xypriss 9.14.24 → 9.14.27
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/cjs/index.js +240 -119
- package/dist/cjs/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/esm/index.js +240 -120
- package/dist/esm/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +8037 -8059
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/cjs/index.js
CHANGED
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@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ const DEFAULT_LOGGER_CONFIG = {
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145
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},
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};
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147
147
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148
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-
function getSysApi() {
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148
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+
function getSysApi$1() {
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if (typeof globalThis !== "undefined" && globalThis.__sys__) {
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return globalThis.__sys__;
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}
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@@ -983,7 +983,7 @@ function initializeLogger(config) {
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* in the `.env` file — useful for staging environments that mimic dev but
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* must not relax CSP/HSTS/COEP.
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*/
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-
const sys = getSysApi();
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+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
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const isDev = sys?.__env__
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? sys.__env__.isDevelopment() &&
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sys.__env__.get("XSEC_TRUST", "true") === "true"
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@@ -1096,8 +1096,8 @@ const xemsKeyPlaceholder = "CHANGE_ME_TO_A_SECURE_32_CHAR_KEY";
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* This configuration is used when no custom configuration is provided.
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*
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*/
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-
const DEFAULT_HOST = getSysApi()?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_HOST") || "localhost";
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1100
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-
const DEFAULT_PORT = (getSysApi()?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_PORT") ||
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+
const DEFAULT_HOST = getSysApi$1()?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_HOST") || "localhost";
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1100
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+
const DEFAULT_PORT = (getSysApi$1()?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_PORT") ||
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8085);
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// Default configuration
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const DEFAULT_OPTIONS = {
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@@ -1314,7 +1314,7 @@ const DEFAULT_OPTIONS = {
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* once `__sys__` is initialized, deliberately avoiding reliance on Node.js core modules (`node:os`).
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*/
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get tempFileDir() {
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-
return getSysApi()?.path.tmpUserDir + "/.uploads/";
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+
return getSysApi$1()?.path.tmpUserDir + "/.uploads/";
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},
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createParentPath: true,
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preservePath: false,
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@@ -1872,7 +1872,7 @@ class FileUploadManager {
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return;
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if (this.config?.storage === "memory" && file.path) {
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try {
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-
const sys = getSysApi();
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+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
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if (sys.fs.exist(file.path)) {
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file.buffer = await sys.fs.readBytes(file.path);
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sys.fs.rm(file.path, { force: true });
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@@ -1904,7 +1904,7 @@ class FileUploadManager {
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}
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if (file.path) {
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try {
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-
const sys = getSysApi();
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+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
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if (sys.fs.exist(file.path)) {
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_cachedBuffer = sys.fs.readBytesSync(file.path);
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return _cachedBuffer;
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@@ -1924,7 +1924,7 @@ class FileUploadManager {
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if (!file.toBuffer) {
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file.toBuffer = async function () {
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if (file.path) {
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-
const sys = getSysApi();
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+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
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if (sys.fs.exist(file.path)) {
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return await sys.fs.readBytes(file.path);
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}
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@@ -1935,7 +1935,7 @@ class FileUploadManager {
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}
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if (!file.getStream) {
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file.getStream = function () {
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1938
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-
const sys = getSysApi();
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+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
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if (file.path && sys.fs.exist(file.path)) {
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return sys.fs.createReadStream(file.path);
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}
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@@ -1999,7 +1999,7 @@ class FileUploadManager {
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}
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}
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if (this.config?.allowedExtensions) {
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-
const sys = getSysApi();
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+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
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const ext = sys.path.extname(file.originalname).toLowerCase();
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this.logger.debug("server", `Checking extensions: ${this.config.allowedExtensions.join(", ")}, file ext: ${ext}`);
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if (!this.config.allowedExtensions.includes(ext)) {
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@@ -3524,14 +3524,21 @@ function clearInternalSignature() {
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catch { }
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}
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/**
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3527
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-
*
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-
* -
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-
*
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-
* -
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3531
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-
*
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3527
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+
* Locks internal session authentication post-boot:
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3528
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+
* - In development / watch mode (e.g. FileOnix hot-reload), preserves the session token on disk
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3529
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* so that reloaded workers can authenticate seamlessly without crashing.
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3530
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+
* - In production mode, irreversibly shreds and unlinks the ephemeral .auth_token from disk
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3531
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+
* and purges all references from memory and environment.
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*/
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function lockSessionAuth() {
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3534
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_ephemeralToken = null;
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+
const isDev = process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production" ||
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+
process.env.FILEONIX === "1" ||
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3537
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+
process.env.FILEONIX_WATCH === "1" ||
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+
(globalThis.__sys__?.__env__?.isDevelopment?.() ?? false);
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3539
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+
if (isDev) {
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3540
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+
return;
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3541
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+
}
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3535
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try {
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const sessionDir = process.env.XYPRISS_USER_TMP || process.env.XESS_SESSION_TMP;
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3537
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if (sessionDir) {
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@@ -4174,7 +4181,7 @@ class ConfigSyntaxParser {
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}
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4175
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getFile(filePath) {
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try {
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4177
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-
const sys = getSysApi();
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+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
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// In XyPriss config, a leading / is often intended as project-root relative
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// especially when the separator dot consumes the '.' of './path'
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const cleanPath = filePath.startsWith("/")
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@@ -4501,13 +4508,15 @@ function identifyProjectRoot(filePath) {
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4501
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if (manifest?.roots) {
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for (const [pluginRoot, _pluginName] of Object.entries(manifest.roots)) {
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const normPluginRoot = pluginRoot.replace(/\\/g, "/");
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4504
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-
if (normalized === normPluginRoot ||
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4511
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+
if (normalized === normPluginRoot ||
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4512
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+
normalized.startsWith(normPluginRoot + "/")) {
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4505
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return pluginRoot;
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4506
4514
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}
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4507
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}
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}
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4509
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// 2. Direct match against primary project root
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4510
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-
if (normalized === primaryRoot ||
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4518
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+
if (normalized === primaryRoot ||
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4519
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+
normalized.startsWith(primaryRoot + "/")) {
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4511
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// If inside node_modules, it is an undeclared/untrusted dependency, NOT the application root!
