xploitscan-shared-rules 1.21.0 → 1.22.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/index.cjs +108 -18
- package/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.cts +74 -3
- package/dist/index.d.ts +74 -3
- package/dist/index.js +105 -18
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.cts
CHANGED
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@@ -1,6 +1,62 @@
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import { ParseResult } from '@babel/parser';
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import { File, Node, CallExpression, ObjectExpression, BinaryExpression } from '@babel/types';
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/**
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* Cross-file facts a rule cannot learn from the file it is scanning.
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*
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* Rules are deliberately single-file: `check(content, filePath)` sees one file
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* and nothing else. That keeps them fast, order-independent and honest about
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* what they can prove, and it is the right default. But some questions are
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* genuinely answered in a different file, and answering them by guessing from
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* the current one is worse than not answering at all.
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*
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* ProjectContext is the narrow exception: a small set of facts computed ONCE
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* over the whole file list before any rule runs, then handed to every rule.
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* It is intentionally not "here is every file" — that would let rules re-parse
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* the project 214 times and quietly become a cross-file analyser, which the
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* roadmap explicitly rules out as an unwinnable race against CodeQL.
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*
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* Every field is optional and every consumer must behave correctly when the
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* context is absent, because most callers (the MCP server, the VS Code
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* extension, single-file scans) have no project to build one from.
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*/
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/** Parsed facts about the project being scanned. */
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interface ProjectContext {
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/**
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* Supabase Edge Functions and whether the PLATFORM verifies a JWT before
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* the function runs, from `supabase/config.toml`. Keyed by function name —
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* the directory under `supabase/functions/`.
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*
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* A missing entry means "not declared", which is not the same as false:
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* Supabase's own default is `verify_jwt = true`, but a function absent from
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* config.toml may simply be undeclared, so callers must treat absent as
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* unknown rather than assuming either way.
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*/
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supabaseEdgeVerifyJwt?: Map<string, boolean>;
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}
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/**
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* Parse `supabase/config.toml` for per-function `verify_jwt` settings.
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*
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* Deliberately a line scanner rather than a TOML parser. Only two constructs
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* matter, adding a TOML dependency to a package that ships in a browser bundle
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* is a poor trade for that, and a malformed config should yield fewer facts
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* rather than an exception during a scan.
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*/
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declare function parseSupabaseConfig(toml: string): Map<string, boolean>;
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/** The function name for a path under `supabase/functions/<name>/…`. */
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declare function supabaseFunctionName(filePath: string): string | null;
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/**
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* Build the context from the files about to be scanned.
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*
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* Cheap by construction: it reads a fixed, tiny set of paths rather than
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* walking content, so adding a fact here costs one more lookup, not another
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* pass over the project.
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*/
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declare function buildProjectContext(files: Array<{
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path: string;
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content: string;
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}>): ProjectContext;
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type Severity = "critical" | "high" | "medium" | "low" | "info";
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type Confidence = "high" | "medium" | "low";
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interface Finding {
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@@ -66,13 +122,21 @@ interface RuleMatch {
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snippet: string;
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fix?: string;
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}
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interface CustomRule {
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id: string;
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title: string;
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severity: Severity;
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category: string;
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description: string;
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-
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/**
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* Optional third argument: cross-file facts computed once per scan. Optional
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* on purpose — every existing rule ignores it and still satisfies this type,
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* and every caller that has no project (single-file scans, the MCP server,
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* the editor extension) can omit it. A rule that uses it must behave
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* correctly when it is undefined.
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*/
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check: (content: string, filePath: string, project?: ProjectContext) => RuleMatch[];
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}
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/**
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@@ -516,7 +580,14 @@ declare const insecureDirectObjectReference: CustomRule;
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declare const freeRules: CustomRule[];
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declare const allRules: CustomRule[];
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declare const allCustomRules: CustomRule[];
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-
declare function runCustomRules(content: string, filePath: string, disabledRules?: string[], tier?: "free" | "pro", extraRules?: CustomRule[]
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declare function runCustomRules(content: string, filePath: string, disabledRules?: string[], tier?: "free" | "pro", extraRules?: CustomRule[],
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/**
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* Cross-file facts for the project being scanned, from
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* buildProjectContext(). Optional: callers that scan a single file with no
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* project around it (the MCP server, the editor extension, a pasted
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* snippet) pass nothing, and every rule must still work.
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*/
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project?: ProjectContext): Finding[];
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/**
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* Rule-set sizes as plain numbers, importable without dragging the rules in.
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@@ -925,4 +996,4 @@ declare function getObjectProperty(node: ObjectExpression, key: string): {
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/** Does this CallExpression spread an expression `matcher` returns true for? */
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declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => boolean): boolean;
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-
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
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999
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export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildProjectContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
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package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -1,6 +1,62 @@
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|
1
1
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import { ParseResult } from '@babel/parser';
|
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2
2
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import { File, Node, CallExpression, ObjectExpression, BinaryExpression } from '@babel/types';
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3
3
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4
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+
/**
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5
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+
* Cross-file facts a rule cannot learn from the file it is scanning.
|
|
6
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+
*
|
|
7
|
+
* Rules are deliberately single-file: `check(content, filePath)` sees one file
|
|
8
|
+
* and nothing else. That keeps them fast, order-independent and honest about
|
|
9
|
+
* what they can prove, and it is the right default. But some questions are
|
|
10
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+
* genuinely answered in a different file, and answering them by guessing from
|
|
11
|
+
* the current one is worse than not answering at all.
|
|
12
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+
*
|
|
13
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+
* ProjectContext is the narrow exception: a small set of facts computed ONCE
|
|
14
|
+
* over the whole file list before any rule runs, then handed to every rule.
|
|
15
|
+
* It is intentionally not "here is every file" — that would let rules re-parse
|
|
16
|
+
* the project 214 times and quietly become a cross-file analyser, which the
|
|
17
|
+
* roadmap explicitly rules out as an unwinnable race against CodeQL.
|
|
18
|
+
*
|
|
19
|
+
* Every field is optional and every consumer must behave correctly when the
|
|
20
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+
* context is absent, because most callers (the MCP server, the VS Code
|
|
21
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+
* extension, single-file scans) have no project to build one from.
|
|
22
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+
*/
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|
23
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+
/** Parsed facts about the project being scanned. */
|
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24
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+
interface ProjectContext {
|
|
25
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+
/**
|
|
26
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+
* Supabase Edge Functions and whether the PLATFORM verifies a JWT before
|
|
27
|
+
* the function runs, from `supabase/config.toml`. Keyed by function name —
|
|
28
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+
* the directory under `supabase/functions/`.
|
|
29
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+
*
|
|
30
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+
* A missing entry means "not declared", which is not the same as false:
|
|
31
|
+
* Supabase's own default is `verify_jwt = true`, but a function absent from
|
|
32
|
+
* config.toml may simply be undeclared, so callers must treat absent as
|
|
33
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+
* unknown rather than assuming either way.
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34
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+
*/
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35
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+
supabaseEdgeVerifyJwt?: Map<string, boolean>;
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}
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37
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+
/**
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|
38
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+
* Parse `supabase/config.toml` for per-function `verify_jwt` settings.
|
|
39
|
+
*
|
|
40
|
+
* Deliberately a line scanner rather than a TOML parser. Only two constructs
|
|
41
|
+
* matter, adding a TOML dependency to a package that ships in a browser bundle
|
|
42
|
+
* is a poor trade for that, and a malformed config should yield fewer facts
|
|
43
|
+
* rather than an exception during a scan.
|
|
44
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+
*/
|
|
45
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+
declare function parseSupabaseConfig(toml: string): Map<string, boolean>;
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46
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/** The function name for a path under `supabase/functions/<name>/…`. */
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47
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declare function supabaseFunctionName(filePath: string): string | null;
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48
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+
/**
|
|
49
|
+
* Build the context from the files about to be scanned.
|
|
50
|
+
*
|
|
51
|
+
* Cheap by construction: it reads a fixed, tiny set of paths rather than
|
|
52
|
+
* walking content, so adding a fact here costs one more lookup, not another
|
|
53
|
+
* pass over the project.
