises as fsp } from 'node:fs'
+import os from 'node:os'
+import path from 'node:path'
+
+const IMAGE_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.git-commit-tool', 'ai-images')
+const MAX_KEEP = 20          // 目录里最多保留的历史图片数(超出按时间最旧先删)
+const CLIP_TIMEOUT_MS = 15000 // 剪贴板读取超时(PowerShell 冷启动可能要几秒)
+
+const MIME_BY_EXT = {
+  '.png': 'image/png',
+  '.jpg': 'image/jpeg',
+  '.jpeg': 'image/jpeg',
+  '.gif': 'image/gif',
+  '.webp': 'image/webp',
+  '.bmp': 'image/bmp',
+}
+
+// ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+// 小工具
+// ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/** execFile 的 Promise 包装;stdout/stderr 给 Buffer,调用方自行解码 */
+function execFileP(cmd, args, options = {}) {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    execFile(cmd, args, { timeout: CLIP_TIMEOUT_MS, windowsHide: true, ...options },
+      (err, stdout, stderr) => {
+        resolve({
+          ok: !err,
+          code: typeof err?.code === 'number' ? err.code : (err ? -1 : 0),
+          stdout: stdout ?? Buffer.alloc(0),
+          stderr: stderr ?? Buffer.alloc(0),
+          error: err ? String(err.message || err) : null,
+        })
+      })
+  })
+}
+
+export function formatBytes(n) {
+  n = Number(n) || 0
+  if (n < 1024) return `${n} B`
+  if (n < 1024 * 1024) return `${(n / 1024).toFixed(1)} KB`
+  return `${(n / 1024 / 1024).toFixed(1)} MB`
+}
+
+/** 清理历史图片:按修改时间保留最新 MAX_KEEP 张(尽力而为,失败不阻塞) */
+async function pruneOldImages() {
+  try {
+    const names = await fsp.readdir(IMAGE_DIR)
+    const files = []
+    for (const name of names) {
+      if (!name.startsWith('clip-') || !name.endsWith('.png')) continue
+      const full = path.join(IMAGE_DIR, name)
+      try {
+        const st = await fsp.stat(full)
+        files.push({ full, mtime: st.mtimeMs })
+      } catch { /* 单个文件失败忽略 */ }
+    }
+    files.sort((a, b) => b.mtime - a.mtime)
+    for (const f of files.slice(MAX_KEEP)) {
+      await fsp.unlink(f.full).catch(() => {})
+    }
+  } catch { /* 目录不存在等情况直接跳过 */ }
+}
+
+// ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+// 各平台剪贴板读取:成功把图片写入 file,失败返回 false
+// ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+async function saveClipboardWindows(file) {
+  // -STA:Clipboard 必须运行在单线程单元
+  // 输出路径走环境变量传递 — 实测 -Command 后的位置参数会被**拼进命令串**再解析,
+  // 路径里的反斜杠直接变成语法错误(ParserError: UnexpectedToken)
+  const script = [
+    'Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms,System.Drawing;',
+    '$img = [System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetImage();',
+    'if ($null -eq $img) { exit 3 }',
+    '$img.Save($env:G_AI_CLIP_OUT, [System.Drawing.Imaging.ImageFormat]::Png);',
+    '$img.Dispose(); exit 0',
+  ].join(' ')
+  const r = await execFileP('powershell.exe', [
+    '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', '-STA', '-Command', script,
+  ], { env: { ...process.env, G_AI_CLIP_OUT: file } })
+  return r.ok && r.code === 0
+}
+
+async function saveClipboardMac(file) {
+  // «class PNGf» 是 AppleScript 的 PNG 剪贴板类型;剪贴板无图片时 osascript 非零退出
+  // 输出路径走 system attribute 读环境变量,避免路径拼进脚本字符串的引号问题
+  const script = [
+    'set outPath to system attribute "G_AI_CLIP_OUT"',
+    'set pngData to the clipboard as «class PNGf»',
+    'set fp to open for access (POSIX file outPath) with write permission',