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4512
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if (normalized.includes("/node_modules/")) {
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return undefined;
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@@ -4582,7 +4591,9 @@ function captureNativeFrames() {
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4582
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const fnName = typeof site.getFunctionName === "function"
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? site.getFunctionName() || ""
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: "";
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4585
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-
const isEval = typeof site.isEval === "function"
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4594
|
+
const isEval = typeof site.isEval === "function"
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4595
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+
? Boolean(site.isEval())
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4596
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+
: false;
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4586
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frames.push({
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4587
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filePath: normalizeScriptName(rawFile),
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fnName,
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@@ -4605,7 +4616,8 @@ function captureNativeFrames() {
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4605
4616
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frames.push({
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4606
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filePath: normalizeScriptName(rawScript),
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4607
4618
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fnName,
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4608
|
-
isEval: !rawScript &&
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4619
|
+
isEval: !rawScript &&
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4620
|
+
(fnName === "eval" || fnName === "anonymous"),
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4609
4621
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});
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4610
4622
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}
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4611
4623
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}
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@@ -4649,7 +4661,15 @@ function isImmediateInternalEngineCall() {
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|
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4649
4661
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fnName === "call" ||
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4650
4662
|
fnName === "callSync" ||
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4651
4663
|
fnName === "callSyncSubprocess" ||
|
|
4652
|
-
fnName === "executeEnvCall"
|
|
4664
|
+
fnName === "executeEnvCall" ||
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4665
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+
// Issue #52 (https://github.com/Nehonix-Team/XyPriss/issues/52)
|
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4666
|
+
// When code accesses `process.env[prop]`, the proxy trap handler executes inside `EnvApi.ts`.
|
|
4667
|
+
// If EnvApi frames are not skipped, `isImmediateInternalEngineCall()` would treat the Proxy
|
|
4668
|
+
// handler itself as the "caller", erroneously considering every process.env access as an
|
|
4669
|
+
// internal engine call and bypassing the shield. Skipping EnvApi frames ensures we inspect
|
|
4670
|
+
// the real consumer (project code, plugins, or third-party dependencies).
|
|
4671
|
+
norm.endsWith("/EnvApi.ts") ||
|
|
4672
|
+
norm.endsWith("/EnvApi.js")) {
|
|
4653
4673
|
continue;
|
|
4654
4674
|
}
|
|
4655
4675
|
}
|
|
@@ -4752,7 +4772,9 @@ function loadXyConfig(projectRoot) {
|
|
|
4752
4772
|
try {
|
|
4753
4773
|
pkgJson = JSON.parse(fs$1.readFileSync(pkgPath, "utf-8"));
|
|
4754
4774
|
}
|
|
4755
|
-
catch {
|
|
4775
|
+
catch {
|
|
4776
|
+
/* ignore */
|
|
4777
|
+
}
|
|
4756
4778
|
}
|
|
4757
4779
|
// Resolve references &(pkg), &(env), etc.
|
|
4758
4780
|
const sys = globalThis.__sys__;
|
|
@@ -4762,7 +4784,7 @@ function loadXyConfig(projectRoot) {
|
|
|
4762
4784
|
if (sys?.__env__?.[XY_ENV_INTERNAL_GET_FOR_ROOT]) {
|
|
4763
4785
|
envProvider = {
|
|
4764
4786
|
has: (key) => sys.__env__[XY_ENV_INTERNAL_GET_FOR_ROOT](key, projectRoot) !== undefined,
|
|
4765
|
-
get: (key) => sys.__env__[XY_ENV_INTERNAL_GET_FOR_ROOT](key, projectRoot)
|
|
4787
|
+
get: (key) => sys.__env__[XY_ENV_INTERNAL_GET_FOR_ROOT](key, projectRoot),
|
|
4766
4788
|
};
|
|
4767
4789
|
}
|
|
4768
4790
|
const parser = new ConfigSyntaxParser(pkgJson, envProvider);
|
|
@@ -5001,6 +5023,8 @@ class SynapxClient {
|
|
|
5001
5023
|
stdio: "inherit",
|
|
5002
5024
|
env: {
|
|
5003
5025
|
...process.env,
|
|
5026
|
+
XYPRISS_USER_TMP: sessionDir,
|
|
5027
|
+
XESS_SESSION_TMP: sessionDir,
|
|
5004
5028
|
...(internalSig ? { XYPRISS_INTERNAL_TOKEN: internalSig } : {}),
|
|
5005
5029
|
NO_COLOR: "1",
|
|
5006
5030
|
},
|
|
@@ -5220,7 +5244,7 @@ class SynapxClient {
|
|
|
5220
5244
|
* Executes a multiplexed RPC call over the persistent private channel with full args and options descriptors.
|
|
5221
5245
|
*/
|
|
5222
5246
|
async call(module, action, args = [], opts = {}, timeoutMs = 60000) {
|
|
5223
|
-
if (module === "env") {
|
|
5247
|
+
if (module === "env" || module === "xems" || module === "sys") {
|
|
5224
5248
|
const callerInfo = getVerifiedCallerInfo();
|
|
5225
5249
|
if (callerInfo.isUntrusted || !isImmediateInternalEngineCall()) {
|
|
5226
5250
|
throw new Error(`libSynapx: Unauthorized caller for restricted module '${module}'`);
|
|
@@ -5264,7 +5288,7 @@ class SynapxClient {
|
|
|
5264
5288
|
* with transparent automatic fallback to stdin pipe subprocess on edge platforms.
|
|
5265
5289
|
*/
|
|
5266
5290
|
callSync(module, action, args = [], opts = {}) {
|
|
5267
|
-
if (module === "env") {
|
|
5291
|
+
if (module === "env" || module === "xems" || module === "sys") {
|
|
5268
5292
|
const callerInfo = getVerifiedCallerInfo();
|
|
5269
5293
|
if (callerInfo.isUntrusted || !isImmediateInternalEngineCall()) {
|
|
5270
5294
|
throw new Error(`libSynapx: Unauthorized caller for restricted module '${module}'`);
|
|
@@ -5291,7 +5315,7 @@ class SynapxClient {
|
|
|
5291
5315
|
* Subprocess-based synchronous fallback pipeline (streaming via stdin to prevent E2BIG).
