xploitscan-shared-rules 2.4.9 → 2.4.11

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.d.cts CHANGED
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ interface CustomRule {
160
160
  * before a scan can be saved without enough provenance to explain a changed
161
161
  * grade.
162
162
  */
163
- declare const SCANNER_VERSION = "2.4.9";
163
+ declare const SCANNER_VERSION = "2.4.11";
164
164
 
165
165
  /**
166
166
  * Line-oriented helpers shared by every rule. Pure string manipulation — no fs
@@ -1134,6 +1134,12 @@ declare const exposedEnvFile: CustomRule;
1134
1134
  * objects are left as they are, which can only suppress a finding.
1135
1135
  */
1136
1136
  declare function maskOutboundAuthNoise(code: string): string;
1137
+ /**
1138
+ * Writes that make a `"use server"` export a real mutation. Shared with
1139
+ * VC064, which walks each pattern once per file. No `g` flag: `.test()`
1140
+ * must not advance `lastIndex`.
1141
+ */
1142
+ declare const SERVER_ACTION_WRITE_RE: RegExp[];
1137
1143
  declare const missingAuthMiddleware: CustomRule;
1138
1144
  declare const supabaseNoRLS: CustomRule;
1139
1145
  declare const stripeWebhookUnprotected: CustomRule;
@@ -1684,4 +1690,4 @@ input: {
1684
1690
  content: string;
1685
1691
  }[] | QualityContext, rules?: QualityRule[]): Finding[];
1686
1692
 
1687
- export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, GRADE_FINDINGS_PER_RULE, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, SCANNER_VERSION, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allRules, assessHeaders, astMatch, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildReviewPrompt, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyPublicEnvVar, classifyStatement, clientSideAuth, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deduplicateFindings, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, dotenvValue, emptyCatchBlock, enclosingHandler, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDebugMode, exposedEnvFile, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, filterSilenced, findMatches, findMatchesAt, findSourceMapRefs, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, gradeRuleFamily, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedSecrets, harvestIntent, insecureCookies, insecureRandomness, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isCommentLine, isDotenvPath, isInlineSilenced, isInsideFixMessage, isLineSilenced, isLive, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isProtectedFromAiRemoval, isSbomPath, isServerSideFile, isServerTarget, isTestFile, isTestPath, isUngradedFinding, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, lineNumberAt, lineTextAt, maskComments, maskOutboundAuthNoise, missingAuthMiddleware, missingCSP, missingErrorBoundary, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, newDataFence, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, packReviewBatches, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, qualityRules, replaceBlockComments, routeForFile, runCustomRules, scanConfigs, scanDependencies, scanEntropy, scanMultiFile, scanQuality, sqlInjection, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, todoLeftInCode, tryParse, unmeasuredQualityRules, unvalidatedRedirect, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, weakHashing, xssVulnerability };
1693
+ export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, GRADE_FINDINGS_PER_RULE, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, SCANNER_VERSION, SERVER_ACTION_WRITE_RE, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allRules, assessHeaders, astMatch, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildReviewPrompt, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyPublicEnvVar, classifyStatement, clientSideAuth, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deduplicateFindings, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, dotenvValue, emptyCatchBlock, enclosingHandler, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDebugMode, exposedEnvFile, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, filterSilenced, findMatches, findMatchesAt, findSourceMapRefs, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, gradeRuleFamily, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedSecrets, harvestIntent, insecureCookies, insecureRandomness, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isCommentLine, isDotenvPath, isInlineSilenced, isInsideFixMessage, isLineSilenced, isLive, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isProtectedFromAiRemoval, isSbomPath, isServerSideFile, isServerTarget, isTestFile, isTestPath, isUngradedFinding, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, lineNumberAt, lineTextAt, maskComments, maskOutboundAuthNoise, missingAuthMiddleware, missingCSP, missingErrorBoundary, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, newDataFence, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, packReviewBatches, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, qualityRules, replaceBlockComments, routeForFile, runCustomRules, scanConfigs, scanDependencies, scanEntropy, scanMultiFile, scanQuality, sqlInjection, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, todoLeftInCode, tryParse, unmeasuredQualityRules, unvalidatedRedirect, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, weakHashing, xssVulnerability };
package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ interface CustomRule {
160
160
  * before a scan can be saved without enough provenance to explain a changed
161
161
  * grade.
162
162
  */
163
- declare const SCANNER_VERSION = "2.4.9";
163
+ declare const SCANNER_VERSION = "2.4.11";
164
164
 
165
165
  /**
166
166
  * Line-oriented helpers shared by every rule. Pure string manipulation — no fs
@@ -1134,6 +1134,12 @@ declare const exposedEnvFile: CustomRule;
1134
1134
  * objects are left as they are, which can only suppress a finding.
1135
1135
  */
1136
1136
  declare function maskOutboundAuthNoise(code: string): string;
1137
+ /**
1138
+ * Writes that make a `"use server"` export a real mutation. Shared with
1139
+ * VC064, which walks each pattern once per file. No `g` flag: `.test()`
1140
+ * must not advance `lastIndex`.
