xploitscan-shared-rules 1.21.0 → 1.23.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/index.cjs +127 -20
- package/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.cts +141 -3
- package/dist/index.d.ts +141 -3
- package/dist/index.js +119 -20
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.cts
CHANGED
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@@ -1,6 +1,62 @@
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import { ParseResult } from '@babel/parser';
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import { File, Node, CallExpression, ObjectExpression, BinaryExpression } from '@babel/types';
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/**
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* Cross-file facts a rule cannot learn from the file it is scanning.
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*
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* Rules are deliberately single-file: `check(content, filePath)` sees one file
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* and nothing else. That keeps them fast, order-independent and honest about
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* what they can prove, and it is the right default. But some questions are
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* genuinely answered in a different file, and answering them by guessing from
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* the current one is worse than not answering at all.
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*
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* ProjectContext is the narrow exception: a small set of facts computed ONCE
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* over the whole file list before any rule runs, then handed to every rule.
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* It is intentionally not "here is every file" — that would let rules re-parse
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* the project 214 times and quietly become a cross-file analyser, which the
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* roadmap explicitly rules out as an unwinnable race against CodeQL.
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*
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* Every field is optional and every consumer must behave correctly when the
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* context is absent, because most callers (the MCP server, the VS Code
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* extension, single-file scans) have no project to build one from.
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*/
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/** Parsed facts about the project being scanned. */
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interface ProjectContext {
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/**
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* Supabase Edge Functions and whether the PLATFORM verifies a JWT before
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* the function runs, from `supabase/config.toml`. Keyed by function name —
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* the directory under `supabase/functions/`.
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*
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* A missing entry means "not declared", which is not the same as false:
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* Supabase's own default is `verify_jwt = true`, but a function absent from
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* config.toml may simply be undeclared, so callers must treat absent as
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* unknown rather than assuming either way.
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*/
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supabaseEdgeVerifyJwt?: Map<string, boolean>;
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}
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/**
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* Parse `supabase/config.toml` for per-function `verify_jwt` settings.
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*
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* Deliberately a line scanner rather than a TOML parser. Only two constructs
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* matter, adding a TOML dependency to a package that ships in a browser bundle
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* is a poor trade for that, and a malformed config should yield fewer facts
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* rather than an exception during a scan.
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*/
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declare function parseSupabaseConfig(toml: string): Map<string, boolean>;
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/** The function name for a path under `supabase/functions/<name>/…`. */
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declare function supabaseFunctionName(filePath: string): string | null;
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/**
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* Build the context from the files about to be scanned.
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*
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* Cheap by construction: it reads a fixed, tiny set of paths rather than
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* walking content, so adding a fact here costs one more lookup, not another
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* pass over the project.
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*/
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declare function buildProjectContext(files: Array<{
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path: string;
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content: string;
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}>): ProjectContext;
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type Severity = "critical" | "high" | "medium" | "low" | "info";
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type Confidence = "high" | "medium" | "low";
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interface Finding {
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@@ -66,13 +122,21 @@ interface RuleMatch {
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snippet: string;
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fix?: string;
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}
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interface CustomRule {
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id: string;
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title: string;
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severity: Severity;
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category: string;
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description: string;
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-
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/**
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* Optional third argument: cross-file facts computed once per scan. Optional
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* on purpose — every existing rule ignores it and still satisfies this type,
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* and every caller that has no project (single-file scans, the MCP server,
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* the editor extension) can omit it. A rule that uses it must behave
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* correctly when it is undefined.
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*/
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check: (content: string, filePath: string, project?: ProjectContext) => RuleMatch[];
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}
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/**
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@@ -81,6 +145,73 @@ interface CustomRule {
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*/
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declare function getSnippet(content: string, line: number, contextLines?: number): string;
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/**
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* Claude model IDs — the single place they are written down.
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*
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* There used to be three copies of "which model do we call", in three
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* packages, each with its own literal. One of them (`ai-analyzer.ts`) sat on
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* `claude-sonnet-4-5-20250514` for long enough that the model went two
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* generations stale without anyone noticing, because nothing in the repo
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* pointed at it. That is the same duplication defect that produced three
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* copies of `calculateGrade` and two of `NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS`.
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*
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* The lesson recorded in docs/BACKLOG.md applies exactly:
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* "Import, don't restate — a shared function makes drift unexpressible,
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* whereas a guard only catches it afterwards."
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*
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* So: import from here. `scripts/check-model-ids.js` fails CI on any Claude
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* model literal written anywhere else, and on a stale review date below.
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*/
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/**
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* Deep analysis — open-ended discovery over up to 50KB of source at a time.
