xploitscan-shared-rules 1.23.0 → 1.25.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.d.cts CHANGED
@@ -391,6 +391,206 @@ declare function isVendoredFinding(finding: {
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  */
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  declare function vendoredReason(filePath: string): string | null;
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+ /**
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+ * Route-table extraction — what URL, if any, reaches a given source file.
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+ *
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+ * WHY A SCANNER WANTS THIS. Severity is not a property of a line of code, it is
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+ * a property of who can reach it. A hardcoded secret in
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+ * `src/app/api/webhooks/stripe/route.ts` is reachable by anyone who can send a
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+ * POST; the same secret in a build script is not reachable at all. Nothing in
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+ * the finding itself carries that distinction, and a scanner that only reads
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+ * files cannot invent it.
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+ *
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+ * Attaching a route to a finding turns "hardcoded secret in a file you have to
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+ * go look up" into "hardcoded secret reachable at POST /api/webhooks/stripe".
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+ *
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+ * EVERY GATE BELOW EXISTS BECAUSE IT FIRED. Measured against real repositories:
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+ *
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+ * - `src/pages/*.tsx` is NOT Next routing in a Vite app. Lovable, Bolt and
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+ * Base44 ship a plain `src/pages/` component folder; matching it invented
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+ * 38 phantom routes in one repo, with case-duplicate pairs (/about AND
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+ * /About) and entries like /Index and /NotFound that do not exist.
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+ * - A config file is not a dependency. That same repo carries a stray unused
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+ * `next.config.js` with no `next` in package.json; trusting the file
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+ * re-invented all 38.
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+ * - `app.get("/download", ...)` inside THIS repo's own rule-override examples
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+ * produced phantom Express routes in a package with no express dependency.
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+ * A scanner scanning a scanner finds "routes" in its documentation samples.
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+ * - The homepage went missing from every Next project using `src/`: the
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+ * pattern required `app/<seg>/page.tsx` or a TOP-LEVEL `app/page.tsx`, so
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+ * nested `src/app/page.tsx` matched neither and "/" — the single most
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+ * important route in any app — was silently absent.
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+ *
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+ * A phantom route is worse than a missing one: it attaches a confident, wrong
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+ * URL to a real finding. Hence every framework's conventions are gated on that
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+ * framework actually being a declared dependency.
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+ *
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+ * Accuracy at the time of writing, against hand-counted ground truth:
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+ * Next App Router (this repo's web package) 135/135, "/" included
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+ * React Router (a Lovable app) 40/40, 0 missed, 0 extra
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+ * TanStack Start (a Lovable app) 6/6
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+ * Flask (a Python dashboard) 53/53
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+ */
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+ type RouteFramework = "next-app" | "next-pages" | "react-router" | "tanstack-router" | "flask-fastapi" | "express";
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+ interface AppRoute {
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+ /** URL path, e.g. "/api/webhooks/stripe". */
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+ path: string;
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+ /** `api` is a data endpoint; `page` renders a document. */
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+ kind: "page" | "api";
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+ /** Contains a parameter segment, so it cannot be fetched without a value. */
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+ dynamic: boolean;
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+ framework: RouteFramework;
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+ /** Repo-relative file that declares it. */
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+ source: string;
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+ }
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+ interface RouteTable {
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+ frameworks: RouteFramework[];
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+ routes: AppRoute[];
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+ }
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+ interface SourceFile {
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+ path: string;
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+ content: string;
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Extract every route the given files declare.
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+ *
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+ * Pure: takes file contents, touches no filesystem, so it runs identically in
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+ * the CLI, the API and a test.
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+ */
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+ declare function extractRoutes(files: SourceFile[]): RouteTable;
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+ /**
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+ * The route a given file is reachable at, if any.
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+ *
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+ * Matches on the declaring file only. A helper imported BY a route handler is
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+ * reachable too, but proving that needs an import graph — claiming it from a
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+ * filename match would attach confident, wrong URLs to real findings, which is
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+ * the failure mode every gate above exists to prevent.
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+ */
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+ declare function routeForFile(table: RouteTable, filePath: string): AppRoute | undefined;
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+
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+ /**
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+ * INTENT vs IMPLEMENTATION
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+ *
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+ * Every other scanner answers "is there a known-bad pattern here". This
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+ * answers a different question: "does the code do what its author said it
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+ * would". That question is normally unanswerable by a static tool, because
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+ * intent lives in someone's head.
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+ *
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+ * It does not live only in the head of a vibe-coder. They wrote it down —
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+ * in the prompt, in the README the generator produced, in CLAUDE.md, in
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+ * .cursor/rules. Their spec is on disk. Ours is the one scanner whose users
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+ * reliably have one, which is exactly why nobody else asks for it: a team
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+ * hand-writing code keeps the spec in a ticket, or nowhere.
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+ *
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+ * ── The honesty constraint that shapes the whole design ──────────────────
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+ *
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+ * A mismatch is only ever reported when it can point at a CONCRETE FINDING
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+ * the scanner already produced, with a file and a line. There is no "your
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+ * app might not do this" verdict, and there is no separate auth detector
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+ * living in this file.
