xploitscan-shared-rules 2.4.6 → 2.4.8
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/index.cjs +234 -57
- package/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.cts +24 -10
- package/dist/index.d.ts +24 -10
- package/dist/index.js +233 -57
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.cts
CHANGED
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@@ -153,6 +153,15 @@ interface CustomRule {
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check: (content: string, filePath: string, project?: ProjectContext) => RuleMatch[];
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}
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+
/**
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* Detection-engine version persisted with scan history.
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*
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* Keep this equal to package.json. The version test makes a missed bump fail
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* before a scan can be saved without enough provenance to explain a changed
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* grade.
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*/
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declare const SCANNER_VERSION = "2.4.8";
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+
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/**
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* Line-oriented helpers shared by every rule. Pure string manipulation — no fs
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* dependency — so safe in the CLI and in serverless/edge environments.
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@@ -520,7 +529,8 @@ declare function isSbomPath(filePath: string): boolean;
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*
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* Formats: `AKIA`/`ABIA`/`ACCA`/`ASIA` plus exactly 16 letters or digits
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* (20 characters, not inside a longer letter-or-digit run; not a key ending in EXAMPLE),
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-
* `sk_live_
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* `sk_live_` / `rk_live_` with a detector-length body, an OpenAI key
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533
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* (`T3BlbkFJ`), an OpenRouter key
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* (`sk-or-v1-`), `ghp_` and `github_pat_`, a Slack `xox*` token, `AIza`,
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* an Anthropic `sk-ant-api03-` key, SendGrid `SG.`, and a Hugging Face
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* `hf_` token.
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@@ -1248,18 +1258,22 @@ interface FilteredFinding {
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interface AIFilterResult {
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findings: Finding[];
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filteredFindings: FilteredFinding[];
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/** Reviewed findings that the model called FP but the host retained. */
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policyRetainedFindings: FilteredFinding[];
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aiReviewed: boolean;
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removedCount: number;
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policyRetainedCount: number;
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totalBefore: number;
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-
/**
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-
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-
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-
* 0 on a full review. Lets the UI honestly say "partially reviewed"
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* instead of labeling unreviewed findings as AI-verified. Does NOT count
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-
* findings skipped by the MAX_TOTAL_FINDINGS cap — that's by design, not
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* a failure.
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*/
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/** Number of findings with one valid, uniquely indexed model verdict. */
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reviewedCount: number;
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/** Every finding without a valid verdict, whatever the reason. */
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unreviewedCount: number;
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/** Findings intentionally left outside the configured AI review cap. */
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cappedCount: number;
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/** Findings that could not be reviewed because their source was unavailable. */
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missingContentCount: number;
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/** True only when the deadline or an individual model-call timeout elapsed. */
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timedOut: boolean;
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}
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/**
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* Findings the AI must never delete. Criticals and live/Secrets stay reported
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@@ -1660,4 +1674,4 @@ input: {
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content: string;
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}[] | QualityContext, rules?: QualityRule[]): Finding[];
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-
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, GRADE_FINDINGS_PER_RULE, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allRules, assessHeaders, astMatch, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildReviewPrompt, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyPublicEnvVar, classifyStatement, clientSideAuth, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, dotenvValue, emptyCatchBlock, enclosingHandler, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDebugMode, exposedEnvFile, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, filterSilenced, findMatches, findMatchesAt, findSourceMapRefs, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, gradeRuleFamily, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedSecrets, harvestIntent, insecureCookies, insecureRandomness, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isCommentLine, isDotenvPath, isInlineSilenced, isInsideFixMessage, isLineSilenced, isLive, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isProtectedFromAiRemoval, isSbomPath, isServerSideFile, isServerTarget, isTestFile, isTestPath, isUngradedFinding, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, lineNumberAt, lineTextAt, maskComments, maskOutboundAuthNoise, missingAuthMiddleware, missingCSP, missingErrorBoundary, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, newDataFence, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, packReviewBatches, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, qualityRules, replaceBlockComments, routeForFile, runCustomRules, scanConfigs, scanDependencies, scanEntropy, scanMultiFile, scanQuality, sqlInjection, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, todoLeftInCode, tryParse, unmeasuredQualityRules, unvalidatedRedirect, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, weakHashing, xssVulnerability };
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export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, GRADE_FINDINGS_PER_RULE, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, SCANNER_VERSION, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allRules, assessHeaders, astMatch, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildReviewPrompt, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyPublicEnvVar, classifyStatement, clientSideAuth, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, dotenvValue, emptyCatchBlock, enclosingHandler, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDebugMode, exposedEnvFile, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, filterSilenced, findMatches, findMatchesAt, findSourceMapRefs, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, gradeRuleFamily, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedSecrets, harvestIntent, insecureCookies, insecureRandomness, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isCommentLine, isDotenvPath, isInlineSilenced, isInsideFixMessage, isLineSilenced, isLive, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isProtectedFromAiRemoval, isSbomPath, isServerSideFile, isServerTarget, isTestFile, isTestPath, isUngradedFinding, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, lineNumberAt, lineTextAt, maskComments, maskOutboundAuthNoise, missingAuthMiddleware, missingCSP, missingErrorBoundary, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, newDataFence, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, packReviewBatches, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, qualityRules, replaceBlockComments, routeForFile, runCustomRules, scanConfigs, scanDependencies, scanEntropy, scanMultiFile, scanQuality, sqlInjection, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, todoLeftInCode, tryParse, unmeasuredQualityRules, unvalidatedRedirect, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, weakHashing, xssVulnerability };
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package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -153,6 +153,15 @@ interface CustomRule {
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153
153
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check: (content: string, filePath: string, project?: ProjectContext) => RuleMatch[];
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}
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155
155
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156
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/**
|
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157
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+
* Detection-engine version persisted with scan history.
|
|
158
|
+
*
|
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159
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+
* Keep this equal to package.json. The version test makes a missed bump fail
|
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160
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+
* before a scan can be saved without enough provenance to explain a changed
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161
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+
* grade.
