xploitscan-shared-rules 2.1.0 → 2.1.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/index.cjs +130 -34
- package/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.cts +11 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +11 -1
- package/dist/index.js +129 -34
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.cts
CHANGED
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@@ -956,6 +956,16 @@ declare function isInsideFixMessage(content: string, matchIndex: number): boolea
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956
956
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*/
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957
957
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declare function filterSilenced(matches: RuleMatch[], content: string, ruleId: string): RuleMatch[];
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958
958
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declare function findMatches(content: string, pattern: RegExp, rule: Omit<CustomRule, "check">, filePath: string, fixTemplate?: (match: RegExpExecArray) => string): RuleMatch[];
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959
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+
/**
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960
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+
* findMatches for a matcher that is not a single RegExp — one a regex can
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961
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+
* only express with super-linear backtracking. `found` yields the matches'
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962
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+
* start indices in increasing order, as RegExp#exec would; the comment and
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963
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+
* fix-message skips, line numbers and the per-file cap are findMatches' own,
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964
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+
* so a rule moved off a regex reports exactly what the regex reported.
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965
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+
*/
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966
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+
declare function findMatchesAt<M extends {
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967
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index: number;
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968
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+
}>(content: string, found: Iterable<M>, rule: Omit<CustomRule, "check">, filePath: string, fixTemplate?: (match: M) => string): RuleMatch[];
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959
969
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/**
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960
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* Build a RuleMatch from an AST-derived location. Mirrors findMatches' output
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* shape so AST-based rules can be mixed into the same Finding stream. `line`
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@@ -1487,4 +1497,4 @@ input: {
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content: string;
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}[] | QualityContext, rules?: QualityRule[]): Finding[];
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1490
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-
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allRules, assessHeaders, astMatch, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyPublicEnvVar, classifyStatement, clientSideAuth, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, dotenvValue, emptyCatchBlock, enclosingHandler, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDebugMode, exposedEnvFile, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, filterSilenced, findMatches, findSourceMapRefs, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedSecrets, harvestIntent, insecureCookies, insecureRandomness, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isCommentLine, isDotenvPath, isInlineSilenced, isInsideFixMessage, isLineSilenced, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isServerSideFile, isServerTarget, isTestFile, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, lineNumberAt, lineTextAt, maskComments, maskOutboundAuthNoise, missingAuthMiddleware, missingCSP, missingErrorBoundary, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, qualityRules, replaceBlockComments, routeForFile, runCustomRules, scanEntropy, scanQuality, sqlInjection, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, todoLeftInCode, tryParse, unmeasuredQualityRules, unvalidatedRedirect, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, weakHashing, xssVulnerability };
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1500
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+
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allRules, assessHeaders, astMatch, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyPublicEnvVar, classifyStatement, clientSideAuth, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, dotenvValue, emptyCatchBlock, enclosingHandler, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDebugMode, exposedEnvFile, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, filterSilenced, findMatches, findMatchesAt, findSourceMapRefs, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedSecrets, harvestIntent, insecureCookies, insecureRandomness, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isCommentLine, isDotenvPath, isInlineSilenced, isInsideFixMessage, isLineSilenced, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isServerSideFile, isServerTarget, isTestFile, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, lineNumberAt, lineTextAt, maskComments, maskOutboundAuthNoise, missingAuthMiddleware, missingCSP, missingErrorBoundary, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, qualityRules, replaceBlockComments, routeForFile, runCustomRules, scanEntropy, scanQuality, sqlInjection, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, todoLeftInCode, tryParse, unmeasuredQualityRules, unvalidatedRedirect, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, weakHashing, xssVulnerability };
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package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -956,6 +956,16 @@ declare function isInsideFixMessage(content: string, matchIndex: number): boolea
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|
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956
956
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*/
|
|
957
957
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declare function filterSilenced(matches: RuleMatch[], content: string, ruleId: string): RuleMatch[];
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958
958
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declare function findMatches(content: string, pattern: RegExp, rule: Omit<CustomRule, "check">, filePath: string, fixTemplate?: (match: RegExpExecArray) => string): RuleMatch[];
|
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959
|
+
/**
|
|
960
|
+
* findMatches for a matcher that is not a single RegExp — one a regex can
|
|
961
|
+
* only express with super-linear backtracking. `found` yields the matches'
|
|
962
|
+
* start indices in increasing order, as RegExp#exec would; the comment and
|
|
963
|
+
* fix-message skips, line numbers and the per-file cap are findMatches' own,
|
|
964
|
+
* so a rule moved off a regex reports exactly what the regex reported.