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+ *
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+ * That second point matters more than it looks. The obvious implementation
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+ * is to re-detect auth here — and this repo has paid for that mistake
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+ * repeatedly: three copies of calculateGrade, two drifted copies of
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+ * NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, four hand-written copies of the free/Pro split. So
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+ * intent facts are DERIVED FROM THE RULE FINDINGS THEMSELVES. When VC003
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+ * learned handler-scoped auth and four new endpoint shapes, this got those
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+ * for free, and it cannot disagree with the scan sitting next to it.
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+ *
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+ * ── What it does NOT do ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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+ *
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+ * Not dataflow, not cross-file policy analysis, not "CodeQL-grade" anything
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+ * — docs/ROADMAP.md rules those out and it is right to. This reads sentences,
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+ * matches them to endpoints by topic, and asks whether a finding already
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+ * contradicts the sentence. That is a join, not an analysis.
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+ */
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+
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+ type IntentOrigin = "declared" | "agent-instructions" | "readme";
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+ interface IntentStatement {
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+ /** The sentence, trimmed of markdown noise. */
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+ text: string;
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+ /** Repo-relative file it came from. */
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+ source: string;
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+ /** 1-based line. */
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+ line: number;
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+ origin: IntentOrigin;
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Pull candidate intent sentences out of whatever the project wrote down.
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+ *
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+ * Deliberately conservative: only files whose whole purpose is to say what
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+ * the thing does. Scanning every markdown file in docs/ would drown the
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+ * signal in changelogs and ADRs.
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+ */
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+ declare function harvestIntent(files: Array<{
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+ path: string;
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+ content: string;
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+ }>): IntentStatement[];
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+ /**
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+ * A property a sentence claims the code has, and the rule findings that
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+ * prove it does not.
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+ *
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+ * Every `contradictedBy` entry is an existing, fixture-backed rule. Nothing
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+ * here re-implements detection; this table is purely the join between "what
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+ * was promised" and "what the scanner already found".
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+ */
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+ interface IntentExpectation {
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+ id: string;
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+ /** Phrases that assert this property. */
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+ claims: RegExp;
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+ /** Plain-English restatement, shown to the user. */
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+ expectation: string;
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+ /** Rules whose presence disproves the claim. */
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+ contradictedBy: string[];
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+ /** Only applies to endpoints that change state. */
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+ writesOnly?: boolean;
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+ }
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+ declare const INTENT_EXPECTATIONS: IntentExpectation[];
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+ interface IntentMismatch {
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+ /** Stable id for the pairing, so the same mismatch dedupes across runs. */
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+ id: string;
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+ statement: IntentStatement;
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+ expectationId: string;
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+ /** What the sentence implies the code does. */
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+ expectation: string;
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+ /** The findings that say otherwise. Never empty. */
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+ evidence: Finding[];
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+ /** The route the evidence sits on, when one could be identified. */
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+ route?: AppRoute;
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+ /**
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+ * `topic` — the sentence named a subject and a finding landed on a file or
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+ * route matching it. `global` — the sentence quantified over everything
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+ * ("all API routes"), so any contradicting finding counts.
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+ */
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+ basis: "topic" | "global";
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+ message: string;
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+ }
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+ interface IntentReport {
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+ statements: IntentStatement[];
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+ mismatches: IntentMismatch[];
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+ /** Sources that were read, so a user can tell whether we found their spec. */
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+ sources: string[];
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+ /**
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+ * Expectations that matched a sentence and found NO contradiction. This is
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+ * the honest other half: "you said X and nothing in the scan disputes it"
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+ * is a weaker claim than "X is true", and is labelled that way.
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+ */
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+ unchallenged: Array<{
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+ statement: IntentStatement;
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+ expectation: string;
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+ }>;
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Join stated intent against findings the scanner already produced.
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+ *
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+ * `findings` must come from the same scan of the same files — this function
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+ * never re-scans, by design.
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+ */
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+ declare function checkIntent(files: Array<{
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+ path: string;
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+ content: string;
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+ }>, findings: Finding[]): IntentReport;
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+
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  declare const hardcodedSecrets: CustomRule;
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  declare const exposedEnvFile: CustomRule;
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  declare const missingAuthMiddleware: CustomRule;
@@ -647,6 +847,23 @@ declare const insecureDirectObjectReference: CustomRule;
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  declare const freeRules: CustomRule[];
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  declare const allRules: CustomRule[];
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  declare const allCustomRules: CustomRule[];
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+ /**
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+ * Every rule that is NOT in the free tier, derived — never hand-listed.
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+ *
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+ * `runCustomRules()` always runs `freeRules` internally; its `extraRules`
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+ * argument is how a caller adds the rest. Passing `allCustomRules` there
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+ * therefore runs the 30 free rules TWICE, and every free-tier finding is
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+ * reported twice. That is exactly what the MCP server and the VS Code
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+ * extension were doing — both shipped, on npm and the Marketplace — while
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+ * the CLI passed the complement and was correct.