|
|
5292
5316
|
*/
|
|
5293
5317
|
callSyncSubprocess(module, action, args = [], opts = {}) {
|
|
5294
|
-
if (module === "env") {
|
|
5318
|
+
if (module === "env" || module === "xems" || module === "sys") {
|
|
5295
5319
|
const callerInfo = getVerifiedCallerInfo();
|
|
5296
5320
|
if (callerInfo.isUntrusted || !isImmediateInternalEngineCall()) {
|
|
5297
5321
|
throw new Error(`libSynapx: Unauthorized caller for restricted module '${module}'`);
|
|
@@ -5545,10 +5569,12 @@ class XyPrissRunner {
|
|
|
5545
5569
|
cmdArgs.push(`--${flag}`, String(value));
|
|
5546
5570
|
}
|
|
5547
5571
|
}
|
|
5572
|
+
const sessionDir = process.env.XYPRISS_USER_TMP || process.env.XESS_SESSION_TMP || "";
|
|
5548
5573
|
const child = node_child_process.spawn(this.binaryPath, cmdArgs, {
|
|
5549
5574
|
cwd: this.root,
|
|
5550
5575
|
env: {
|
|
5551
5576
|
...process.env,
|
|
5577
|
+
...(sessionDir ? { XYPRISS_USER_TMP: sessionDir, XESS_SESSION_TMP: sessionDir } : {}),
|
|
5552
5578
|
...(internalSig ? { XYPRISS_INTERNAL_TOKEN: internalSig } : {}),
|
|
5553
5579
|
},
|
|
5554
5580
|
});
|
|
@@ -5582,10 +5608,12 @@ class XyPrissRunner {
|
|
|
5582
5608
|
cmdArgs.push(`--${flag}`, String(value));
|
|
5583
5609
|
}
|
|
5584
5610
|
}
|
|
5611
|
+
const sessionDir = process.env.XYPRISS_USER_TMP || process.env.XESS_SESSION_TMP || "";
|
|
5585
5612
|
const child = node_child_process.spawn(this.binaryPath, cmdArgs, {
|
|
5586
5613
|
cwd: this.root,
|
|
5587
5614
|
env: {
|
|
5588
5615
|
...process.env,
|
|
5616
|
+
...(sessionDir ? { XYPRISS_USER_TMP: sessionDir, XESS_SESSION_TMP: sessionDir } : {}),
|
|
5589
5617
|
...(internalSig ? { XYPRISS_INTERNAL_TOKEN: internalSig } : {}),
|
|
5590
5618
|
},
|
|
5591
5619
|
});
|
|
@@ -5603,7 +5631,7 @@ class XyPrissRunner {
|
|
|
5603
5631
|
* @returns {string} Path to `<os.tmpdir>/nehonix.xypriss.data`
|
|
5604
5632
|
*/
|
|
5605
5633
|
function getXyprissTempDir() {
|
|
5606
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
5634
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
5607
5635
|
return sys.path.join(sys.path.tempDir(), "nehonix.xypriss.data");
|
|
5608
5636
|
}
|
|
5609
5637
|
/**
|
|
@@ -5613,7 +5641,7 @@ function getXyprissTempDir() {
|
|
|
5613
5641
|
* @returns {string} The absolute resolved temp sub-path.
|
|
5614
5642
|
*/
|
|
5615
5643
|
function createXyprissTempDir(_p) {
|
|
5616
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
5644
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
5617
5645
|
const base = getXyprissTempDir();
|
|
5618
5646
|
const segment = typeof _p === "string"
|
|
5619
5647
|
? _p
|
|
@@ -5653,7 +5681,7 @@ function generateXUserTmpDir() {
|
|
|
5653
5681
|
if (_sessionTmpDir !== null) {
|
|
5654
5682
|
return _sessionTmpDir;
|
|
5655
5683
|
}
|
|
5656
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
5684
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
5657
5685
|
// 1. Adopt the session directory allocated exclusively by the libProc supervisor
|
|
5658
5686
|
const envSession = sys?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_USER_TMP") ||
|
|
5659
5687
|
sys?.__env__?.get("XESS_SESSION_TMP") ||
|
|
@@ -5675,7 +5703,7 @@ function generateXUserTmpDir() {
|
|
|
5675
5703
|
* Delegated exclusively to the libProc supervisor (Single Source of Truth).
|
|
5676
5704
|
*/
|
|
5677
5705
|
function getSessionHash() {
|
|
5678
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
5706
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
5679
5707
|
const envHash = sys?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_SESSION_HASH") ||
|
|
5680
5708
|
(typeof process !== "undefined" ? process.env?.XYPRISS_SESSION_HASH : undefined);
|
|
5681
5709
|
if (envHash && typeof envHash === "string") {
|
|
@@ -6576,7 +6604,7 @@ class QuickLogger {
|
|
|
6576
6604
|
return new QuickLogger(context);
|
|
6577
6605
|
}
|
|
6578
6606
|
static shouldLog(level) {
|
|
6579
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
6607
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
6580
6608
|
let isDebug = false;
|
|
6581
6609
|
if (sys?.__env__) {
|
|
6582
6610
|
isDebug =
|
|
@@ -6732,7 +6760,7 @@ class TempFileManager {
|
|
|
6732
6760
|
* Track a temporary file for automatic TTL expiration and process exit cleanup.
|
|
6733
6761
|
*/
|
|
6734
6762
|
track(filePath, options = {}) {
|
|
6735
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
6763
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
6736
6764
|
const ttlMs = TempFileManager.parseTTL(options.ttl);
|
|
6737
6765
|
const autoCleanup = options.autoCleanupOnExit !== false;
|
|
6738
6766
|
const now = Date.now();
|
|
@@ -6774,7 +6802,7 @@ class TempFileManager {
|
|
|
6774
6802
|
* Remove a single tracked temporary file safely using native XyPriss FS API.
|
|
6775
6803
|
*/
|
|
6776
6804
|
removeFile(filePath) {
|
|
6777
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
6805
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
6778
6806
|
const entry = this.trackedFiles.get(filePath);
|
|
6779
6807
|
if (entry?.timer) {
|
|
6780
6808
|
clearTimeout(entry.timer);
|
|
@@ -6796,7 +6824,7 @@ class TempFileManager {
|
|
|
6796
6824
|
* Clean up all active tracked temporary files.
|
|
6797
6825
|
*/
|
|
6798
6826
|
cleanupAll() {
|
|
6799
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
6827
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
6800
6828
|
let count = 0;
|
|
6801
6829
|
for (const [filePath, entry] of this.trackedFiles.entries()) {
|
|
6802
6830
|
if (entry.timer)
|
|
@@ -6820,7 +6848,7 @@ class TempFileManager {
|
|
|
6820
6848
|
return;
|
|
6821
6849
|
this.exitHooksRegistered = true;
|
|
6822
6850
|
const performExitCleanup = () => {
|
|
6823
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
6851
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
6824
6852
|
for (const [filePath, entry] of this.trackedFiles.entries()) {
|
|
6825
6853
|
if (entry.autoCleanupOnExit) {
|
|
6826
6854
|
try {
|
|
@@ -8836,6 +8864,8 @@ class VarsApi extends BaseApi {
|
|
|
8836
8864
|
|
|
8837
8865
|
const _envRunnerStore = new WeakMap();
|
|
8838
8866
|
const _sealKeyStore = new WeakMap();
|
|
8867
|
+
const _shieldedInstances = new WeakSet();
|
|
8868
|
+
const SHIELD_MARKER = Symbol("xypriss.internal.env.shielded");
|
|
8839
8869
|
class EnvApi {
|
|
8840
8870
|
/**
|
|
8841
8871
|
* @param runner - The XyPrissRunner used to invoke native Go binaries.