|
|
965
|
+
*/
|
|
966
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+
declare function findMatchesAt<M extends {
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967
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+
index: number;
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968
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+
}>(content: string, found: Iterable<M>, rule: Omit<CustomRule, "check">, filePath: string, fixTemplate?: (match: M) => string): RuleMatch[];
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959
969
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/**
|
|
960
970
|
* Build a RuleMatch from an AST-derived location. Mirrors findMatches' output
|
|
961
971
|
* shape so AST-based rules can be mixed into the same Finding stream. `line`
|
|
@@ -1487,4 +1497,4 @@ input: {
|
|
|
1487
1497
|
content: string;
|
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1488
1498
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}[] | QualityContext, rules?: QualityRule[]): Finding[];
|
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1489
1499
|
|
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1490
|
-
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allRules, assessHeaders, astMatch, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyPublicEnvVar, classifyStatement, clientSideAuth, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, dotenvValue, emptyCatchBlock, enclosingHandler, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDebugMode, exposedEnvFile, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, filterSilenced, findMatches, findSourceMapRefs, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedSecrets, harvestIntent, insecureCookies, insecureRandomness, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isCommentLine, isDotenvPath, isInlineSilenced, isInsideFixMessage, isLineSilenced, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isServerSideFile, isServerTarget, isTestFile, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, lineNumberAt, lineTextAt, maskComments, maskOutboundAuthNoise, missingAuthMiddleware, missingCSP, missingErrorBoundary, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, qualityRules, replaceBlockComments, routeForFile, runCustomRules, scanEntropy, scanQuality, sqlInjection, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, todoLeftInCode, tryParse, unmeasuredQualityRules, unvalidatedRedirect, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, weakHashing, xssVulnerability };
|
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1500
|
+
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allRules, assessHeaders, astMatch, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyPublicEnvVar, classifyStatement, clientSideAuth, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, dotenvValue, emptyCatchBlock, enclosingHandler, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDebugMode, exposedEnvFile, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, filterSilenced, findMatches, findMatchesAt, findSourceMapRefs, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedSecrets, harvestIntent, insecureCookies, insecureRandomness, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isCommentLine, isDotenvPath, isInlineSilenced, isInsideFixMessage, isLineSilenced, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isServerSideFile, isServerTarget, isTestFile, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, lineNumberAt, lineTextAt, maskComments, maskOutboundAuthNoise, missingAuthMiddleware, missingCSP, missingErrorBoundary, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, qualityRules, replaceBlockComments, routeForFile, runCustomRules, scanEntropy, scanQuality, sqlInjection, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, todoLeftInCode, tryParse, unmeasuredQualityRules, unvalidatedRedirect, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, weakHashing, xssVulnerability };
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package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1621,19 +1621,27 @@ function filterSilenced(matches, content, ruleId) {
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1621
1621
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return matches.filter((m) => !isInlineSilenced(content, lineStartIndex(m.line), ruleId));
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1622
1622
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}
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1623
1623
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function findMatches(content, pattern, rule, filePath, fixTemplate) {
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1624
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-
const matches = [];
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1625