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+ *
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+ * The free/Pro split had been restated in three places by hand: this file's
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+ * `freeRules`, a literal ID Set in scripts/vsi/vsi-lib.cjs, and a 184-entry
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+ * import list in packages/cli/src/pro-bundle-entry.ts. Deriving it once is
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+ * the fix the repo keeps re-learning — a shared value makes the drift
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+ * unexpressible, where a guard only catches it afterwards.
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+ */
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+ declare const proOnlyRules: CustomRule[];
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  declare function runCustomRules(content: string, filePath: string, disabledRules?: string[], tier?: "free" | "pro", extraRules?: CustomRule[],
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  /**
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  * Cross-file facts for the project being scanned, from
@@ -757,83 +974,6 @@ declare function scanEntropy(files: {
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  content: string;
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  }[]): Finding[];
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- /**
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- * Route-table extraction — what URL, if any, reaches a given source file.
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- *
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- * WHY A SCANNER WANTS THIS. Severity is not a property of a line of code, it is
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- * a property of who can reach it. A hardcoded secret in
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- * `src/app/api/webhooks/stripe/route.ts` is reachable by anyone who can send a
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- * POST; the same secret in a build script is not reachable at all. Nothing in
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- * the finding itself carries that distinction, and a scanner that only reads
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- * files cannot invent it.
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- *
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- * Attaching a route to a finding turns "hardcoded secret in a file you have to
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- * go look up" into "hardcoded secret reachable at POST /api/webhooks/stripe".
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- *
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- * EVERY GATE BELOW EXISTS BECAUSE IT FIRED. Measured against real repositories:
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- *
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- * - `src/pages/*.tsx` is NOT Next routing in a Vite app. Lovable, Bolt and
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- * Base44 ship a plain `src/pages/` component folder; matching it invented
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- * 38 phantom routes in one repo, with case-duplicate pairs (/about AND
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- * /About) and entries like /Index and /NotFound that do not exist.
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- * - A config file is not a dependency. That same repo carries a stray unused
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- * `next.config.js` with no `next` in package.json; trusting the file
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- * re-invented all 38.
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- * - `app.get("/download", ...)` inside THIS repo's own rule-override examples
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- * produced phantom Express routes in a package with no express dependency.
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- * A scanner scanning a scanner finds "routes" in its documentation samples.
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- * - The homepage went missing from every Next project using `src/`: the
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- * pattern required `app/<seg>/page.tsx` or a TOP-LEVEL `app/page.tsx`, so
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- * nested `src/app/page.tsx` matched neither and "/" — the single most
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- * important route in any app — was silently absent.
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- *
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- * A phantom route is worse than a missing one: it attaches a confident, wrong
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- * URL to a real finding. Hence every framework's conventions are gated on that
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- * framework actually being a declared dependency.
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- *
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- * Accuracy at the time of writing, against hand-counted ground truth:
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- * Next App Router (this repo's web package) 135/135, "/" included
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- * React Router (a Lovable app) 40/40, 0 missed, 0 extra
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- * TanStack Start (a Lovable app) 6/6
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- * Flask (a Python dashboard) 53/53
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- */
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- type RouteFramework = "next-app" | "next-pages" | "react-router" | "tanstack-router" | "flask-fastapi" | "express";
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- interface AppRoute {
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- /** URL path, e.g. "/api/webhooks/stripe". */
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- path: string;
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- /** `api` is a data endpoint; `page` renders a document. */
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- kind: "page" | "api";
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- /** Contains a parameter segment, so it cannot be fetched without a value. */
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- dynamic: boolean;
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- framework: RouteFramework;
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- /** Repo-relative file that declares it. */
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- source: string;
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- }
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- interface RouteTable {
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- frameworks: RouteFramework[];
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- routes: AppRoute[];
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- }
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- interface SourceFile {
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- path: string;
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- content: string;
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- }
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- /**
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- * Extract every route the given files declare.
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- *
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- * Pure: takes file contents, touches no filesystem, so it runs identically in
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- * the CLI, the API and a test.
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- */
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- declare function extractRoutes(files: SourceFile[]): RouteTable;
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- /**
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- * The route a given file is reachable at, if any.
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- *
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- * Matches on the declaring file only. A helper imported BY a route handler is
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- * reachable too, but proving that needs an import graph — claiming it from a
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- * filename match would attach confident, wrong URLs to real findings, which is
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- * the failure mode every gate above exists to prevent.
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- */
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- declare function routeForFile(table: RouteTable, filePath: string): AppRoute | undefined;
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-
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  /**
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  * URL recon — what can be learned about a deployed app from what it already
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  * serves the public.
@@ -1063,4 +1203,4 @@ declare function getObjectProperty(node: ObjectExpression, key: string): {
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  /** Does this CallExpression spread an expression `matcher` returns true for? */
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  declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => boolean): boolean;
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- export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildProjectContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
1206
+ export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, INTENT_EXPECTATIONS, type IntentExpectation, type IntentMismatch, type IntentOrigin, type IntentReport, type IntentStatement, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildProjectContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, checkIntent, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, harvestIntent, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, proOnlyRules, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };