xploitscan-shared-rules 1.35.1 → 1.36.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/index.cjs +181 -71
- package/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.cts +28 -5
- package/dist/index.d.ts +28 -5
- package/dist/index.js +179 -71
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.cts
CHANGED
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@@ -1278,8 +1278,9 @@ declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => bool
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* EVERY RULE HERE EARNED ITS PLACE BY SURVIVING AN ATTACK. Each began as a
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* real defect found in this product, was then handed to an adversarial review
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* whose only job was to find legitimate code that would trip it, and ships
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* only with the narrowing that survived.
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* are not here
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* only with the narrowing that survived. Six candidates did not survive and
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* are not here; the last two are written up at the end of NARROWINGS.md, so
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* that proposing them again costs an argument rather than a round. The precision bar is the product: a noisy rule trains people
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* to ignore the tool, which is worse than having no rule at all.
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*/
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interface QualityRule {
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@@ -1341,6 +1342,19 @@ declare function buildQualityContext(files: {
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path: string;
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content: string;
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}[]): QualityContext;
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/** Line number for a byte offset, 1-based. Offsets survive maskComments. */
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/**
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* The gate a client-side rule applies before it looks at a file, named once.
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*
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* Four rules spelled these three conditions out, and the measurement harness
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* made a fifth copy that dropped `!isServer` — so `src/api/hooks/useThing.ts`
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* counted toward a denominator no client rule would ever run on, and counted
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* again on the server side. A denominator that does not match its numerator is
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* the one thing that harness exists not to produce.
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*/
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declare function isClientTarget(file: QualityFile): boolean;
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/** The server-side counterpart. */
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declare function isServerTarget(file: QualityFile): boolean;
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/**
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* Worked examples for the quality catalogue, one vulnerable/safe pair per rule.
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@@ -1402,9 +1416,18 @@ declare const unmeasuredQualityRules: QualityRule[];
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* Parallel to scanEntropy and scanDependencies: an engine, not a rule, because
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* most of these need more than the single file the rule contract allows.
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*/
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declare function scanQuality(
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declare function scanQuality(
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/**
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* The files to scan, or a context already built for them. Building one
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* parses every file into a Babel AST and holds them all at once, so a caller
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* that needs the context for its own reasons — the measurement harness counts
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* how many files each rule class applies to — should hand it over rather than
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* pay for a second one. Taking either here, instead of a third parameter,
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* means there is no pair of arguments that can disagree.
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*/
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input: {
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path: string;
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content: string;
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}[], rules?: QualityRule[]): Finding[];
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}[] | QualityContext, rules?: QualityRule[]): Finding[];
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-
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyStatement, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, harvestIntent, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, maskComments, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, proOnlyRules, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, qualityRules, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, scanQuality, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unmeasuredQualityRules, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
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export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyStatement, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, harvestIntent, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isServerTarget, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, maskComments, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, proOnlyRules, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, qualityRules, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, scanQuality, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unmeasuredQualityRules, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
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package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -1278,8 +1278,9 @@ declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => bool
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1278
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* EVERY RULE HERE EARNED ITS PLACE BY SURVIVING AN ATTACK. Each began as a
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* real defect found in this product, was then handed to an adversarial review
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* whose only job was to find legitimate code that would trip it, and ships
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* only with the narrowing that survived.
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* are not here
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1281
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* only with the narrowing that survived. Six candidates did not survive and
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1282
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* are not here; the last two are written up at the end of NARROWINGS.md, so
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1283
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* that proposing them again costs an argument rather than a round. The precision bar is the product: a noisy rule trains people
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1283
1284
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* to ignore the tool, which is worse than having no rule at all.
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*/
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interface QualityRule {
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@@ -1341,6 +1342,19 @@ declare function buildQualityContext(files: {
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path: string;
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content: string;
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}[]): QualityContext;
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/** Line number for a byte offset, 1-based. Offsets survive maskComments. */
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/**
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* The gate a client-side rule applies before it looks at a file, named once.
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*
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* Four rules spelled these three conditions out, and the measurement harness
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1350
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* made a fifth copy that dropped `!isServer` — so `src/api/hooks/useThing.ts`
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* counted toward a denominator no client rule would ever run on, and counted
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* again on the server side. A denominator that does not match its numerator is
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* the one thing that harness exists not to produce.
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*/
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declare function isClientTarget(file: QualityFile): boolean;
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/** The server-side counterpart. */
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declare function isServerTarget(file: QualityFile): boolean;
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/**
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* Worked examples for the quality catalogue, one vulnerable/safe pair per rule.
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@@ -1402,9 +1416,18 @@ declare const unmeasuredQualityRules: QualityRule[];
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1402
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* Parallel to scanEntropy and scanDependencies: an engine, not a rule, because
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* most of these need more than the single file the rule contract allows.
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*/
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declare function scanQuality(
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declare function scanQuality(
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/**
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* The files to scan, or a context already built for them. Building one
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1422
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* parses every file into a Babel AST and holds them all at once, so a caller
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1423
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* that needs the context for its own reasons — the measurement harness counts
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1424
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* how many files each rule class applies to — should hand it over rather than
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1425
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* pay for a second one. Taking either here, instead of a third parameter,
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* means there is no pair of arguments that can disagree.