|
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54
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+
*/
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55
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+
declare function buildProjectContext(files: Array<{
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path: string;
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content: string;
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}>): ProjectContext;
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type Severity = "critical" | "high" | "medium" | "low" | "info";
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type Confidence = "high" | "medium" | "low";
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interface Finding {
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@@ -66,13 +122,21 @@ interface RuleMatch {
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66
122
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snippet: string;
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67
123
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fix?: string;
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}
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+
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interface CustomRule {
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id: string;
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title: string;
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severity: Severity;
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73
130
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category: string;
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74
131
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description: string;
|
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75
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-
|
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132
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+
/**
|
|
133
|
+
* Optional third argument: cross-file facts computed once per scan. Optional
|
|
134
|
+
* on purpose — every existing rule ignores it and still satisfies this type,
|
|
135
|
+
* and every caller that has no project (single-file scans, the MCP server,
|
|
136
|
+
* the editor extension) can omit it. A rule that uses it must behave
|
|
137
|
+
* correctly when it is undefined.
|
|
138
|
+
*/
|
|
139
|
+
check: (content: string, filePath: string, project?: ProjectContext) => RuleMatch[];
|
|
76
140
|
}
|
|
77
141
|
|
|
78
142
|
/**
|
|
@@ -516,7 +580,14 @@ declare const insecureDirectObjectReference: CustomRule;
|
|
|
516
580
|
declare const freeRules: CustomRule[];
|
|
517
581
|
declare const allRules: CustomRule[];
|
|
518
582
|
declare const allCustomRules: CustomRule[];
|
|
519
|
-
declare function runCustomRules(content: string, filePath: string, disabledRules?: string[], tier?: "free" | "pro", extraRules?: CustomRule[]
|
|
583
|
+
declare function runCustomRules(content: string, filePath: string, disabledRules?: string[], tier?: "free" | "pro", extraRules?: CustomRule[],
|
|
584
|
+
/**
|
|
585
|
+
* Cross-file facts for the project being scanned, from
|
|
586
|
+
* buildProjectContext(). Optional: callers that scan a single file with no
|
|
587
|
+
* project around it (the MCP server, the editor extension, a pasted
|
|
588
|
+
* snippet) pass nothing, and every rule must still work.
|
|
589
|
+
*/
|
|
590
|
+
project?: ProjectContext): Finding[];
|
|
520
591
|
|
|
521
592
|
/**
|
|
522
593
|
* Rule-set sizes as plain numbers, importable without dragging the rules in.
|
|
@@ -925,4 +996,4 @@ declare function getObjectProperty(node: ObjectExpression, key: string): {
|
|
|
925
996
|
/** Does this CallExpression spread an expression `matcher` returns true for? */
|
|
926
997
|
declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => boolean): boolean;