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162
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+
*/
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163
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+
declare const SCANNER_VERSION = "2.4.8";
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+
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/**
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157
166
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* Line-oriented helpers shared by every rule. Pure string manipulation — no fs
|
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158
167
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* dependency — so safe in the CLI and in serverless/edge environments.
|
|
@@ -520,7 +529,8 @@ declare function isSbomPath(filePath: string): boolean;
|
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520
529
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*
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521
530
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* Formats: `AKIA`/`ABIA`/`ACCA`/`ASIA` plus exactly 16 letters or digits
|
|
522
531
|
* (20 characters, not inside a longer letter-or-digit run; not a key ending in EXAMPLE),
|
|
523
|
-
* `sk_live_
|
|
532
|
+
* `sk_live_` / `rk_live_` with a detector-length body, an OpenAI key
|
|
533
|
+
* (`T3BlbkFJ`), an OpenRouter key
|
|
524
534
|
* (`sk-or-v1-`), `ghp_` and `github_pat_`, a Slack `xox*` token, `AIza`,
|
|
525
535
|
* an Anthropic `sk-ant-api03-` key, SendGrid `SG.`, and a Hugging Face
|
|
526
536
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* `hf_` token.
|
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@@ -1248,18 +1258,22 @@ interface FilteredFinding {
|
|
|
1248
1258
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interface AIFilterResult {
|
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1249
1259
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findings: Finding[];
|
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1250
1260
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filteredFindings: FilteredFinding[];
|
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1261
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+
/** Reviewed findings that the model called FP but the host retained. */
|
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1262
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+
policyRetainedFindings: FilteredFinding[];
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aiReviewed: boolean;
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removedCount: number;
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policyRetainedCount: number;
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totalBefore: number;
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1254
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-
/**
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-
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1256
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-
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1257
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-
* 0 on a full review. Lets the UI honestly say "partially reviewed"
|
|
1258
|
-
* instead of labeling unreviewed findings as AI-verified. Does NOT count
|
|
1259
|
-
* findings skipped by the MAX_TOTAL_FINDINGS cap — that's by design, not
|
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1260
|
-
* a failure.
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1261
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-
*/
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1267
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/** Number of findings with one valid, uniquely indexed model verdict. */
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reviewedCount: number;
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/** Every finding without a valid verdict, whatever the reason. */
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unreviewedCount: number;
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/** Findings intentionally left outside the configured AI review cap. */
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cappedCount: number;
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/** Findings that could not be reviewed because their source was unavailable. */
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missingContentCount: number;
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/** True only when the deadline or an individual model-call timeout elapsed. */
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timedOut: boolean;
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}
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/**
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* Findings the AI must never delete. Criticals and live/Secrets stay reported
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@@ -1660,4 +1674,4 @@ input: {
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1660
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content: string;
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}[] | QualityContext, rules?: QualityRule[]): Finding[];
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1662
1676
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1663
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-
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, GRADE_FINDINGS_PER_RULE, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allRules, assessHeaders, astMatch, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildReviewPrompt, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyPublicEnvVar, classifyStatement, clientSideAuth, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, dotenvValue, emptyCatchBlock, enclosingHandler, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDebugMode, exposedEnvFile, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, filterSilenced, findMatches, findMatchesAt, findSourceMapRefs, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, gradeRuleFamily, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedSecrets, harvestIntent, insecureCookies, insecureRandomness, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isCommentLine, isDotenvPath, isInlineSilenced, isInsideFixMessage, isLineSilenced, isLive, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isProtectedFromAiRemoval, isSbomPath, isServerSideFile, isServerTarget, isTestFile, isTestPath, isUngradedFinding, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, lineNumberAt, lineTextAt, maskComments, maskOutboundAuthNoise, missingAuthMiddleware, missingCSP, missingErrorBoundary, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, newDataFence, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, packReviewBatches, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, qualityRules, replaceBlockComments, routeForFile, runCustomRules, scanConfigs, scanDependencies, scanEntropy, scanMultiFile, scanQuality, sqlInjection, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, todoLeftInCode, tryParse, unmeasuredQualityRules, unvalidatedRedirect, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, weakHashing, xssVulnerability };
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export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, GRADE_FINDINGS_PER_RULE, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, SCANNER_VERSION, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allRules, assessHeaders, astMatch, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildReviewPrompt, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyPublicEnvVar, classifyStatement, clientSideAuth, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, dotenvValue, emptyCatchBlock, enclosingHandler, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDebugMode, exposedEnvFile, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, filterSilenced, findMatches, findMatchesAt, findSourceMapRefs, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, gradeRuleFamily, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedSecrets, harvestIntent, insecureCookies, insecureRandomness, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isCommentLine, isDotenvPath, isInlineSilenced, isInsideFixMessage, isLineSilenced, isLive, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isProtectedFromAiRemoval, isSbomPath, isServerSideFile, isServerTarget, isTestFile, isTestPath, isUngradedFinding, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, lineNumberAt, lineTextAt, maskComments, maskOutboundAuthNoise, missingAuthMiddleware, missingCSP, missingErrorBoundary, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, newDataFence, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, packReviewBatches, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, qualityRules, replaceBlockComments, routeForFile, runCustomRules, scanConfigs, scanDependencies, scanEntropy, scanMultiFile, scanQuality, sqlInjection, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, todoLeftInCode, tryParse, unmeasuredQualityRules, unvalidatedRedirect, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, weakHashing, xssVulnerability };
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package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
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@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
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// src/version.ts
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var SCANNER_VERSION = "2.4.8";
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// src/snippet.ts
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var cacheContent = null;
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var cacheLines = [];
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@@ -501,7 +504,12 @@ function isPlaceholderToken(token) {
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}
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var AWS_ACCESS_KEY_SOURCE = String.raw`(?:(?<![A-Z0-9])|(?<=%3[Dd]|\\x[0-9A-Fa-f]{2}|\\u[0-9A-Fa-f]{4}))(?:AKIA|ABIA|ACCA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}(?![A-Z0-9])`;
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var LIVE_TOKEN_SOURCES = [
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-
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// Keep the body floors aligned with VC001's Stripe detectors. A short
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// lookalike such as `sk_live_nope` can still be reported by VC001's generic
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509
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// `apiKey:` pattern, but it is not a provider-shaped live credential and a
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// test fixture containing it must stay held out of the grade.