|
|
@@ -8870,25 +8900,13 @@ class EnvApi {
|
|
|
8870
8900
|
"NODE_DEBUG",
|
|
8871
8901
|
"NODE_OPTIONS",
|
|
8872
8902
|
"NODE_ENV",
|
|
8873
|
-
"ENC_SECRET_KEY",
|
|
8874
|
-
"ENC_SECRET_SEED",
|
|
8875
|
-
"ENC_SECRET_SALT",
|
|
8876
8903
|
"TRACE_DEPRECATION",
|
|
8877
8904
|
"APPEND_DEPRECATION",
|
|
8878
8905
|
"READABLE_STREAM",
|
|
8879
8906
|
"BUN_CONFIG_VERBOSE_FETCH",
|
|
8880
8907
|
"XYPRISS_ENV_SHIELD",
|
|
8881
|
-
"XYPRISS_SESSION_HASH",
|
|
8882
|
-
"XYPRISS_USER_TMP",
|
|
8883
|
-
"XYPRISS_XESS_AUTH_TOKEN",
|
|
8884
|
-
"LIBXESS_ACTIVE",
|
|
8885
|
-
"XESS_SESSION_TMP",
|
|
8886
|
-
"XESS_TEMP_DIR",
|
|
8887
|
-
"LIBPORT_SOCKET_PATH",
|
|
8888
|
-
"PORT_SOCKET_PATH",
|
|
8889
|
-
"XPM_SOCKET_PATH",
|
|
8890
8908
|
"BUN_DISABLE_DYNAMIC_CHUNK_SIZE",
|
|
8891
|
-
// Node / Bun core HTTPS variables (
|
|
8909
|
+
// Node / Bun core HTTPS variables (read allowed for network clients, writes strictly guarded in set trap)
|
|
8892
8910
|
"NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED",
|
|
8893
8911
|
"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS",
|
|
8894
8912
|
// Standard OS environment paths (Windows / Cross-platform stability)
|
|
@@ -9417,15 +9435,27 @@ class EnvApi {
|
|
|
9417
9435
|
* @internal
|
|
9418
9436
|
*/
|
|
9419
9437
|
applyShield() {
|
|
9420
|
-
// Issue #43: Guard against multi-server sequential startup re-wrapping process.env
|
|
9421
|
-
|
|
9422
|
-
if (process.env[SHIELD_MARKER]) {
|
|
9438
|
+
// Issue #43 / XSA-008: Guard against multi-server sequential startup re-wrapping process.env.
|
|
9439
|
+
// Uses unforgeable private Symbol and WeakSet to defeat pre-bootstrap spoofing attacks.
|
|
9440
|
+
if (_shieldedInstances.has(process.env) || process.env[SHIELD_MARKER] === true) {
|
|
9423
9441
|
return;
|
|
9424
9442
|
}
|
|
9425
9443
|
// Per-key deduplication: every distinct blocked key gets exactly one
|
|
9426
9444
|
// warning, preserving actionable signal without log flooding.
|
|
9427
9445
|
const warnedKeys = new Set();
|
|
9428
9446
|
const self = this;
|
|
9447
|
+
// Critical environment keys that must NEVER be mutated or poisoned by application or third-party code
|
|
9448
|
+
const CRITICAL_IMMUTABLE_ENV = new Set([
|
|
9449
|
+
"NODE_OPTIONS",
|
|
9450
|
+
"NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED",
|
|
9451
|
+
"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS",
|
|
9452
|
+
"PATH",
|
|
9453
|
+
"LD_PRELOAD",
|
|
9454
|
+
"LD_LIBRARY_PATH",
|
|
9455
|
+
"DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES",
|
|
9456
|
+
"DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH",
|
|
9457
|
+
]);
|
|
9458
|
+
let isInsideShieldCheck = false;
|
|
9429
9459
|
const envShield = new Proxy(process.env, {
|
|
9430
9460
|
get(target, prop, receiver) {
|
|
9431
9461
|
if (prop === SHIELD_MARKER) {
|
|
@@ -9434,17 +9464,26 @@ class EnvApi {
|
|
|
9434
9464
|
if (typeof prop !== "string") {
|
|
9435
9465
|
return Reflect.get(target, prop, receiver);
|
|
9436
9466
|
}
|
|
9437
|
-
|
|
9438
|
-
|
|
9439
|
-
|
|
9440
|
-
|
|
9441
|
-
|
|
9442
|
-
prop.startsWith("ENC_") ||
|
|
9443
|
-
prop.startsWith("DOTENV_") ||
|
|
9444
|
-
prop.startsWith("__")) {
|
|
9467
|
+
if (isInsideShieldCheck || prop === "XYPRISS_PROJECT_ROOT" || prop === "XYPRISS_ENV_SHIELD") {
|
|
9468
|
+
return Reflect.get(target, prop, receiver);
|
|
9469
|
+
}
|
|
9470
|
+
// Pass through whitelisted keys.
|
|
9471
|
+
if (self.whitelistedFields.has(prop)) {
|
|
9445
9472
|
return Reflect.get(target, prop, receiver);
|
|
9446
9473
|
}
|
|
9447
|
-
//
|
|
9474
|
+
// Internal framework operations: allow verified engine callers to read environment safely
|
|
9475
|
+
isInsideShieldCheck = true;
|
|
9476
|
+
try {
|
|
9477
|
+
const caller = getVerifiedCallerInfo();
|
|
9478
|
+
if (!caller.isUntrusted && isImmediateInternalEngineCall()) {
|
|
9479
|
+
return Reflect.get(target, prop, receiver);
|
|
9480
|
+
}
|
|
9481
|
+
}
|
|
9482
|
+
finally {
|
|
9483
|
+
isInsideShieldCheck = false;
|
|
9484
|
+
}
|
|
9485
|
+
// All other keys (including ENC_*, DOTENV_*, __*, and application secrets):
|
|
9486
|
+
// direct process.env reads by untrusted/external callers are strictly intercepted and blocked!