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*/
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input: {
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path: string;
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content: string;
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}[], rules?: QualityRule[]): Finding[];
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}[] | QualityContext, rules?: QualityRule[]): Finding[];
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1409
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1410
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-
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyStatement, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, harvestIntent, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, maskComments, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, proOnlyRules, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, qualityRules, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, scanQuality, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unmeasuredQualityRules, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
|
|
1433
|
+
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, CHECKABLE_CLAIMS, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, QUALITY_EXAMPLES, type QualityContext, type QualityExample, type QualityFile, type QualityHit, type QualityRule, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TEST_FILE_PATTERN, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildProjectContext, buildQualityContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, checkIntent, classifyExposure, classifyStatement, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, harvestIntent, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isClientTarget, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isServerTarget, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, maskComments, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, proOnlyRules, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, qualityRules, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, scanQuality, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unmeasuredQualityRules, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
|
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -10105,6 +10105,12 @@ function buildQualityContext(files) {
|
|
|
10105
10105
|
});
|
|
10106
10106
|
return { files: built, byPath: new Map(built.map((f) => [f.path, f])) };
|
|
10107
10107
|
}
|
|
10108
|
+
function isClientTarget(file) {
|
|
10109
|
+
return !file.excluded && file.isClient && !file.isServer;
|
|
10110
|
+
}
|
|
10111
|
+
function isServerTarget(file) {
|
|
10112
|
+
return !file.excluded && file.isServer;
|
|
10113
|
+
}
|
|
10108
10114
|
function lineAt(content, index) {
|
|
10109
10115
|
let line = 1;
|
|
10110
10116
|
for (let i = 0; i < index && i < content.length; i++) {
|
|
@@ -12319,6 +12325,55 @@ var unassociatedLabel = {
|
|
|
12319
12325
|
|
|
12320
12326
|
// src/quality/rules/failed-read-empty-state.ts
|
|
12321
12327
|
import _traverse4 from "@babel/traverse";
|
|
12328
|
+
import { getBindingIdentifiers } from "@babel/types";
|
|
12329
|
+
|
|
12330
|
+
// src/quality/rules/scope.ts
|
|
12331
|
+
function unwrap(node) {
|
|
12332
|
+
let cur = node;
|
|
12333
|
+
while (cur.type === "TSAsExpression" || cur.type === "TSNonNullExpression" || cur.type === "TSTypeAssertion" || cur.type === "TSSatisfiesExpression") {
|
|
12334
|
+
cur = cur.expression;
|
|
12335
|
+
}
|
|
12336
|
+
return cur;
|
|
12337
|
+
}
|
|
12338
|
+
function calleeName3(node) {
|
|
12339
|
+
if (node.type !== "CallExpression" && node.type !== "OptionalCallExpression") return null;
|
|
12340
|
+
const c = node.callee;
|
|
12341
|
+
if (c.type === "Identifier") return c.name;
|
|
12342
|
+
if ((c.type === "MemberExpression" || c.type === "OptionalMemberExpression") && c.property.type === "Identifier") {
|
|
12343
|
+
return c.property.name;
|
|
12344
|
+
}
|
|
12345
|
+
return null;
|
|
12346
|
+
}
|
|
12347
|
+
function useStateBinding(at, name) {
|
|
12348
|
+
const binding = at.scope.getBinding(name);
|
|
12349
|
+
if (!binding) return void 0;
|
|
12350
|
+
const decl = binding.path;
|
|
12351
|
+
if (!decl.isVariableDeclarator()) return void 0;
|
|
12352
|
+
const id = decl.node.id;
|
|
12353
|
+
const init = decl.node.init;
|
|
12354
|
+
if (id.type !== "ArrayPattern") return void 0;
|
|
12355
|