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String.raw`sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}`,
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String.raw`\brk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,200}`,
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// OpenAI (`T3BlbkFJ` sits in every sk-proj- / sk-svcacct- / sk-admin- / legacy
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// sk- key) and OpenRouter. A bare `sk-` is not a provider format.
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String.raw`sk-(?:(?:proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,80}|[A-Za-z0-9]{20,80})T3BlbkFJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,80}`,
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@@ -3259,6 +3267,7 @@ var evalUsage = {
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category: "Injection",
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description: "eval() and new Function() execute arbitrary code, creating severe injection risks.",
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check(content, filePath) {
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if (/\.json$/i.test(filePath)) return [];
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if (filePath.includes("node_modules") || filePath.includes(".min.")) return [];
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if (filePath.match(/(?:webpack|rollup|vite|jest|babel|tsup|esbuild)\.config/i)) return [];
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if (isTestFile(filePath)) return [];
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@@ -3332,6 +3341,31 @@ var unvalidatedRedirect = {
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return matches;
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}
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};
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var CLIENT_PREFERENCE_COOKIE_NAME_RE = /(?:consent|preferences?|prefs?)/i;
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var CLIENT_PREFERENCE_COOKIE_VALUE_RE = /(?:choice|consent|preferences?|prefs?|accepted|essential(?:-only)?|declined|rejected|granted|denied|opt(?:ed)?[-_ ]?(?:in|out))/i;
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var SENSITIVE_CLIENT_COOKIE_RE = /(?:auth|session|token|jwt|bearer|credential|password|passwd|secret|csrf|xsrf|refresh)/i;
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function isClearlyNonSensitivePreferenceCookieWrite(content, line) {
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const assignment = /\bdocument\s*\.\s*cookie\s*=\s*(.+)$/i.exec(line);
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if (!assignment) return false;
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const pair = /^[`"']?\s*([^=;]{1,160})=([^;]{1,160})/.exec(assignment[1]);
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if (!pair) return false;
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|
+
const nameAndValue = `${pair[1]}=${pair[2]}`;
|
|
3353
|
+
if (SENSITIVE_CLIENT_COOKIE_RE.test(nameAndValue)) return false;
|
|
3354
|
+
if (!CLIENT_PREFERENCE_COOKIE_NAME_RE.test(pair[1])) return false;
|
|
3355
|
+
if (!CLIENT_PREFERENCE_COOKIE_VALUE_RE.test(pair[2])) return false;
|
|
3356
|
+
if (!/;\s*SameSite\s*=/i.test(line)) return false;
|
|
3357
|
+
if (/;\s*Secure\b/i.test(line)) return true;
|
|
3358
|
+
for (const ref of line.matchAll(/\$\{\s*(secure[A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*\}/gi)) {
|
|
3359
|
+
const declaration = new RegExp(
|
|
3360
|
+
`\\b(?:const|let|var)\\s+${ref[1]}\\s*=`,
|
|
3361
|
+
"i"
|
|
3362
|
+
).exec(content);
|
|
3363
|
+
if (!declaration) continue;
|
|
3364
|
+
const nearby = content.slice(declaration.index, declaration.index + 500);
|
|
3365
|
+
if (/["'`][^"'`\n]{0,100};\s*Secure\b/i.test(nearby)) return true;
|
|
3366
|
+
}
|
|
3367
|
+
return false;
|
|
3368
|
+
}
|
|
3335
3369
|
var insecureCookies = {
|
|
3336
3370
|
id: "VC017",
|
|
3337
3371
|
title: "Insecure Cookie Settings",
|
|
@@ -3341,7 +3375,7 @@ var insecureCookies = {
|
|
|
3341
3375
|
check(content, filePath) {
|
|
3342
3376
|
if (isTestFile(filePath)) return [];
|
|
3343
3377
|
if (!/cookie/i.test(content)) return [];
|
|
3344
|
-
const setCookiePattern = /(?:set-cookie|setCookie|\bcookie\s*=|res\.cookie\s*\()/
|
|
3378
|
+
const setCookiePattern = /(?:set-cookie|setCookie|\bcookie\s*=|res\.cookie\s*\()/i;
|
|
3345
3379
|
if (!setCookiePattern.test(content)) return [];
|
|
3346
3380
|
const hasHttpOnly = /httpOnly\s*:\s*true|httponly/i.test(content);
|
|
3347
3381
|
const hasSecure = /secure\s*:\s*(?!false\b)\S/i.test(content) || /;\s*secure/i.test(content);
|
|
@@ -3352,13 +3386,21 @@ var insecureCookies = {
|
|
|
3352
3386
|
if (!hasHttpOnly) missing.push("httpOnly");
|
|
3353
3387
|
if (!hasSecure) missing.push("secure");
|
|
3354
3388
|
if (!hasSameSite) missing.push("sameSite");
|
|
3355
|
-
|
|
3389
|
+
const rawMatches = findMatches(
|
|
3356
3390
|
content,
|
|
3357
|
-
|
|
3391
|
+
setCookiePattern,
|
|
3358
3392
|
insecureCookies,
|
|
3359
3393
|
filePath,
|
|
3360
3394
|
() => `Add missing cookie flags: ${missing.join(", ")}. Example: { httpOnly: true, secure: true, sameSite: 'lax' }`
|
|
3361
|
-
)
|
|
3395
|
+
);
|
|
3396
|
+
const lines = content.split("\n");
|
|
3397
|
+
for (const match of rawMatches) {
|
|
3398
|
+
const line = lines[match.line - 1] ?? "";
|
|
3399
|
+
if (!hasHttpOnly && isClearlyNonSensitivePreferenceCookieWrite(content, line)) {
|
|
3400
|
+
continue;
|
|
3401
|
+
}
|
|
3402
|
+
matches.push(match);
|
|
3403
|
+
}
|
|
3362
3404
|
}
|
|
3363
3405
|
return matches;
|
|
3364
3406
|
}
|
|
@@ -4503,7 +4545,7 @@ The user message wraps scanned source in random DATA fences. Everything between
|
|
|
4503
4545
|
|
|
4504
4546
|
Hard rules \u2014 never return verdict "fp" when:
|
|
4505
4547
|
- Severity is critical, OR
|
|
4506
|
-
- The finding is a live credential
|
|
4548
|
+
- The finding is a live credential or an exact Secrets-category detector
|
|
4507
4549
|
Those must always be "real". The host process also ignores "fp" for them.