|
|
9448
9487
|
if (!warnedKeys.has(prop)) {
|
|
9449
9488
|
const isSilent = target["XYPRISS_ENV_SHIELD"] === "silent";
|
|
9450
9489
|
if (!isSilent) {
|
|
@@ -9458,35 +9497,51 @@ class EnvApi {
|
|
|
9458
9497
|
return undefined;
|
|
9459
9498
|
},
|
|
9460
9499
|
/**
|
|
9461
|
-
*
|
|
9462
|
-
*
|
|
9463
|
-
*
|
|
9464
|
-
* `Reflect.defineProperty` with strict descriptor expectations, failing with:
|
|
9465
|
-
* `'process.env' only accepts a configurable, writable, and enumerable data descriptor`.
|
|
9466
|
-
*
|
|
9467
|
-
* This trap permits safe mutation of whitelisted and framework-reserved keys (e.g. `XYPRISS_*`),
|
|
9468
|
-
* while gracefully intercepting and auditing non-compliant mutations without crashing the host process.
|
|
9500
|
+
* Strict `set` trap on `process.env`.
|
|
9501
|
+
* Blocks tampering with critical system environment variables (CWE-471).
|
|
9502
|
+
* Restricts internal prefixes to verified engine callers.
|
|
9469
9503
|
*/
|
|
9470
9504
|
set(target, prop, value, receiver) {
|
|
9471
9505
|
if (typeof prop !== "string") {
|
|
9472
9506
|
return Reflect.set(target, prop, value, receiver);
|
|
9473
9507
|
}
|
|
9474
9508
|
const key = prop;
|
|
9475
|
-
//
|
|
9476
|
-
if (
|
|
9477
|
-
|
|
9478
|
-
|
|
9509
|
+
// Faille 4 (XSA_2026_XESS_007): Prevent poisoning of critical runtime & system variables
|
|
9510
|
+
if (CRITICAL_IMMUTABLE_ENV.has(key)) {
|
|
9511
|
+
if (!warnedKeys.has(key)) {
|
|
9512
|
+
process.stderr.write(`\x1b[31m[SECURITY]\x1b[0m ` +
|
|
9513
|
+
`Direct modification to critical system environment variable process.env["${key}"] is permanently blocked.\n`);
|
|
9514
|
+
warnedKeys.add(key);
|
|
9515
|
+
}
|
|
9516
|
+
return true; // Return true to avoid throwing in strict runtime modes while dropping the poisoned write
|
|
9517
|
+
}
|
|
9518
|
+
// Internal framework prefixes: only mutable by verified internal callers
|
|
9519
|
+
if (key.startsWith("XYPRISS_") ||
|
|
9479
9520
|
key.startsWith("LIBXESS_") ||
|
|
9480
9521
|
key.startsWith("XEMS_") ||
|
|
9481
|
-
key.startsWith("
|
|
9482
|
-
|
|
9483
|
-
key.startsWith("__")) {
|
|
9522
|
+
key.startsWith("XESS_")) {
|
|
9523
|
+
isInsideShieldCheck = true;
|
|
9484
9524
|
try {
|
|
9485
|
-
|
|
9525
|
+
const caller = getVerifiedCallerInfo();
|
|
9526
|
+
if (!caller.isUntrusted &&
|
|
9527
|
+
isImmediateInternalEngineCall()) {
|
|
9528
|
+
try {
|
|
9529
|
+
target[key] = String(value);
|
|
9530
|
+
}
|
|
9531
|
+
catch { }
|
|
9532
|
+
return true;
|
|
9533
|
+
}
|
|
9486
9534
|
}
|
|
9487
|
-
|
|
9488
|
-
|
|
9535
|
+
finally {
|
|
9536
|
+
isInsideShieldCheck = false;
|
|
9489
9537
|
}
|
|
9538
|
+
}
|
|
9539
|
+
// Allowed whitelisted non-critical keys
|
|
9540
|
+
if (self.whitelistedFields.has(key)) {
|
|
9541
|
+
try {
|
|
9542
|
+
target[key] = String(value);
|
|
9543
|
+
}
|
|
9544
|
+
catch { }
|
|
9490
9545
|
return true;
|
|
9491
9546
|
}
|
|
9492
9547
|
// Prevent fatal crashes in strict runtimes (like Bun) while auditing unauthorized modifications
|
|
@@ -9499,9 +9554,13 @@ class EnvApi {
|
|
|
9499
9554
|
return true;
|
|
9500
9555
|
},
|
|
9501
9556
|
/**
|
|
9502
|
-
*
|
|
9557
|
+
* Explicit `defineProperty` trap to prevent uncaught descriptor exceptions under Bun,
|
|
9558
|
+
* strictly forbidding definition of critical immutable environment keys.
|
|
9503
9559
|
*/
|
|
9504
9560
|
defineProperty(target, prop, descriptor) {
|
|
9561
|
+
if (typeof prop === "string" && CRITICAL_IMMUTABLE_ENV.has(prop)) {
|
|
9562
|
+
return false;
|
|
9563
|
+
}
|
|
9505
9564
|
try {
|
|
9506
9565
|
return Reflect.defineProperty(target, prop, descriptor);
|
|
9507
9566
|
}
|
|
@@ -9510,42 +9569,95 @@ class EnvApi {
|
|
|
9510
9569
|
}
|
|
9511
9570
|
},
|
|
9512
9571
|
/**
|
|
9513
|
-
*
|
|
9572
|
+
* Explicit `deleteProperty` trap to allow removing allowed keys safely,
|
|
9573
|
+
* protecting critical environment variables and internal framework state.