|
|
927
998
|
|
|
928
|
-
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
|
|
999
|
+
export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, type ProjectContext, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildProjectContext, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, parseSupabaseConfig, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseFunctionName, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
|
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -284,6 +284,42 @@ function classifyExposure(filePath) {
|
|
|
284
284
|
return "unknown";
|
|
285
285
|
}
|
|
286
286
|
|
|
287
|
+
// src/project-context.ts
|
|
288
|
+
var TOML_FN_SECTION_RE = /^\s*\[functions\.(?:"([^"]+)"|([A-Za-z0-9._-]+))\]\s*$/;
|
|
289
|
+
var TOML_VERIFY_JWT_RE = /^\s*verify_jwt\s*=\s*(true|false)\s*(?:#.*)?$/i;
|
|
290
|
+
function parseSupabaseConfig(toml) {
|
|
291
|
+
const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
|
|
292
|
+
let current = null;
|
|
293
|
+
for (const line of toml.split(/\r?\n/)) {
|
|
294
|
+
const section = line.match(TOML_FN_SECTION_RE);
|
|
295
|
+
if (section) {
|
|
296
|
+
current = section[1] ?? section[2];
|
|
297
|
+
continue;
|
|
298
|
+
}
|
|
299
|
+
if (/^\s*\[/.test(line)) {
|
|
300
|
+
current = null;
|
|
301
|
+
continue;
|
|
302
|
+
}
|
|
303
|
+
if (!current) continue;
|
|
304
|
+
const verify = line.match(TOML_VERIFY_JWT_RE);
|
|
305
|
+
if (verify) out.set(current, verify[1].toLowerCase() === "true");
|
|
306
|
+
}
|
|
307
|
+
return out;
|
|
308
|
+
}
|
|
309
|
+
function supabaseFunctionName(filePath) {
|
|
310
|
+
const m = filePath.match(/(?:^|\/)supabase\/functions\/([^/]+)\//);
|
|
311
|
+
return m ? m[1] : null;
|
|
312
|
+
}
|
|
313
|
+
function buildProjectContext(files) {
|
|
314
|
+
const ctx = {};
|
|
315
|
+
const config = files.find((f) => /(?:^|\/)supabase\/config\.toml$/.test(f.path));
|
|
316
|
+
if (config) {
|
|
317
|
+
const parsed = parseSupabaseConfig(config.content);
|
|
318
|
+
if (parsed.size > 0) ctx.supabaseEdgeVerifyJwt = parsed;
|
|
319
|
+
}
|
|
320
|
+
return ctx;
|
|
321
|
+
}
|
|
322
|
+
|
|
287
323
|
// src/vendored.ts
|
|
288
324
|
var NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS = [
|
|
289
325
|
// 1. vendored UI component libraries
|
|
@@ -1032,6 +1068,7 @@ var SERVER_SIDE_CONTENT_RE = /\b(?:req|request)\.(?:body|query|params|headers|co
|
|
|
1032
1068
|
function isServerSideFile(filePath, content) {
|
|
1033
1069
|
if (isTestFile(filePath)) return false;
|
|
1034
1070
|
if (SERVER_SIDE_PATH_RE.test(filePath)) return true;
|
|
1071
|
+
if (content && /^\s*["']use server["']/m.test(content)) return true;
|
|
1035
1072
|
if (content && SERVER_SIDE_CONTENT_RE.test(content)) return true;
|
|
1036
1073
|
return false;
|
|
1037
1074
|
}
|
|
@@ -1335,7 +1372,7 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1335
1372
|
severity: "high",
|
|
1336
1373
|
category: "Authentication",
|
|
1337
1374
|
description: "API routes without authentication checks allow unauthorized access.",
|
|
1338
|
-
check(content, filePath) {
|
|
1375
|
+
check(content, filePath, project) {
|
|
1339
1376
|
if (!isServerSideFile(filePath, content)) return [];
|
|
1340
1377
|
const routePatterns = [
|
|
1341
1378
|
// Express/Hono style
|
|
@@ -1343,6 +1380,27 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1343
1380
|
// Next.js API routes — named function declaration
|
|
1344
1381
|
/export\s+(?:async\s+)?function\s+(?:GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)\s*\(/gi
|
|
1345
1382
|
];
|
|
1383
|
+
const VERCEL_API_FN_RE = /(?:^|\/)api\/[^/]+\.(?:m?[jt]s)$/;
|
|
1384
|
+
const isNextTree = /(?:^|\/)(?:src\/)?(?:app|pages)\//.test(filePath);
|
|
1385
|
+
if (VERCEL_API_FN_RE.test(filePath) && !isNextTree) {
|
|
1386
|
+
routePatterns.push(
|
|
1387
|
+
/export\s+default\s+(?:async\s+)?(?:function\b|\()/g,
|
|
1388
|
+