|
|
4508
4550
|
|
|
4509
4551
|
Common false positive patterns you should catch (only for non-critical, non-live-secret findings):
|
|
@@ -4522,7 +4564,8 @@ Common false positive patterns you should catch (only for non-critical, non-live
|
|
|
4522
4564
|
- Package-lock.json URLs flagged as secrets (they're npm registry URLs, not secrets)
|
|
4523
4565
|
|
|
4524
4566
|
For each finding, respond ONLY with a JSON array. No other text.
|
|
4525
|
-
Each element: {"index": <number>, "verdict": "real" or "fp", "reason": "<1 sentence>"}
|
|
4567
|
+
Each element: {"index": <zero-based number shown in Finding N>, "verdict": "real" or "fp", "reason": "<1 sentence>"}
|
|
4568
|
+
Return exactly one element for every finding index.`;
|
|
4526
4569
|
var MAX_FINDINGS_PER_BATCH = 15;
|
|
4527
4570
|
var MAX_CONTEXT_LINES = 10;
|
|
4528
4571
|
var MAX_CONTEXT_LINE_CHARS = 300;
|
|
@@ -4558,6 +4601,13 @@ function isAbortError(err) {
|
|
|
4558
4601
|
const name = "name" in err ? String(err.name) : "";
|
|
4559
4602
|
return name === "AbortError" || name === "APIUserAbortError";
|
|
4560
4603
|
}
|
|
4604
|
+
function isTimeoutError(err) {
|
|
4605
|
+
if (!err || typeof err !== "object") return false;
|
|
4606
|
+
const name = "name" in err ? String(err.name) : "";
|
|
4607
|
+
if (name === "TimeoutError" || name === "APIConnectionTimeoutError") return true;
|
|
4608
|
+
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
4609
|
+
return /\b(?:request|connection|operation|model call)\s+(?:has\s+)?timed out\b/i.test(message) || /\bETIMEDOUT\b/i.test(message);
|
|
4610
|
+
}
|
|
4561
4611
|
var SEVERITY_PRIORITY = {
|
|
4562
4612
|
critical: 0,
|
|
4563
4613
|
high: 1,
|
|
@@ -4582,7 +4632,7 @@ function getExpandedContext(content, line, contextLines = MAX_CONTEXT_LINES) {
|
|
|
4582
4632
|
}
|
|
4583
4633
|
function isProtectedFromAiRemoval(finding) {
|
|
4584
4634
|
if ((finding.severity || "").toLowerCase() === "critical") return true;
|
|
4585
|
-
if ((finding.category || "").toLowerCase() === "secrets") return true;
|
|
4635
|
+
if ((finding.category || "").toLowerCase() === "secrets" && (finding.rule || "").toUpperCase() !== "ENTROPY") return true;
|
|
4586
4636
|
return isLive(finding);
|
|
4587
4637
|
}
|
|
4588
4638
|
function newDataFence() {
|
|
@@ -4633,18 +4683,45 @@ function parseReviewResponse(text) {
|
|
|
4633
4683
|
try {
|
|
4634
4684
|
const cleaned = text.replace(/```json\n?/g, "").replace(/```\n?/g, "").trim();
|
|
4635
4685
|
const parsed = JSON.parse(cleaned);
|
|
4636
|
-
if (!Array.isArray(parsed)) return
|
|
4637
|
-
|
|
4638
|
-
|
|
4639
|
-
)
|
|
4686
|
+
if (!Array.isArray(parsed)) return null;
|
|
4687
|
+
const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
|
|
4688
|
+
const valid = [];
|
|
4689
|
+
for (const row of parsed) {
|
|
4690
|
+
if (!row || typeof row !== "object") continue;
|
|
4691
|
+
const candidate = row;
|
|
4692
|
+
if (!Number.isInteger(candidate.index) || Number(candidate.index) < 0) continue;
|
|
4693
|
+
if (candidate.verdict !== "real" && candidate.verdict !== "fp") continue;
|
|
4694
|
+
const index = Number(candidate.index);
|
|
4695
|
+
if (seen.has(index)) continue;
|
|
4696
|
+
seen.add(index);
|
|
4697
|
+
valid.push({
|
|
4698
|
+
index,
|
|
4699
|
+
verdict: candidate.verdict,
|
|
4700
|
+
reason: typeof candidate.reason === "string" ? truncateChars(candidate.reason, MAX_FIELD_CHARS) : ""
|
|
4701
|
+
});
|
|
4702
|
+
}
|
|
4703
|
+
return valid;
|
|
4640
4704
|
} catch {
|
|
4641
|
-
return
|
|
4705
|
+
return null;
|
|
4642
4706
|
}
|
|
4643
4707
|
}
|
|
4644
4708
|
async function filterFalsePositives(findings, fileContents, budgetMs = AI_FILTER_BUDGET_MS) {
|
|
4645
|
-
const empty = {
|
|
4646
|
-
|
|
4709
|
+
const empty = {
|
|
4710
|
+
findings,
|
|
4711
|
+
filteredFindings: [],
|
|
4712
|
+
policyRetainedFindings: [],
|
|
4713
|
+
aiReviewed: false,
|
|
4714
|
+
removedCount: 0,
|
|
4715
|
+
policyRetainedCount: 0,
|
|
4716
|
+
totalBefore: findings.length,
|
|
4717
|
+
reviewedCount: 0,
|
|
4718
|
+
unreviewedCount: findings.length,
|
|
4719
|
+
cappedCount: 0,
|
|
4720
|
+
missingContentCount: 0,
|
|
4721
|
+
timedOut: false
|
|
4722
|
+
};
|
|
4647
4723
|
if (findings.length === 0) return empty;
|
|
4724
|
+
if (!process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY) return empty;
|
|
4648
4725
|
const deadlineMs = Date.now() + Math.max(0, budgetMs);
|
|
4649
4726
|
const abortController = new AbortController();
|
|
4650
4727
|
let budgetExpired = budgetMs <= 0;
|
|
@@ -4653,19 +4730,22 @@ async function filterFalsePositives(findings, fileContents, budgetMs = AI_FILTER
|
|
|
4653
4730
|
budgetExpired = true;
|
|
4654
4731
|
abortController.abort();
|
|
4655
4732
|
}, budgetMs);
|
|
4656
|
-
const prioritized =
|
|
4657
|
-
|
|
4658
|
-
|
|
4659
|
-
|
|
4733
|
+
const prioritized = findings.map((finding, originalIndex) => ({
|
|
4734
|
+
finding,
|
|
4735
|
+
originalIndex
|
|
4736
|
+
})).sort((a, b) => {
|
|
4737
|
+
const pa = SEVERITY_PRIORITY[(a.finding.severity || "").toLowerCase()] ?? 5;
|
|
4738
|
+
const pb = SEVERITY_PRIORITY[(b.finding.severity || "").toLowerCase()] ?? 5;
|
|
4739
|
+
return pa - pb || a.originalIndex - b.originalIndex;
|
|
4660
4740
|
});
|
|
4661
4741
|
const toReview = prioritized.slice(0, MAX_TOTAL_FINDINGS);
|
|
4662
4742
|
const overflow = prioritized.slice(MAX_TOTAL_FINDINGS);
|
|
4663
4743
|
const totalBefore = findings.length;
|
|
4664
4744
|
const byFile = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
|
|
4665
|
-
for (const
|
|
4666
|
-
const group = byFile.get(
|
|
4667
|
-
group.push(
|
|
4668
|
-
byFile.set(
|
|
4745
|
+
for (const target of toReview) {
|
|
4746
|
+
const group = byFile.get(target.finding.file) || [];
|
|
4747
|
+
group.push(target);
|
|
4748
|
+
byFile.set(target.finding.file, group);
|
|
4669
4749
|
}
|
|
4670
4750
|
let client;
|
|
4671
4751
|
try {
|
|
@@ -4674,23 +4754,34 @@ async function filterFalsePositives(findings, fileContents, budgetMs = AI_FILTER
|
|
|
4674
4754
|
return empty;
|
|
4675
4755
|
}
|
|
4676
4756
|
const fpMap = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
|
|
4677
|
-
|
|
4757
|
+
const policyRetainedMap = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
|
|
4758
|
+
const reviewedIndices = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
|
|
4678
4759
|
let firstError = null;
|
|
4679
4760
|
let failedBatches = 0;
|
|
4680
|
-
let
|
|
4761
|
+
let timedOutCount = 0;
|
|
4762
|
+
let missingContentCount = 0;
|
|
4681
4763
|
const tasks = [];
|
|
4682
|
-
for (const [file,
|
|
4764
|
+
for (const [file, fileTargets] of byFile) {
|
|
4683
4765
|
const content = fileContents.get(file);
|
|
4684
|
-
if (
|
|
4685
|
-
|
|
4686
|
-
|
|
4766
|
+
if (content === void 0) {
|
|
4767
|
+
missingContentCount += fileTargets.length;
|
|
4768
|
+
continue;
|
|
4769
|
+
}
|
|
4770
|
+
let offset = 0;
|
|
4771
|
+
for (const batch of packReviewBatches(fileTargets.map((target) => target.finding), content)) {
|
|
4772
|
+
tasks.push({
|
|
4773
|
+
targets: fileTargets.slice(offset, offset + batch.length),
|
|
4774
|
+
content
|
|
4775
|
+
});
|
|
4776
|
+
offset += batch.length;
|
|
4687
4777
|
}
|
|
4688
4778
|
}
|
|
4689
4779
|
const reviewBatch = async (task) => {
|
|
4690
|
-
const {
|
|
4780
|
+
const { targets, content } = task;
|
|
4781
|
+
const batch = targets.map((target) => target.finding);
|
|
4691
4782
|
if (abortController.signal.aborted || Date.now() >= deadlineMs) {
|
|
4692
4783
|
budgetExpired = true;
|
|
4693
|
-
|
|
4784
|
+
timedOutCount += batch.length;
|
|
4694
4785
|
return;
|
|
4695
4786
|
}
|
|
4696
4787
|
try {
|
|
@@ -4707,7 +4798,7 @@ async function filterFalsePositives(findings, fileContents, budgetMs = AI_FILTER
|
|
|
4707
4798
|
const response = await client.messages.create(
|
|
4708
4799
|
{
|
|
4709
4800
|
model: MODEL_TRIAGE,
|
|
4710
|
-
max_tokens:
|
|
4801
|
+
max_tokens: 2048,
|
|
4711
4802
|
// Haiku 5.5 rejects non-default sampling params with HTTP 400
|
|
4712
4803
|
// ("temperature is deprecated for this model"). Omit temperature /
|
|
4713
4804
|
// top_p / top_k entirely — do NOT send MODEL_TEMPERATURE (0).
|
|
@@ -4725,20 +4816,26 @@ async function filterFalsePositives(findings, fileContents, budgetMs = AI_FILTER
|
|
|
4725
4816
|
);
|
|
4726
4817
|
const text = response.content.filter((b) => b.type === "text").map((b) => b.text).join("");
|
|
4727
4818
|
const results = parseReviewResponse(text);
|
|
4728
|
-
|
|
4819
|
+
if (!results) throw new Error("AI review returned malformed JSON");
|
|
4729
4820
|
for (const r of results) {
|
|
4730
|
-
if (r.
|
|
4731
|
-
|
|
4732
|
-
|
|
4733
|
-
|
|
4734
|
-
|
|
4735
|
-
|
|
4736
|
-
|
|
4821
|
+
if (r.index >= batch.length) continue;
|
|
4822
|
+
const target = targets[r.index];
|
|
4823
|
+
reviewedIndices.add(target.originalIndex);
|
|
4824
|
+
if (r.verdict !== "fp") continue;
|
|
4825
|
+
if (isProtectedFromAiRemoval(target.finding)) {
|
|
4826
|
+
policyRetainedMap.set(target.originalIndex, r.reason);
|
|
4827
|
+
} else {
|
|
4828
|
+
fpMap.set(target.originalIndex, r.reason);
|
|
4737
4829
|
}
|
|
4738
4830
|
}
|
|
4831
|
+
if (results.filter((result) => result.index < batch.length).length < batch.length) {
|
|
4832
|
+
failedBatches++;
|
|
4833
|
+
if (!firstError) firstError = new Error("AI review returned incomplete verdicts");
|
|
4834
|
+
}
|
|
4739
4835
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
4740
|
-
|
|
4741
|
-
if (
|
|
4836
|
+
const callTimedOut = isAbortError(err) || isTimeoutError(err) || abortController.signal.aborted;
|
|
4837
|
+
if (callTimedOut) {
|
|
4838
|
+
timedOutCount += batch.length;
|
|
4742
4839
|
budgetExpired = true;
|
|
4743
4840
|
return;
|
|
4744
4841
|
}
|
|
@@ -4759,9 +4856,13 @@ async function filterFalsePositives(findings, fileContents, budgetMs = AI_FILTER
|
|
|
4759
4856
|
} finally {
|
|
4760
4857
|
if (budgetTimer) clearTimeout(budgetTimer);
|
|
4761
4858
|
}
|
|
4762
|
-
|
|
4859
|
+
const reviewedCount = reviewedIndices.size;
|
|
4860
|
+
const unreviewedCount = totalBefore - reviewedCount;
|
|
4861
|
+
const timedOut = timedOutCount > 0;
|
|
4862
|
+
const reviewedAny = reviewedCount > 0;
|
|
4863
|
+
if (timedOut) {
|
|
4763
4864
|
console.warn(
|
|
4764
|
-
`[ai-fp-filter] budget expired
|
|
4865
|
+
`[ai-fp-filter] budget expired or model call timed out \u2014 ${timedOutCount} finding(s) not reviewed; returning them unchanged`
|
|
4765
4866
|
);
|
|
4766
4867
|
}
|
|
4767
4868
|
if (firstError) {
|
|
@@ -4778,18 +4879,28 @@ async function filterFalsePositives(findings, fileContents, budgetMs = AI_FILTER
|
|
|
4778
4879
|
);
|
|
4779
4880
|
}
|
|
4780
4881
|
}
|
|
4781
|
-
const filtered =
|
|
4882
|
+
const filtered = findings.filter((_, index) => !fpMap.has(index));
|
|
4782
4883
|
const filteredFindings = [];
|
|
4783
|
-
for (const [
|
|
4784
|
-
filteredFindings.push({ finding:
|
|
4884
|
+
for (const [index, reason] of [...fpMap].sort((a, b) => a[0] - b[0])) {
|
|
4885
|
+
filteredFindings.push({ finding: findings[index], reason });
|
|
4886
|
+
}
|
|
4887
|
+
const policyRetainedFindings = [];
|
|
4888
|
+
for (const [index, reason] of [...policyRetainedMap].sort((a, b) => a[0] - b[0])) {
|
|
4889
|
+
policyRetainedFindings.push({ finding: findings[index], reason });
|
|
4785
4890
|
}
|
|
4786
4891
|
return {
|
|
4787
|
-
findings:
|
|
4892
|
+
findings: filtered,
|
|
4788
4893
|
filteredFindings,
|
|
4894
|
+
policyRetainedFindings,
|
|
4789
4895
|
aiReviewed: reviewedAny,
|
|
4790
4896
|
removedCount: fpMap.size,
|
|
4897
|
+
policyRetainedCount: policyRetainedMap.size,
|
|
4791
4898
|
totalBefore,
|
|
4792
|
-
|
|
4899
|
+
reviewedCount,
|
|
4900
|
+
unreviewedCount,
|
|
4901
|
+
cappedCount: overflow.length,
|
|
4902
|
+
missingContentCount,
|
|
4903
|
+
timedOut
|
|
4793
4904
|
};
|
|
4794
4905
|
}
|
|
4795
4906
|
|
|
@@ -4888,8 +4999,6 @@ var SAFE_PATTERNS = [
|
|
|
4888
4999
|
// the documented workflow (Supabase's own dotenvx example does). The value
|
|
4889
5000
|
// is not usable without that key, so it is not a leaked secret.
|
|
4890
5001
|
/^encrypted:[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{20,}$/,
|
|
4891
|
-
/^ey[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.ey[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\./,
|
|
4892
|
-
// JWT header.payload prefix — don't flag solely on entropy
|
|
4893
5002
|
// Content-Security-Policy hashes / nonces in HTML/JSON
|
|
4894
5003
|
/^'sha\d+-/,
|
|
4895
5004
|
/^nonce-/i,
|
|
@@ -4912,8 +5021,11 @@ var SAFE_PATTERNS = [
|
|
|
4912
5021
|
/^pkg:[a-z0-9.+-]+\//,
|
|
4913
5022
|
/^urn:/
|
|
4914
5023
|
];
|
|
4915
|
-
var SKIP_FILES = /\.(css|scss|less|svg|md|txt|html?|
|
|
5024
|
+
var SKIP_FILES = /\.(css|scss|less|svg|md|txt|html?|yml|yaml|toml|lock|map|woff2?|ttf|eot|ico|png|jpg|gif|webp)$/i;
|
|
4916
5025
|
var SKIP_FILENAMES = /(?:package-lock\.json|pnpm-lock\.yaml|yarn\.lock|composer\.lock|Gemfile\.lock|Cargo\.lock|poetry\.lock|Pipfile\.lock|shrinkwrap\.json)$/i;
|
|
5026
|
+
var KEY_VALUE_CONFIG_RE = /\.(?:ini|properties|cfg|conf)$/i;
|
|
5027
|
+
var XML_CONFIG_RE = /\.xml$/i;
|
|
5028
|
+
var JWT_RE = /^ey[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.ey[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/;
|
|
4917
5029
|
var SAFE_VAR_NAMES = /(?:description|message|text|label|title|content|template|html|svg|css|style|class(?:Name)?|query|mutation|schema|regex|pattern|format|placeholder|comment|url|path|route|endpoint|href|src|alt|name|type|version|encoding|charset|chars|alphabet|locale|translation|copy|prose|markdown|slug|handle)/i;
|
|
4918
5030
|
var HASH_LIKE_VAR_NAMES = /(?:^|[^a-z])(?:hash|digest|checksum|fingerprint|etag|crc|md5|sha1|sha256|sha512|contenthash|buildid|revision|commit|sri|integrity|cacheKey|fileHash|assetId|versionId)(?:$|[^a-z])/i;
|
|
4919
5031
|
var HASH_PREFIX_RE = /^(?:sha\d+|md5|crc32|base64|bcrypt|argon2|pbkdf2|blake2b?)[:_]/i;
|
|
@@ -4921,8 +5033,14 @@ var VERIFICATION_BLOCK_RE = /\bverification\s*:\s*\{/;
|
|
|
4921
5033
|
var VERIFICATION_KEY_NAMES = /^(?:google|yandex|yahoo|bing|me|other|["']?(?:google-site-verification|facebook-domain-verification|msvalidate\.01|norton-safeweb-site-verification|ahrefs-site-verification|p:domain_verify|wot-verification)["']?)$/i;
|
|
4922
5034
|
var VERIFICATION_META_RE = /<meta[^>]+name\s*=\s*["'][^"']*(?:site-verification|domain-verification|msvalidate|domain_verify)[^"']*["']/i;
|
|
4923
5035
|
var SECRET_VAR_NAMES = /(?:^|[^a-z])(?:key|secret|token|password|passwd|pwd|api[_-]?key|auth|credential|private|signing|bearer|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|session[_-]?id)(?:$|[^a-z])/i;
|
|
5036
|
+
var CAMEL_SECRET_VAR_NAMES = /(?:Key|Secret|Token|Password|Passwd|Credential|Private|Signing|Bearer|Auth)$/;
|
|
5037
|
+
var HUMAN_READABLE_ENV_REFERENCE_RE = /^(?:[a-z][a-z'-]*\s+){1,6}[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,}$/;
|
|
5038
|
+
function isSecretVariableName(name) {
|
|
5039
|
+
return SECRET_VAR_NAMES.test(name) || CAMEL_SECRET_VAR_NAMES.test(name);
|
|
5040
|
+
}
|
|
4924
5041
|
var DOTENV_EXAMPLE_RE = /\.(?:example|sample|template|dist|defaults?)$/i;
|
|
4925
5042
|
var MAX_DOTENV_VALUE = 256;
|
|
5043
|
+
var MAX_QUOTED_VALUE = 256;
|
|
4926
5044
|
function getSnippet2(content, line) {
|
|
4927
5045
|
const lines = content.split("\n");
|
|
4928
5046
|
const start = Math.max(0, line - 2);
|
|
@@ -4974,7 +5092,56 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
|
|
|
4974
5092
|
candidates.push({ value: assignValue, beforeAssign: assign[1], dotenvName: assign[1] });
|
|
4975
5093
|
}
|
|
4976
5094
|
} else {
|
|
4977
|
-
|
|
5095
|
+
if (KEY_VALUE_CONFIG_RE.test(filePath)) {
|
|
5096
|
+
const configAssign = /^\s*([A-Za-z][\w.-]{1,120})\s*[:=]\s*(.+?)\s*$/.exec(line);
|
|
5097
|
+
if (configAssign && isSecretVariableName(configAssign[1])) {
|
|
5098
|
+
const value = dotenvValue(configAssign[2]);
|
|
5099
|
+
if (value.length >= 20 && value.length <= MAX_DOTENV_VALUE) {
|
|
5100
|
+
candidates.push({
|
|
5101
|
+
value,
|
|
5102
|
+
beforeAssign: configAssign[1],
|
|
5103
|
+
variableName: configAssign[1]
|
|
5104
|
+
});
|
|
5105
|
+
}
|
|
5106
|
+
}
|
|
5107
|
+
}
|
|
5108
|
+
if (XML_CONFIG_RE.test(filePath)) {
|
|
5109
|
+
const xmlPair = /\b(?:key|name)\s*=\s*["']([^"']+)["'][^>]*\bvalue\s*=\s*["']([^"']{20,256})["']/i.exec(line) || /\bvalue\s*=\s*["']([^"']{20,256})["'][^>]*\b(?:key|name)\s*=\s*["']([^"']+)["']/i.exec(line);
|
|
5110
|
+
if (xmlPair) {
|
|
5111
|
+
const valueFirst = /^\s*<[^>]*\bvalue\s*=/i.test(line);
|
|
5112
|
+
const variableName = valueFirst ? xmlPair[2] : xmlPair[1];
|
|
5113
|
+
const value = valueFirst ? xmlPair[1] : xmlPair[2];
|
|