|
|
9514
9574
|
*/
|
|
9515
9575
|
deleteProperty(target, prop) {
|
|
9516
9576
|
if (typeof prop === "string") {
|
|
9517
|
-
if (
|
|
9518
|
-
|
|
9519
|
-
|
|
9577
|
+
if (CRITICAL_IMMUTABLE_ENV.has(prop)) {
|
|
9578
|
+
return false;
|
|
9579
|
+
}
|
|
9580
|
+
if (prop.startsWith("XYPRISS_") ||
|
|
9520
9581
|
prop.startsWith("LIBXESS_") ||
|
|
9521
9582
|
prop.startsWith("XEMS_") ||
|
|
9522
|
-
prop.startsWith("
|
|
9523
|
-
|
|
9524
|
-
prop.startsWith("__")) {
|
|
9583
|
+
prop.startsWith("XESS_")) {
|
|
9584
|
+
isInsideShieldCheck = true;
|
|
9525
9585
|
try {
|
|
9526
|
-
|
|
9586
|
+
const caller = getVerifiedCallerInfo();
|
|
9587
|
+
if (!caller.isUntrusted && isImmediateInternalEngineCall()) {
|
|
9588
|
+
try {
|
|
9589
|
+
delete target[prop];
|
|
9590
|
+
}
|
|
9591
|
+
catch { }
|
|
9592
|
+
return true;
|
|
9593
|
+
}
|
|
9527
9594
|
}
|
|
9528
|
-
|
|
9529
|
-
|
|
9595
|
+
finally {
|
|
9596
|
+
isInsideShieldCheck = false;
|
|
9530
9597
|
}
|
|
9531
9598
|
return true;
|
|
9532
9599
|
}
|
|
9600
|
+
if (self.whitelistedFields.has(prop)) {
|
|
9601
|
+
try {
|
|
9602
|
+
delete target[prop];
|
|
9603
|
+
}
|
|
9604
|
+
catch { }
|
|
9605
|
+
return true;
|
|
9606
|
+
}
|
|
9533
9607
|
}
|
|
9534
9608
|
return true;
|
|
9535
9609
|
},
|
|
9536
|
-
// Harden enumeration: restrict what callers see when they iterate
|
|
9537
|
-
// or spread process.env
|
|
9538
|
-
|
|
9539
|
-
|
|
9610
|
+
// Harden enumeration: restrict what untrusted callers see when they iterate
|
|
9611
|
+
// or spread process.env, while preserving full environment for internal engine callers.
|
|
9612
|
+
ownKeys(target) {
|
|
9613
|
+
if (isInsideShieldCheck) {
|
|
9614
|
+
return Reflect.ownKeys(target);
|
|
9615
|
+
}
|
|
9616
|
+
isInsideShieldCheck = true;
|
|
9617
|
+
try {
|
|
9618
|
+
const caller = getVerifiedCallerInfo();
|
|
9619
|
+
if (!caller.isUntrusted && isImmediateInternalEngineCall()) {
|
|
9620
|
+
return Reflect.ownKeys(target);
|
|
9621
|
+
}
|
|
9622
|
+
}
|
|
9623
|
+
catch {
|
|
9624
|
+
}
|
|
9625
|
+
finally {
|
|
9626
|
+
isInsideShieldCheck = false;
|
|
9627
|
+
}
|
|
9540
9628
|
return [...self.whitelistedFields];
|
|
9541
9629
|
},
|
|
9542
9630
|
// Align `in` operator behaviour with the restricted key set.
|
|
9543
|
-
has(
|
|
9631
|
+
has(target, prop) {
|
|
9544
9632
|
if (typeof prop !== "string")
|
|
9545
9633
|
return false;
|
|
9546
|
-
|
|
9634
|
+
if (self.whitelistedFields.has(prop))
|
|
9635
|
+
return true;
|
|
9636
|
+
if (prop.startsWith("XYPRISS_") ||
|
|
9637
|
+
prop.startsWith("LIBXESS_") ||
|
|
9638
|
+
prop.startsWith("XESS_") ||
|
|
9639
|
+
prop.startsWith("LIBPORT_") ||
|
|
9640
|
+
prop.startsWith("PORT_") ||
|
|
9641
|
+
prop.startsWith("XPM_")) {
|
|
9642
|
+
if (isInsideShieldCheck)
|
|
9643
|
+
return true;
|
|
9644
|
+
isInsideShieldCheck = true;
|
|
9645
|
+
try {
|
|
9646
|
+
const caller = getVerifiedCallerInfo();
|
|
9647
|
+
return !caller.isUntrusted && isImmediateInternalEngineCall();
|
|
9648
|
+
}
|
|
9649
|
+
catch {
|
|
9650
|
+
return false;
|
|
9651
|
+
}
|
|
9652
|
+
finally {
|
|
9653
|
+
isInsideShieldCheck = false;
|
|
9654
|
+
}
|
|
9655
|
+
}
|
|
9656
|
+
return false;
|
|
9547
9657
|
},
|
|
9548
9658
|
});
|
|
9659
|
+
_shieldedInstances.add(envShield);
|
|
9660
|
+
_shieldedInstances.add(process.env);
|
|
9549
9661
|
try {
|
|
9550
9662
|
Object.defineProperty(process, "env", {
|
|
9551
9663
|
value: envShield,
|
|
@@ -9554,11 +9666,13 @@ class EnvApi {
|
|
|
9554
9666
|
enumerable: true,
|
|
9555
9667
|
});
|
|
9556
9668
|
}
|
|
9557
|
-
catch {
|
|
9558
|
-
//
|
|
9559
|
-
//
|
|
9560
|
-
//
|
|
9561
|
-
//
|
|
9669
|
+
catch (err) {
|
|
9670
|
+
// Issue #52 (https://github.com/Nehonix-Team/XyPriss/issues/52)
|
|
9671
|
+
// Emits an explicit diagnostic notice if the host runtime, sandbox, or
|
|
9672
|
+
// strict VM has locked the process.env descriptor beforehand.
|
|
9673
|
+
// Avoids silent degradation so operators immediately know when the JS
|
|
9674
|
+
// proxy layer cannot replace process.env on the global object.