1141
+ */
1142
+ declare const SERVER_ACTION_WRITE_RE: RegExp[];
1137
1143
  declare const missingAuthMiddleware: CustomRule;
1138
1144
  declare const supabaseNoRLS: CustomRule;
1139
1145
  declare const stripeWebhookUnprotected: CustomRule;
@@ -1684,4 +1690,4 @@ input: {
1684
1690
  content: string;
1685
1691
  }[] | QualityContext, rules?: QualityRule[]): Finding[];
1686
1692
 
1687
- export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, GRADE_FINDINGS_PER_RULE, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, SCANNER_VERSION, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allRules, assessHeaders, astMatch, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildReviewPrompt, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyPublicEnvVar, classifyStatement, clientSideAuth, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deduplicateFindings, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, dotenvValue, emptyCatchBlock, enclosingHandler, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDebugMode, exposedEnvFile, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, filterSilenced, findMatches, findMatchesAt, findSourceMapRefs, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, gradeRuleFamily, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedSecrets, harvestIntent, insecureCookies, insecureRandomness, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isCommentLine, isDotenvPath, isInlineSilenced, isInsideFixMessage, isLineSilenced, isLive, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isProtectedFromAiRemoval, isSbomPath, isServerSideFile, isServerTarget, isTestFile, isTestPath, isUngradedFinding, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, lineNumberAt, lineTextAt, maskComments, maskOutboundAuthNoise, missingAuthMiddleware, missingCSP, missingErrorBoundary, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, newDataFence, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, packReviewBatches, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, qualityRules, replaceBlockComments, routeForFile, runCustomRules, scanConfigs, scanDependencies, scanEntropy, scanMultiFile, scanQuality, sqlInjection, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, todoLeftInCode, tryParse, unmeasuredQualityRules, unvalidatedRedirect, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, weakHashing, xssVulnerability };
1693
+ export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, GRADE_FINDINGS_PER_RULE, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, SCANNER_VERSION, SERVER_ACTION_WRITE_RE, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allRules, assessHeaders, astMatch, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildReviewPrompt, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyPublicEnvVar, classifyStatement, clientSideAuth, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deduplicateFindings, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, dotenvValue, emptyCatchBlock, enclosingHandler, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDebugMode, exposedEnvFile, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, filterSilenced, findMatches, findMatchesAt, findSourceMapRefs, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, gradeRuleFamily, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedSecrets, harvestIntent, insecureCookies, insecureRandomness, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isCommentLine, isDotenvPath, isInlineSilenced, isInsideFixMessage, isLineSilenced, isLive, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isProtectedFromAiRemoval, isSbomPath, isServerSideFile, isServerTarget, isTestFile, isTestPath, isUngradedFinding, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, lineNumberAt, lineTextAt, maskComments, maskOutboundAuthNoise, missingAuthMiddleware, missingCSP, missingErrorBoundary, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, newDataFence, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, packReviewBatches, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, qualityRules, replaceBlockComments, routeForFile, runCustomRules, scanConfigs, scanDependencies, scanEntropy, scanMultiFile, scanQuality, sqlInjection, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, todoLeftInCode, tryParse, unmeasuredQualityRules, unvalidatedRedirect, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, weakHashing, xssVulnerability };
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
1
1
  // src/version.ts
2
- var SCANNER_VERSION = "2.4.9";
2
+ var SCANNER_VERSION = "2.4.11";
3
3
 
4
4
  // src/snippet.ts
5
5
  var cacheContent = null;
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ function isTestPath(filePath) {
514
514