5114
|
+
if (isSecretVariableName(variableName)) {
|
|
5115
|
+
candidates.push({ value, beforeAssign: variableName, variableName });
|
|
5116
|
+
}
|
|
5117
|
+
}
|
|
5118
|
+
}
|
|
5119
|
+
const assignmentMatch = /[:=]\s*/.exec(line);
|
|
5120
|
+
if (assignmentMatch) {
|
|
5121
|
+
const rhsStart = assignmentMatch.index + assignmentMatch[0].length;
|
|
5122
|
+
const rhs = line.slice(rhsStart);
|
|
5123
|
+
const literals = [...rhs.matchAll(/(["'`])([^"'`\n]*)\1/g)];
|
|
5124
|
+
if (literals.length >= 2 && literals[0].index === 0) {
|
|
5125
|
+
let adjacent = true;
|
|
5126
|
+
for (let literalIndex = 1; literalIndex < literals.length; literalIndex++) {
|
|
5127
|
+
const previous = literals[literalIndex - 1];
|
|
5128
|
+
const previousEnd = (previous.index || 0) + previous[0].length;
|
|
5129
|
+
const between = rhs.slice(previousEnd, literals[literalIndex].index);
|
|
5130
|
+
if (!/^\s*\+\s*$/.test(between)) {
|
|
5131
|
+
adjacent = false;
|
|
5132
|
+
break;
|
|
5133
|
+
}
|
|
5134
|
+
}
|
|
5135
|
+
const joined = literals.map((literal) => literal[2]).join("");
|
|
5136
|
+
if (adjacent && joined.length >= 20 && joined.length <= MAX_QUOTED_VALUE) {
|
|
5137
|
+
candidates.push({
|
|
5138
|
+
value: joined,
|
|
5139
|
+
beforeAssign: line.substring(0, assignmentMatch.index)
|
|
5140
|
+
});
|
|
5141
|
+
}
|
|
5142
|
+
}
|
|
5143
|
+
}
|
|
5144
|
+
const stringPattern = /(?:[:=]\s*)(["'`])([^"'`\n]{20,256})\1/g;
|
|
4978
5145
|
let match;
|
|
4979
5146
|
while ((match = stringPattern.exec(line)) !== null) {
|
|
4980
5147
|
let beforeAssign = line.substring(0, match.index);
|
|
@@ -4982,9 +5149,13 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
|
|
|
4982
5149
|
candidates.push({ value: match[2], beforeAssign });
|
|
4983
5150
|
}
|
|
4984
5151
|
}
|
|
4985
|
-
|
|
5152
|
+
const seenValues = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
|
|
5153
|
+
for (const { value, beforeAssign, dotenvName, variableName } of candidates) {
|
|
5154
|
+
if (seenValues.has(value)) continue;
|
|
5155
|
+
seenValues.add(value);
|
|
4986
5156
|
if (value.includes("${")) continue;
|
|
4987
5157
|
if (value.includes("\\(")) continue;
|
|
5158
|
+
if (value.includes("#{") || value.includes("{{")) continue;
|
|
4988
5159
|
if (SAFE_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(value))) continue;
|
|
4989
5160
|
if (HASH_PREFIX_RE.test(value)) continue;
|
|
4990
5161
|
if (SAFE_VAR_NAMES.test(beforeAssign)) continue;
|
|
@@ -4998,15 +5169,19 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
|
|
|
4998
5169
|
if (value.length < 20) continue;
|
|
4999
5170
|
const entropy = shannonEntropy(value);
|
|
5000
5171
|
if (entropy < threshold) continue;
|
|
5001
|
-
const varName = dotenvName || beforeAssign.match(/["']([^"']+)["']\s*$/)?.[1] || beforeAssign.match(/([\w$-]+)\s*$/)?.[1] || "";
|
|
5172
|
+
const varName = variableName || dotenvName || beforeAssign.match(/["']([^"']+)["']\s*$/)?.[1] || beforeAssign.match(/([\w$-]+)\s*$/)?.[1] || "";
|
|
5173
|
+
if (HUMAN_READABLE_ENV_REFERENCE_RE.test(value) && !isSecretVariableName(varName)) {
|
|
5174
|
+
continue;
|
|
5175
|
+
}
|
|
5002
5176
|
if (inVerificationBlock && VERIFICATION_KEY_NAMES.test(varName)) continue;
|
|
5003
5177
|
if (VERIFICATION_META_RE.test(line)) continue;
|
|
5004
5178
|
if (HASH_LIKE_VAR_NAMES.test(varName) && (isHex || isBase64)) continue;
|
|
5179
|
+
if (JWT_RE.test(value) && !isSecretVariableName(varName)) continue;
|
|
5005
5180
|
if (/^DOTENV_PUBLIC_KEY(?:_\w{1,60})?$/.test(varName) && /^0[23][0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(value)) continue;
|
|
5006
5181
|
const publicEnv = classifyPublicEnvVar(varName, value);
|
|
5007
5182
|
if (publicEnv && publicEnv.publicByDesign) continue;
|
|
5008
|
-
if (dotenvName && /(?:^|_)IDS?$/i.test(dotenvName) && !
|
|
5009
|
-
const isLikelySecret =
|
|
5183
|
+
if (dotenvName && /(?:^|_)IDS?$/i.test(dotenvName) && !isSecretVariableName(dotenvName)) continue;
|
|
5184
|
+
const isLikelySecret = isSecretVariableName(varName) || publicEnv?.secret === true;
|
|
5010
5185
|
if (entropy < 4.5 && !isLikelySecret) continue;
|
|
5011
5186
|
if (isLineSilenced(lines, i, "ENTROPY")) continue;
|
|
5012
5187
|
const masked = value.substring(0, 6) + "..." + value.substring(value.length - 4);
|
|
@@ -9509,6 +9684,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
9509
9684
|
PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE,
|
|
9510
9685
|
QUALITY_EXAMPLES,
|
|
9511
9686
|
RULE_IMPACTS,
|
|
9687
|
+
SCANNER_VERSION,
|
|
9512
9688
|
TEST_FILE_PATTERN,
|
|
9513
9689
|
TOTAL_RULE_COUNT,
|
|
9514
9690
|
allRules,
|