|
|
9675
|
+
process.stderr.write(`\x1b[33m[SECURITY] WARNING:\x1b[0m Unable to lock process.env descriptor: ${err?.message || err}. Shield proxy degradation active.\n`);
|
|
9562
9676
|
}
|
|
9563
9677
|
}
|
|
9564
9678
|
isCallerProjectCode() {
|
|
@@ -16291,7 +16405,7 @@ class MetaConfigRunner {
|
|
|
16291
16405
|
* Executes a specific meta configuration file
|
|
16292
16406
|
*/
|
|
16293
16407
|
runMetaFile(metaPath) {
|
|
16294
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
16408
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
16295
16409
|
const absolutePath = sys.path.resolve(metaPath);
|
|
16296
16410
|
if (this.executedMetas.has(absolutePath))
|
|
16297
16411
|
return;
|
|
@@ -16318,7 +16432,7 @@ class MetaConfigRunner {
|
|
|
16318
16432
|
* Discovers and executes meta configuration files based on priority
|
|
16319
16433
|
*/
|
|
16320
16434
|
executeMetaConfig(searchDir) {
|
|
16321
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
16435
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
16322
16436
|
const root = searchDir || getCallerProjectRoot() || __sys__$1.__root__;
|
|
16323
16437
|
const metaFiles = searchDir
|
|
16324
16438
|
? [
|
|
@@ -16368,7 +16482,7 @@ class ConfigLoader {
|
|
|
16368
16482
|
this.isConfigApplied = false;
|
|
16369
16483
|
this.packageJson = null;
|
|
16370
16484
|
this.metaRunner = new MetaConfigRunner();
|
|
16371
|
-
this.sys = getSysApi();
|
|
16485
|
+
this.sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
16372
16486
|
}
|
|
16373
16487
|
/**
|
|
16374
16488
|
* Load all xypriss.config.json files found in the project and apply configurations
|
|
@@ -18442,7 +18556,7 @@ const MIME_MAP = {
|
|
|
18442
18556
|
function resolveMime(ext) {
|
|
18443
18557
|
return MIME_MAP[ext.toLowerCase()] ?? "application/octet-stream";
|
|
18444
18558
|
}
|
|
18445
|
-
getSysApi();
|
|
18559
|
+
getSysApi$1();
|
|
18446
18560
|
class SendFileHandler {
|
|
18447
18561
|
constructor(res, logger) {
|
|
18448
18562
|
this.res = res;
|
|
@@ -26683,7 +26797,7 @@ class XHSCWorker {
|
|
|
26683
26797
|
app.logger || initializeLogger(ConfigurationManager.get("logging"));
|
|
26684
26798
|
// Issue #43: Access system environment variables through getSysApi()
|
|
26685
26799
|
// to maintain compatibility with the XyPriss zero-trust model and shielded process.env
|
|
26686
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
26800
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
26687
26801
|
this.workerId =
|
|
26688
26802
|
options?.workerId ||
|
|
26689
26803
|
sys?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_WORKER_ID") ||
|
|
@@ -27317,7 +27431,7 @@ class EngineManager {
|
|
|
27317
27431
|
? ["--plugins", uniquePluginPaths.join(",")]
|
|
27318
27432
|
: [];
|
|
27319
27433
|
// Access project root lazily via getSysApi() to break circular imports
|
|
27320
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
27434
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
27321
27435
|
const projectRoot = sys?.__root__ ||
|
|
27322
27436
|
getCallerProjectRoot() ||
|
|
27323
27437
|
identifyProjectRoot(process.cwd()) ||
|
|
@@ -27370,6 +27484,9 @@ class EngineManager {
|
|
|
27370
27484
|
detached: true,
|
|
27371
27485
|
env: {
|
|
27372
27486
|
...process.env,
|
|
27487
|
+
XYPRISS_USER_TMP: tmpDir,
|
|
27488
|
+
XESS_SESSION_TMP: tmpDir,
|
|
27489
|
+
XYPRISS_SESSION_HASH: sessionHash,
|
|
27373
27490
|
...(internalSig
|
|
27374
27491
|
? { XYPRISS_INTERNAL_TOKEN: internalSig }
|
|
27375
27492
|
: {}),
|
|
@@ -27490,7 +27607,7 @@ class XHSCBridge {
|
|
|
27490
27607
|
// 0. Check if we are a worker spawned by Go (Clustering mode)
|
|
27491
27608
|
// Auxiliary servers should NEVER act as cluster workers for the primary instance.
|
|
27492
27609
|
// Issue #43: Access workerId via getSysApi() to adhere to XyPriss zero-trust environment model
|
|
27493
|
-
const sysApi = getSysApi();
|
|
27610
|
+
const sysApi = getSysApi$1();
|
|
27494
27611
|
const currentWorkerId = sysApi?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_WORKER_ID");
|
|
27495
27612
|
if (currentWorkerId && currentWorkerId !== "master" && !this.app.configs?.isAuxiliary) {
|
|
27496
27613
|
this.logger.info("cluster", `Worker ${currentWorkerId} starting...`);
|
|
@@ -27529,7 +27646,7 @@ class XHSCBridge {
|
|
|
27529
27646
|
// Issue #43: Use getSysApi().__env__.set() instead of assigning to process.env directly.
|
|
27530
27647
|
// In strict JS runtimes like Bun (multi-server mode), mutating process.env when wrapped
|
|
27531
27648
|
// in an immutable descriptor causes fatal descriptor rejection exceptions.
|
|
27532
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
27649
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
27533
27650
|
sys?.__env__?.set("XYPRISS_WORKER_ID", "master");
|
|
27534
27651
|
sys?.__env__?.set("XYPRISS_IPC_PATH", this.socketPath);
|
|
27535
27652
|
}
|
|
@@ -28145,7 +28262,7 @@ class ConsoleInterceptor {
|
|
|
28145
28262
|
isActive: false,
|
|
28146
28263
|
};
|
|
28147
28264
|
// Issue #43: Access XYPRISS_IPC_PATH via getSysApi()
|
|
28148
|
-
this.ipcPath = getSysApi()?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_IPC_PATH");
|
|
28265
|
+
this.ipcPath = getSysApi$1()?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_IPC_PATH");
|
|
28149
28266
|
}
|
|
28150
28267
|
/**
|
|
28151
28268
|
* Decides whether a log line should be displayed given the current displayLimit config.