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-
let m;
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1626
1624
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const re = new RegExp(pattern.source, pattern.flags.includes("g") ? pattern.flags : `${pattern.flags}g`);
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1625
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+
function* execAll() {
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1626
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+
let m;
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1627
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+
let lastMatchIndex = -1;
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1628
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+
while ((m = re.exec(content)) !== null) {
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1629
|
+
if (m.index === lastMatchIndex && m[0].length === 0) {
|
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1630
|
+
re.lastIndex++;
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1631
|
+
continue;
|
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1632
|
+
}
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1633
|
+
lastMatchIndex = m.index;
|
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1634
|
+
yield m;
|
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1635
|
+
}
|
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1636
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+
}
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1637
|
+
return findMatchesAt(content, execAll(), rule, filePath, fixTemplate);
|
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1638
|
+
}
|
|
1639
|
+
function findMatchesAt(content, found, rule, filePath, fixTemplate) {
|
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1640
|
+
const matches = [];
|
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1627
1641
|
let scanned = 0;
|
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1628
1642
|
let lineNum = 1;
|
|
1629
|
-
let lastMatchIndex = -1;
|
|
1630
1643
|
const MAX_MATCHES = 500;
|
|
1631
|
-
|
|
1632
|
-
if (m.index === lastMatchIndex && m[0].length === 0) {
|
|
1633
|
-
re.lastIndex++;
|
|
1634
|
-
continue;
|
|
1635
|
-
}
|
|
1636
|
-
lastMatchIndex = m.index;
|
|
1644
|
+
for (const m of found) {
|
|
1637
1645
|
if (isCommentLine(content, m.index)) continue;
|
|
1638
1646
|
if (isInsideFixMessage(content, m.index)) continue;
|
|
1639
1647
|
for (; scanned < m.index; scanned++) {
|
|
@@ -2575,6 +2583,105 @@ function namesPlaceholderRun(content) {
|
|
|
2575
2583
|
}
|
|
2576
2584
|
return false;
|
|
2577
2585
|
}
|
|
2586
|
+
function isLineTerminator(c) {
|
|
2587
|
+
return c === 10 || c === 13 || c === 8232 || c === 8233;
|
|
2588
|
+
}
|
|
2589
|
+
function quotedLiterals(content) {
|
|
2590
|
+
const literals = [];
|
|
2591
|
+
const failedUpTo = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
|
|
2592
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < content.length; i++) {
|
|
2593
|
+
const quote = content.charCodeAt(i);
|
|
2594
|
+
if (quote !== 39 && quote !== 34 && quote !== 96) continue;
|
|
2595
|
+
if (i < (failedUpTo.get(quote) ?? -1)) continue;
|
|
2596
|
+
let j = i + 1;
|
|
2597
|
+
let closed = false;
|
|
2598
|
+
while (j < content.length) {
|
|
2599
|
+
const c = content.charCodeAt(j);
|
|
2600
|
+
if (c === quote) {
|
|
2601
|
+
closed = true;
|
|
2602
|
+
break;
|
|
2603
|
+
}
|
|
2604
|
+
if (c === 92) {
|
|
2605
|
+
if (j + 1 >= content.length || isLineTerminator(content.charCodeAt(j + 1))) break;
|
|
2606
|
+
j += 2;
|
|
2607
|
+
continue;
|
|
2608
|
+
}
|
|
2609
|
+
if (c === 10 && quote !== 96) break;
|
|
2610
|
+
j++;
|
|
2611
|
+
}
|
|
2612
|
+
if (!closed) {
|
|
2613
|
+
failedUpTo.set(quote, j);
|
|
2614
|
+
continue;
|
|
2615
|
+
}
|
|
2616
|
+
literals.push(content.slice(i, j + 1));
|
|
2617
|
+
i = j;
|
|
2618
|
+
}
|
|
2619
|
+
return literals;
|
|
2620
|
+
}
|
|
2621
|
+
var SQL_VERB_RE = /\b(?:SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE)\b/i;
|
|
2622
|
+
var SQL_CLAUSE_RE = /\b(?:FROM|INTO|SET|VALUES|WHERE)\b/gi;
|
|
2623
|
+
function isSqlStatement(lit) {
|
|
2624
|
+
const verb = SQL_VERB_RE.exec(lit);
|
|
2625
|
+
if (!verb) return false;
|
|
2626
|
+
SQL_CLAUSE_RE.lastIndex = verb.index + verb[0].length;
|
|
2627
|
+
return SQL_CLAUSE_RE.test(lit);
|
|
2628
|
+
}
|
|
2629
|
+
function* interpolatedSqlLiterals(content) {
|
|
2630
|
+
const opener = /["'`]\s*(?:SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE)\b/gi;
|
|
2631
|
+
const literalBreak = /["'`\n]/g;
|
|
2632
|
+
const clauseRe = /\b(?:FROM|INTO|SET|VALUES|WHERE|JOIN|RETURNING)\b/i;
|
|
2633
|
+
let lineEnds = null;
|
|
2634
|
+
let lastOnLine = [];
|
|
2635
|
+
const parameterizedLater = (x) => {