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*
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* Why Sonnet and not Haiku: this call *invents* findings rather than judging
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* ones it was handed, and whatever it returns is pushed onto the finding list
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* that `calculateGrade()` scores. A wrong finding here becomes a wrong letter
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* grade shown to someone who, by construction, cannot tell a bogus finding
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* from a real one — the audience is non-expert developers. It also runs on the
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* *user's* own ANTHROPIC_API_KEY in the CLI (see `analyzeWithAI`), so the
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* cost of the stronger model is not ours to optimise away.
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*/
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declare const MODEL_ANALYSIS = "claude-sonnet-5";
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/**
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* High-volume narrow judgment — "is this specific finding a false positive?"
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* and "answer this questionnaire item from these facts".
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*
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* Haiku is the right tier: the task is bounded, the finding is handed to the
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* model rather than discovered by it, and the call count scales with findings
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* (one per file batch, many per scan). Pinned to a dated release deliberately
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* — this one runs on OUR key against user-visible output, and a silent model
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* swap underneath a filter that can *hide* a real vulnerability is not a
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* change we want to arrive unannounced.
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*/
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declare const MODEL_TRIAGE = "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001";
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/**
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* Last time a human checked these against the current model line-up.
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*
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* `scripts/check-model-ids.js` FAILS once this is more than
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* MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS old. That is deliberate: a warning in CI is a
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* warning nobody reads, and "we fell two generations behind without noticing"
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* is the exact failure this module exists to prevent.
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*
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* To clear it: re-read https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/about-claude/models,
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* update the IDs above if the line-up moved, and set today's date here.
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*/
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declare const MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED = "2026-09-15";
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/** How long a review stays fresh before CI asks for another one. */
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declare const MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS = 180;
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/**
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* Sampling is pinned to 0 at every call site, and extended thinking is
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* deliberately NOT enabled at any of them.
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*
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* Both follow from the same requirement: a user who scans the same unchanged
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* commit twice must get the same letter grade, with no explanation needed for
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* why it moved. Extended thinking requires temperature 1, so enabling it
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* would trade that guarantee away. If a future call site does not feed a
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* grade, it is free to make the opposite choice — but it should say so.
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*/
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declare const MODEL_TEMPERATURE = 0;
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/**
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* Real-world consequence descriptions for VC### rules.
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*
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@@ -516,7 +647,14 @@ declare const insecureDirectObjectReference: CustomRule;
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declare const freeRules: CustomRule[];
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declare const allRules: CustomRule[];
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declare const allCustomRules: CustomRule[];
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declare function runCustomRules(content: string, filePath: string, disabledRules?: string[], tier?: "free" | "pro", extraRules?: CustomRule[]
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declare function runCustomRules(content: string, filePath: string, disabledRules?: string[], tier?: "free" | "pro", extraRules?: CustomRule[],
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/**
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* Cross-file facts for the project being scanned, from
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* buildProjectContext(). Optional: callers that scan a single file with no
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* project around it (the MCP server, the editor extension, a pasted
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* snippet) pass nothing, and every rule must still work.
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*/
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project?: ProjectContext): Finding[];
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/**
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* Rule-set sizes as plain numbers, importable without dragging the rules in.
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@@ -925,4 +1063,4 @@ declare function getObjectProperty(node: ObjectExpression, key: string): {
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/** Does this CallExpression spread an expression `matcher` returns true for? */
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declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => boolean): boolean;
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export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
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export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildProjectContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
|
package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,62 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { ParseResult } from '@babel/parser';
|
|
2
2
|
import { File, Node, CallExpression, ObjectExpression, BinaryExpression } from '@babel/types';
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
|
+
/**
|
|
5
|
+
* Cross-file facts a rule cannot learn from the file it is scanning.
|
|
6
|
+
*
|
|
7
|
+
* Rules are deliberately single-file: `check(content, filePath)` sees one file
|
|
8
|
+
* and nothing else. That keeps them fast, order-independent and honest about
|
|
9
|
+
* what they can prove, and it is the right default. But some questions are
|
|
10
|
+
* genuinely answered in a different file, and answering them by guessing from
|
|
11
|
+
* the current one is worse than not answering at all.
|
|
12
|
+
*
|
|
13
|
+
* ProjectContext is the narrow exception: a small set of facts computed ONCE
|
|
14
|
+
* over the whole file list before any rule runs, then handed to every rule.
|
|
15
|
+
* It is intentionally not "here is every file" — that would let rules re-parse
|
|
16
|
+
* the project 214 times and quietly become a cross-file analyser, which the
|
|
17
|
+
* roadmap explicitly rules out as an unwinnable race against CodeQL.