  if (/(?:^|\/)testing(?:\/|$)/i.test(normalized)) return true;
515
515
  return false;
516
516
  }
517
- var SBOM_FILE_RE = /(?:^|\/)(?:[^/]*\.spdx(?:\.json)?|[^/]*\.cdx\.json|[^/]*\.cdx\.xml|bom\.json|sbom[^/]*\.json|[^/]*\.sbom\.json|[^/]*cyclonedx[^/]*\.(?:json|xml))$/i;
517
+ var SBOM_FILE_RE = /(?:^|\/)(?:[^/]*\.spdx(?:\.json)?|[^/]*\.cdx\.json|[^/]*\.cdx\.xml|bom\.(?:json|xml)|sbom[^/]*\.json|[^/]*\.sbom\.json|[^/]*cyclonedx[^/]*\.(?:json|xml))$/i;
518
518
  function isSbomPath(filePath) {
519
519
  return SBOM_FILE_RE.test(normalize(filePath));
520
520
  }
@@ -1852,13 +1852,40 @@ function dbUrlLacksRealCredential(url) {
1852
1852
  const userinfo = rest.slice(0, at);
1853
1853
  const colon = userinfo.indexOf(":");
1854
1854
  const user = colon < 0 ? userinfo : userinfo.slice(0, colon);
1855
- const pass = colon < 0 ? "" : decodeURIComponentSafe(userinfo.slice(colon + 1));
1855
+ const rawPass = colon < 0 ? "" : userinfo.slice(colon + 1);
1856
+ const pass = colon < 0 ? "" : decodeURIComponentSafe(rawPass);
1856
1857
  if (!pass) return true;
1858
+ const portShaped = /^(\d{1,5})(?:\/[\w.-]{0,64})?[?#"'`][^@]*$/.exec(rawPass);
1859
+ if (portShaped && Number(portShaped[1]) <= 65535) return true;
1857
1860
  if (isFormatPlaceholder(pass)) return true;
1858
1861
  if (isPlaceholderSecret(pass)) return true;
1859
1862
  if (/^(?:u|user|username)$/i.test(user) && /^(?:pass|password|passwd|pwd)$/i.test(pass)) return true;
1860
1863
  return false;
1861
1864
  }
1865
+ var LOOPBACK_DEV_USER_RE = /^(?:postgres|root|admin|user|test|dev|mysql|mongo|mongodb|redis|sa|guest|app|example)$/i;
1866
+ function isLoopbackDevDefault(url) {
1867
+ const rest = url.replace(/^[a-z0-9+]+:\/\//i, "");
1868
+ const at = rest.lastIndexOf("@");
1869
+ if (at < 0) return false;
1870
+ const userinfo = rest.slice(0, at);
1871
+ const colon = userinfo.indexOf(":");
1872
+ if (colon < 0) return false;
1873
+ const user = userinfo.slice(0, colon);
1874
+ const pass = decodeURIComponentSafe(userinfo.slice(colon + 1));
1875
+ if (user !== pass || !LOOPBACK_DEV_USER_RE.test(user)) return false;
1876
+ let host = rest.slice(at + 1);
1877
+ const cut = host.search(/[/?#]/);
1878
+ if (cut >= 0) host = host.slice(0, cut);
1879
+ if (host.startsWith("[")) {
1880
+ const end = host.indexOf("]");
1881
+ host = end >= 0 ? host.slice(1, end) : host;
1882
+ } else {
1883
+ const port = host.lastIndexOf(":");
1884
+ if (port >= 0) host = host.slice(0, port);
1885
+ }
1886
+ const h = host.toLowerCase();
1887
+ return h === "localhost" || h === "::1" || h === "0.0.0.0" || h === "host.docker.internal" || /^127(?:\.\d{1,3}){0,3}$/.test(h);
1888
+ }
1862
1889
  function decodeURIComponentSafe(value) {
1863
1890
  try {
1864
1891
  return decodeURIComponent(value);
@@ -1867,10 +1894,12 @@ function decodeURIComponentSafe(value) {
1867
1894
  }
1868
1895
  }
1869
1896
  var FORMAT_PLACEHOLDER_MAX = 256;
1897
+ var FORMAT_FIELD_RE = /^\{(?:[a-z_][a-z0-9_]{0,63}|[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]{0,63})(?:\.(?:[a-z_][a-z0-9_]{0,63}|[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]{0,63})){0,4}(?:\[[\w'"]{1,64}\])?(?:![rsa])?(?::[<>=^]?\d{0,3}[sd]?)?\}$/;
1870
1898
  function isFormatPlaceholder(value) {
1871
1899
  const v = value.trim();
1872
1900
  if (!v) return true;
1873
1901
  if (v.length > FORMAT_PLACEHOLDER_MAX) return false;
1902
+ if (FORMAT_FIELD_RE.test(v)) return true;
1874
1903
  if (/^(?:%(?:[%sdifvx]|\([^)]+\))|\{[0-9]*\}|\$\{[^}]*\}|<[^<>]*>|\*+)$/i.test(v)) return true;
1875
1904
  if (/%(?:[%sdifvx]|\([^)]+\))|\{[0-9]*\}|\$\{[^}]*\}|<[^<>]*>/.test(v)) return true;
1876
1905
  return false;
@@ -1925,11 +1954,14 @@ var hardcodedSecrets = {
1925
1954
  /\b(?:password|passwd|pwd)\s*:\s*["'`]([a-zA-Z0-9_\-!@#$%^&*.\/:\-]{8,})["'`]/gi,
1926
1955
  // Private keys
1927
1956
  /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,
1928
- // Database URLs with credentials. The user and password cannot cross
1929
- // whitespace or a newline, and each is capped at 1024 characters, so
1930
- // a localhost URL cannot run forward to a later `@` and a run of
1931
- // `postgres://a:b` with no `@` cannot backtrack.
1932
- /(?:postgres|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?):\/\/[^:@\s/]{1,1024}:[^@\s]{1,1024}@[^/\s"'`]{1,256}/gi,
1957
+ // Database URLs with credentials. Align with Pro VC049: `postgresql://`
1958
+ // and `postgresql+asyncpg://` (and mysql/mongodb+srv) are what providers
1959
+ // actually hand out — `postgres://` alone missed Supabase/Prisma URLs.
1960
+ // The user and password cannot cross whitespace or a newline, and each
1961
+ // is capped at 1024 characters, so a localhost URL cannot run forward
1962
+ // to a later `@` and a run of `postgres://a:b` with no `@` cannot
1963
+ // backtrack.
1964
+ /(?:postgres(?:ql)?(?:\+[a-z0-9]{1,20})?|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?):\/\/[^:@\s/]{1,1024}:[^@\s]{1,1024}@[^/\s"'`]{1,256}/gi,
1933
1965
  // ── [11]–[14] Fixed-prefix AI-provider and payment keys ──
1934
1966
  // These match the token itself, so they fire whatever it is bound to:
1935
1967
  // `const k = "…"`, a positional `new OpenAI("…")`, an unquoted .env
@@ -2044,15 +2076,20 @@ var hardcodedSecrets = {
2044
2076
  }
2045
2077
  if (pi === 6) {
2046
2078
  const valMatch = lineText.match(/[:=]\s*["'`]([^"'`]+)["'`]/);
2047
- const nameMatch = lineText.match(/([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*_(?:SECRET|TOKEN|KEY|PASSWORD|PASSWD))\b/);
2079
+ const nameMatch = (matchedText[ri] ?? "").match(/^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{0,64}_(?:SECRET|TOKEN|KEY|PASSWORD|PASSWD)\b/);
2048
2080
  if (valMatch && nameMatch) {
2049
2081
  const value = valMatch[1];
2050
- const isKeySuffix = nameMatch[1].endsWith("_KEY");
2051
- const isSlotIdentifier = value.length < 40 && (/^[a-z0-9]+([_-][a-z0-9]+)+$/.test(value) || isNamespacedSlotKey(nameMatch[1], value));
2082
+ const isKeySuffix = nameMatch[0].endsWith("_KEY");
2083
+ const isSlotIdentifier = value.length < 40 && (/^[a-z0-9]+([_-][a-z0-9]+)+$/.test(value) || isNamespacedSlotKey(nameMatch[0], value));
2052
2084
  if (isKeySuffix && isSlotIdentifier) continue;
2053
2085
  }
2054
2086
  }
2055
- if (pi === 10 && dbUrlLacksRealCredential(matchedText[ri] ?? "")) continue;
2087
+ if (pi === 10) {
2088
+ const url = matchedText[ri] ?? "";
2089
+ if (dbUrlLacksRealCredential(url)) continue;
2090
+ matches.push(isLoopbackDevDefault(url) ? { ...rm, severity: "low" } : textHasLiveCredential(url) ? { ...rm, live: true } : rm);
2091
+ continue;
2092
+ }
2056
2093
  const matched = matchedText[ri] ?? "";
2057
2094
  matches.push(textHasLiveCredential(matched) ? { ...rm, live: true } : rm);
2058
2095
  }
@@ -2473,6 +2510,22 @@ function unauthenticatedTanStackHandlers(masked, filePath) {
2473
2510
  }
2474
2511
  return hits;
2475
2512
  }
2513
+ var SERVER_ACTION_WRITE_RE = [
2514
+ /\b(?:kv|redis|cache|upstash)\s*\.\s*(?:set|del|hset|hdel|incr\w{0,4}|decr\w{0,4}|lpush|rpush|sadd|srem|zadd|expire|getdel)\s*\(/,
2515
+ /\b(?:stripe|paypal|braintree|lemonsqueezy|paddle)\s*\.\s*\w{1,40}\s*\.\s*(?:create|update|del|cancel|capture|refund)\w{0,10}\s*\(/,
2516
+ /\bfetch\s*\([^;]{0,400}?\bmethod\s*(?::\s*(?=["'`](?:POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)\b|`\$\{|[A-Za-z_$(\[])|(?=[,}]))/i,
2517
+ /\b(?:fs(?:\.promises)?\s*\.\s*)?(?:writeFile|appendFile|unlink|rm|rmdir|rename|copyFile)(?:Sync)?\s*\(/,
2518
+ /\.\s*(?:del|deleteOne|deleteMany|insertOne|insertMany|updateOne|updateMany|replaceOne|bulkWrite|upsert|increment|decrement|destroy|truncate)\s*\(/,
2519
+ /cookies\(\)\)?\s*\.\s*set\(\s*["'`][\w-]*(?:session|token|auth|jwt|sid|role|user|admin)/i,
2520
+ ...TANSTACK_MUTATION_RE,
2521
+ /\b(?:prisma|db|tx)\s*\.\s*\w{1,64}\s*\.\s*(?:create|createMany|insert\w{0,10})\s*\(/,
2522
+ /\b(?:db|tx)\s*\.\s*insert\s*\(\s*\w/,
2523
+ /\.from\(\s*["'`][\w.-]{1,64}["'`]\s*\)\s*\.\s*insert\s*\(/,
2524
+ /\bINSERT\s+INTO\b/i,
2525
+ /\.collection\(\s*["'`][\w.-]{1,64}["'`]\s*\)\s*\.\s*(?:insert\w{0,8}|update\w{0,8}|delete\w{0,8}|replaceOne|findOneAndUpdate|findOneAndDelete)\s*\(/,
2526
+ /\b(?!(?:Object|Array|Promise|Reflect|Buffer|Math|JSON|Date|Intl|Symbol|Map|Set|WeakMap|Response|NextResponse|Request|URL|Error)\b)[A-Z]\w{0,40}\.(?:create|insertMany|updateOne|updateMany|deleteOne|deleteMany|findByIdAndUpdate|findByIdAndDelete|findOneAndUpdate|findOneAndDelete|destroy)\s*\(/,
2527
+ /\b(?:delete|remove|update|set|grant|revoke|ban|promote|demote|transfer|refund|cancel|reset|change)\w{0,20}(?:User|Account|Role|Admin|Order|Payment|Subscription|Member|Permission|Password|Email|Org|Organization|Team|Project|Invoice|Profile|Balance|Credits?|Plan|Post|Comment)s?\s*\(/
2528
+ ];
2476
2529
  var missingAuthMiddleware = {
2477
2530
  id: "VC003",
2478
2531
  title: "API Route Missing Authentication",
@@ -2498,8 +2551,9 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
2498
2551
  /module\.exports\s*=\s*(?:async\s+)?(?:function\b|\()/g
2499
2552
  );
2500
2553
  }
2554
+ const useServerPatterns = [];
2501
2555
  if (USE_SERVER_DIRECTIVE_RE.test(content)) {
2502
- routePatterns.push(
2556
+ useServerPatterns.push(