+    'set eof fp to 0',
+    'write pngData to fp',
+    'close access fp',
+  ].join('\n')
+  const r = await execFileP('osascript', ['-e', script], { env: { ...process.env, G_AI_CLIP_OUT: file } })
+  return r.ok && r.code === 0
+}
+
+async function saveClipboardLinux(file) {
+  // 优先 Wayland 的 wl-paste;失败再试 X11 的 xclip
+  const wayland = await execFileP('wl-paste', ['--no-newline', '--type', 'image/png'])
+  if (wayland.ok && wayland.stdout.length > 0) {
+    await fsp.writeFile(file, wayland.stdout)
+    return true
+  }
+  const x11 = await execFileP('xclip', ['-selection', 'clipboard', '-t', 'image/png', '-o'])
+  if (x11.ok && x11.stdout.length > 0) {
+    await fsp.writeFile(file, x11.stdout)
+    return true
+  }
+  return false
+}
+
+// ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+// 对外 API
+// ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * 读取剪贴板图片,保存为 PNG。
+ * @returns {Promise<{path: string, bytes: number} | null>}
+ *   成功返回文件路径与字节数;剪贴板无图片 / 平台不支持 / 超时返回 null
+ */
+export async function readClipboardImage() {
+  await fsp.mkdir(IMAGE_DIR, { recursive: true })
+  const file = path.join(IMAGE_DIR, `clip-${Date.now()}.png`)
+
+  let saved = false
+  try {
+    if (process.platform === 'win32') saved = await saveClipboardWindows(file)
+    else if (process.platform === 'darwin') saved = await saveClipboardMac(file)
+    else saved = await saveClipboardLinux(file)
+  } catch {
+    saved = false
+  }
+
+  if (!saved) {
+    await fsp.unlink(file).catch(() => {})
+    return null
+  }
+
+  try {
+    const st = await fsp.stat(file)
+    if (st.size === 0) {
+      await fsp.unlink(file).catch(() => {})
+      return null
+    }
+    pruneOldImages() // 不 await,后台清理
+    return { path: file, bytes: st.size }
+  } catch {
+    return null
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * 校验本地图片文件,返回 {path, bytes};不存在/不是支持的格式返回 null
+ */
+export async function checkImageFile(filePath) {
+  try {
+    const ext = path.extname(filePath).toLowerCase()
+    if (!MIME_BY_EXT[ext]) return null
+    const st = await fsp.stat(filePath)
+    if (!st.isFile() || st.size === 0) return null
+    return { path: filePath, bytes: st.size }
+  } catch {
+    return null
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * 图片文件 → OpenAI 多模态格式需要的 base64 data URL
+ */
+export async function imageToDataUrl(filePath) {
+  const ext = path.extname(filePath).toLowerCase()
+  const mime = MIME_BY_EXT[ext] || 'image/png'
+  const buf = await fsp.readFile(filePath)
+  return `data:${mime};base64,${buf.toString('base64')}`
+}
+
+export default { readClipboardImage, checkImageFile, imageToDataUrl, formatBytes }

package/src/cli/ai/images.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+// Copyright 2026 xz333221
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+//
+// src/cli/ai/images.js 单元测试。
+// 不覆盖 readClipboardImage(依赖真实剪贴板与平台工具,CI 上不可控),
+// 只测纯函数与本地文件逻辑。
+import { test } from 'node:test'
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import { promises as fsp } from 'node:fs'
+import os from 'node:os'
+import path from 'node:path'
+import { formatBytes, checkImageFile, imageToDataUrl } from './images.js'
+
+// 最小合法 PNG(1x1 透明像素),base64 编码共 68 字节
+const PNG_1X1_B64 =
+  'iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mNkYPhfDwAChwGA60e6kgAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=='
+
+test('formatBytes: B / KB / MB 三档', () => {
+  assert.equal(formatBytes(0), '0 B')
+  assert.equal(formatBytes(512), '512 B')
+  assert.equal(formatBytes(2048), '2.0 KB')
+  assert.equal(formatBytes(5 * 1024 * 1024), '5.0 MB')
+  assert.equal(formatBytes(undefined), '0 B')
+})
+
+test('checkImageFile: 不存在的路径返回 null', async () => {
+  assert.equal(await checkImageFile(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'g-ai-no-such-file.png')), null)
+})
+
+test('checkImageFile: 不支持的扩展名返回 null', async () => {
+  const f = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `g-ai-test-${Date.now()}.txt`)
+  await fsp.writeFile(f, 'hello')
+  try {
+    assert.equal(await checkImageFile(f), null)
+  } finally {
+    await fsp.unlink(f)
+  }
+})
+
+test('checkImageFile: 合法 PNG 返回路径与字节数', async () => {
+  const f = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `g-ai-test-${Date.now()}.png`)
+  const pngBuf = Buffer.from(PNG_1X1_B64, 'base64')
+  await fsp.writeFile(f, pngBuf)
+  try {
+    const r = await checkImageFile(f)
+    assert.ok(r, '应识别 PNG')
+    assert.equal(r.path, f)
+    assert.equal(r.bytes, pngBuf.length)
+  } finally {
+    await fsp.unlink(f)
+  }
+})
+
+test('checkImageFile: 空文件返回 null', async () => {
+  const f = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `g-ai-test-empty-${Date.now()}.png`)
+  await fsp.writeFile(f, '')
+  try {
+    assert.equal(await checkImageFile(f), null)
+  } finally {
+    await fsp.unlink(f)
+  }
+})
+
+test('imageToDataUrl: 生成 data URL 且 base64 内容可还原', async () => {
+  const f = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `g-ai-test-du-${Date.now()}.png`)
+  const original = Buffer.from(PNG_1X1_B64, 'base64')
+  await fsp.writeFile(f, original)
+  try {
+    const url = await imageToDataUrl(f)
+    assert.ok(url.startsWith('data:image/png;base64,'), `应为 png data URL,实际前缀: ${url.slice(0, 30)}`)
+    const b64 = url.slice('data:image/png;base64,'.length)
+    assert.ok(Buffer.from(b64, 'base64').equals(original), 'base64 应能还原原文件')
+  } finally {
+    await fsp.unlink(f)
+  }
+})
+
+test('imageToDataUrl: jpg 扩展名映射到 image/jpeg', async () => {
+  const f = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `g-ai-test-du-${Date.now()}.jpg`)
+  await fsp.writeFile(f, Buffer.from('fake-jpeg-bytes'))
+  try {
+    const url = await imageToDataUrl(f)
+    assert.ok(url.startsWith('data:image/jpeg;base64,'))
+  } finally {
+    await fsp.unlink(f)
+  }
+})

package/src/cli/ai/safety.js

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+// Copyright 2026 xz333221
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+//
+// g ai 智能体的危险命令守卫 — 这是智能体的**唯一硬性限制**。
+//
+// 设计原则(用户明确授权的权限模型):
+//   - 工作目录内:所有操作直接放行
+//   - 其他目录:同样可读写、可修改
+//   - 唯一红线:不得执行"会把系统搞崩"的命令 —— 本模块负责拦截
+//
+// 拦截清单刻意保持克制,只覆盖不可逆的系统级破坏:
+//   1. 递归删除根目录/系统目录/用户 home(rm -rf / · rd /s C:\ · Remove-Item C:\ -Recurse)
+//   2. 格式化/抹盘(format · mkfs · diskpart · dd of=/dev/* · 重定向写块设备)
+//   3. 关机/重启(shutdown · reboot · poweroff · halt · Stop-Computer)
+//   4. fork bomb
+//   5. 删除注册表主键(reg delete HKLM 等)
+//   6. 引导配置破坏(bcdedit · bootrec)
+//   7. 递归改根目录权限/属主(chmod -R / · chown -R /)
+//
+// 像 `rm -rf node_modules`、`git clean -fdx`、`del /s /q build` 这类项目内
+// 破坏性操作**不拦截** —— 那是用户的正常工作流,模型自己会判断。
+//
+// 纯函数,不依赖 fs / child_process,便于单测。
+
+// rm / del / rd 等命令的"危险目标"判定:
+// 递归删除时,目标落在这个集合里才算系统级破坏
+const ROOT_TARGETS_UNIX = new Set([
+  '/', '/*', '~', '~/', '$HOME', '${HOME}',
+  '/etc', '/usr', '/bin', '/sbin', '/boot', '/lib', '/lib64',
+  '/var', '/opt', '/root', '/System', '/Library', '/Applications',
+  '/windows', '/Windows', '/WINDOWS',
+  '%SystemDrive%', '%systemroot%', '%SystemRoot%', '%windir%',
+])
+
+// 判断一个 token 是否是"盘符根"(C:\ C:/ C: \  /c  /c/  D:\ 等)
+// Git Bash 下盘符挂载为 /c /d 形式,cmd/PowerShell 下是 C:\ 形式
+function isDriveRootToken(token) {
+  const t = token.replace(/["']/g, '')
+  // C:\  C:/  C:\*  C:/  C:
+  if (/^[a-zA-Z]:[\\/]?\*?(\.\*)?$/.test(t)) return true
+  // Git Bash 挂载点: /c  /c/  /d  /d/ ...(仅单字母)
+  if (/^\/[a-zA-Z]\/?\*?$/.test(t)) return true
+  // 反斜杠根
+  if (t === '\\' || t === '\\*') return true
+  return false
+}
+
+// 判断 token 是否是 Unix 根/系统目录目标
+function isRootTargetToken(token) {
+  const t = token.replace(/["']/g, '')
+  if (ROOT_TARGETS_UNIX.has(t)) return true
+  // 带尾通配:/usr/* /etc/* 之类
+  if (t.endsWith('/*') && ROOT_TARGETS_UNIX.has(t.slice(0, -2))) return true
+  return false
+}
+
+// 从命令串中抽出所有 "命令段"(按 ; && || | 切分),返回小写化前的原文段
+function splitCommandSegments(cmd) {
+  return String(cmd).split(/&&|\|\||[;|]/).map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean)
+}
+
+// 解析命令段:返回小写命令名(跳过 sudo / doas 前缀) + 原始参数串
+// 注意:args 必须用匹配到的原始串长度切片,不能用 indexOf(小写名) —
+// 混合大小写命令(Remove-Item 等)会 indexOf 失败导致切片错位
+function parseSegment(seg) {
+  const m = seg.match(/^(?:sudo|doas)\s+(\S+)|^(\S+)/)
+  const name = (m?.[1] || m?.[2] || '')
+  const args = m ? seg.slice(m[0].length) : seg
+  return { head: name.toLowerCase(), args }
+}
+
+// 段是否有递归/强制类 flag(-r -R -f -rf -fr --recursive /s 等)
+function hasRecursiveFlag(args, style) {
+  if (style === 'unix') {
+    return /(^|\s)-[a-zA-Z]*(r|R)[a-zA-Z]*(?=\s|$)/.test(args) || /--recursive\b/.test(args)
+  }
+  // cmd 风格: /s
+  return /(^|\s)\/s(?=\s|$)/i.test(args)
+}
+
+/**
+ * 检查一条 shell 命令是否属于"会把系统搞崩"的红线操作。
+ *
+ * @param {unknown} cmd - 待检查的命令字符串
+ * @returns {{ blocked: boolean, reason: string|null }}
+ *   blocked=true 时 reason 给出中文原因(会回喂给模型,让它换方案)
+ */
+export function checkDangerousCommand(cmd) {
+  if (typeof cmd !== 'string' || !cmd.trim()) {
+    return { blocked: false, reason: null }
+  }
+  const text = cmd
+
+  // ── 1. fork bomb(经典 :(){ :|:& };: 及变体)──
+  if (/:\s*\(\s*\)\s*\{[^}]*:\s*\|\s*:[^}]*&[^}]*\}/.test(text)) {
+    return { blocked: true, reason: '检测到 fork bomb(:(){ :|:& };:),会耗尽系统进程资源' }
+  }
+
+  // ── 2. dd / 重定向直接写块设备 ──
+  if (/\bdd\b[^;&|]*\bof=["']?\/dev\//i.test(text)) {
+    return { blocked: true, reason: '检测到 dd 直接写块设备(of=/dev/*),会物理抹掉磁盘数据' }
+  }
+  if (/>\s*\/dev\/(sd|hd|nvme|mmcblk|disk)/i.test(text)) {
+    return { blocked: true, reason: '检测到重定向写块设备(/dev/sd* 等),会物理抹掉磁盘数据' }
+  }
+
+  // ── 3. 注册表主键删除 ──
+  if (/\breg\s+delete\s+"?(HKLM|HKCR|HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE|HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT)\b/i.test(text)) {
+    return { blocked: true, reason: '检测到删除注册表主键(HKLM/HKCR),会破坏系统配置' }
+  }
+
+  // ── 4. 逐段检查命令名级红线 ──
+  for (const seg of splitCommandSegments(text)) {
+    const { head, args } = parseSegment(seg)
+
+    // 关机/重启/停机
+    if (/^(shutdown|reboot|poweroff|halt|init|telinit|stop-computer|restart-computer)$/i.test(head)) {
+      // init 只有 0/6 才是关机/重启
+      if (/^(init|telinit)$/i.test(head) && !/\b[06]\b/.test(args)) continue
+      return { blocked: true, reason: `检测到关机/重启命令(${head}),会中断整台机器` }
+    }
+
+    // 格式化/分区/引导破坏
+    if (/^(format|format\.com|mkfs(\.\w+)?|diskpart|bcdedit|bootrec|wipefs|fdisk|parted)$/i.test(head)) {
+      return { blocked: true, reason: `检测到磁盘格式化/分区/引导操作(${head}),会造成不可逆数据丢失` }
+    }
+
+    // rm 递归删除系统目标
+    if (head === 'rm') {
+      if (hasRecursiveFlag(args, 'unix')) {
+        const tokens = args.split(/\s+/).filter(t => t && !t.startsWith('-'))
+        for (const tok of tokens) {
+          if (isDriveRootToken(tok) || isRootTargetToken(tok)) {
+            return { blocked: true, reason: `检测到 rm 递归删除系统根目录/盘符根(${tok}),会摧毁整个文件系统` }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // shred 直接抹设备
+    if (head === 'shred' && /\/dev\//.test(args)) {
+      return { blocked: true, reason: '检测到 shred 抹除块设备,会物理摧毁磁盘数据' }
+    }
+
+    // rd / rmdir /s 删盘符根或系统目录(cmd)
+    if (/^(rd|rmdir)$/i.test(head)) {
+      if (hasRecursiveFlag(args, 'cmd')) {
+        const tokens = args.split(/\s+/).filter(t => t && !t.startsWith('/'))
+        for (const tok of tokens) {
+          const clean = tok.replace(/["']/g, '').replace(/\\\*$/, '').replace(/\\\.\*$/, '')
+          if (isDriveRootToken(clean) || /^%system|^%win/i.test(clean) || /^[a-zA-Z]:[\\/]+(windows|program files)/i.test(clean)) {
+            return { blocked: true, reason: `检测到 rd /s 删除盘符根/系统目录(${tok}),会摧毁整个磁盘内容` }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // del /s 清盘符根(cmd)
+    if (head === 'del' || head === 'erase') {
+      if (hasRecursiveFlag(args, 'cmd')) {
+        const tokens = args.split(/\s+/).filter(t => t && !t.startsWith('/'))
+        for (const tok of tokens) {
+          const clean = tok.replace(/["']/g, '')
+          // C:\* C:\*.* C:\ C:/
+          if (isDriveRootToken(clean) || /^[a-zA-Z]:[\\/]\*(\.\*)?$/.test(clean)) {
+            return { blocked: true, reason: `检测到 del /s 清空盘符根(${tok}),会删除整个磁盘文件` }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // chmod / chown 递归动根目录
+    if (head === 'chmod' || head === 'chown' || head === 'chgrp') {
+      if (hasRecursiveFlag(args, 'unix')) {
+        const tokens = args.split(/\s+/).filter(t => t && !t.startsWith('-'))
+        for (const tok of tokens) {
+          if (isRootTargetToken(tok) || tok === '/') {
+            return { blocked: true, reason: `检测到 ${head} -R 递归改根目录权限/属主(${tok}),会让系统无法正常运行` }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // PowerShell Remove-Item -Recurse 删根
+    if (head === 'remove-item' || head === 'ri') {
+      if (/\-r(ecurse)?\b/i.test(args)) {
+        if (/\$env:(SystemDrive|windir|SystemRoot)/i.test(args)
+          || /(^|\s)["']?[a-zA-Z]:[\\/]\*?["']?(\s|$)/.test(args)
+          || /(^|\s)["']?~["']?(\s|$)/.test(args)) {
+          return { blocked: true, reason: '检测到 Remove-Item -Recurse 删除盘符根/系统目录/home,会摧毁大量数据' }
+        }
+      }
+      continue
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { blocked: false, reason: null }
+}
+
+export default { checkDangerousCommand }