xploitscan-shared-rules 1.27.0 → 1.27.2
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/index.cjs +34 -3
- package/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +34 -3
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +2 -2
package/dist/index.cjs
CHANGED
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@@ -644,11 +644,17 @@ var NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS = [
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644
644
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// which makes even a repo-root `.claude/` a nested segment.
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".claude/**",
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".agent/**",
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647
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+
// Plural too. `.agent/**` alone let `.agents/skills/**` through as app code,
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648
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// and agent scaffolds ship .tsx templates — so every rule fired on somebody
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649
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// else's boilerplate. Found 2026-09-15 while specifying the unwired-control
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650
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// check, which produced 4 accusations against one such template.
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651
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".agents/**",
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".cursor/**",
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".superpowers/**",
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".windsurf/**",
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"**/.claude/**",
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"**/.agent/**",
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657
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"**/.agents/**",
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"**/.cursor/**",
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"**/.superpowers/**",
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"**/.windsurf/**",
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@@ -2104,6 +2110,7 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
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description: "API routes without authentication checks allow unauthorized access.",
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check(content, filePath, project) {
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if (!isServerSideFile(filePath, content)) return [];
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if (PUBLIC_BY_CONVENTION_ROUTE.test(routeSegmentName(filePath))) return [];
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const routePatterns = [
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// Express/Hono style
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/\.(get|post|put|patch|delete)\s*\(\s*["'`][^"'`]+["'`]\s*,\s*(?:async\s+)?\(?(?:req|c|ctx)/gi,
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@@ -2169,7 +2176,22 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
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/\bjwt\.verify\b/i,
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/\bbearer\s/i,
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/\b(?:protect|guard)\(/i,
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-
/\.use\([^)]*(?:auth|session|protect|requireAuth)/i
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/\.use\([^)]*(?:auth|session|protect|requireAuth)/i,
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// A handler that can answer HTTP 401 is, by definition, deciding whether
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// the caller is allowed in. This catches the whole family of
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// capability-token flows the named patterns above miss — magic links,
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// share links, unsubscribe links, invite/claim URLs — where there is no
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// session and no account, and the unguessable token in the request IS
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// the credential, checked by a bespoke lookup like
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// `findShareByToken(slug, token)`.
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//
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// 401 only, deliberately not 403. 401 means "I could not authenticate
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// you"; 403 is routinely returned by things that never identified the
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// caller at all — an Origin allowlist on an anonymous analytics beacon,
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// a feature flag, a geo block. Accepting 403 would suppress genuinely
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// unauthenticated routes.
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/\bstatus(?:Code)?\s*[:(]\s*401\b/,
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/\bsendStatus\s*\(\s*401\b/
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];
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const APP_LEVEL_AUTH = [
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/\.use\([^)]*(?:auth|session|protect|requireAuth)/i,
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@@ -2229,6 +2251,15 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
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return filterSilenced(unauthenticated, content, "VC003");
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}
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};
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var PUBLIC_BY_CONVENTION_ROUTE = /^(?:og|opengraph-image|twitter-image|icon|apple-icon|favicon|sitemap|robots|manifest|badge)(?:[.-]\w+)?$/i;
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function routeSegmentName(filePath) {
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const segments = filePath.split("/");
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const base = segments[segments.length - 1] ?? "";
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if (/^route\.(?:ts|tsx|js|jsx|mjs|cjs)$/i.test(base)) {
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return segments[segments.length - 2] ?? "";
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}
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return base.replace(/\.[^.]+$/, "");
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}
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var supabaseNoRLS = {
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id: "VC004",
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title: "Supabase Client Without Row Level Security",
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@@ -2762,10 +2793,10 @@ var insecureCookies = {
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check(content, filePath) {
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if (isTestFile(filePath)) return [];
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if (!/cookie/i.test(content)) return [];
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-
const setCookiePattern = /(?:set-cookie|setCookie
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const setCookiePattern = /(?:set-cookie|setCookie|\bcookie\s*=|res\.cookie\s*\()/gi;
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if (!setCookiePattern.test(content)) return [];
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const hasHttpOnly = /httpOnly\s*:\s*true|httponly/i.test(content);
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-
const hasSecure = /secure\s*:\s*
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const hasSecure = /secure\s*:\s*(?!false\b)\S/i.test(content) || /;\s*secure/i.test(content);
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const hasSameSite = /sameSite\s*:|samesite/i.test(content);
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const matches = [];
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if (!hasHttpOnly || !hasSecure || !hasSameSite) {
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