2503
2557
  /export\s+(?:async\s+)?function\s+\w+\s*\(/g,
2504
2558
  /export\s+const\s+\w+\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,120})?=\s*(?:async\s*)?\(/g
2505
2559
  );
@@ -2585,24 +2639,33 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
2585
2639
  );
2586
2640
  const maskedForScope = maskOutboundAuthNoise(maskComments(content));
2587
2641
  const codeForAuth = maskOutboundAuthNoise(codeOnly);
2588
- const handlerHasAuth = (index) => {
2642
+ const scopeCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
2643
+ const scopeAt = (index) => {
2644
+ const cached = scopeCache.get(index);
2645
+ if (cached !== void 0) return cached;
2589
2646
  const bodyStart = maskedForScope.indexOf("{", index);
2590
2647
  const probe = bodyStart === -1 ? index : bodyStart + 1;
2591
2648
  const scope = enclosingHandler(maskedForScope, probe);
2649
+ scopeCache.set(index, scope);
2650
+ return scope;
2651
+ };
2652
+ const handlerHasAuth = (index) => {
2653
+ const scope = scopeAt(index);
2592
2654
  if (scope === null) return handlerAuthPatterns.some((p) => p.test(codeForAuth));
2593
2655
  return handlerAuthPatterns.some((p) => p.test(scope));
2594
2656
  };
2595
2657
  const matches = [];
2658
+ const routeLines = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
2659
+ const authFix = "Add authentication middleware to protect this route. Check the user's session/token before processing the request. If the endpoint is public by design (an OG image, an embeddable badge, a health check), add an inline `// VC003-OK: <reason>` comment above the handler to silence.";
2596
2660
  for (const pattern of serverSide ? routePatterns : []) {
2597
- matches.push(
2598
- ...findMatches(
2599
- content,
2600
- pattern,
2601
- missingAuthMiddleware,
2602
- filePath,
2603
- () => "Add authentication middleware to protect this route. Check the user's session/token before processing the request. If the endpoint is public by design (an OG image, an embeddable badge, a health check), add an inline `// VC003-OK: <reason>` comment above the handler to silence."
2604
- )
2605
- );
2661
+ const found = findMatches(content, pattern, missingAuthMiddleware, filePath, () => authFix);
2662
+ for (const foundMatch of found) routeLines.add(foundMatch.line);
2663
+ matches.push(...found);
2664
+ }
2665
+ if (serverSide) {
2666
+ for (const pattern of useServerPatterns) {
2667
+ matches.push(...findMatches(content, pattern, missingAuthMiddleware, filePath, () => authFix));
2668
+ }
2606
2669
  }
2607
2670
  if (matches.length === 0 && serverSide && SUPABASE_EDGE_FN_RE.test(filePath) && isDenoEdgeEntry(codeOnly) && !isPublicByDesignEdgePath(filePath)) {
2608
2671
  const fnName = supabaseFunctionName(filePath);
@@ -2631,7 +2694,12 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
2631
2694
  const isPublicRootGet = (index) => /\.\s*get\s*\(\s*["'`]\/["'`]\s*,/i.test(content.slice(index, index + 240));
2632
2695
  const unauthenticated = matches.filter((m) => {
2633
2696
  const index = indexOfLine(m.line);
2634
- return !isPublicRootGet(index) && !handlerHasAuth(index);
2697
+ if (isPublicRootGet(index) || handlerHasAuth(index)) return false;
2698
+ if (useServerPatterns.length > 0 && !routeLines.has(m.line)) {
2699
+ const scope = scopeAt(index);
2700
+ if (scope !== null && !SERVER_ACTION_WRITE_RE.some((re) => re.test(scope))) return false;
2701
+ }
2702
+ return true;
2635
2703
  });
2636
2704
  if (serverSide || tanstackCandidate) {
2637
2705
  for (const idx of unauthenticatedTanStackHandlers(maskedForScope, filePath)) {
@@ -3031,6 +3099,9 @@ var noRateLimiting = {
3031
3099
  check(content, filePath) {
3032
3100
  const isEntryFile = /(?:server|app|index|main)\.[jt]sx?$/.test(filePath) || filePath.includes("middleware");
3033
3101
  if (!isEntryFile) return [];
3102
+ if (/(?:^|\/)(?:lib|libs|utils?|helpers?|components|hooks|shared|types)\/(?:[^/]+\/)*index\.[jt]sx?$/.test(filePath) && !/\.listen\s*\(|\bcreateServer\s*\(|\bexpress\s*\(\s*\)|\bFastify\s*\(|\bnew\s+(?:Koa|Hono)\b/.test(content)) {
3103
+ return [];
3104
+ }
3034
3105
  const isServer = /(?:from\s+|require\s*\(\s*)["'`](?:express|hono|fastify|koa|koa-router|@koa\/[\w-]+|@hono\/[\w-]+|next(?:\/server)?|next-auth(?:\/[\w-]+)?|@clerk\/nextjs(?:\/server)?)["'`]/.test(content) || // Case-sensitive framework types — `adNext` and `nextLap` can't match.