|
|
18
|
+
*
|
|
19
|
+
* Every field is optional and every consumer must behave correctly when the
|
|
20
|
+
* context is absent, because most callers (the MCP server, the VS Code
|
|
21
|
+
* extension, single-file scans) have no project to build one from.
|
|
22
|
+
*/
|
|
23
|
+
/** Parsed facts about the project being scanned. */
|
|
24
|
+
interface ProjectContext {
|
|
25
|
+
/**
|
|
26
|
+
* Supabase Edge Functions and whether the PLATFORM verifies a JWT before
|
|
27
|
+
* the function runs, from `supabase/config.toml`. Keyed by function name —
|
|
28
|
+
* the directory under `supabase/functions/`.
|
|
29
|
+
*
|
|
30
|
+
* A missing entry means "not declared", which is not the same as false:
|
|
31
|
+
* Supabase's own default is `verify_jwt = true`, but a function absent from
|
|
32
|
+
* config.toml may simply be undeclared, so callers must treat absent as
|
|
33
|
+
* unknown rather than assuming either way.
|
|
34
|
+
*/
|
|
35
|
+
supabaseEdgeVerifyJwt?: Map<string, boolean>;
|
|
36
|
+
}
|
|
37
|
+
/**
|
|
38
|
+
* Parse `supabase/config.toml` for per-function `verify_jwt` settings.
|
|
39
|
+
*
|
|
40
|
+
* Deliberately a line scanner rather than a TOML parser. Only two constructs
|
|
41
|
+
* matter, adding a TOML dependency to a package that ships in a browser bundle
|
|
42
|
+
* is a poor trade for that, and a malformed config should yield fewer facts
|
|
43
|
+
* rather than an exception during a scan.
|
|
44
|
+
*/
|
|
45
|
+
declare function parseSupabaseConfig(toml: string): Map<string, boolean>;
|
|
46
|
+
/** The function name for a path under `supabase/functions/<name>/…`. */
|
|
47
|
+
declare function supabaseFunctionName(filePath: string): string | null;
|
|
48
|
+
/**
|
|
49
|
+
* Build the context from the files about to be scanned.
|
|
50
|
+
*
|
|
51
|
+
* Cheap by construction: it reads a fixed, tiny set of paths rather than
|
|
52
|
+
* walking content, so adding a fact here costs one more lookup, not another
|
|
53
|
+
* pass over the project.
|
|
54
|
+
*/
|
|
55
|
+
declare function buildProjectContext(files: Array<{
|
|
56
|
+
path: string;
|
|
57
|
+
content: string;
|
|
58
|
+
}>): ProjectContext;
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
4
60
|
type Severity = "critical" | "high" | "medium" | "low" | "info";
|
|
5
61
|
type Confidence = "high" | "medium" | "low";
|
|
6
62
|
interface Finding {
|
|
@@ -66,13 +122,21 @@ interface RuleMatch {
|
|
|
66
122
|
snippet: string;
|
|
67
123
|
fix?: string;
|
|
68
124
|
}
|
|
125
|
+
|
|
69
126
|
interface CustomRule {
|
|
70
127
|
id: string;
|
|
71
128
|
title: string;
|
|
72
129
|
severity: Severity;
|
|
73
130
|
category: string;
|
|
74
131
|
description: string;
|
|
75
|
-
|
|
132
|
+
/**
|
|
133
|
+
* Optional third argument: cross-file facts computed once per scan. Optional
|
|
134
|
+
* on purpose — every existing rule ignores it and still satisfies this type,
|
|
135
|
+
* and every caller that has no project (single-file scans, the MCP server,
|
|
136
|
+
* the editor extension) can omit it. A rule that uses it must behave
|
|
137
|
+
* correctly when it is undefined.
|
|
138
|
+
*/
|
|
139
|
+
check: (content: string, filePath: string, project?: ProjectContext) => RuleMatch[];
|
|
76
140
|
}
|
|
77
141
|
|
|
78
142
|
/**
|
|
@@ -81,6 +145,73 @@ interface CustomRule {
|
|
|
81
145
|
*/
|
|
82
146
|
declare function getSnippet(content: string, line: number, contextLines?: number): string;
|
|
83
147
|
|
|
148
|
+
/**
|
|
149
|
+
* Claude model IDs — the single place they are written down.
|
|
150
|
+
*
|
|
151
|
+
* There used to be three copies of "which model do we call", in three
|
|
152
|
+
* packages, each with its own literal. One of them (`ai-analyzer.ts`) sat on
|
|
153
|
+
* `claude-sonnet-4-5-20250514` for long enough that the model went two
|
|
154
|
+
* generations stale without anyone noticing, because nothing in the repo
|
|
155
|
+
* pointed at it. That is the same duplication defect that produced three
|
|
156
|
+
* copies of `calculateGrade` and two of `NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS`.
|
|
157
|
+
*
|
|
158
|
+
* The lesson recorded in docs/BACKLOG.md applies exactly:
|
|
159
|
+
* "Import, don't restate — a shared function makes drift unexpressible,
|
|
160
|
+
* whereas a guard only catches it afterwards."
|
|
161
|
+
*
|
|
162
|
+
* So: import from here. `scripts/check-model-ids.js` fails CI on any Claude
|
|
163
|
+
* model literal written anywhere else, and on a stale review date below.
|
|
164
|
+
*/
|
|
165
|
+
/**
|
|
166
|
+
* Deep analysis — open-ended discovery over up to 50KB of source at a time.
|
|
167
|
+
*
|
|
168
|
+
* Why Sonnet and not Haiku: this call *invents* findings rather than judging
|
|
169
|
+
* ones it was handed, and whatever it returns is pushed onto the finding list
|
|
170
|
+
* that `calculateGrade()` scores. A wrong finding here becomes a wrong letter
|
|
171
|
+
* grade shown to someone who, by construction, cannot tell a bogus finding
|
|
172
|
+
* from a real one — the audience is non-expert developers. It also runs on the
|
|
173
|
+
* *user's* own ANTHROPIC_API_KEY in the CLI (see `analyzeWithAI`), so the
|
|
174
|
+
* cost of the stronger model is not ours to optimise away.
|
|
175
|
+
*/
|
|
176
|
+
declare const MODEL_ANALYSIS = "claude-sonnet-5";
|
|
177
|
+
/**
|
|
178
|
+
* High-volume narrow judgment — "is this specific finding a false positive?"
|
|
179
|
+
* and "answer this questionnaire item from these facts".
|
|
180
|
+
*
|
|
181
|
+
* Haiku is the right tier: the task is bounded, the finding is handed to the
|
|
182
|
+
* model rather than discovered by it, and the call count scales with findings
|
|
183
|
+
* (one per file batch, many per scan). Pinned to a dated release deliberately
|
|
184
|
+
* — this one runs on OUR key against user-visible output, and a silent model
|
|
185
|
+
* swap underneath a filter that can *hide* a real vulnerability is not a
|
|
186
|
+
* change we want to arrive unannounced.
|
|
187
|
+
*/
|
|
188
|
+
declare const MODEL_TRIAGE = "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001";
|
|
189
|
+
/**
|
|
190
|
+
* Last time a human checked these against the current model line-up.
|
|
191
|
+
*
|
|
192
|
+
* `scripts/check-model-ids.js` FAILS once this is more than
|
|
193
|
+
* MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS old. That is deliberate: a warning in CI is a
|
|
194
|
+
* warning nobody reads, and "we fell two generations behind without noticing"
|
|
195
|
+
* is the exact failure this module exists to prevent.
|
|
196
|
+
*
|
|
197
|
+
* To clear it: re-read https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/about-claude/models,
|
|
198
|
+
* update the IDs above if the line-up moved, and set today's date here.
|
|
199
|
+
*/
|
|
200
|
+
declare const MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED = "2026-09-15";
|
|
201
|
+
/** How long a review stays fresh before CI asks for another one. */
|
|
202
|
+
declare const MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS = 180;
|
|
203
|
+
/**
|
|
204
|
+
* Sampling is pinned to 0 at every call site, and extended thinking is
|
|
205
|
+
* deliberately NOT enabled at any of them.
|
|
206
|
+
*
|
|
207
|
+
* Both follow from the same requirement: a user who scans the same unchanged
|
|
208
|
+
* commit twice must get the same letter grade, with no explanation needed for
|
|
209
|
+
* why it moved. Extended thinking requires temperature 1, so enabling it
|
|
210
|
+
* would trade that guarantee away. If a future call site does not feed a
|
|
211
|
+
* grade, it is free to make the opposite choice — but it should say so.
|
|
212
|
+
*/
|
|
213
|
+
declare const MODEL_TEMPERATURE = 0;
|
|
214
|
+
|
|
84
215
|
/**
|
|
85
216
|
* Real-world consequence descriptions for VC### rules.
|
|
86
217
|
*
|
|
@@ -516,7 +647,14 @@ declare const insecureDirectObjectReference: CustomRule;
|
|
|
516
647
|
declare const freeRules: CustomRule[];
|
|
517
648
|
declare const allRules: CustomRule[];
|
|
518
649
|
declare const allCustomRules: CustomRule[];
|
|
519
|
-
declare function runCustomRules(content: string, filePath: string, disabledRules?: string[], tier?: "free" | "pro", extraRules?: CustomRule[]
|
|
650
|
+
declare function runCustomRules(content: string, filePath: string, disabledRules?: string[], tier?: "free" | "pro", extraRules?: CustomRule[],
|
|
651
|
+
/**
|
|
652
|
+
* Cross-file facts for the project being scanned, from
|
|
653
|
+
* buildProjectContext(). Optional: callers that scan a single file with no
|
|
654
|
+
* project around it (the MCP server, the editor extension, a pasted
|
|
655
|
+
* snippet) pass nothing, and every rule must still work.
|
|
656
|
+
*/
|
|
657
|
+
project?: ProjectContext): Finding[];
|
|
520
658
|
|
|
521
659
|
/**
|
|
522
660
|
* Rule-set sizes as plain numbers, importable without dragging the rules in.
|
|
@@ -925,4 +1063,4 @@ declare function getObjectProperty(node: ObjectExpression, key: string): {
|
|
|
925
1063
|
/** Does this CallExpression spread an expression `matcher` returns true for? */
|
|
926
1064
|
declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => boolean): boolean;
|
|
927
1065
|
|
|
928
|
-
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
|
|
1066
|
+
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, MODEL_ANALYSIS, MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED, MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS, MODEL_TEMPERATURE, MODEL_TRIAGE, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildProjectContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
|
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@ function getSnippet(content, line, contextLines = 2) {
|
|
|
45
45
|
return out.join("\n");
|
|
46
46
|
}
|
|
47
47
|
|
|
48
|
+
// src/models.ts
|
|
49
|
+
var MODEL_ANALYSIS = "claude-sonnet-5";
|
|
50
|
+
var MODEL_TRIAGE = "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001";
|
|
51
|
+
var MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED = "2026-09-15";
|
|
52
|
+
var MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS = 180;
|
|
53
|
+
var MODEL_TEMPERATURE = 0;
|
|
54
|
+
|
|
48
55
|
// src/rule-impacts.ts
|
|
49
56
|
var RULE_IMPACTS = {
|
|
50
57
|
VC001: "An attacker who finds this key in your source code or client bundle can use your API with your credentials, potentially reading or modifying user data and racking up usage charges.",
|
|
@@ -284,6 +291,42 @@ function classifyExposure(filePath) {
|
|
|
284
291
|
return "unknown";
|
|
285
292
|
}
|
|
286
293
|
|
|
294
|
+
// src/project-context.ts
|
|
295
|
+
var TOML_FN_SECTION_RE = /^\s*\[functions\.(?:"([^"]+)"|([A-Za-z0-9._-]+))\]\s*$/;
|
|
296
|
+
var TOML_VERIFY_JWT_RE = /^\s*verify_jwt\s*=\s*(true|false)\s*(?:#.*)?$/i;
|
|
297
|
+
function parseSupabaseConfig(toml) {
|
|
298
|
+
const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
|
|
299
|
+
let current = null;
|
|
300
|
+
for (const line of toml.split(/\r?\n/)) {
|
|
301
|
+
const section = line.match(TOML_FN_SECTION_RE);
|
|
302
|
+
if (section) {
|
|
303
|
+
current = section[1] ?? section[2];
|
|
304
|
+
continue;
|
|
305
|
+
}
|
|
306
|
+
if (/^\s*\[/.test(line)) {
|
|
307
|
+
current = null;
|
|
308
|
+
continue;
|
|
309
|
+
}
|
|
310
|
+
if (!current) continue;
|
|
311
|
+
const verify = line.match(TOML_VERIFY_JWT_RE);
|
|
312
|
+
if (verify) out.set(current, verify[1].toLowerCase() === "true");
|
|
313
|
+
}
|
|
314
|
+
return out;
|
|
315
|
+
}
|
|
316
|
+
function supabaseFunctionName(filePath) {
|
|
317
|
+
const m = filePath.match(/(?:^|\/)supabase\/functions\/([^/]+)\//);
|
|
318
|
+
return m ? m[1] : null;
|
|
319
|
+
}
|
|
320
|
+
function buildProjectContext(files) {
|
|
321
|
+
const ctx = {};
|
|
322
|
+
const config = files.find((f) => /(?:^|\/)supabase\/config\.toml$/.test(f.path));
|
|
323
|
+
if (config) {
|
|
324
|
+
const parsed = parseSupabaseConfig(config.content);
|
|
325
|
+
if (parsed.size > 0) ctx.supabaseEdgeVerifyJwt = parsed;
|
|
326
|
+
}
|
|
327
|
+
return ctx;
|
|
328
|
+
}
|
|
329
|
+
|
|
287
330
|
// src/vendored.ts
|
|
288
331
|
var NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS = [
|
|
289
332
|
// 1. vendored UI component libraries
|
|
@@ -1032,6 +1075,7 @@ var SERVER_SIDE_CONTENT_RE = /\b(?:req|request)\.(?:body|query|params|headers|co
|
|
|
1032
1075
|
function isServerSideFile(filePath, content) {
|
|
1033
1076
|
if (isTestFile(filePath)) return false;
|
|
1034
1077
|
if (SERVER_SIDE_PATH_RE.test(filePath)) return true;
|
|
1078
|
+
if (content && /^\s*["']use server["']/m.test(content)) return true;
|
|
1035
1079
|
if (content && SERVER_SIDE_CONTENT_RE.test(content)) return true;
|
|
1036
1080
|
return false;
|
|
1037
1081
|
}
|
|
@@ -1335,7 +1379,7 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1335
1379
|
severity: "high",
|
|
1336
1380
|
category: "Authentication",
|
|
1337
1381
|
description: "API routes without authentication checks allow unauthorized access.",
|
|
1338
|
-
check(content, filePath) {
|
|
1382
|
+
check(content, filePath, project) {
|
|
1339
1383
|
if (!isServerSideFile(filePath, content)) return [];
|
|
1340
1384
|
const routePatterns = [
|
|
1341
1385
|
// Express/Hono style
|
|
@@ -1343,6 +1387,27 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1343
1387
|
// Next.js API routes — named function declaration
|
|
1344
1388
|
/export\s+(?:async\s+)?function\s+(?:GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)\s*\(/gi
|
|
1345
1389
|
];
|
|
1390
|
+
const VERCEL_API_FN_RE = /(?:^|\/)api\/[^/]+\.(?:m?[jt]s)$/;
|
|
1391
|
+
const isNextTree = /(?:^|\/)(?:src\/)?(?:app|pages)\//.test(filePath);
|
|
1392
|
+
if (VERCEL_API_FN_RE.test(filePath) && !isNextTree) {
|
|
1393
|
+
routePatterns.push(
|
|
1394
|
+
/export\s+default\s+(?:async\s+)?(?:function\b|\()/g,
|
|
1395
|
+
/module\.exports\s*=\s*(?:async\s+)?(?:function\b|\()/g
|
|
1396
|
+
);
|
|
1397
|
+
}
|
|
1398
|
+
if (/^\s*["']use server["']/m.test(content)) {
|
|
1399
|
+
routePatterns.push(
|
|
1400
|
+
/export\s+(?:async\s+)?function\s+\w+\s*\(/g,
|
|
1401
|
+
/export\s+const\s+\w+\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,120})?=\s*(?:async\s*)?\(/g
|
|
1402
|
+
);
|
|
1403
|
+
}
|
|
1404
|
+
const EDGE_FN_DIR_RE = /(?:^|\/)(?:netlify\/(?:edge-)?functions|functions|edge-functions)\/[^/]+\/?[^/]*\.(?:m?[jt]s)$/;
|
|
1405
|
+
if (EDGE_FN_DIR_RE.test(filePath) && !SUPABASE_EDGE_FN_RE.test(filePath)) {
|
|
1406
|
+
routePatterns.push(
|
|
1407
|
+
/(?:exports\s*\.\s*handler|export\s+const\s+handler)\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,120})?=\s*(?:async\s*)?(?:function\b|\()/g,
|
|
1408
|
+
/export\s+default\s+(?:async\s+)?(?:function\b|\()/g
|
|
1409
|
+
);
|
|
1410
|
+
}
|
|
1346
1411
|
if (/(?:^|\/)(?:src\/)?app\/(?:.*\/)?route\.(?:m?[jt]sx?)$/.test(filePath)) {
|
|
1347
1412
|
routePatterns.push(
|
|
1348
1413
|
/export\s+const\s+(?:GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,120})?=\s*(?:async\s*)?(?:function\b|\()/g
|
|
@@ -1383,8 +1448,24 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1383
1448
|
/\b(?:protect|guard)\(/i,
|
|
1384
1449
|
/\.use\([^)]*(?:auth|session|protect|requireAuth)/i
|
|
1385
1450
|
];
|
|
1386
|
-
const
|
|
1387
|
-
|
|
1451
|
+
const APP_LEVEL_AUTH = [
|
|
1452
|
+
/\.use\([^)]*(?:auth|session|protect|requireAuth)/i,
|
|
1453
|
+
/\bpassport\b/i,
|
|
1454
|
+
/\bclerk\b/i,
|
|
1455
|
+
/\bwithAuth\b/i
|
|
1456
|
+
];
|
|
1457
|
+
if (APP_LEVEL_AUTH.some((p) => p.test(codeOnly))) return [];
|
|
1458
|
+
const handlerAuthPatterns = authPatterns.filter(
|
|
1459
|
+
(p) => !APP_LEVEL_AUTH.some((a) => a.source === p.source)
|
|
1460
|
+
);
|
|
1461
|
+
const maskedForScope = maskComments(content);
|
|
1462
|
+
const handlerHasAuth = (index) => {
|
|
1463
|
+
const bodyStart = maskedForScope.indexOf("{", index);
|
|
1464
|
+
const probe = bodyStart === -1 ? index : bodyStart + 1;
|
|
1465
|
+
const scope = enclosingHandler(maskedForScope, probe);
|
|
1466
|
+
if (scope === null) return handlerAuthPatterns.some((p) => p.test(codeOnly));
|
|
1467
|
+
return handlerAuthPatterns.some((p) => p.test(scope));
|
|
1468
|
+
};
|
|
1388
1469
|
const matches = [];
|
|
1389
1470
|
for (const pattern of routePatterns) {
|
|
1390
1471
|
matches.push(
|
|
@@ -1398,21 +1479,31 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1398
1479
|
);
|
|
1399
1480
|
}
|
|
1400
1481
|
if (matches.length === 0 && SUPABASE_EDGE_FN_RE.test(filePath) && isDenoEdgeEntry(codeOnly) && !isPublicByDesignEdgePath(filePath)) {
|
|
1401
|
-
const
|
|
1402
|
-
const
|
|
1403
|
-
if (
|
|
1404
|
-
|
|
1405
|
-
|
|
1406
|
-
|
|
1407
|
-
|
|
1408
|
-
|
|
1409
|
-
|
|
1410
|
-
|
|
1411
|
-
|
|
1412
|
-
|
|
1482
|
+
const fnName = supabaseFunctionName(filePath);
|
|
1483
|
+
const verifyJwt = fnName && project?.supabaseEdgeVerifyJwt ? project.supabaseEdgeVerifyJwt.get(fnName) : void 0;
|
|
1484
|
+
if (verifyJwt !== true) {
|
|
1485
|
+
const withoutCors = stripCorsHeaderList(codeOnly);
|
|
1486
|
+
const hasWeakHint = verifyJwt === false ? false : EDGE_WEAK_AUTH_HINTS.some((p) => p.test(withoutCors));
|
|
1487
|
+
if (!hasWeakHint) {
|
|
1488
|
+
matches.push(
|
|
1489
|
+
...findMatches(
|
|
1490
|
+
content,
|
|
1491
|
+
DENO_EDGE_ENTRY_RE,
|
|
1492
|
+
missingAuthMiddleware,
|
|
1493
|
+
filePath,
|
|
1494
|
+
() => "This edge function does not establish who is calling it. Read the caller's token from the Authorization header and resolve it (`const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser(token)`), or build the Supabase client with that token so row-level security scopes every query to the caller. If the endpoint is public by design, add an inline `// VC003-OK: <reason>` comment above the handler to silence."