/module\.exports\s*=\s*(?:async\s+)?(?:function\b|\()/g
|
|
1389
|
+
);
|
|
1390
|
+
}
|
|
1391
|
+
if (/^\s*["']use server["']/m.test(content)) {
|
|
1392
|
+
routePatterns.push(
|
|
1393
|
+
/export\s+(?:async\s+)?function\s+\w+\s*\(/g,
|
|
1394
|
+
/export\s+const\s+\w+\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,120})?=\s*(?:async\s*)?\(/g
|
|
1395
|
+
);
|
|
1396
|
+
}
|
|
1397
|
+
const EDGE_FN_DIR_RE = /(?:^|\/)(?:netlify\/(?:edge-)?functions|functions|edge-functions)\/[^/]+\/?[^/]*\.(?:m?[jt]s)$/;
|
|
1398
|
+
if (EDGE_FN_DIR_RE.test(filePath) && !SUPABASE_EDGE_FN_RE.test(filePath)) {
|
|
1399
|
+
routePatterns.push(
|
|
1400
|
+
/(?:exports\s*\.\s*handler|export\s+const\s+handler)\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,120})?=\s*(?:async\s*)?(?:function\b|\()/g,
|
|
1401
|
+
/export\s+default\s+(?:async\s+)?(?:function\b|\()/g
|
|
1402
|
+
);
|
|
1403
|
+
}
|
|
1346
1404
|
if (/(?:^|\/)(?:src\/)?app\/(?:.*\/)?route\.(?:m?[jt]sx?)$/.test(filePath)) {
|
|
1347
1405
|
routePatterns.push(
|
|
1348
1406
|
/export\s+const\s+(?:GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,120})?=\s*(?:async\s*)?(?:function\b|\()/g
|
|
@@ -1383,8 +1441,24 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1383
1441
|
/\b(?:protect|guard)\(/i,
|
|
1384
1442
|
/\.use\([^)]*(?:auth|session|protect|requireAuth)/i
|
|
1385
1443
|
];
|
|
1386
|
-
const
|
|
1387
|
-
|
|
1444
|
+
const APP_LEVEL_AUTH = [
|
|
1445
|
+
/\.use\([^)]*(?:auth|session|protect|requireAuth)/i,
|
|
1446
|
+
/\bpassport\b/i,
|
|
1447
|
+
/\bclerk\b/i,
|
|
1448
|
+
/\bwithAuth\b/i
|
|
1449
|
+
];
|
|
1450
|
+
if (APP_LEVEL_AUTH.some((p) => p.test(codeOnly))) return [];
|
|
1451
|
+
const handlerAuthPatterns = authPatterns.filter(
|
|
1452
|
+
(p) => !APP_LEVEL_AUTH.some((a) => a.source === p.source)
|
|
1453
|
+
);
|
|
1454
|
+
const maskedForScope = maskComments(content);
|
|
1455
|
+
const handlerHasAuth = (index) => {
|
|
1456
|
+
const bodyStart = maskedForScope.indexOf("{", index);
|
|
1457
|
+
const probe = bodyStart === -1 ? index : bodyStart + 1;
|
|
1458
|
+
const scope = enclosingHandler(maskedForScope, probe);
|
|
1459
|
+
if (scope === null) return handlerAuthPatterns.some((p) => p.test(codeOnly));
|
|
1460
|
+
return handlerAuthPatterns.some((p) => p.test(scope));
|
|
1461
|
+
};
|
|
1388
1462
|
const matches = [];
|
|
1389
1463
|
for (const pattern of routePatterns) {
|
|
1390
1464
|
matches.push(
|
|
@@ -1398,21 +1472,31 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1398
1472
|
);
|
|
1399
1473
|
}
|
|
1400
1474
|
if (matches.length === 0 && SUPABASE_EDGE_FN_RE.test(filePath) && isDenoEdgeEntry(codeOnly) && !isPublicByDesignEdgePath(filePath)) {
|
|
1401
|
-
const
|
|
1402
|
-
const
|
|
1403
|
-
if (
|
|
1404
|
-
|
|
1405
|
-
|
|
1406
|
-
|
|
1407
|
-
|
|
1408
|
-
|
|
1409
|
-
|
|
1410
|
-
|
|
1411
|
-
|
|
1412
|
-
|
|
1475
|
+
const fnName = supabaseFunctionName(filePath);
|
|
1476
|
+
const verifyJwt = fnName && project?.supabaseEdgeVerifyJwt ? project.supabaseEdgeVerifyJwt.get(fnName) : void 0;
|
|
1477
|
+
if (verifyJwt !== true) {
|
|
1478
|
+
const withoutCors = stripCorsHeaderList(codeOnly);
|
|
1479
|
+
const hasWeakHint = verifyJwt === false ? false : EDGE_WEAK_AUTH_HINTS.some((p) => p.test(withoutCors));
|
|
1480
|
+
if (!hasWeakHint) {
|
|
1481
|
+
matches.push(
|
|
1482
|
+
...findMatches(
|
|
1483
|
+
content,
|
|
1484
|
+
DENO_EDGE_ENTRY_RE,
|
|
1485
|
+
missingAuthMiddleware,
|
|
1486
|
+
filePath,
|
|
1487
|
+
() => "This edge function does not establish who is calling it. Read the caller's token from the Authorization header and resolve it (`const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser(token)`), or build the Supabase client with that token so row-level security scopes every query to the caller. If the endpoint is public by design, add an inline `// VC003-OK: <reason>` comment above the handler to silence."