3035
3106
  /\b(?:NextApiRequest|NextApiResponse|NextRequest|NextResponse)\b/.test(content) || /\b(?:express|fastify|createServer)\s*\(/.test(content) || /\bnew\s+(?:Hono|Koa)\s*\(/.test(content) || /\b(?:Deno|Bun)\.serve\s*\(/.test(content) || /\.listen\s*\(/.test(content);
3036
3107
  if (!isServer) return [];
@@ -3370,6 +3441,28 @@ var unvalidatedRedirect = {
3370
3441
  var CLIENT_PREFERENCE_COOKIE_NAME_RE = /(?:consent|preferences?|prefs?)/i;
3371
3442
  var CLIENT_PREFERENCE_COOKIE_VALUE_RE = /(?:choice|consent|preferences?|prefs?|accepted|essential(?:-only)?|declined|rejected|granted|denied|opt(?:ed)?[-_ ]?(?:in|out))/i;
3372
3443
  var SENSITIVE_CLIENT_COOKIE_RE = /(?:auth|session|token|jwt|bearer|credential|password|passwd|secret|csrf|xsrf|refresh)/i;
3444
+ var UI_FLAG_COOKIE_NAME_RE = /^(?:theme|color-?scheme|sidebar|welcome-toast|toast|locale|lang|language|dir|collapsed|expanded|layout|banner|dismissed|density|contrast|font|font-?size|motion|reduced-?motion|color-mode|dark-mode|ui)$/i;
3445
+ var UI_FLAG_COOKIE_ASSIGN_RE = /\b(?:document\s*\.\s*)?cookie\s*=\s*(["'`])([^"'`]*)\1/gi;
3446
+ var UI_FLAG_SENSITIVE_NAME_RE = /(?:sess|sid(?!ebar)|login|user|uid|key|account|admin|role|remember|__host-|__secure-)/i;
3447
+ var UI_FLAG_COOKIE_BODY_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+=[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+(?:\s*;\s*(?:max-age=-?\d{1,10}|path=\/[\w./-]{0,100}|expires=[\w ,:+-]{1,40}|samesite=(?:lax|strict|none)|secure|domain=\.?[\w.-]{1,100})){0,6}\s*;?\s*$/i;
3448
+ function isConstantUiFlagCookieWrite(line, nextLine) {
3449
+ const next = nextLine.trimStart();
3450
+ if (next.startsWith("+") || next.startsWith(".") || next.startsWith("`")) return false;
3451
+ if (/\bset-cookie\b|\bsetCookie\b|res\.cookie\s*\(/i.test(line)) return false;
3452
+ const re = new RegExp(UI_FLAG_COOKIE_ASSIGN_RE.source, "gi");
3453
+ let saw = false;
3454
+ let assignment;
3455
+ while ((assignment = re.exec(line)) !== null) {
3456
+ saw = true;
3457
+ const body = assignment[2];
3458
+ if (!UI_FLAG_COOKIE_BODY_RE.test(body)) return false;
3459
+ if (SENSITIVE_CLIENT_COOKIE_RE.test(body)) return false;
3460
+ const name = body.split("=")[0];
3461
+ if (!UI_FLAG_COOKIE_NAME_RE.test(name)) return false;
3462
+ if (UI_FLAG_SENSITIVE_NAME_RE.test(name)) return false;
3463
+ }
3464
+ return saw;
3465
+ }
3373
3466
  function isClearlyNonSensitivePreferenceCookieWrite(content, line) {
3374
3467
  const assignment = /\bdocument\s*\.\s*cookie\s*=\s*(.+)$/i.exec(line);
3375
3468
  if (!assignment) return false;
@@ -3401,7 +3494,7 @@ var insecureCookies = {
3401
3494
  check(content, filePath) {
3402
3495
  if (isTestFile(filePath)) return [];
3403
3496
  if (!/cookie/i.test(content)) return [];
3404
- const setCookiePattern = /(?:set-cookie|setCookie|\bcookie\s*=|res\.cookie\s*\()/i;
3497
+ const setCookiePattern = /(?:\bset-cookie|\bsetCookie|\bcookie\s*=|res\.cookie\s*\()/i;
3405
3498
  if (!setCookiePattern.test(content)) return [];
3406
3499
  const hasHttpOnly = /httpOnly\s*:\s*true|httponly/i.test(content);
3407
3500
  const hasSecure = /secure\s*:\s*(?!false\b)\S/i.test(content) || /;\s*secure/i.test(content);
@@ -3420,12 +3513,18 @@ var insecureCookies = {
3420
3513
  () => `Add missing cookie flags: ${missing.join(", ")}. Example: { httpOnly: true, secure: true, sameSite: 'lax' }`
3421
3514
  );
3422
3515
  const lines = content.split("\n");
3516
+ const uiFlagMemo = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
3423
3517
  for (const match of rawMatches) {
3424
3518
  const line = lines[match.line - 1] ?? "";
3425
3519
  if (!hasHttpOnly && isClearlyNonSensitivePreferenceCookieWrite(content, line)) {
3426
3520
  continue;
3427
3521
  }
3428
- matches.push(match);
3522
+ let info = uiFlagMemo.get(match.line);
3523
+ if (info === void 0) {
3524
+ info = isConstantUiFlagCookieWrite(line, lines[match.line] ?? "");
3525
+ uiFlagMemo.set(match.line, info);
3526
+ }
3527
+ matches.push(info ? { ...match, severity: "info" } : match);
3429
3528
  }
3430
3529
  }
3431
3530
  return matches;
@@ -3571,19 +3670,49 @@ var missingHTTPS = {
3571
3670
  const isScriptFile = /\.(?:[cm]?[jt]sx?|vue|svelte)$/i.test(filePath);
3572
3671
  if (!isScriptFile && /<!DOCTYPE|xmlns|\.dtd|\.xsd/i.test(content) && !/fetch|axios|request|http\.get/i.test(content)) return [];
3573
3672
  const httpPattern = /["'`]http:\/\/(?!localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|0\.0\.0\.0|192\.168\.|10\.|172\.(?:1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.|www\.w3\.org|www\.apple\.com\/DTDs|schemas?\.|xml\.org|purl\.org|ns\.adobe|xmlpull\.org|java\.sun\.com)[^"'`\s]+["'`]/g;
3574
- const rawMatches = findMatches(
3575
- content,
3576
- httpPattern,
3577
- missingHTTPS,
3578
- filePath,
3579
- () => "Use https:// instead of http:// for all production URLs. Add HSTS header: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
3580
- );
3673
+ const httpIndexes = [];
3674
+ const rawMatches = findMatches(content, httpPattern, missingHTTPS, filePath, (m) => {
3675
+ httpIndexes.push(m.index);
3676
+ return "Use https:// instead of http:// for all production URLs. Add HSTS header: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains";
3677
+ });
3581
3678
  const lines = rawMatches.length > 0 ? content.split("\n") : [];
3582
- for (const rm of rawMatches) {
3679
+ const lineStarts = [];
3680
+ if (rawMatches.length > 0) {
3681
+ let acc = 0;
3682
+ for (const line of lines) {
3683
+ lineStarts.push(acc);
3684
+ acc += line.length + 1;
3685
+ }
3686
+ }
3687
+ const schemaKeyOnLine = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
3688
+ const tsaOnLine = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
3689
+ const firstSchemaKey = (line, lineNo) => {
3690
+ const cached = schemaKeyOnLine.get(lineNo);
3691
+ if (cached !== void 0) return cached;
3692
+ const key = /(?<![\w$])["']?\$(?:schema|id|ref)["']?\s*:/.exec(line);
3693
+ const at = key ? key.index : -1;
3694
+ schemaKeyOnLine.set(lineNo, at);
3695
+ return at;
3696
+ };
3697
+ for (let i = 0; i < rawMatches.length; i++) {
3698
+ const rm = rawMatches[i];
3583
3699
  const matchText = lines[rm.line - 1] ?? "";
3584
3700
  if (/DTD|DOCTYPE|w3\.org|apple\.com\/DTDs|\bxmlns[\w:-]*\s*=/i.test(matchText)) continue;
3585
- if (/["']\$schema["']\s*:|["']\$id["']\s*:/.test(matchText)) continue;
3586
- if (/--\s*tsaurl\b|\btsaurl\b|timestamp\.(?:digicert|sectigo|comodoca|globalsign|entrust|geotrust|verisign|apple)\.|timestamp\.acs\.microsoft\.com|freetsa\.org/i.test(matchText)) continue;
3701
+ if (firstSchemaKey(matchText, rm.line) >= 0) {
3702
+ const col = httpIndexes[i] - (lineStarts[rm.line - 1] ?? 0);
3703
+ const lookback = matchText.slice(Math.max(0, col - 48), col);
3704
+ if (/(?<![\w$])["']?\$(?:schema|id)["']?\s*:\s*["']?\s*$/.test(lookback)) continue;
3705
+ if (/(?<![\w$])["']?\$ref["']?\s*:\s*["']?\s*$/.test(lookback)) {
3706
+ const host = (/https?:\/\/([^/"'\s:?#]+)/i.exec(matchText.slice(col, col + 300))?.[1] ?? "").toLowerCase();
3707
+ if (host === "json-schema.org" || host.endsWith(".json-schema.org")) continue;
3708
+ }
3709
+ }
3710
+ let tsa = tsaOnLine.get(rm.line);
3711
+ if (tsa === void 0) {
3712
+ tsa = /--\s*tsaurl\b|\btsaurl\b|timestamp\.(?:digicert|sectigo|comodoca|globalsign|entrust|geotrust|verisign|apple)\.|timestamp\.acs\.microsoft\.com|freetsa\.org/i.test(matchText);
3713
+ tsaOnLine.set(rm.line, tsa);
3714
+ }
3715
+ if (tsa) continue;
3587
3716
  matches.push(rm);
3588
3717
  }
3589
3718
  return matches;
@@ -4513,12 +4642,13 @@ function runCustomRules(content, filePath, disabledRules = [], tier = "free", ex
4513
4642
  }
4514
4643
  if (maxLineLen > 5e4) return findings;
4515
4644
  if (/demo-data|example-vulnerable|code-sample/i.test(filePath)) return findings;
4516
- if (isSbomPath(filePath)) return findings;
4645
+ const sbomFile = isSbomPath(filePath);
4517
4646
  const vendoredFile = isVendoredPath(filePath);
4518
4647
  const ruleset = tier === "pro" && extraRules.length > 0 ? [...freeRules, ...extraRules] : freeRules;
4519
4648
