xploitscan-shared-rules 2.4.0 → 2.4.2

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.cjs CHANGED
@@ -633,10 +633,12 @@ function isTestPath(filePath) {
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  if (/^Test[A-Z_]\w*\.py$/.test(base)) return true;
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  if (/^conftest\.py$/i.test(base)) return true;
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  if (/_test\.go$/.test(base)) return true;
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+ if (/^[A-Z][A-Za-z0-9]*Tests\.cs$/.test(base)) return true;
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  if (/(?:^|\/)routes\/test\//i.test(normalized)) return false;
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  if (/(?:^|\/)(?:tests|testdata|spec|__tests__|__mocks__|fixtures?|mocks?)(?:\/|$)/i.test(normalized)) return true;
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  if (/(?:^|\/)test\//i.test(normalized)) return true;
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  if (/(?:^|\/)[^/]*\.(?:UnitTests|IntegrationTests|Tests)\//i.test(normalized)) return true;
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+ if (/\.cs$/.test(base) && /(?:^|\/)[^/]*Tests\//.test(normalized)) return true;
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  if (/test-utils/i.test(normalized)) return true;
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  if (/(?:^|\/)testing(?:\/|$)/i.test(normalized)) return true;
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  return false;
@@ -651,6 +653,7 @@ function isPlaceholderToken(token) {
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  if (new Set(token).size < 8) return true;
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  return /example|placeholder|redacted|your_?(?:api_?)?(?:key|token)|insert_?your|replace_?me|\b(?:test|fake|dummy|sample|your)\b/i.test(token);
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  }
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+ var AWS_ACCESS_KEY_SOURCE = String.raw`(?:(?<![A-Z0-9])|(?<=%3[Dd]|\\x[0-9A-Fa-f]{2}|\\u[0-9A-Fa-f]{4}))(?:AKIA|ABIA|ACCA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}(?![A-Z0-9])`;
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  var LIVE_TOKEN_SOURCES = [
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  String.raw`(?:sk|rk)_live_[A-Za-z0-9]+`,
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  // OpenAI (`T3BlbkFJ` sits in every sk-proj- / sk-svcacct- / sk-admin- / legacy
@@ -664,7 +667,7 @@ var LIVE_TOKEN_SOURCES = [
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  String.raw`AIza[A-Za-z0-9_-]{35}`,
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  String.raw`SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}`,
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  String.raw`\bhf_[A-Za-z]{34}\b`,
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- String.raw`(?:AKIA|ABIA|ACCA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}`
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+ AWS_ACCESS_KEY_SOURCE
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  ];
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  function providerTokens(text) {
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  if (!text) return [];
@@ -2011,8 +2014,10 @@ var hardcodedSecrets = {
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  const patterns = [
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  // Generic API key patterns — require actual value assignment, not variable declarations
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  /(?:api[_-]?key|apikey|api[_-]?secret)\s*[:=]\s*["'`]([a-zA-Z0-9_\-]{20,})["'`]/gi,
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- // AWS keys
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- /(?:AKIA|ABIA|ACCA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}/g,
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+ // AWS access key IDs: exactly 20 characters. Same source as the
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+ // live-key check. A longer ASIA token must not match, and a key
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+ // ending in EXAMPLE stays non-live in tokenIsLive.
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+ new RegExp(AWS_ACCESS_KEY_SOURCE, "g"),
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  // Stripe keys
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  /(?:sk_live|pk_live|sk_test|pk_test)_[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/g,
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  // Supabase anon/service keys (JWT format)
@@ -2032,7 +2037,9 @@ var hardcodedSecrets = {
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  // SCREAMING_CASE identifiers ending in SECRET/TOKEN/KEY/PASSWORD
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  // (OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, JWT_PRIVATE_KEY, STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET, etc.)
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  // that are assigned a string literal, not an env var or function call.
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- /[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*_(?:SECRET|TOKEN|KEY|PASSWORD|PASSWD)\s*[:=]\s*["'`]([a-zA-Z0-9_\-!@#$%^&*.\/]{12,})["'`]/g,
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+ // The name is capped at 64 characters so a long run of A's cannot
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+ // backtrack into the suffix.
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+ /[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{0,64}_(?:SECRET|TOKEN|KEY|PASSWORD|PASSWD)\s*[:=]\s*["'`]([a-zA-Z0-9_\-!@#$%^&*.\/]{12,})["'`]/g,
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  // camelCase / snake_case object properties that look like credentials:
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  // apiKey: "...", webhookUrl: "https://...", accountSid: "...", authToken: "..."
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  // password: "..." caught here separately with a lower threshold (many
@@ -2042,8 +2049,11 @@ var hardcodedSecrets = {
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  /\b(?:password|passwd|pwd)\s*:\s*["'`]([a-zA-Z0-9_\-!@#$%^&*.\/:\-]{8,})["'`]/gi,
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  // Private keys
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  /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,
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- // Database URLs with credentials
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- /(?:postgres|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?):\/\/[^:]+:[^@]+@[^/\s"'`]+/gi,
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+ // Database URLs with credentials. The user and password cannot cross
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+ // whitespace or a newline, and each is capped at 1024 characters, so
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+ // a localhost URL cannot run forward to a later `@` and a run of
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+ // `postgres://a:b` with no `@` cannot backtrack.
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+ /(?:postgres|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?):\/\/[^:@\s/]{1,1024}:[^@\s]{1,1024}@[^/\s"'`]{1,256}/gi,
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  // ── [11]–[14] Fixed-prefix AI-provider and payment keys ──
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  // These match the token itself, so they fire whatever it is bound to:
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  // `const k = "…"`, a positional `new OpenAI("…")`, an unquoted .env
@@ -2158,7 +2168,7 @@ var hardcodedSecrets = {
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  }
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  if (pi === 6) {
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  const valMatch = lineText.match(/[:=]\s*["'`]([^"'`]+)["'`]/);
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- const nameMatch = lineText.match(/\b([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*_(?:SECRET|TOKEN|KEY|PASSWORD|PASSWD))\b/);
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+ const nameMatch = lineText.match(/([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*_(?:SECRET|TOKEN|KEY|PASSWORD|PASSWD))\b/);
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  if (valMatch && nameMatch) {
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  const value = valMatch[1];
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  const isKeySuffix = nameMatch[1].endsWith("_KEY");
@@ -2818,9 +2828,9 @@ var stripeWebhookUnprotected = {
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  const code = maskComments(content);
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  const pathSaysStripeWebhook = /(?:^|\/)(?:stripe[_-]?webhooks?|webhooks?[_-]?stripe)(?:\/|\.|$)/i.test(filePath) || /webhooks?\/stripe/i.test(filePath) || /stripe\/webhooks?/i.test(filePath);
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  if (!/stripe/i.test(code) && !pathSaysStripeWebhook) return [];
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- const hasStripeWebhookHandler = pathSaysStripeWebhook || /(?:stripe.*webhook|webhook.*stripe)/i.test(code) || /(?:checkout\.session\.completed|invoice\.paid|payment_intent|customer\.subscription)/i.test(code);
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+ const hasStripeWebhookHandler = pathSaysStripeWebhook || /(?:stripe.{0,200}webhook|webhook.{0,200}stripe)/i.test(code) || /(?:checkout\.session\.completed|invoice\.paid|payment_intent|customer\.subscription)/i.test(code);
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  if (!hasStripeWebhookHandler) return [];
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- if (/constructEvent|verifyHeader|stripe[_-]?signature|webhook[_-]?secret|STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET/i.test(code) || /\b\w*verif\w*\s*\(/i.test(code) && /\bverif\w*(?:stripe|webhook|signature|sig)\w*\s*\(/i.test(code)) return [];
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+ if (/constructEvent|verifyHeader|stripe[_-]?signature|webhook[_-]?secret|STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET/i.test(code) || /\b\w{0,40}verif\w{0,40}\s*\(/i.test(code) && /\bverif\w{0,40}(?:stripe|webhook|signature|sig)\w{0,40}\s*\(/i.test(code)) return [];
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  const handlerPatterns = [
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  // POST handler that processes Stripe events
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  /export\s+(?:async\s+)?function\s+POST\s*\(/g,
@@ -2828,7 +2838,10 @@ var stripeWebhookUnprotected = {
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  // export const POST = async (req) => { … }
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  // Added alongside the same shape in VC003 (#648); without it an App
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  // Router webhook written in the arrow style was invisible.
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- /export\s+const\s+POST\s*(?::[^=]+)?=\s*(?:async\s*)?(?:\([^)]*\)|[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)\s*=>/g,
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+ // Bound the optional TypeScript type annotation: `(?::[^=]+)?` walks an
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+ // entire 500KB line of non-`=` characters on every near-miss. Real
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+ // annotations (`: NextRequest`, `: RouteHandler`) sit well under 200.
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+ /export\s+const\s+POST\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,200})?=\s*(?:async\s*)?(?:\([^)]*\)|[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)\s*=>/g,
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  // Express-style Stripe webhook route
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  /\.(post|all)\s*\(\s*["'`][^"'`]*(?:stripe|webhook)[^"'`]*["'`]/gi,
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  // Event type checking without prior verification