|
|
@@ -28205,7 +28322,7 @@ class ConsoleInterceptor {
|
|
|
28205
28322
|
this.stats.isActive = true;
|
|
28206
28323
|
// Try to sync config if IPC is already available (Issue #43)
|
|
28207
28324
|
this.ipcPath =
|
|
28208
|
-
this.ipcPath || getSysApi()?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_IPC_PATH");
|
|
28325
|
+
this.ipcPath || getSysApi$1()?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_IPC_PATH");
|
|
28209
28326
|
if (this.ipcPath) {
|
|
28210
28327
|
const ipc = new XHSCDirectIPC(this.ipcPath);
|
|
28211
28328
|
await ipc.sendCommand("console", "update-config", this.config);
|
|
@@ -28595,7 +28712,7 @@ class XyLifecycleManager {
|
|
|
28595
28712
|
async handleServerStartup(serverPort, host, callback) {
|
|
28596
28713
|
// Rust/Go-Managed Clustering Mode
|
|
28597
28714
|
// Issue #43: Retrieve workerId and ipcPath via getSysApi() rather than raw process.env
|
|
28598
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
28715
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
28599
28716
|
const workerId = sys?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_WORKER_ID") ||
|
|
28600
28717
|
(typeof process !== "undefined"
|
|
28601
28718
|
? process.env?.XYPRISS_WORKER_ID
|
|
@@ -29081,12 +29198,12 @@ class XyprissApp {
|
|
|
29081
29198
|
this.settings = {
|
|
29082
29199
|
"x-powered-by": false,
|
|
29083
29200
|
etag: "weak",
|
|
29084
|
-
env: getSysApi()?.__env__?.get("NODE_ENV") || "development",
|
|
29201
|
+
env: getSysApi$1()?.__env__?.get("NODE_ENV") || "development",
|
|
29085
29202
|
"subdomain offset": 2,
|
|
29086
29203
|
"trust proxy": false,
|
|
29087
29204
|
"view cache": true,
|
|
29088
29205
|
"view engine": false,
|
|
29089
|
-
views: getSysApi()?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_VIEWS") || process.cwd() + "/views",
|
|
29206
|
+
views: getSysApi$1()?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_VIEWS") || process.cwd() + "/views",
|
|
29090
29207
|
};
|
|
29091
29208
|
}
|
|
29092
29209
|
// ===== HTTP METHOD IMPLEMENTATIONS =====
|
|
@@ -31109,7 +31226,7 @@ class SecurityMiddleware {
|
|
|
31109
31226
|
cookieOptions: {
|
|
31110
31227
|
httpOnly: true,
|
|
31111
31228
|
sameSite: "strict",
|
|
31112
|
-
secure: getSysApi().__env__.isProduction(),
|
|
31229
|
+
secure: getSysApi$1().__env__.isProduction(),
|
|
31113
31230
|
maxAge: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 24 hours
|
|
31114
31231
|
...(csrfConfig.cookieOptions || {}),
|
|
31115
31232
|
},
|
|
@@ -32394,7 +32511,7 @@ class WorkerPoolComponent {
|
|
|
32394
32511
|
// Add task execution method via IPC
|
|
32395
32512
|
// Issue #43: Access XYPRISS_IPC_PATH through getSysApi()
|
|
32396
32513
|
app.executeTask = (task) => {
|
|
32397
|
-
const ipcPath = getSysApi()?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_IPC_PATH");
|
|
32514
|
+
const ipcPath = getSysApi$1()?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_IPC_PATH");
|
|
32398
32515
|
if (this.isXHSC && ipcPath) {
|
|
32399
32516
|
// In worker mode, we send the task to Go via the global IPC handler
|
|
32400
32517
|
// We'll assume the XHSCWorker instance is available or
|
|
@@ -32481,7 +32598,7 @@ class ComponentManager {
|
|
|
32481
32598
|
}
|
|
32482
32599
|
async initializeWorkerPool() {
|
|
32483
32600
|
// Issue #43: Retrieve XYPRISS_WORKER_ID via getSysApi()
|
|
32484
|
-
const workerId = getSysApi()?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_WORKER_ID");
|
|
32601
|
+
const workerId = getSysApi$1()?.__env__?.get("XYPRISS_WORKER_ID");
|
|
32485
32602
|
const isWorker = !!workerId && workerId !== "master";
|
|
32486
32603
|
if (this.options.workerPool?.enabled) {
|
|
32487
32604
|
this.refs.workerPoolComponent = new WorkerPoolComponent({ workerPool: this.options.workerPool }, { app: this.app, serverOptions: this.options });
|
|
@@ -32811,7 +32928,7 @@ class XyPrissServer {
|
|
|
32811
32928
|
* the XyPriss zero-trust model and avoid process.env shield traps.
|
|
32812
32929
|
*/
|
|
32813
32930
|
function handleWorkerMode(options) {
|
|
32814
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
32931
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
32815
32932
|
const env = sys?.__env__;
|
|
32816
32933
|
// Check if running in worker mode
|
|
32817
32934
|
const clusterMode = env?.get("XYPRISS_CLUSTER_MODE") ||
|
|
@@ -36617,7 +36734,7 @@ class XyServerCreator {
|
|
|
36617
36734
|
// 3. Setup environment
|
|
36618
36735
|
// Issue #43: Apply NODE_ENV through getSysApi().__env__.set() to avoid strict descriptor exceptions under Bun
|
|
36619
36736
|
if (options.env) {
|
|
36620
|
-
const sys = getSysApi();
|
|
36737
|
+
const sys = getSysApi$1();
|
|
36621
36738
|
if (sys?.__env__) {
|
|
36622
36739
|
sys.__env__.set("NODE_ENV", options.env);
|
|
36623
36740
|
}
|
|
@@ -36743,7 +36860,7 @@ class XMSStartupUI {
|
|
|
36743
36860
|
quiet: options.quiet !== false,
|
|
36744
36861
|
silent: options.silent === true,
|
|
36745
36862
|
};
|
|
36746
|
-
const sysEnv = getSysApi()?.__env__;
|
|
36863
|
+
const sysEnv = getSysApi$1()?.__env__;
|
|
36747
36864
|
const isCI = sysEnv ? sysEnv.get("CI") : (typeof process !== "undefined" && process.env?.CI);
|
|
36748
36865
|
const noColor = sysEnv ? sysEnv.get("NO_COLOR") : (typeof process !== "undefined" && process.env?.NO_COLOR);
|
|
36749
36866
|
const disableColors = sysEnv ? sysEnv.get("NODE_DISABLE_COLORS") : (typeof process !== "undefined" && process.env?.NODE_DISABLE_COLORS);
|
|
@@ -38913,6 +39030,9 @@ function getIp(req, enriched) {
|
|
|
38913
39030
|
if (typeof globalThis !== "undefined") {
|
|
38914
39031
|
configLoader.loadAndApplySysConfig();
|
|
38915
39032
|
}
|
|
39033
|
+
function getSysApi() {
|
|
39034
|
+
return __sys__$1;
|
|
39035
|
+
}
|
|
38916
39036
|
/**
|
|
38917
39037
|
* Default router instance for quick start
|
|
38918
39038
|
*/
|
|
@@ -38951,6 +39071,7 @@ exports.getInstanceId = getInstanceId;
|
|
|
38951
39071
|
exports.getIp = getIp;
|
|
38952
39072
|
exports.getMime = getMime;
|
|
38953
39073
|
exports.getMimes = getMimes;
|
|
39074
|
+
exports.getSysApi = getSysApi;
|
|
38954
39075
|
exports.identifyProjectRoot = identifyProjectRoot;
|
|
38955
39076
|
exports.initializeFileUpload = initializeFileUpload;
|
|
38956
39077
|
exports.mergeWithDefaults = mergeWithDefaults;
|