+
if (!init || calleeName3(init) !== "useState") return void 0;
|
|
12356
|
+
const first = id.elements[0];
|
|
12357
|
+
if (!first || first.type !== "Identifier" || first.name !== name) return void 0;
|
|
12358
|
+
const second = id.elements[1];
|
|
12359
|
+
return {
|
|
12360
|
+
initial: init.arguments[0],
|
|
12361
|
+
setter: second && second.type === "Identifier" ? second.name : null,
|
|
12362
|
+
decl
|
|
12363
|
+
};
|
|
12364
|
+
}
|
|
12365
|
+
function isEmptyInitial(node) {
|
|
12366
|
+
if (!node) return false;
|
|
12367
|
+
if (node.type === "ArrayExpression") return node.elements.length === 0;
|
|
12368
|
+
if (node.type === "ObjectExpression") return node.properties.length === 0;
|
|
12369
|
+
if (node.type === "StringLiteral") return node.value === "";
|
|
12370
|
+
if (node.type === "TemplateLiteral") {
|
|
12371
|
+
return node.quasis.length === 1 && node.quasis[0].value.raw === "";
|
|
12372
|
+
}
|
|
12373
|
+
return false;
|
|
12374
|
+
}
|
|
12375
|
+
|
|
12376
|
+
// src/quality/rules/failed-read-empty-state.ts
|
|
12322
12377
|
var traverse4 = typeof _traverse4 === "function" ? _traverse4 : _traverse4.default;
|
|
12323
12378
|
var READ_ERROR_PATH_SIGNALS = ERROR_PATH_SIGNALS.filter(
|
|
12324
12379
|
(re) => re.source !== /\.catch\s*\(/.source
|
|
@@ -12336,28 +12391,57 @@ function setterName(callee) {
|
|
|
12336
12391
|
function isPropertyRead(node) {
|
|
12337
12392
|
return node.type === "MemberExpression" || node.type === "OptionalMemberExpression";
|
|
12338
12393
|
}
|
|
12394
|
+
function mentionsJsonParse(node, code) {
|
|
12395
|
+
return /\.json\s*\(/.test(code.slice(nodeStart(node), nodeEnd(node)));
|
|
12396
|
+
}
|
|
12397
|
+
function chainParsesBody(node, code) {
|
|
12398
|
+
let cur = unwrap(node);
|
|
12399
|
+
for (; ; ) {
|
|
12400
|
+
if (cur.type === "CallExpression" || cur.type === "OptionalCallExpression") {
|
|
12401
|
+
const callee = unwrap(cur.callee);
|
|
12402
|
+
if ((callee.type === "MemberExpression" || callee.type === "OptionalMemberExpression") && callee.property.type === "Identifier") {
|
|
12403
|
+
const method = callee.property.name;
|
|
12404
|
+
if (method === "json") return true;
|
|
12405
|
+
if (method === "then" || method === "catch") {
|
|
12406
|
+
const cb = cur.arguments[0];
|
|
12407
|
+
if (cb && (cb.type === "ArrowFunctionExpression" || cb.type === "FunctionExpression") && /\.json\s*\(/.test(code.slice(nodeStart(cb), nodeEnd(cb)))) {
|
|
12408
|
+
return true;
|
|
12409
|
+
}
|
|
12410
|
+
}
|
|
12411
|
+
cur = unwrap(callee.object);
|
|
12412
|
+
continue;
|
|
12413
|
+
}
|
|
12414
|
+
cur = callee;
|
|
12415
|
+
continue;
|
|
12416
|
+
}
|
|
12417
|
+
if (cur.type === "MemberExpression" || cur.type === "OptionalMemberExpression") {
|
|
12418
|
+
cur = unwrap(cur.object);
|
|
12419
|
+
continue;
|
|
12420
|
+
}
|
|
12421
|
+
return false;
|
|
12422
|
+
}
|
|
12423
|
+
return false;
|
|
12424
|
+
}
|
|
12425
|
+
function boundNames(id, into) {
|
|
12426
|
+
for (const name of Object.keys(getBindingIdentifiers(id))) into.add(name);
|
|
12427
|
+
}
|
|
12339
12428
|
function parsedBodyBindings(unit, code) {
|
|
12340
12429
|
const names = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
|
|
12430
|
+
const record = (id, init) => {
|
|
12431
|
+
if (!id || !init) return;
|
|
12432
|
+
const awaited = unwrap(init);
|
|
12433
|
+
if (awaited.type !== "AwaitExpression") return;
|
|
12434
|
+
if (!chainParsesBody(awaited.argument, code)) return;
|
|
12435
|
+
boundNames(id, names);
|
|
12436
|
+
};
|
|
12341
12437
|
unit.traverse({
|
|
12342
12438
|
VariableDeclarator(decl) {
|
|
12343
|
-
|
|
12344
|
-
|
|
12345
|
-
|
|
12346
|
-
|
|
12347
|
-
|
|
12348
|
-
|
|
12349
|
-
return;
|
|
12350
|
-
if (callee.property.type !== "Identifier") return;
|
|
12351
|
-
const method = callee.property.name;
|
|
12352
|
-
let isBody = method === "json";
|
|
12353
|
-
if (!isBody && method === "then") {
|
|
12354
|
-
const cb = arg.arguments[0];
|
|
12355
|
-
if (cb && (cb.type === "ArrowFunctionExpression" || cb.type === "FunctionExpression")) {
|
|
12356
|
-
isBody = /\.json\s*\(/.test(code.slice(nodeStart(cb), nodeEnd(cb)));
|
|
12357
|
-
}
|
|
12358
|
-
}
|
|
12359
|
-
if (!isBody) return;
|
|
12360
|
-
if (decl.node.id.type === "Identifier") names.add(decl.node.id.name);
|
|
12439
|
+
record(decl.node.id, decl.node.init);
|
|
12440
|
+
},
|
|
12441
|
+
// `let data; data = await res.json();` — the same read, not a declaration.
|
|
12442
|
+
AssignmentExpression(assign) {
|
|
12443
|
+
if (assign.node.operator !== "=") return;
|
|
12444
|
+
record(assign.node.left, assign.node.right);
|
|
12361
12445
|
},
|
|
12362
12446
|
// The promise-chain spelling, which is the shipped defect's own:
|
|
12363
12447
|
// fetch(u).then(r => r.json()).then(data => setRows(data.rows || []))
|
|
@@ -12370,26 +12454,24 @@ function parsedBodyBindings(unit, code) {
|
|
|
12370
12454
|
return;
|
|
12371
12455
|
if (callee.property.type !== "Identifier" || callee.property.name !== "then") return;
|
|
12372
12456
|
const receiver = callee.object;
|
|
12373
|
-
if (
|
|
12457
|
+
if (!mentionsJsonParse(receiver, code)) return;
|
|
12374
12458
|
const cb = call.node.arguments[0];
|
|
12375
12459
|
if (!cb) return;
|
|
12376
12460
|
if (cb.type !== "ArrowFunctionExpression" && cb.type !== "FunctionExpression") return;
|
|
12377
12461
|
const param = cb.params[0];
|
|
12378
|
-
if (param
|
|
12462
|
+
if (param) boundNames(param, names);
|
|
12379
12463
|
}
|
|
12380
12464
|
});
|
|
12381
12465
|
return names;
|
|
12382
12466
|
}
|
|
12383
12467
|
function derivesFromParsedBody(node, bodies, code) {
|
|
12384
|
-
let cur = node;
|
|
12385
|
-
while (cur.type === "MemberExpression" || cur.type === "OptionalMemberExpression") {
|
|
12386
|
-
cur = cur.object;
|
|
12468
|
+
let cur = unwrap(node);
|
|
12469
|
+
while (cur && (cur.type === "MemberExpression" || cur.type === "OptionalMemberExpression")) {
|
|
12470
|
+
cur = unwrap(cur.object);
|
|
12387
12471
|
}
|
|
12388
12472
|
if (cur.type === "Identifier") return bodies.has(cur.name);
|
|
12389
|
-
if (cur.type === "AwaitExpression"
|
|
12390
|
-
|
|
12391
|
-
}
|
|
12392
|
-
return false;
|
|
12473
|
+
if (cur.type === "AwaitExpression") cur = unwrap(cur.argument);
|
|
12474
|
+
return chainParsesBody(cur, code);
|
|
12393
12475
|
}
|
|
12394
12476
|
function emptyFallbackArgument(node) {
|
|
12395
12477
|
if (node.type !== "LogicalExpression") return null;
|
|
@@ -12431,7 +12513,7 @@ var failedReadEmptyState = {
|
|
|
12431
12513
|
category: "Correctness",
|
|
12432
12514
|
description: "This loader turns a failed or unexpected response into an empty list and renders it, so the page shows the same thing it would show a brand-new account: no sessions, no scans, no members. Nothing tells the user the request failed, and anything they do next \u2014 including saving \u2014 acts on data the app never actually received.",
|
|
12433
12515
|
fix: "Check the response before using it: on a non-2xx, or a body without the field you expected, set an error state and render that instead of the empty state. Keep the `|| []` only for a response you have already confirmed arrived.",
|
|
12434
|
-
precisionNotes: "Client files only, and only a unit containing the literal global `fetch(` \u2014 throwing clients (ky, wretch, ofetch) reject on non-2xx, so `|| []` after them is correct, and in-file wrappers that check `.ok` and rethrow leave their callers containing no `fetch(` at all. The empty fallback must be `|| []`/`?? []`/`{}` over a PROPERTY READ passed straight to a `setX` state setter: `setRows(rows || [])` defaults a value the component already holds, and a pure helper's argument is never rendered. The unit is the effect callback, or the outermost non-component function \u2014 the nearest function cannot see the `.catch` below it, and the whole component would let an unrelated toast.error exonerate a broken loader. Exoneration is QA002's ERROR_PATH_SIGNALS with `.catch(` REMOVED: for a write a `.catch` means the author handled it, for a read `.catch(() => setLoaded(true))` is the defect itself. The defaulted value must come from a body the unit itself parsed \u2014 `await res.json()`, a `.then` off a receiver containing `.json(`, or the inline `(await res.json()).rows` \u2014 because a unit can hold more than one read, and a nearby real fetch was found satisfying the clause for a fallback belonging to a throwing helper. Measured at 6 fires over 5 sites in 437 .tsx files with zero false positives, then across 168 third-party repositories
|
|
12516
|
+
precisionNotes: "Client files only, and only a unit containing the literal global `fetch(` \u2014 throwing clients (ky, wretch, ofetch) reject on non-2xx, so `|| []` after them is correct, and in-file wrappers that check `.ok` and rethrow leave their callers containing no `fetch(` at all. The empty fallback must be `|| []`/`?? []`/`{}` over a PROPERTY READ passed straight to a `setX` state setter: `setRows(rows || [])` defaults a value the component already holds, and a pure helper's argument is never rendered. The unit is the effect callback, or the outermost non-component function \u2014 the nearest function cannot see the `.catch` below it, and the whole component would let an unrelated toast.error exonerate a broken loader. Exoneration is QA002's ERROR_PATH_SIGNALS with `.catch(` REMOVED: for a write a `.catch` means the author handled it, for a read `.catch(() => setLoaded(true))` is the defect itself. The defaulted value must come from a body the unit itself parsed \u2014 `await res.json()`, a `.then` off a receiver containing `.json(`, or the inline `(await res.json()).rows` \u2014 because a unit can hold more than one read, and a nearby real fetch was found satisfying the clause for a fallback belonging to a throwing helper. Measured at 6 fires over 5 sites in 437 .tsx files with zero false positives, then across 168 third-party repositories: 8 fires over 5 of them, every one re-read in full and every one real. That is a precision result, not a recall one \u2014 the client files those repositories hold are about a third of them, and the parsed-body clause recognised only one spelling of the read at the time it was measured.",
|
|
12435
12517
|
check(ctx) {
|
|
12436
12518
|
const hits = [];
|
|
12437
12519
|
for (const file of ctx.files) {
|
|
@@ -12439,16 +12521,18 @@ var failedReadEmptyState = {
|
|
|
12439
12521
|
if (!file.isClient) continue;
|
|
12440
12522
|
if (file.isServer) continue;
|
|
12441
12523
|
if (/^\s*["']use server["']/m.test(file.code)) continue;
|
|
12524
|
+
if (!file.code.includes("fetch")) continue;
|
|
12442
12525
|
const parsed = file.parsed;
|
|
12443
12526
|
if (!parsed) continue;
|
|
12444
|
-
const
|
|
12527
|
+
const examined = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
|
|
12445
12528
|
traverse4(parsed.ast, {
|
|
12446
12529
|
CallExpression(path) {
|
|
12447
12530
|
if (!isFetchCallee(path.node.callee)) return;
|
|
12448
12531
|
const unit = unitFor(path);
|
|
12449
12532
|
if (!unit) return;
|
|
12450
12533
|
const start = nodeStart(unit.node);
|
|
12451
|
-
if (
|
|
12534
|
+
if (examined.has(start)) return;
|
|
12535
|
+
examined.add(start);
|
|
12452
12536
|
const unitSource = file.code.slice(start, nodeEnd(unit.node));
|
|
12453
12537
|
if (READ_ERROR_PATH_SIGNALS.some((re) => re.test(unitSource))) return;
|
|
12454
12538
|
const bodies = parsedBodyBindings(unit, file.code);
|
|
@@ -12467,7 +12551,6 @@ var failedReadEmptyState = {
|
|
|
12467
12551
|
}
|
|
12468
12552
|
});
|
|
12469
12553
|
if (!hit) return;
|
|
12470
|
-
reported.add(start);
|
|
12471
12554
|
const { line, setter } = hit;
|
|
12472
12555
|
hits.push({
|
|
12473
12556
|
file: file.path,
|
|
@@ -12484,6 +12567,20 @@ var failedReadEmptyState = {
|
|
|
12484
12567
|
// src/quality/rules/autosave-armed-by-failed-load.ts
|
|
12485
12568
|
import _traverse5 from "@babel/traverse";
|
|
12486
12569
|
var traverse5 = typeof _traverse5 === "function" ? _traverse5 : _traverse5.default;
|
|
12570
|
+
function writerTouchesEmptyState(writers) {
|
|
12571
|
+
for (const writer of writers) {
|
|
12572
|
+
let found = false;
|
|
12573
|
+
writer.traverse({
|
|
12574
|
+
Identifier(id) {
|
|
12575
|
+
if (found) return;
|
|
12576
|
+
if (!id.isReferencedIdentifier()) return;
|
|
12577
|
+
if (isEmptyInitial(useStateBinding(id, id.node.name)?.initial)) found = true;
|
|
12578
|
+
}
|
|
12579
|
+
});
|
|
12580
|
+
if (found) return true;
|
|
12581
|
+
}
|
|
12582
|
+
return false;
|
|
12583
|
+
}
|
|
12487
12584
|
var PERSISTENT_WRITE = /\bfetch\s*\([^)]{0,400}?method\s*:\s*["'`](?:POST|PUT|PATCH)["'`]|\blocalStorage\s*\.\s*setItem\s*\(|\bsessionStorage\s*\.\s*setItem\s*\(/is;
|
|
12488
12585
|
var EMPTY_INITIAL = /\buseState\s*(?:<[^>]*>)?\s*\(\s*(?:\[\s*\]|\{\s*\}|""|''|``)\s*\)/;
|
|
12489
12586
|
function calleeIdentifier(node) {
|
|
@@ -12540,32 +12637,14 @@ var autosaveArmedByFailedLoad = {
|
|
|
12540
12637
|
category: "Correctness",
|
|
12541
12638
|
description: "The flag that permits this component to write the user's state back is set in a `finally`, so a load that failed arms it exactly like one that succeeded \u2014 while the component is still holding the empty values it initialised with. Opening the page during a blip is enough to write those empties over whatever the user had saved, and the write looks like any other.",
|
|
12542
12639
|
fix: "Set the arming flag on the success path only, and record the failure in its own state. The component can stay readable and interactive; it just must not write anything back until a load actually succeeds.",
|
|
12543
|
-
precisionNotes: 'Fires on the ARMING, not on a missing guard: the shipped defect had a guard (`if (stateLoaded && !stateLoadFailed) saveState()`), and a rule keyed on unguarded writes would have missed it while reporting every correct autosave. Requires all of: a client file; a `useEffect` whose body reaches a persistent write (fetch with POST/PUT/PATCH, or localStorage/sessionStorage.setItem) either directly or through a same-file callback it names; that write gated on an identifier; a `set<Identifier>` for that same identifier called inside a `finally` block; and at least one `useState` in the file initialised to an empty literal \u2014 `[]`, `{}` or `""`, never `0`, because the empty literal is what turns "wrote too early" into "erased what was there". The join between the finally-set flag and the write\'s guard is the whole narrowing: `finally { setLoading(false) }` is everywhere and correct, and is only reportable when that same flag is what permits the write. The value matters too \u2014 a `finally` that sets the flag back to the literal `useState` started it as is a reset and cannot arm anything, which is what separates this from the hundreds of correct `finally` blocks around it. Measured across 168 third-party repositories
|
|
12640
|
+
precisionNotes: 'Fires on the ARMING, not on a missing guard: the shipped defect had a guard (`if (stateLoaded && !stateLoadFailed) saveState()`), and a rule keyed on unguarded writes would have missed it while reporting every correct autosave. Requires all of: a client file; a `useEffect` whose body reaches a persistent write (fetch with POST/PUT/PATCH, or localStorage/sessionStorage.setItem) either directly or through a same-file callback it names; that write gated on an identifier; a `set<Identifier>` for that same identifier called inside a `finally` block; and at least one `useState` in the file initialised to an empty literal \u2014 `[]`, `{}` or `""`, never `0`, because the empty literal is what turns "wrote too early" into "erased what was there". The join between the finally-set flag and the write\'s guard is the whole narrowing: `finally { setLoading(false) }` is everywhere and correct, and is only reportable when that same flag is what permits the write. The value matters too \u2014 a `finally` that sets the flag back to the literal `useState` started it as is a reset and cannot arm anything, which is what separates this from the hundreds of correct `finally` blocks around it. Measured across 168 third-party repositories: 0 fires. The denominator is the client files among them, not the whole corpus.',
|
|
12544
12641
|
check(ctx) {
|
|
12545
12642
|
const hits = [];
|
|
12546
12643
|
for (const file of ctx.files) {
|
|
12547
|
-
if (file
|
|
12548
|
-
if (!file.isClient) continue;
|
|
12549
|
-
if (file.isServer) continue;
|
|
12644
|
+
if (!isClientTarget(file)) continue;
|
|
12550
12645
|
const parsed = file.parsed;
|
|
12551
12646
|
if (!parsed) continue;
|
|
12552
12647
|
if (!EMPTY_INITIAL.test(file.code)) continue;
|
|
12553
|
-
const initialValues = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
|
|
12554
|
-
traverse5(parsed.ast, {
|
|
12555
|
-
VariableDeclarator(decl) {
|
|
12556
|
-
const id = decl.node.id;
|
|
12557
|
-
const init = decl.node.init;
|
|
12558
|
-
if (!id || id.type !== "ArrayPattern") return;
|
|
12559
|
-
if (!init || init.type !== "CallExpression") return;
|
|
12560
|
-
const callee = init.callee;
|
|
12561
|
-
const name = callee.type === "Identifier" ? callee.name : callee.type === "MemberExpression" && callee.property.type === "Identifier" ? callee.property.name : null;
|
|
12562
|
-
if (name !== "useState") return;
|
|
12563
|
-
const first = id.elements[0];
|
|
12564
|
-
const arg = init.arguments[0];
|
|
12565
|
-
if (!first || first.type !== "Identifier" || !arg) return;
|
|
12566
|
-
initialValues.set(first.name, arg);
|
|
12567
|
-
}
|
|
12568
|
-
});
|
|
12569
12648
|
const armedInFinally = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
|
|
12570
12649
|
traverse5(parsed.ast, {
|
|
12571
12650
|
TryStatement(path) {
|
|
@@ -12577,29 +12656,32 @@ var autosaveArmedByFailedLoad = {
|
|
|
12577
12656
|
if (!name) return;
|
|
12578
12657
|
const state = stateFromSetter(name);
|
|
12579
12658
|
if (!state) return;
|
|
12580
|
-
if (setsBackToInitial(call.node,
|
|
12659
|
+
if (setsBackToInitial(call.node, useStateBinding(call, state)?.initial)) return;
|
|
12581
12660
|
armedInFinally.set(state, nodeStart(call.node));
|
|
12582
12661
|
}
|
|
12583
12662
|
});
|
|
12584
12663
|
}
|
|
12585
12664
|
});
|
|
12586
12665
|
if (armedInFinally.size === 0) continue;
|
|
12587
|
-
const writingFunctions = /* @__PURE__ */ new
|
|
12666
|
+
const writingFunctions = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
|
|
12588
12667
|
traverse5(parsed.ast, {
|
|
12589
12668
|
Function(path) {
|
|
12590
12669
|
const src = file.code.slice(nodeStart(path.node), nodeEnd(path.node));
|
|
12591
12670
|
if (!PERSISTENT_WRITE.test(src)) return;
|
|
12671
|
+
const deps = [];
|
|
12592
12672
|
let owner = path.parentPath;
|
|
12593
12673
|
for (let hops = 0; owner && hops < 3; hops++, owner = owner.parentPath) {
|
|
12594
12674
|
const node = owner.node;
|
|
12595
12675
|
if (node.type === "VariableDeclarator" && node.id.type === "Identifier") {
|
|
12596
|
-
writingFunctions.
|
|
12676
|
+
writingFunctions.set(node.id.name, [path, ...deps]);
|
|
12597
12677
|
break;
|
|
12598
12678
|
}
|
|
12599
12679
|
if (node.type !== "CallExpression") break;
|
|
12680
|
+
const depArg = owner.get("arguments.1");
|
|
12681
|
+
if (depArg && depArg.node) deps.push(depArg);
|
|
12600
12682
|
}
|
|
12601
12683
|
const n = path.node;
|
|
12602
|
-
if (n.id && n.id.name) writingFunctions.
|
|
12684
|
+
if (n.id && n.id.name) writingFunctions.set(n.id.name, [path, ...deps]);
|
|
12603
12685
|
}
|
|
12604
12686
|
});
|
|
12605
12687
|
const reported = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
|
|
@@ -12611,8 +12693,15 @@ var autosaveArmedByFailedLoad = {
|
|
|
12611
12693
|
const body = file.code.slice(nodeStart(cb.node), nodeEnd(cb.node));
|
|
12612
12694
|
const names = identifiersIn(cb);
|
|
12613
12695
|
const writesDirectly = PERSISTENT_WRITE.test(body);
|
|
12614
|
-
const
|
|
12615
|
-
if (!writesDirectly &&
|
|
12696
|
+
const calledWriters = [...writingFunctions.entries()].filter(([fn]) => names.has(fn)).flatMap(([, paths]) => paths);
|
|
12697
|
+
if (!writesDirectly && calledWriters.length === 0) return;
|
|
12698
|
+
const effectDeps = path.get("arguments.1");
|
|
12699
|
+
const writers = [
|
|
12700
|
+
...writesDirectly ? [cb] : [],
|
|
12701
|
+
...calledWriters,
|
|
12702
|
+
...effectDeps && effectDeps.node ? [effectDeps] : []
|
|
12703
|
+
];
|
|
12704
|
+
if (!writerTouchesEmptyState(writers)) return;
|
|
12616
12705
|
for (const [state, armLine] of armedInFinally) {
|
|
12617
12706
|
if (!names.has(state)) continue;
|
|
12618
12707
|
if (reported.has(state)) continue;
|
|
@@ -12639,7 +12728,7 @@ var DURABLE_WRITE = /\b(?:INSERT\s+INTO\b|UPDATE\s+\w+\s+SET\b|DELETE\s+FROM\b)|
|
|
|
12639
12728
|
var EXTERNAL_MUTATION = /\b\w+\s*\.\s*\w+\s*\.\s*(?:create|send|update|delete|cancel|charge|capture|refund)\s*\(|\bfetch\s*\([^)]{0,300}?method\s*:\s*["'`](?:POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)["'`]/is;
|
|
12640
12729
|
var BOOKKEEPING = /analytics|telemetry|track|metric|event|beacon|log|audit|ping/i;
|
|
12641
12730
|
var DIRECT_ENV_TEST = /\bprocess\s*\.\s*env\b|\bDeno\s*\.\s*env\s*\.\s*get\s*\(/;
|
|
12642
|
-
function
|
|
12731
|
+
function calleeName4(node) {
|
|
12643
12732
|
if (node.type !== "CallExpression") return null;
|
|
12644
12733
|
const c = node.callee;
|
|
12645
12734
|
if (c.type === "Identifier") return c.name;
|
|
@@ -12661,11 +12750,11 @@ function successPayloadShape(ret, source, offset) {
|
|
|
12661
12750
|
if (!arg || arg.type !== "CallExpression") return null;
|
|
12662
12751
|
const text = source.slice(nodeStart(ret) - offset, nodeEnd(ret) - offset);
|
|
12663
12752
|
if (/status\s*:\s*[45]\d\d|,\s*\{\s*status\s*:\s*[45]\d\d/.test(text)) return null;
|
|
12664
|
-
const name =
|
|
12753
|
+
const name = calleeName4(arg);
|
|
12665
12754
|
if (name !== "json" && name !== "Response" && name !== "NextResponse") return null;
|
|
12666
12755
|
const first = arg.arguments[0];
|
|
12667
12756
|
if (!first) return null;
|
|
12668
|
-
if (first.type === "CallExpression" &&
|
|
12757
|
+
if (first.type === "CallExpression" && calleeName4(first) === "stringify") {
|
|
12669
12758
|
return keyShape(first.arguments[0]);
|
|
12670
12759
|
}
|
|
12671
12760
|
return keyShape(first);
|
|
@@ -12841,13 +12930,11 @@ var staleResponseWins = {
|
|
|
12841
12930
|
category: "Correctness",
|
|
12842
12931
|
description: "This effect refetches whenever the user changes their selection, and does nothing to cancel the request already in flight. Pick one thing, then another before the first answers, and the first response lands last and wins: the selector says one thing and the panel shows another. Nothing errors, the data is real \u2014 it is just the wrong data, and it stays wrong until the next interaction.",
|
|
12843
12932
|
fix: "Return a cleanup function from the effect that makes the late response a no-op \u2014 set a `cancelled` flag the `.then` checks, or abort the request with an AbortController and pass its `signal` to fetch. React calls the cleanup before it re-runs the effect, which is exactly when the older request becomes irrelevant.",
|
|
12844
|
-
precisionNotes: 'Two clauses came from being wrong. The first draft asked whether the interpolated identifier was ASSIGNED INSIDE THE EFFECT, which an effect-local constant satisfies (`const base = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_API ?? ""`), so it fired on URLs that cannot vary between renders; what matters is that the identifier is DERIVED FROM A DEPENDENCY, since only a dependency can change mid-flight. The second: an identifier REFERENCED AGAIN AFTER the network call is the signature of code that already handles ordering \u2014 the keyed write `setCache(prev => ({ ...prev, [id]: data }))`, where out-of-order arrival is harmless, and the hand-rolled `if (latest.current === id) setScan(data)`, which is a cleanup function written by hand. Neither mentions cancelled/AbortController/signal, so nothing else excludes them. Also required: a non-empty dep array, a literal `fetch(`, a state setter after it, and the dependency must be a useState in this file wired to an onChange \u2014 the strict form, because relaxing it to "or any dep" reopens the child that fetches on a prop whose parent remounts it with a `key`, and that remount is invisible from the child\'s file. Frequency is this rule\'s weak point and is worth stating:
|
|
12933
|
+
precisionNotes: 'Two clauses came from being wrong. The first draft asked whether the interpolated identifier was ASSIGNED INSIDE THE EFFECT, which an effect-local constant satisfies (`const base = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_API ?? ""`), so it fired on URLs that cannot vary between renders; what matters is that the identifier is DERIVED FROM A DEPENDENCY, since only a dependency can change mid-flight. The second: an identifier REFERENCED AGAIN AFTER the network call is the signature of code that already handles ordering \u2014 the keyed write `setCache(prev => ({ ...prev, [id]: data }))`, where out-of-order arrival is harmless, and the hand-rolled `if (latest.current === id) setScan(data)`, which is a cleanup function written by hand. Neither mentions cancelled/AbortController/signal, so nothing else excludes them. Also required: a non-empty dep array, a literal `fetch(`, a state setter after it, and the dependency must be a useState in this file wired to an onChange \u2014 the strict form, because relaxing it to "or any dep" reopens the child that fetches on a prop whose parent remounts it with a `key`, and that remount is invisible from the child\'s file. Frequency is this rule\'s weak point and is worth stating: three distinct defects now, across two codebases \u2014 two in this product, and one found across 168 third-party repositories, verified real, with no false positives beside it. Precise on everything it has been run against; still rare. Shipped at medium for that reason.',
|
|
12845
12934
|
check(ctx) {
|
|
12846
12935
|
const hits = [];
|
|
12847
12936
|
for (const file of ctx.files) {
|
|
12848
|
-
if (file
|
|
12849
|
-
if (!file.isClient) continue;
|
|
12850
|
-
if (file.isServer) continue;
|
|
12937
|
+
if (!isClientTarget(file)) continue;
|
|
12851
12938
|
const parsed = file.parsed;
|
|
12852
12939
|
if (!parsed) continue;
|
|
12853
12940
|
traverse7(parsed.ast, {
|
|
@@ -12892,7 +12979,10 @@ var staleResponseWins = {
|
|
|
12892
12979
|
for (const ident2 of interpolated) {
|
|
12893
12980
|
if (!derivesFromDep(ident2, deps, cb, file.code)) continue;
|
|
12894
12981
|
if (new RegExp(`\\b${ident2}\\b`).test(afterCall)) continue;
|
|
12895
|
-
|
|
12982
|
+
const driving = [...deps].filter(
|
|
12983
|
+
(d) => derivesFromDep(ident2, /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([d]), cb, file.code)
|
|
12984
|
+
);
|
|
12985
|
+
if (!driving.some((d) => userDriven(d, cb))) continue;
|
|
12896
12986
|
hit = { line: lineAt(file.content, nodeStart(inner.node)), ident: ident2 };
|
|
12897
12987
|
return;
|
|
12898
12988
|
}
|
|
@@ -12911,10 +13001,26 @@ var staleResponseWins = {
|
|
|
12911
13001
|
return hits;
|
|
12912
13002
|
}
|
|
12913
13003
|
};
|
|
12914
|
-
function userDriven(dep,
|
|
12915
|
-
const
|
|
12916
|
-
|
|
12917
|
-
|
|
13004
|
+
function userDriven(dep, at) {
|
|
13005
|
+
const binding = useStateBinding(at, dep);
|
|
13006
|
+
const setter = binding?.setter;
|
|
13007
|
+
if (!setter) return false;
|
|
13008
|
+
const owner = binding.decl.getFunctionParent() ?? binding.decl.scope.path;
|
|
13009
|
+
let wired = false;
|
|
13010
|
+
owner.traverse({
|
|
13011
|
+
JSXAttribute(attr) {
|
|
13012
|
+
if (wired) return;
|
|
13013
|
+
const name = attr.node.name;
|
|
13014
|
+
if (name.type !== "JSXIdentifier") return;
|
|
13015
|
+
if (!/^on(?:Change|Click|Input|Select)$/.test(name.name)) return;
|
|
13016
|
+
attr.traverse({
|
|
13017
|
+
Identifier(id) {
|
|
13018
|
+
if (id.node.name === setter) wired = true;
|
|
13019
|
+
}
|
|
13020
|
+
});
|
|
13021
|
+
}
|
|
13022
|
+
});
|
|
13023
|
+
return wired;
|
|
12918
13024
|
}
|
|
12919
13025
|
|
|
12920
13026
|
// src/quality/rules/lost-update-counter.ts
|
|
@@ -13435,8 +13541,8 @@ var qualityRules = [
|
|
|
13435
13541
|
var unmeasuredQualityRules = [
|
|
13436
13542
|
lostUpdateCounter
|
|
13437
13543
|
];
|
|
13438
|
-
function scanQuality(
|
|
13439
|
-
const ctx = buildQualityContext(
|
|
13544
|
+
function scanQuality(input, rules = qualityRules) {
|
|
13545
|
+
const ctx = Array.isArray(input) ? buildQualityContext(input) : input;
|
|
13440
13546
|
const findings = [];
|
|
13441
13547
|
for (const rule of rules) {
|
|
13442
13548
|
let hits;
|
|
@@ -13620,8 +13726,10 @@ export {
|
|
|
13620
13726
|
insecureWebSocket,
|
|
13621
13727
|
ipcPathTraversal,
|
|
13622
13728
|
isCalleeNamed,
|
|
13729
|
+
isClientTarget,
|
|
13623
13730
|
isMethodCall,
|
|
13624
13731
|
isPrivateAddress,
|
|
13732
|
+
isServerTarget,
|
|
13625
13733
|
isVendoredFinding,
|
|
13626
13734
|
isVendoredPath,
|
|
13627
13735
|
javaDeserialization,
|