|
|
2636
|
+
if (lineEnds === null) {
|
|
2637
|
+
const ends = [];
|
|
2638
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < content.length; i++) {
|
|
2639
|
+
if (isLineTerminator(content.charCodeAt(i))) ends.push(i);
|
|
2640
|
+
}
|
|
2641
|
+
ends.push(content.length);
|
|
2642
|
+
lastOnLine = new Array(ends.length).fill(-1);
|
|
2643
|
+
const word = /parameterized/gi;
|
|
2644
|
+
let line = 0;
|
|
2645
|
+
for (let w = word.exec(content); w !== null; w = word.exec(content)) {
|
|
2646
|
+
while (ends[line] < w.index) line++;
|
|
2647
|
+
lastOnLine[line] = w.index;
|
|
2648
|
+
}
|
|
2649
|
+
lineEnds = ends;
|
|
2650
|
+
}
|
|
2651
|
+
let lo = 0;
|
|
2652
|
+
let hi = lineEnds.length - 1;
|
|
2653
|
+
while (lo < hi) {
|
|
2654
|
+
const mid = lo + hi >> 1;
|
|
2655
|
+
if (lineEnds[mid] < x) lo = mid + 1;
|
|
2656
|
+
else hi = mid;
|
|
2657
|
+
}
|
|
2658
|
+
return lastOnLine[lo] >= x;
|
|
2659
|
+
};
|
|
2660
|
+
for (let m = opener.exec(content); m !== null; m = opener.exec(content)) {
|
|
2661
|
+
const start = m.index;
|
|
2662
|
+
const runStart = opener.lastIndex;
|
|
2663
|
+
literalBreak.lastIndex = runStart;
|
|
2664
|
+
const runEnd = literalBreak.exec(content)?.index ?? content.length;
|
|
2665
|
+
const run = content.slice(runStart, runEnd);
|
|
2666
|
+
const clause = clauseRe.exec(run);
|
|
2667
|
+
let matchEnd = -1;
|
|
2668
|
+
if (clause) {
|
|
2669
|
+
const clauseEnd = clause.index + clause[0].length;
|
|
2670
|
+
for (let d = run.lastIndexOf("${"); d >= clauseEnd; d = run.lastIndexOf("${", d - 1)) {
|
|
2671
|
+
if (!parameterizedLater(runStart + d + 2)) {
|
|
2672
|
+
matchEnd = runStart + d + 2;
|
|
2673
|
+
break;
|
|
2674
|
+
}
|
|
2675
|
+
}
|
|
2676
|
+
}
|
|
2677
|
+
if (matchEnd === -1) {
|
|
2678
|
+
opener.lastIndex = start + 1;
|
|
2679
|
+
continue;
|
|
2680
|
+
}
|
|
2681
|
+
yield { index: start };
|
|
2682
|
+
opener.lastIndex = matchEnd;
|
|
2683
|
+
}
|
|
2684
|
+
}
|
|
2578
2685
|
var sqlInjection = {
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2579
2686
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id: "VC006",
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2580
2687
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title: "Potential SQL Injection",
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@@ -2597,35 +2704,22 @@ var sqlInjection = {
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2597
2704
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// allows the opposite quote type inside (common in SQL — "WHERE x = 'a'").
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2598
2705
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// The older `[^"']*` class bailed out at the first inner quote and
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2599
2706
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// missed every realistic SQL-containing concat.
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2600
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-
/(?:query|execute|raw|sql|queryRaw|queryRawUnsafe|executeRaw|executeRawUnsafe)\s*\(\s*(?:"(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*"|'(?:[^'\\]|\\.)*')\s*\+/gi
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2601
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-
// Direct variable interpolation in a SQL string literal. Requires the
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2602
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-
// verb to START a quoted/backtick literal AND be followed — within the
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2603
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-
// same literal — by a SQL structural keyword (FROM/SET/WHERE/…), then a
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2604
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-
// `${` interpolation. The structural keyword is what distinguishes a
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2605
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-
// real query from ordinary prose: the previous pattern matched any
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2606
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-
// SELECT/UPDATE/… word anywhere on a line followed by `${`, so UI copy
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2607
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-
// like `UPDATE your profile settings ${name}` flagged as a CRITICAL SQL
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2608
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-
// injection. Real queries ("SELECT … FROM …", "UPDATE … SET …") always
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2609
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-
// carry a second structural keyword; sentences almost never do.