|
|
1488
|
+
)
|
|
1489
|
+
);
|
|
1490
|
+
}
|
|
1413
1491
|
}
|
|
1414
1492
|
}
|
|
1415
|
-
|
|
1493
|
+
const lineStarts = [0];
|
|
1494
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < content.length; i++) {
|
|
1495
|
+
if (content[i] === "\n") lineStarts.push(i + 1);
|
|
1496
|
+
}
|
|
1497
|
+
const indexOfLine = (line) => lineStarts[Math.max(0, Math.min(line - 1, lineStarts.length - 1))];
|
|
1498
|
+
const unauthenticated = matches.filter((m) => !handlerHasAuth(indexOfLine(m.line)));
|
|
1499
|
+
return filterSilenced(unauthenticated, content, "VC003");
|
|
1416
1500
|
}
|
|
1417
1501
|
};
|
|
1418
1502
|
var supabaseNoRLS = {
|
|
@@ -8851,7 +8935,7 @@ var allCustomRules = [
|
|
|
8851
8935
|
entitlementFromWebStorage,
|
|
8852
8936
|
accountStateFromWebStorage
|
|
8853
8937
|
];
|
|
8854
|
-
function runCustomRules(content, filePath, disabledRules = [], tier = "free", extraRules = []) {
|
|
8938
|
+
function runCustomRules(content, filePath, disabledRules = [], tier = "free", extraRules = [], project) {
|
|
8855
8939
|
const findings = [];
|
|
8856
8940
|
if (/function runScan\(files\)|export function runCustomRules/.test(content) && /const (?:rules|allRules)\s*[:=]/.test(content) && /findMatches/.test(content)) {
|
|
8857
8941
|
return findings;
|
|
@@ -8873,7 +8957,7 @@ function runCustomRules(content, filePath, disabledRules = [], tier = "free", ex
|
|
|
8873
8957
|
const ruleset = tier === "pro" && extraRules.length > 0 ? [...freeRules, ...extraRules] : freeRules;
|
|
8874
8958
|
for (const rule of ruleset) {
|
|
8875
8959
|
if (disabledRules.includes(rule.id)) continue;
|
|
8876
|
-
const matches = rule.check(content, filePath);
|
|
8960
|
+
const matches = rule.check(content, filePath, project);
|
|
8877
8961
|
const compliance = complianceMap[rule.id];
|
|
8878
8962
|
const vendored = vendoredFile && isVendoredFinding({ file: filePath, rule: rule.id, category: rule.category });
|
|
8879
8963
|
for (const match of matches) {
|
|
@@ -9574,6 +9658,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
9574
9658
|
androidDebuggable,
|
|
9575
9659
|
assessHeaders,
|
|
9576
9660
|
blockingMainThread,
|
|
9661
|
+
buildProjectContext,
|
|
9577
9662
|
buildTaintMap,
|
|
9578
9663
|
calculateGrade,
|
|
9579
9664
|
callSpreads,
|
|
@@ -9750,6 +9835,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
9750
9835
|
overlyPermissiveIAM,
|
|
9751
9836
|
parseFile,
|
|
9752
9837
|
parseScanTarget,
|
|
9838
|
+
parseSupabaseConfig,
|
|
9753
9839
|
pathTraversal,
|
|
9754
9840
|
pickleDeserialization,
|
|
9755
9841
|
piiInLogs,
|
|
@@ -9787,6 +9873,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
9787
9873
|
ssti,
|
|
9788
9874
|
stripeWebhookUnprotected,
|
|
9789
9875
|
supabaseAnonAdmin,
|
|
9876
|
+
supabaseFunctionName,
|
|
9790
9877
|
supabaseNoRLS,
|
|
9791
9878
|
syncFileOps,
|
|
9792
9879
|
terraformStateExposed,
|