  const silenceableLines = /-OK\b/i.test(content) ? content.split("\n") : null;
4520
4649
  for (const rule of ruleset) {
4521
4650
  if (disabledRules.includes(rule.id)) continue;
4651
+ if (sbomFile && rule.category !== "Secrets") continue;
4522
4652
  const matches = rule.check(content, filePath, project);
4523
4653
  const compliance = complianceMap[rule.id];
4524
4654
  const vendored = vendoredFile && isVendoredFinding({ file: filePath, rule: rule.id, category: rule.category });
@@ -4931,6 +5061,30 @@ async function filterFalsePositives(findings, fileContents, budgetMs = AI_FILTER
4931
5061
  }
4932
5062
 
4933
5063
  // src/entropy-scanner.ts
5064
+ function orderedAlphabetRatio(value) {
5065
+ if (value.length === 0) return 0;
5066
+ let ordered = 0;
5067
+ let run = 1;
5068
+ const cls = (c) => {
5069
+ if (c >= 48 && c <= 57) return 1;
5070
+ if (c >= 65 && c <= 90) return 2;
5071
+ if (c >= 97 && c <= 122) return 3;
5072
+ return 0;
5073
+ };
5074
+ for (let i = 1; i < value.length; i++) {
5075
+ const a = value.charCodeAt(i - 1);
5076
+ const b = value.charCodeAt(i);
5077
+ const ca = cls(a);
5078
+ if (ca !== 0 && ca === cls(b) && b === a + 1) {
5079
+ run++;
5080
+ if (run === 4) ordered += 4;
5081
+ else if (run > 4) ordered++;
5082
+ } else {
5083
+ run = 1;
5084
+ }
5085
+ }
5086
+ return ordered / value.length;
5087
+ }
4934
5088
  function shannonEntropy(str) {
4935
5089
  const freq = {};
4936
5090
  for (const ch of str) {
@@ -5170,6 +5324,7 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
5170
5324
  const stringPattern = /(?:[:=]\s*)(["'`])([^"'`\n]{20,256})\1/g;
5171
5325
  let match;
5172
5326
  while ((match = stringPattern.exec(line)) !== null) {
5327
+ if (match[1] === "`" && /(?:^|[\s(]):[a-z][\w-]{0,20}:$/.test(line.slice(Math.max(0, match.index - 23), match.index + 1))) continue;
5173
5328
  let beforeAssign = line.substring(0, match.index);
5174
5329
  if (structured) beforeAssign = beforeAssign.slice(Math.max(beforeAssign.lastIndexOf(","), beforeAssign.lastIndexOf("{")) + 1);
5175
5330
  candidates.push({ value: match[2], beforeAssign });
@@ -5182,7 +5337,10 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
5182
5337
  if (value.includes("${")) continue;
5183
5338
  if (value.includes("\\(")) continue;
5184
5339
  if (value.includes("#{") || value.includes("{{")) continue;
5185
- if (SAFE_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(value))) continue;
5340
+ if (/^(?:\$\w{1,64}|\$env\{\w{1,64}\}|%\w{1,64}%|~|\.{1,2})?[\/\\](?:[\w.@ -]{1,64}[\/\\]){1,20}[\w@ -][\w.@ -]{0,63}\.[A-Za-z0-9]{1,8}$/.test(value) && !/[A-Za-z0-9+]{24,}/.test(value)) continue;
5341
+ if (orderedAlphabetRatio(value) >= 0.9) continue;
5342
+ const isUuidShape = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i.test(value);
5343
+ if (!isUuidShape && SAFE_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(value))) continue;
5186
5344
  if (HASH_PREFIX_RE.test(value)) continue;
5187
5345
  if (SAFE_VAR_NAMES.test(beforeAssign)) continue;
5188
5346
  if (/^https?:\/\/[^:@]*$/.test(value)) continue;
@@ -5193,9 +5351,10 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
5193
5351
  if (isHex) threshold = 3;
5194
5352
  else if (isBase64) threshold = 4.5;
5195
5353
  if (value.length < 20) continue;
5196
- const entropy = shannonEntropy(value);
5197
- if (entropy < threshold) continue;
5198
5354
  const varName = variableName || dotenvName || beforeAssign.match(/["']([^"']+)["']\s*$/)?.[1] || beforeAssign.match(/([\w$-]+)\s*$/)?.[1] || "";
5355
+ if (isUuidShape && !isSecretVariableName(varName)) continue;
5356
+ const entropy = shannonEntropy(value);
5357
+ if (entropy < threshold && !(isUuidShape && isSecretVariableName(varName))) continue;
5199
5358
  if (HUMAN_READABLE_ENV_REFERENCE_RE.test(value) && !isSecretVariableName(varName)) {
5200
5359
  continue;
5201
5360
  }
@@ -9711,6 +9870,7 @@ export {
9711
9870
  QUALITY_EXAMPLES,
9712
9871
  RULE_IMPACTS,
9713
9872
  SCANNER_VERSION,
9873
+ SERVER_ACTION_WRITE_RE,
9714
9874
  TEST_FILE_PATTERN,
9715
9875
  TOTAL_RULE_COUNT,
9716
9876
  allRules,