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2610
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-
/["'`]\s*(?:SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE)\b[^"'`\n]*\b(?:FROM|INTO|SET|VALUES|WHERE|JOIN|RETURNING)\b[^"'`\n]*\$\{(?!.*parameterized)/gi
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2707
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+
/(?:query|execute|raw|sql|queryRaw|queryRawUnsafe|executeRaw|executeRawUnsafe)\s*\(\s*(?:"(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*"|'(?:[^'\\]|\\.)*')\s*\+/gi
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2611
2708
|
];
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2612
2709
|
const matches = [];
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2613
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-
const sqlLiterals = (content
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2614
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-
(lit) => /\b(?:SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE)\b[\s\S]*\b(?:FROM|INTO|SET|VALUES|WHERE)\b/i.test(lit)
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2615
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-
);
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2710
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+
const sqlLiterals = quotedLiterals(content).filter(isSqlStatement);
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2616
2711
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const usesParams = /\bprepare\b/i.test(content) || sqlLiterals.some((lit) => /\?\s*,|\?[^?,;]{1,20}\?|\$\d+|:[A-Za-z_]\w*|@[A-Za-z_]\w*|=\s*\?/.test(lit));
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2617
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-
const code = content
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2712
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+
const code = replaceBlockComments(content, () => " ").replace(/(^|[^:"'`\\])\/\/.*$/gm, "$1");
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2618
2713
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if (usesParams || namesPlaceholderRun(code)) return [];
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2619
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-
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2620
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-
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2621
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-
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2622
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-
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2623
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-
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2624
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-
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2625
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-
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2626
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-
);
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2714
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+
const fix = () => "Use parameterized queries or prepared statements instead of string interpolation. Example: db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?', [userId])";
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2715
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+
const raws = [
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2716
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+
...patterns.map((pattern) => findMatches(content, pattern, sqlInjection, filePath, fix)),
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2717
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+
findMatchesAt(content, interpolatedSqlLiterals(content), sqlInjection, filePath, fix)
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2718
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+
];
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2719
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+
let lines;
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2720
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+
for (const raw of raws) {
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2627
2721
|
for (const m of raw) {
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2628
|
-
const lineText = content.split("\n")[m.line - 1] || "";
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2722
|
+
const lineText = (lines ??= content.split("\n"))[m.line - 1] || "";
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2629
2723
|
if (/\bPrisma\.sql\s*`/.test(lineText)) continue;
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2630
2724
|
if (/\bsql\s*`/.test(lineText) && !/\bsql\.raw\s*\(/.test(lineText)) continue;
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2631
2725
|
if (/\$queryRaw\s*\(\s*Prisma\.sql|\$executeRaw\s*\(\s*Prisma\.sql/.test(lineText)) continue;
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@@ -3435,7 +3529,7 @@ var dangerousInnerHTML = {
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3435
3529
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if (!filePath.match(/\.(jsx|tsx)$/)) return [];
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3436
3530
|
if (isTestFile(filePath)) return [];
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3437
3531
|
if (!/dangerouslySetInnerHTML/i.test(content)) return [];
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3438
|
-
const codeOnly = content
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|
3532
|
+
const codeOnly = replaceBlockComments(content, () => "").replace(/(^|[^:])\/\/.*$/gm, "$1").replace(/\{\s*\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\/\s*\}/g, "");
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3439
3533
|
const hasSanitize = /\b(?:DOMPurify|sanitizeHtml|sanitize-html|isomorphic-dompurify)\b|\b(?:sanitize|purify|xss)\s*\(/i.test(codeOnly);
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3440
3534
|
if (hasSanitize) return [];
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3441
3535
|
const findings = [];
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@@ -8238,6 +8332,7 @@ export {
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8238
8332
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filterFalsePositives,
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8239
8333
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filterSilenced,
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8240
8334
|
findMatches,
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|
8335
|
+
findMatchesAt,
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8241
8336
|
findSourceMapRefs,
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8242
8337
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freeRules,
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8243
8338
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getObjectProperty,
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