|
|
1495
|
+
)
|
|
1496
|
+
);
|
|
1497
|
+
}
|
|
1413
1498
|
}
|
|
1414
1499
|
}
|
|
1415
|
-
|
|
1500
|
+
const lineStarts = [0];
|
|
1501
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < content.length; i++) {
|
|
1502
|
+
if (content[i] === "\n") lineStarts.push(i + 1);
|
|
1503
|
+
}
|
|
1504
|
+
const indexOfLine = (line) => lineStarts[Math.max(0, Math.min(line - 1, lineStarts.length - 1))];
|
|
1505
|
+
const unauthenticated = matches.filter((m) => !handlerHasAuth(indexOfLine(m.line)));
|
|
1506
|
+
return filterSilenced(unauthenticated, content, "VC003");
|
|
1416
1507
|
}
|
|
1417
1508
|
};
|
|
1418
1509
|
var supabaseNoRLS = {
|
|
@@ -8851,7 +8942,7 @@ var allCustomRules = [
|
|
|
8851
8942
|
entitlementFromWebStorage,
|
|
8852
8943
|
accountStateFromWebStorage
|
|
8853
8944
|
];
|
|
8854
|
-
function runCustomRules(content, filePath, disabledRules = [], tier = "free", extraRules = []) {
|
|
8945
|
+
function runCustomRules(content, filePath, disabledRules = [], tier = "free", extraRules = [], project) {
|
|
8855
8946
|
const findings = [];
|
|
8856
8947
|
if (/function runScan\(files\)|export function runCustomRules/.test(content) && /const (?:rules|allRules)\s*[:=]/.test(content) && /findMatches/.test(content)) {
|
|
8857
8948
|
return findings;
|
|
@@ -8873,7 +8964,7 @@ function runCustomRules(content, filePath, disabledRules = [], tier = "free", ex
|
|
|
8873
8964
|
const ruleset = tier === "pro" && extraRules.length > 0 ? [...freeRules, ...extraRules] : freeRules;
|
|
8874
8965
|
for (const rule of ruleset) {
|
|
8875
8966
|
if (disabledRules.includes(rule.id)) continue;
|
|
8876
|
-
const matches = rule.check(content, filePath);
|
|
8967
|
+
const matches = rule.check(content, filePath, project);
|
|
8877
8968
|
const compliance = complianceMap[rule.id];
|
|
8878
8969
|
const vendored = vendoredFile && isVendoredFinding({ file: filePath, rule: rule.id, category: rule.category });
|
|
8879
8970
|
for (const match of matches) {
|
|
@@ -9036,7 +9127,7 @@ async function filterFalsePositives(findings, fileContents) {
|
|
|
9036
9127
|
const prompt = buildReviewPrompt(batch, content);
|
|
9037
9128
|
const response = await client.messages.create(
|
|
9038
9129
|
{
|
|
9039
|
-
model:
|
|
9130
|
+
model: MODEL_TRIAGE,
|
|
9040
9131
|
max_tokens: 1024,
|
|
9041
9132
|
// Pinned, NOT left to the API default of 1.0. This is a binary
|
|
9042
9133
|
// classification (real vs. false positive), not generation — there
|
|
@@ -9048,7 +9139,7 @@ async function filterFalsePositives(findings, fileContents) {
|
|
|
9048
9139
|
// variance source that was ours to control. See
|
|
9049
9140
|
// scripts/fp-filter-repeatability.cjs for the measured flip rate,
|
|
9050
9141
|
// and the assertion in ai-fp-filter.test.ts that keeps it pinned.
|
|
9051
|
-
temperature:
|
|
9142
|
+
temperature: MODEL_TEMPERATURE,
|
|
9052
9143
|
system: REVIEW_SYSTEM_PROMPT,
|
|
9053
9144
|
messages: [{ role: "user", content: prompt }]
|
|
9054
9145
|
},
|
|
@@ -9564,6 +9655,11 @@ function extractScriptUrls(html, pageUrl, limit = 12) {
|
|
|
9564
9655
|
}
|
|
9565
9656
|
export {
|
|
9566
9657
|
FREE_RULE_COUNT,
|
|
9658
|
+
MODEL_ANALYSIS,
|
|
9659
|
+
MODEL_POLICY_REVIEWED,
|
|
9660
|
+
MODEL_REVIEW_INTERVAL_DAYS,
|
|
9661
|
+
MODEL_TEMPERATURE,
|
|
9662
|
+
MODEL_TRIAGE,
|
|
9567
9663
|
NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS,
|
|
9568
9664
|
PRO_RULE_COUNT,
|
|
9569
9665
|
RULE_IMPACTS,
|
|
@@ -9574,6 +9670,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
9574
9670
|
androidDebuggable,
|
|
9575
9671
|
assessHeaders,
|
|
9576
9672
|
blockingMainThread,
|
|
9673
|
+
buildProjectContext,
|
|
9577
9674
|
buildTaintMap,
|
|
9578
9675
|
calculateGrade,
|
|
9579
9676
|
callSpreads,
|
|
@@ -9750,6 +9847,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
9750
9847
|
overlyPermissiveIAM,
|
|
9751
9848
|
parseFile,
|
|
9752
9849
|
parseScanTarget,
|
|
9850
|
+
parseSupabaseConfig,
|
|
9753
9851
|
pathTraversal,
|
|
9754
9852
|
pickleDeserialization,
|
|
9755
9853
|
piiInLogs,
|
|
@@ -9787,6 +9885,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
9787
9885
|
ssti,
|
|
9788
9886
|
stripeWebhookUnprotected,
|
|
9789
9887
|
supabaseAnonAdmin,
|
|
9888
|
+
supabaseFunctionName,
|
|
9790
9889
|
supabaseNoRLS,
|
|
9791
9890
|
syncFileOps,
|
|
9792
9891
|
terraformStateExposed,
|