xploitscan-shared-rules 1.36.3 → 2.0.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +9 -7
- package/dist/index.cjs +623 -7010
- package/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.cts +257 -318
- package/dist/index.d.ts +257 -318
- package/dist/index.js +609 -6823
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -139,12 +139,78 @@ interface CustomRule {
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139
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check: (content: string, filePath: string, project?: ProjectContext) => RuleMatch[];
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}
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142
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+
/**
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* Line-oriented helpers shared by every rule. Pure string manipulation — no fs
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144
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* dependency — so safe in the CLI and in serverless/edge environments.
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145
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*
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146
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* Performance note (security review, June 2026): rules call `getSnippet` and a
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147
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* line-number lookup once PER match. Both used to do `content.split("\n")` /
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148
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* `content.substring(0, idx).split("\n")`, which is O(content) per call. A
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149
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* pathological single- or multi-line payload that produces O(content) matches
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150
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* therefore drove O(content^2) CPU and pinned the public scan endpoint (a
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* remote DoS). We memoize the split + line-start offsets per content string
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152
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* (rules run synchronously over one file at a time, so a by-reference cache of
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153
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* size 1 hits for every match and every rule on that file). With the cache,
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* `getSnippet` is O(contextLines) and `lineNumberAt` is O(log lines) per call —
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* the whole scan is O(n log n) with byte-identical output to the old code.
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*/
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/**
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* 1-based line number containing character `index`. Replaces the
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* `content.substring(0, index).split("\n").length` idiom (which was O(content)
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* per call) with an O(log lines) binary search over memoized line offsets.
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*/
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declare function lineNumberAt(content: string, index: number): number;
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/**
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* Return a small code snippet around a given line number with a `>` marker on
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* the matched line.
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*/
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declare function getSnippet(content: string, line: number, contextLines?: number): string;
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/**
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* Inline finding suppression — the `// VC###-OK: <reason>` marker.
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171
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*
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172
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* Lives in its own module because both the regex rules (rules.ts) and the
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173
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* entropy scanner (entropy-scanner.ts) need it, and this repo has been bitten
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174
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* repeatedly by the same duplication pattern: `calculateGrade` had three
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175
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* copies, the score→letter ladder had three, `NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS` had two
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* that had already drifted. Import, don't restate.
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*/
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/**
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179
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* Check whether a finding has been silenced via an inline comment marker.
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*
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* Supported placements:
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* 1. Same line, trailing: `someCode(); // VC146-OK: magic-link token gates this`
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* 2. Comment block above: `// VC146-OK: magic-link token gates this`
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* `// (explanation may wrap across lines)`
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* `someCode();`
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* 3. Multi-line block: `/* VC146-OK: ... *\/` above the match
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*
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* The marker is `<RULE-ID>-OK` (with optional `:` and explanation) or the
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* wildcard `scanner-OK`. Both `#` (Python/Ruby/sh) and `//` (JS/TS/Go)
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* comment prefixes are accepted.
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*
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* Rationale: some findings aren't a regex-tightening problem — they're "I
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* have reviewed this and accept it here." An intentionally public OG-image
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* endpoint is genuinely unauthenticated; the rule is right and the developer
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* is also right. Loosening the regex would weaken the rule for everyone,
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* whereas an inline marker keeps the rule strict and gives one site an
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* explicit, self-documenting escape valve.
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*
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199
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* Note this is deliberately NOT wired into findMatches() globally — that
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* would opt every rule in at once. Rules opt in individually, either by
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* calling this directly from their match loop or by passing their results
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* through filterSilenced().
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*/
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declare function isInlineSilenced(content: string, matchIndex: number, ruleId: string): boolean;
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/**
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* Line-indexed variant. The entropy scanner walks the file line by line and
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* never computes character offsets, so making it reconstruct one just to call
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* the index-based entry point would be wasted work on every finding.
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*
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* `lineIdx` is 0-based, matching `content.split("\n")`.
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*/
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declare function isLineSilenced(lines: string[], lineIdx: number, ruleId: string): boolean;
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/**
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* Claude model IDs — the single place they are written down.
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*
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@@ -625,7 +691,119 @@ declare function checkIntent(files: Array<{
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content: string;
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692
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}>, findings: Finding[]): IntentReport;
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693
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694
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/**
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695
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* Centralized Babel parser with per-file caching.
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696
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*
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697
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* Rules that opt in to AST analysis call parseFile(content, filename) to get
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698
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* a Program node back. Parsing is expensive (~5-50ms per KB of source); the
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699
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* LRU cache ensures a single scan pass touches each file at most once even
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* when multiple rules walk the same AST.
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*
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702
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* Failure mode: returns null on parse errors. Callers fall back to regex-only
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703
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* behavior so a syntax-error file in the user's repo can never break a scan.
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704
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*/
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705
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706
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interface ParsedFile {
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ast: ParseResult<File>;
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708
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language: "js" | "ts" | "jsx" | "tsx";
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709
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}
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710
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/**
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711
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* Parse a JS/TS file. Returns null for unsupported extensions, parse errors,
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712
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* or empty content. Callers MUST handle null and fall back to regex-only.
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*/
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714
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declare function parseFile(content: string, filename: string): ParsedFile | null;
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715
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716
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/**
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717
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* Lightweight taint tracking for AST-based rules.
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*
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719
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* "Tainted" means "derived from untrusted input" — an Express/Next request
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720
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* body, query string, params, or headers; process.argv; environment
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721
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* variables known to be user-controlled; or file contents read at runtime.
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722
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*
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723
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* This is deliberately a local-only analysis: we walk the AST of one file,
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724
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* track which identifiers bind to a tainted source, and propagate through
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725
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* direct assignments and destructuring. Cross-function and cross-file flow
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* is out of scope for Phase A — those require a module graph we don't build
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727
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* yet. A conservative local analysis is still enough to flip the benchmark
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728
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* recall on the data-flow rules.
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729
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*
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730
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* The analysis returns a TaintMap the rules can query:
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731
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* isTainted(node) → "is this AST expression tainted?"
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732
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* isTaintedIdent(name) → "is this identifier currently bound to tainted
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733
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* data in the file-level scope?"
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734
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*
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735
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* Shape of recognized sources:
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736
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* req.body, req.query, req.params, req.headers, req.cookies
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737
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* request.body, request.query, ... (Fastify)
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738
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* ctx.request.body, ctx.query (Koa)
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739
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* process.argv, process.env[Keys known to be user-controllable]
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740
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* event.queryStringParameters, event.body (AWS Lambda / API Gateway)
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741
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* searchParams.get(...), url.searchParams (Next.js / Web fetch API)
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*/
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interface TaintMap {
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745
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/** true iff the given expression node evaluates to tainted data. */
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746
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isTainted(node: Node | null | undefined): boolean;
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747
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/** true iff the named identifier is bound to tainted data somewhere visible. */
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748
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isTaintedIdent(name: string): boolean;
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749
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/** Debug: all identifiers the analysis marked tainted, in discovery order. */
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750
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taintedNames(): string[];
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751
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}
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752
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/**
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753
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* Build a TaintMap for one parsed file. Single traversal, propagates taint
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754
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* through:
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755
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* - const/let bindings: const x = req.body.foo → x tainted
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756
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* - destructuring: const { foo } = req.body → foo tainted
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757
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* - assignment expressions: y = x; x is tainted → y tainted
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758
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* - function params named req/request/ctx (inside handlers, `req.body` is
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759
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* tainted even if we didn't see the outer binding)
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760
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*/
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761
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declare function buildTaintMap(parsed: ParsedFile): TaintMap;
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762
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763
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/**
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764
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* Visitor helpers for rule authors. Each helper takes a parsed file and a
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765
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* callback, and walks the AST in the most common pattern (find call
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766
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* expressions to a particular function, find member expressions of a
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767
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* particular shape, etc.).
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768
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*
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769
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* The rule code stays short and declarative; this file carries the
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770
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* @babel/traverse boilerplate and default-export interop.
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771
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*/
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772
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+
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773
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/**
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774
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* Visit every BinaryExpression in the parsed file. Rule authors use this to
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775
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* catch `a === b` / `a !== b` comparisons where one side is a secret identifier.
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776
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*/
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777
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declare function visitBinary(parsed: ParsedFile, visit: (node: BinaryExpression, line: number) => void): void;
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778
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/**
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779
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* Visit every CallExpression. `matchCallee` decides whether to surface the
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780
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* call; if it returns true, `visit` is invoked with the node and its
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781
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* 1-indexed source line.
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782
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*/
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783
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declare function visitCalls(parsed: ParsedFile, matchCallee: (callee: Node) => boolean, visit: (call: CallExpression, line: number) => void): void;
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784
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/**
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785
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* "Does this callee resolve to a member/global named <name>?" — handles
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786
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* foo(x)
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787
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* obj.foo(x)
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788
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* a.b.foo(x)
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789
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* foo?.(x)
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790
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* Matches the terminal identifier only; doesn't bind to a specific receiver.
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791
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*/
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792
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declare function isCalleeNamed(callee: Node, name: string): boolean;
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793
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/**
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794
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* Matches a call to `objName.methodName(...)` — useful for things like
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795
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* `_.merge`, `Object.assign`, `Handlebars.compile`, `libxml.parseXml`.
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796
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*/
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797
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declare function isMethodCall(callee: Node, objName: string, methodName: string): boolean;
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798
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/** Looks up an ObjectExpression property by key name. */
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799
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declare function getObjectProperty(node: ObjectExpression, key: string): {
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800
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value: Node;
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801
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} | null;
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802
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/** Does this CallExpression spread an expression `matcher` returns true for? */
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803
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declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => boolean): boolean;
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804
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+
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628
805
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declare const TEST_FILE_PATTERN: RegExp;
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806
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declare function isTestFile(filePath: string): boolean;
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629
807
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/**
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630
808
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* Blank out comments while preserving every byte offset and newline.
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631
809
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*
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@@ -642,6 +820,75 @@ declare const TEST_FILE_PATTERN: RegExp;
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642
820
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* beneath them, so this is not a fixture artefact.
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643
821
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*/
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644
822
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declare function maskComments(content: string): string;
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823
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+
/**
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824
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* Return the source of the handler enclosing `index`, or null if none is found.
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825
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*
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826
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* WHY THIS EXISTS. VC003 and VC158 both decided "is this route protected?" by
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827
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* grepping the ENTIRE FILE for auth or ownership vocabulary. A single matching
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828
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* token anywhere in a file exempted every handler in it, no matter how far away
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829
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* the token was or what it was doing.
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830
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*
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831
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* The held-out DVNA IDOR case is the clean demonstration. Its vulnerable
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832
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* handler runs `db.User.find({ where: { 'id': req.body.id } })` with no
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833
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* ownership scoping at all — but a DIFFERENT function in the same file calls
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834
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* `res.render('app/useredit', { userId: req.user.id })`. The whole-file greps
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835
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* saw `userId` and `req.user`, concluded the file was safe, and returned before
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836
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* reaching any detection logic.
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837
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+
*
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838
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* The distinction the fixtures already encode is proximity, not vocabulary:
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839
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* clean/VC158-express-ownership-check scopes with
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840
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* `where: { id: req.params.id, userId: req.user.id }` — the ownership token is
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841
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* INSIDE the query. This narrows the guards to the handler actually performing
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842
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* the lookup, which is the only scope in which "is ownership enforced here?"
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843
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* is a meaningful question.
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844
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*
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845
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* Heuristic and deliberately conservative: brace counting, no parser, and it
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846
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* does not understand braces inside strings, template literals or regex
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847
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* literals. When it cannot confidently identify a handler it returns null, and
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848
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* both callers then fall back to whole-file behaviour — so a failure to parse
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849
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* can only preserve today's result, never invent a new finding.
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850
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+
*/
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851
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+
declare function enclosingHandler(content: string, index: number): string | null;
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852
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+
declare function isServerSideFile(filePath: string, content?: string): boolean;
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853
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+
/**
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854
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* The full text of the line containing `index`.
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855
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+
*
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856
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* Exists because `content.substring(lineStart, content.indexOf("\n", index))`
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857
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* is wrong for a match on the LAST line of a file with no trailing newline:
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858
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* indexOf returns -1, and `substring(start, -1)` does not return "" — it
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859
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* clamps and swaps, handing back `content.substring(0, lineStart)`, which is
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860
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* everything BEFORE the line.
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861
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+
*
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862
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* That silently dropped findings. isCommentLine would test the top of the file
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863
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* instead of the match's line, so any file that opens with a comment — a
|
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864
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+
* licence header, a docblock, an explanatory note — lost every finding on its
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865
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* last line. It runs for every regex rule, so this was not one rule's problem.
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866
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+
*
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867
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* Four other sites in this file already guard the -1 explicitly. This is the
|
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868
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+
* same fix, in one place, for the seven that did not.
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869
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+
*/
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870
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+
declare function lineTextAt(content: string, index: number): string;
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871
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+
declare function isCommentLine(content: string, matchIndex: number): boolean;
|
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872
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+
declare function isInsideFixMessage(content: string, matchIndex: number): boolean;
|
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873
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+
/**
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874
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+
* Drop findMatches-style results that sit at an inline-silenced site. Lets any
|
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875
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+
* rule honor `// VC###-OK:` / `// scanner-OK` with a one-liner, even when it
|
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876
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+
* only has line numbers (not match indices) to work with. Used to give the
|
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877
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+
* high/critical rules a per-site escape valve so users don't disable a whole
|
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878
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+
* rule to suppress one reviewed-and-accepted finding.
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879
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+
*/
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880
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+
declare function filterSilenced(matches: RuleMatch[], content: string, ruleId: string): RuleMatch[];
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881
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+
declare function findMatches(content: string, pattern: RegExp, rule: Omit<CustomRule, "check">, filePath: string, fixTemplate?: (match: RegExpExecArray) => string): RuleMatch[];
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882
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+
/**
|
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883
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+
* Build a RuleMatch from an AST-derived location. Mirrors findMatches' output
|
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884
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+
* shape so AST-based rules can be mixed into the same Finding stream. `line`
|
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885
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+
* comes from node.loc; we still call getSnippet for consistent UI.
|
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886
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+
*/
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887
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+
declare function astMatch(content: string, filePath: string, line: number, rule: Omit<CustomRule, "check">, fix?: string): RuleMatch;
|
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888
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+
declare function tryParse(content: string, filePath: string): {
|
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889
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+
parsed: ParsedFile;
|
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890
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+
taint: TaintMap;
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891
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+
} | null;
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645
892
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declare const hardcodedSecrets: CustomRule;
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646
893
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declare const exposedEnvFile: CustomRule;
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647
894
|
declare const missingAuthMiddleware: CustomRule;
|
|
@@ -653,73 +900,22 @@ declare const noRateLimiting: CustomRule;
|
|
|
653
900
|
declare const corsWildcard: CustomRule;
|
|
654
901
|
declare const clientSideAuth: CustomRule;
|
|
655
902
|
declare const nextPublicSecret: CustomRule;
|
|
656
|
-
declare const firebaseClientConfig: CustomRule;
|
|
657
|
-
declare const supabaseAnonAdmin: CustomRule;
|
|
658
903
|
declare const envNotGitignored: CustomRule;
|
|
659
904
|
declare const evalUsage: CustomRule;
|
|
660
905
|
declare const unvalidatedRedirect: CustomRule;
|
|
661
906
|
declare const insecureCookies: CustomRule;
|
|
662
907
|
declare const exposedAuthSecret: CustomRule;
|
|
663
|
-
declare const insecureElectronWindow: CustomRule;
|
|
664
908
|
declare const missingCSP: CustomRule;
|
|
665
|
-
declare const ipcPathTraversal: CustomRule;
|
|
666
|
-
declare const unsanitizedHTMLExport: CustomRule;
|
|
667
|
-
declare const prototypePollution: CustomRule;
|
|
668
|
-
declare const missingFileSizeLimits: CustomRule;
|
|
669
|
-
declare const unsanitizedFilenames: CustomRule;
|
|
670
|
-
declare const electronNavigationUnrestricted: CustomRule;
|
|
671
|
-
declare const missingSecurityMeta: CustomRule;
|
|
672
|
-
declare const unvalidatedAPIParams: CustomRule;
|
|
673
|
-
declare const unvalidatedEventData: CustomRule;
|
|
674
|
-
declare const insecureDeserialization: CustomRule;
|
|
675
909
|
declare const hardcodedJWTSecret: CustomRule;
|
|
676
910
|
declare const missingHTTPS: CustomRule;
|
|
677
911
|
declare const exposedDebugMode: CustomRule;
|
|
678
912
|
declare const insecureRandomness: CustomRule;
|
|
679
|
-
declare const openRedirectParams: CustomRule;
|
|
680
913
|
declare const missingErrorBoundary: CustomRule;
|
|
681
914
|
declare const exposedStackTraces: CustomRule;
|
|
682
|
-
declare const insecureFileUpload: CustomRule;
|
|
683
915
|
declare const missingLockFile: CustomRule;
|
|
684
|
-
declare const exposedGitDir: CustomRule;
|
|
685
|
-
declare const ssrfVulnerability: CustomRule;
|
|
686
|
-
declare const massAssignment: CustomRule;
|
|
687
|
-
declare const timingAttack: CustomRule;
|
|
688
|
-
declare const logInjection: CustomRule;
|
|
689
|
-
declare const weakPasswordRequirements: CustomRule;
|
|
690
|
-
declare const sessionFixation: CustomRule;
|
|
691
|
-
declare const missingBruteForce: CustomRule;
|
|
692
|
-
declare const nosqlInjection: CustomRule;
|
|
693
|
-
declare const exposedDBCredentials: CustomRule;
|
|
694
|
-
declare const missingDBEncryption: CustomRule;
|
|
695
|
-
declare const graphqlIntrospection: CustomRule;
|
|
696
|
-
declare const missingRequestSizeLimit: CustomRule;
|
|
697
|
-
declare const hardcodedIPAllowlist: CustomRule;
|
|
698
|
-
declare const sensitiveLocalStorage: CustomRule;
|
|
699
|
-
declare const exposedSourceMaps: CustomRule;
|
|
700
|
-
declare const clickjacking: CustomRule;
|
|
701
|
-
declare const overlyPermissiveIAM: CustomRule;
|
|
702
|
-
declare const dockerRunAsRoot: CustomRule;
|
|
703
|
-
declare const exposedDockerPorts: CustomRule;
|
|
704
916
|
declare const weakHashing: CustomRule;
|
|
705
917
|
declare const disabledTLSVerification: CustomRule;
|
|
706
|
-
declare const hardcodedEncryptionKey: CustomRule;
|
|
707
918
|
declare const dangerousInnerHTML: CustomRule;
|
|
708
|
-
declare const exposedServerActions: CustomRule;
|
|
709
|
-
declare const unprotectedAPIRoutes: CustomRule;
|
|
710
|
-
declare const clientComponentSecret: CustomRule;
|
|
711
|
-
declare const insecureDeepLink: CustomRule;
|
|
712
|
-
declare const sensitiveAsyncStorage: CustomRule;
|
|
713
|
-
declare const missingCertPinning: CustomRule;
|
|
714
|
-
declare const androidDebuggable: CustomRule;
|
|
715
|
-
declare const djangoDebug: CustomRule;
|
|
716
|
-
declare const flaskSecretKey: CustomRule;
|
|
717
|
-
declare const pickleDeserialization: CustomRule;
|
|
718
|
-
declare const missingCSRF: CustomRule;
|
|
719
|
-
declare const githubActionsInjection: CustomRule;
|
|
720
|
-
declare const secretsInCI: CustomRule;
|
|
721
|
-
declare const corsServerless: CustomRule;
|
|
722
|
-
declare const k8sPrivileged: CustomRule;
|
|
723
919
|
type DetectedFramework = "next.js" | "react" | "react-native" | "express" | "hono" | "fastify" | "django" | "flask" | "electron" | "vue" | "svelte" | "unknown";
|
|
724
920
|
declare function detectFramework(files: {
|
|
725
921
|
path: string;
|
|
@@ -755,166 +951,15 @@ interface GradeOptions {
|
|
|
755
951
|
gradeVendored?: boolean;
|
|
756
952
|
}
|
|
757
953
|
declare function calculateGrade(findings: Finding[], _totalFiles: number, options?: GradeOptions): GradeResult;
|
|
758
|
-
declare const jwtAlgConfusion: CustomRule;
|
|
759
|
-
declare const regexDos: CustomRule;
|
|
760
|
-
declare const xxeVulnerability: CustomRule;
|
|
761
|
-
declare const ssti: CustomRule;
|
|
762
|
-
declare const javaDeserialization: CustomRule;
|
|
763
|
-
declare const missingSRI: CustomRule;
|
|
764
|
-
declare const exposedAdminRoutes: CustomRule;
|
|
765
|
-
declare const insecureWebSocket: CustomRule;
|
|
766
|
-
declare const missingHSTS: CustomRule;
|
|
767
|
-
declare const sensitiveURLParams: CustomRule;
|
|
768
|
-
declare const missingContentDisposition: CustomRule;
|
|
769
|
-
declare const hostHeaderRedirect: CustomRule;
|
|
770
|
-
declare const raceCondition: CustomRule;
|
|
771
|
-
declare const unsafeObjectAssign: CustomRule;
|
|
772
|
-
declare const unprotectedDownload: CustomRule;
|
|
773
|
-
declare const commandInjection: CustomRule;
|
|
774
|
-
declare const corsLocalhost: CustomRule;
|
|
775
|
-
declare const insecureGRPC: CustomRule;
|
|
776
954
|
declare const complianceMap: Record<string, {
|
|
777
955
|
owasp: string;
|
|
778
956
|
cwe: string;
|
|
779
957
|
}>;
|
|
780
958
|
declare const consoleLogProduction: CustomRule;
|
|
781
|
-
declare const syncFileOps: CustomRule;
|
|
782
|
-
declare const eventListenerLeak: CustomRule;
|
|
783
|
-
declare const nPlusOneQuery: CustomRule;
|
|
784
|
-
declare const largeBundleImport: CustomRule;
|
|
785
|
-
declare const blockingMainThread: CustomRule;
|
|
786
959
|
declare const todoLeftInCode: CustomRule;
|
|
787
960
|
declare const emptyCatchBlock: CustomRule;
|
|
788
|
-
declare const callbackHell: CustomRule;
|
|
789
|
-
declare const magicNumbers: CustomRule;
|
|
790
|
-
declare const s3BucketNoEncryption: CustomRule;
|
|
791
|
-
declare const securityGroupAllInbound: CustomRule;
|
|
792
|
-
declare const rdsPubliclyAccessible: CustomRule;
|
|
793
|
-
declare const missingCloudTrail: CustomRule;
|
|
794
|
-
declare const lambdaWithoutVPC: CustomRule;
|
|
795
|
-
declare const dockerLatestTag: CustomRule;
|
|
796
|
-
declare const dockerCopySensitive: CustomRule;
|
|
797
|
-
declare const dockerTooManyPorts: CustomRule;
|
|
798
|
-
declare const k8sSecretNotEncrypted: CustomRule;
|
|
799
|
-
declare const k8sNoResourceLimits: CustomRule;
|
|
800
|
-
declare const pathTraversal: CustomRule;
|
|
801
|
-
declare const piiInLogs: CustomRule;
|
|
802
|
-
declare const hardcodedOAuthSecret: CustomRule;
|
|
803
|
-
declare const missingOAuthState: CustomRule;
|
|
804
|
-
declare const unpinnedGitHubAction: CustomRule;
|
|
805
|
-
declare const deprecatedTLS: CustomRule;
|
|
806
|
-
declare const weakRSAKeySize: CustomRule;
|
|
807
|
-
declare const ecbModeEncryption: CustomRule;
|
|
808
|
-
declare const insecurePasswordReset: CustomRule;
|
|
809
|
-
declare const terraformStateExposed: CustomRule;
|
|
810
|
-
declare const insecureHTTPMethods: CustomRule;
|
|
811
|
-
declare const httpRequestSmuggling: CustomRule;
|
|
812
|
-
declare const unencryptedPII: CustomRule;
|
|
813
|
-
declare const missingAuthRateLimit: CustomRule;
|
|
814
|
-
declare const vulnerableDependencies: CustomRule;
|
|
815
|
-
declare const hardcodedAnthropicKey: CustomRule;
|
|
816
|
-
declare const hardcodedGitHubPAT: CustomRule;
|
|
817
|
-
declare const hardcodedSendGridKey: CustomRule;
|
|
818
|
-
declare const hardcodedSlackToken: CustomRule;
|
|
819
|
-
declare const hardcodedGCPServiceAccount: CustomRule;
|
|
820
|
-
declare const hardcodedShopifyToken: CustomRule;
|
|
821
|
-
declare const hardcodedGitLabToken: CustomRule;
|
|
822
|
-
declare const hardcodedTwilioKey: CustomRule;
|
|
823
|
-
declare const hardcodedMailgunKey: CustomRule;
|
|
824
|
-
declare const hardcodedDatadogKey: CustomRule;
|
|
825
|
-
declare const hardcodedVercelToken: CustomRule;
|
|
826
|
-
declare const hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole: CustomRule;
|
|
827
|
-
declare const hardcodedVaultToken: CustomRule;
|
|
828
|
-
declare const hardcodedPineconeKey: CustomRule;
|
|
829
|
-
declare const hardcodedCohereKey: CustomRule;
|
|
830
|
-
declare const hardcodedReplicateKey: CustomRule;
|
|
831
|
-
declare const hardcodedMistralKey: CustomRule;
|
|
832
|
-
declare const hardcodedTogetherKey: CustomRule;
|
|
833
|
-
declare const hardcodedGroqKey: CustomRule;
|
|
834
|
-
declare const hardcodedFireworksKey: CustomRule;
|
|
835
|
-
declare const hardcodedPostmarkKey: CustomRule;
|
|
836
|
-
declare const hardcodedResendKey: CustomRule;
|
|
837
|
-
declare const hardcodedLoopsKey: CustomRule;
|
|
838
|
-
declare const hardcodedCloudflareToken: CustomRule;
|
|
839
|
-
declare const hardcodedFastlyToken: CustomRule;
|
|
840
|
-
declare const hardcodedNetlifyToken: CustomRule;
|
|
841
|
-
declare const hardcodedRailwayToken: CustomRule;
|
|
842
|
-
declare const hardcodedFlyToken: CustomRule;
|
|
843
|
-
declare const hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey: CustomRule;
|
|
844
|
-
declare const hardcodedQdrantKey: CustomRule;
|
|
845
|
-
declare const hardcodedWeaviateKey: CustomRule;
|
|
846
|
-
declare const hardcodedLinearKey: CustomRule;
|
|
847
|
-
declare const hardcodedNotionKey: CustomRule;
|
|
848
|
-
declare const hardcodedDiscordToken: CustomRule;
|
|
849
|
-
declare const hardcodedIntercomToken: CustomRule;
|
|
850
|
-
declare const hardcodedSentryAuthToken: CustomRule;
|
|
851
|
-
declare const hardcodedLogtailToken: CustomRule;
|
|
852
|
-
declare const hardcodedHighlightKey: CustomRule;
|
|
853
|
-
declare const hardcodedPlivoToken: CustomRule;
|
|
854
|
-
declare const ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout: CustomRule;
|
|
855
|
-
declare const ghaPermissionsWriteAll: CustomRule;
|
|
856
|
-
declare const ghaExpressionInjection: CustomRule;
|
|
857
|
-
declare const ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets: CustomRule;
|
|
858
|
-
declare const dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY: CustomRule;
|
|
859
|
-
declare const dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe: CustomRule;
|
|
860
|
-
declare const dockerfileMissingHealthcheck: CustomRule;
|
|
861
|
-
declare const pyRequestsVerifyFalse: CustomRule;
|
|
862
|
-
declare const pyJinja2AutoescapeOff: CustomRule;
|
|
863
|
-
declare const pyTempfileMktemp: CustomRule;
|
|
864
|
-
declare const pyDjangoMarkSafe: CustomRule;
|
|
865
|
-
declare const pyParamikoAutoAdd: CustomRule;
|
|
866
|
-
declare const pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard: CustomRule;
|
|
867
|
-
declare const pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig: CustomRule;
|
|
868
|
-
declare const llmPromptInjection: CustomRule;
|
|
869
|
-
declare const llmSystemPromptInjection: CustomRule;
|
|
870
|
-
declare const llmOutputAsHTML: CustomRule;
|
|
871
|
-
declare const vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter: CustomRule;
|
|
872
|
-
declare const vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata: CustomRule;
|
|
873
|
-
declare const llmCallNoMaxTokens: CustomRule;
|
|
874
|
-
declare const graphqlNoDepthLimit: CustomRule;
|
|
875
|
-
declare const graphqlNoComplexityLimit: CustomRule;
|
|
876
|
-
declare const graphqlCSRFDisabled: CustomRule;
|
|
877
|
-
declare const llmOutputToSink: CustomRule;
|
|
878
|
-
declare const secretInLLMPrompt: CustomRule;
|
|
879
|
-
declare const webhookMissingIdempotency: CustomRule;
|
|
880
|
-
declare const entitlementFromWebStorage: CustomRule;
|
|
881
|
-
declare const accountStateFromWebStorage: CustomRule;
|
|
882
|
-
declare const middlewareMatcherExcludesApi: CustomRule;
|
|
883
|
-
declare const hardcodedCreditCard: CustomRule;
|
|
884
|
-
declare const hardcodedSSN: CustomRule;
|
|
885
|
-
declare const secretInURLParam: CustomRule;
|
|
886
|
-
declare const secretLoggedToConsole: CustomRule;
|
|
887
|
-
declare const secretInErrorResponse: CustomRule;
|
|
888
|
-
declare const secretInBundleConfig: CustomRule;
|
|
889
|
-
declare const secretInHTMLAttribute: CustomRule;
|
|
890
|
-
declare const secretInCLIArgument: CustomRule;
|
|
891
|
-
declare const webhookSignatureVerification: CustomRule;
|
|
892
|
-
declare const reflectedCORSOrigin: CustomRule;
|
|
893
|
-
declare const missingRequestValidation: CustomRule;
|
|
894
|
-
declare const missingAIRateLimit: CustomRule;
|
|
895
|
-
declare const missingPagination: CustomRule;
|
|
896
|
-
declare const exposedDatabaseStudio: CustomRule;
|
|
897
|
-
declare const insecureDirectObjectReference: CustomRule;
|
|
898
961
|
declare const freeRules: CustomRule[];
|
|
899
962
|
declare const allRules: CustomRule[];
|
|
900
|
-
declare const allCustomRules: CustomRule[];
|
|
901
|
-
/**
|
|
902
|
-
* Every rule that is NOT in the free tier, derived — never hand-listed.
|
|
903
|
-
*
|
|
904
|
-
* `runCustomRules()` always runs `freeRules` internally; its `extraRules`
|
|
905
|
-
* argument is how a caller adds the rest. Passing `allCustomRules` there
|
|
906
|
-
* therefore runs the 30 free rules TWICE, and every free-tier finding is
|
|
907
|
-
* reported twice. That is exactly what the MCP server and the VS Code
|
|
908
|
-
* extension were doing — both shipped, on npm and the Marketplace — while
|
|
909
|
-
* the CLI passed the complement and was correct.
|
|
910
|
-
*
|
|
911
|
-
* The free/Pro split had been restated in three places by hand: this file's
|
|
912
|
-
* `freeRules`, a literal ID Set in scripts/vsi/vsi-lib.cjs, and a 184-entry
|
|
913
|
-
* import list in packages/cli/src/pro-bundle-entry.ts. Deriving it once is
|
|
914
|
-
* the fix the repo keeps re-learning — a shared value makes the drift
|
|
915
|
-
* unexpressible, where a guard only catches it afterwards.
|
|
916
|
-
*/
|
|
917
|
-
declare const proOnlyRules: CustomRule[];
|
|
918
963
|
declare function runCustomRules(content: string, filePath: string, disabledRules?: string[], tier?: "free" | "pro", extraRules?: CustomRule[],
|
|
919
964
|
/**
|
|
920
965
|
* Cross-file facts for the project being scanned, from
|
|
@@ -940,10 +985,15 @@ project?: ProjectContext): Finding[];
|
|
|
940
985
|
* not shipped in npm package." A count is a number, and a number is all the
|
|
941
986
|
* CLI should have to import to print one.
|
|
942
987
|
*
|
|
943
|
-
*
|
|
944
|
-
*
|
|
945
|
-
*
|
|
946
|
-
*
|
|
988
|
+
* Since 2.0.0 the Pro rules are not in this package at all — they live in the
|
|
989
|
+
* private packages/pro-rules — so this package CANNOT compute 184 or 214: the
|
|
990
|
+
* arrays those numbers describe do not exist here. Literals are the only way
|
|
991
|
+
* to publish them.
|
|
992
|
+
*
|
|
993
|
+
* So: literals here, and packages/pro-rules/src/rule-counts.test.ts asserts
|
|
994
|
+
* each one equals the real array's length. The value is *derived at test time*
|
|
995
|
+
* and *shipped as a constant* — drift fails CI instead of reaching npm, and
|
|
996
|
+
* nothing in this file references a rule.
|
|
947
997
|
*
|
|
948
998
|
* THIS FILE MUST NOT IMPORT FROM ./rules.js. That import is the entire bug.
|
|
949
999
|
*/
|
|
@@ -1143,117 +1193,6 @@ declare function assessHeaders(headers: Record<string, string>): HeaderFinding[]
|
|
|
1143
1193
|
/** Script `src` URLs in an HTML document, resolved against the page URL. */
|
|
1144
1194
|
declare function extractScriptUrls(html: string, pageUrl: string, limit?: number): string[];
|
|
1145
1195
|
|
|
1146
|
-
/**
|
|
1147
|
-
* Centralized Babel parser with per-file caching.
|
|
1148
|
-
*
|
|
1149
|
-
* Rules that opt in to AST analysis call parseFile(content, filename) to get
|
|
1150
|
-
* a Program node back. Parsing is expensive (~5-50ms per KB of source); the
|
|
1151
|
-
* LRU cache ensures a single scan pass touches each file at most once even
|
|
1152
|
-
* when multiple rules walk the same AST.
|
|
1153
|
-
*
|
|
1154
|
-
* Failure mode: returns null on parse errors. Callers fall back to regex-only
|
|
1155
|
-
* behavior so a syntax-error file in the user's repo can never break a scan.
|
|
1156
|
-
*/
|
|
1157
|
-
|
|
1158
|
-
interface ParsedFile {
|
|
1159
|
-
ast: ParseResult<File>;
|
|
1160
|
-
language: "js" | "ts" | "jsx" | "tsx";
|
|
1161
|
-
}
|
|
1162
|
-
/**
|
|
1163
|
-
* Parse a JS/TS file. Returns null for unsupported extensions, parse errors,
|
|
1164
|
-
* or empty content. Callers MUST handle null and fall back to regex-only.
|
|
1165
|
-
*/
|
|
1166
|
-
declare function parseFile(content: string, filename: string): ParsedFile | null;
|
|
1167
|
-
|
|
1168
|
-
/**
|
|
1169
|
-
* Lightweight taint tracking for AST-based rules.
|
|
1170
|
-
*
|
|
1171
|
-
* "Tainted" means "derived from untrusted input" — an Express/Next request
|
|
1172
|
-
* body, query string, params, or headers; process.argv; environment
|
|
1173
|
-
* variables known to be user-controlled; or file contents read at runtime.
|
|
1174
|
-
*
|
|
1175
|
-
* This is deliberately a local-only analysis: we walk the AST of one file,
|
|
1176
|
-
* track which identifiers bind to a tainted source, and propagate through
|
|
1177
|
-
* direct assignments and destructuring. Cross-function and cross-file flow
|
|
1178
|
-
* is out of scope for Phase A — those require a module graph we don't build
|
|
1179
|
-
* yet. A conservative local analysis is still enough to flip the benchmark
|
|
1180
|
-
* recall on the data-flow rules.
|
|
1181
|
-
*
|
|
1182
|
-
* The analysis returns a TaintMap the rules can query:
|
|
1183
|
-
* isTainted(node) → "is this AST expression tainted?"
|
|
1184
|
-
* isTaintedIdent(name) → "is this identifier currently bound to tainted
|
|
1185
|
-
* data in the file-level scope?"
|
|
1186
|
-
*
|
|
1187
|
-
* Shape of recognized sources:
|
|
1188
|
-
* req.body, req.query, req.params, req.headers, req.cookies
|
|
1189
|
-
* request.body, request.query, ... (Fastify)
|
|
1190
|
-
* ctx.request.body, ctx.query (Koa)
|
|
1191
|
-
* process.argv, process.env[Keys known to be user-controllable]
|
|
1192
|
-
* event.queryStringParameters, event.body (AWS Lambda / API Gateway)
|
|
1193
|
-
* searchParams.get(...), url.searchParams (Next.js / Web fetch API)
|
|
1194
|
-
*/
|
|
1195
|
-
|
|
1196
|
-
interface TaintMap {
|
|
1197
|
-
/** true iff the given expression node evaluates to tainted data. */
|
|
1198
|
-
isTainted(node: Node | null | undefined): boolean;
|
|
1199
|
-
/** true iff the named identifier is bound to tainted data somewhere visible. */
|
|
1200
|
-
isTaintedIdent(name: string): boolean;
|
|
1201
|
-
/** Debug: all identifiers the analysis marked tainted, in discovery order. */
|
|
1202
|
-
taintedNames(): string[];
|
|
1203
|
-
}
|
|
1204
|
-
/**
|
|
1205
|
-
* Build a TaintMap for one parsed file. Single traversal, propagates taint
|
|
1206
|
-
* through:
|
|
1207
|
-
* - const/let bindings: const x = req.body.foo → x tainted
|
|
1208
|
-
* - destructuring: const { foo } = req.body → foo tainted
|
|
1209
|
-
* - assignment expressions: y = x; x is tainted → y tainted
|
|
1210
|
-
* - function params named req/request/ctx (inside handlers, `req.body` is
|
|
1211
|
-
* tainted even if we didn't see the outer binding)
|
|
1212
|
-
*/
|
|
1213
|
-
declare function buildTaintMap(parsed: ParsedFile): TaintMap;
|
|
1214
|
-
|
|
1215
|
-
/**
|
|
1216
|
-
* Visitor helpers for rule authors. Each helper takes a parsed file and a
|
|
1217
|
-
* callback, and walks the AST in the most common pattern (find call
|
|
1218
|
-
* expressions to a particular function, find member expressions of a
|
|
1219
|
-
* particular shape, etc.).
|
|
1220
|
-
*
|
|
1221
|
-
* The rule code stays short and declarative; this file carries the
|
|
1222
|
-
* @babel/traverse boilerplate and default-export interop.
|
|
1223
|
-
*/
|
|
1224
|
-
|
|
1225
|
-
/**
|
|
1226
|
-
* Visit every BinaryExpression in the parsed file. Rule authors use this to
|
|
1227
|
-
* catch `a === b` / `a !== b` comparisons where one side is a secret identifier.
|
|
1228
|
-
*/
|
|
1229
|
-
declare function visitBinary(parsed: ParsedFile, visit: (node: BinaryExpression, line: number) => void): void;
|
|
1230
|
-
/**
|
|
1231
|
-
* Visit every CallExpression. `matchCallee` decides whether to surface the
|
|
1232
|
-
* call; if it returns true, `visit` is invoked with the node and its
|
|
1233
|
-
* 1-indexed source line.
|
|
1234
|
-
*/
|
|
1235
|
-
declare function visitCalls(parsed: ParsedFile, matchCallee: (callee: Node) => boolean, visit: (call: CallExpression, line: number) => void): void;
|
|
1236
|
-
/**
|
|
1237
|
-
* "Does this callee resolve to a member/global named <name>?" — handles
|
|
1238
|
-
* foo(x)
|
|
1239
|
-
* obj.foo(x)
|
|
1240
|
-
* a.b.foo(x)
|
|
1241
|
-
* foo?.(x)
|
|
1242
|
-
* Matches the terminal identifier only; doesn't bind to a specific receiver.
|
|
1243
|
-
*/
|
|
1244
|
-
declare function isCalleeNamed(callee: Node, name: string): boolean;
|
|
1245
|
-
/**
|
|
1246
|
-
* Matches a call to `objName.methodName(...)` — useful for things like
|
|
1247
|
-
* `_.merge`, `Object.assign`, `Handlebars.compile`, `libxml.parseXml`.
|
|
1248
|
-
*/
|
|
1249
|
-
declare function isMethodCall(callee: Node, objName: string, methodName: string): boolean;
|
|
1250
|
-
/** Looks up an ObjectExpression property by key name. */
|
|
1251
|
-
declare function getObjectProperty(node: ObjectExpression, key: string): {
|
|
1252
|
-
value: Node;
|
|
1253
|
-
} | null;
|
|
1254
|
-
/** Does this CallExpression spread an expression `matcher` returns true for? */
|
|
1255
|
-
declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => boolean): boolean;
|
|
1256
|
-
|
|
1257
1196
|
/**
|
|
1258
1197
|
* Quality rules — a separate catalogue from the VC security rules.
|
|
1259
1198
|
*
|
|
@@ -1430,4 +1369,4 @@ input: {
|
|
|
1430
1369
|
content: string;
|
|
1431
1370
|
}[] | QualityContext, rules?: QualityRule[]): Finding[];
|
|
1432
1371
|
|
|
1433
|
-
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform,
|
|
1372
|
+
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allRules, assessHeaders, astMatch, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyStatement, clientSideAuth, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, emptyCatchBlock, enclosingHandler, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDebugMode, exposedEnvFile, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, filterSilenced, findMatches, findSourceMapRefs, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedSecrets, harvestIntent, insecureCookies, insecureRandomness, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isCommentLine, isInlineSilenced, isInsideFixMessage, isLineSilenced, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isServerSideFile, isServerTarget, isTestFile, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, lineNumberAt, lineTextAt, maskComments, missingAuthMiddleware, missingCSP, missingErrorBoundary, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, qualityRules, routeForFile, runCustomRules, scanEntropy, scanQuality, sqlInjection, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, todoLeftInCode, tryParse, unmeasuredQualityRules, unvalidatedRedirect, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, weakHashing, xssVulnerability };
|