xploitscan-shared-rules 1.17.0 → 1.20.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.d.cts CHANGED
@@ -34,6 +34,26 @@ interface Finding {
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  * itself by arriving with the flag already set.
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  */
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  vendored?: boolean;
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+ /**
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+ * The URL that reaches this finding's file, when one does.
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+ *
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+ * Severity is not a property of a line of code, it is a property of who can
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+ * reach it: a hardcoded secret in `app/api/webhooks/stripe/route.ts` is
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+ * reachable by anyone who can send a POST, while the same secret in a build
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+ * script is not reachable at all.
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+ *
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+ * Advisory label for renderers, on the same terms as `vendored` above —
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+ * `calculateGrade` never reads it, so a finding cannot raise or lower its own
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+ * score by arriving with this set. It is populated from the file's declared
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+ * route only; a helper imported BY a handler is reachable too, but proving
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+ * that needs an import graph, and guessing would attach a confident wrong URL
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+ * to a real finding.
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+ */
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+ route?: {
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+ path: string;
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+ kind: "page" | "api";
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+ framework: string;
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+ };
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  }
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  interface RuleMatch {
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  rule: string;
@@ -324,17 +344,6 @@ declare function detectFramework(files: {
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  content: string;
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  }[]): DetectedFramework[];
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  type VibePlatform = "lovable" | "bolt" | "replit" | "cursor" | "v0" | "claude-code";
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- /**
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- * Detect the AI coding platform / scaffold behind a project from tell-tale
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- * files, dependencies, and generated-comment headers.
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- *
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- * Deliberately high-precision: signals are mostly exact config-file paths
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- * (`.replit`, `.cursorrules`, `.bolt/`) plus a couple of unambiguous content
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- * markers (`lovable-tagger`, `bolt.new`, `v0.dev`). A plain framework project
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- * with none of these returns `[]` — we never guess a platform, because a wrong
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- * "Detected: X" label reads worse than none. Returns every platform detected
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- * (a Lovable app opened in Cursor legitimately reports both).
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- */
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  declare function detectPlatform(files: {
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  path: string;
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  content: string;
@@ -486,6 +495,8 @@ declare const graphqlCSRFDisabled: CustomRule;
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  declare const llmOutputToSink: CustomRule;
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  declare const secretInLLMPrompt: CustomRule;
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  declare const webhookMissingIdempotency: CustomRule;
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+ declare const entitlementFromWebStorage: CustomRule;
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+ declare const accountStateFromWebStorage: CustomRule;
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  declare const middlewareMatcherExcludesApi: CustomRule;
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  declare const hardcodedCreditCard: CustomRule;
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  declare const hardcodedSSN: CustomRule;
@@ -507,6 +518,36 @@ declare const allRules: CustomRule[];
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  declare const allCustomRules: CustomRule[];
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  declare function runCustomRules(content: string, filePath: string, disabledRules?: string[], tier?: "free" | "pro", extraRules?: CustomRule[]): Finding[];
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+ /**
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+ * Rule-set sizes as plain numbers, importable without dragging the rules in.
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+ *
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+ * WHY THIS FILE EXISTS — read before "simplifying" it back to `.length`.
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+ *
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+ * The CLI needs to tell a free user how many rules Pro unlocks. The obvious
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+ * way is `allCustomRules.length`. Doing exactly that shipped **63 Pro-only
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+ * rule definitions into the published free CLI bundle** in v1.3.3: tsup marks
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+ * shared-rules `noExternal`, so importing the array inlines every regex, check
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+ * body and fix string it contains. v1.3.2's executable JS had zero Pro-range
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+ * rule IDs; v1.3.3's had 63, and the main chunk grew 1.7MB -> 1.9MB.
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+ *
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+ * `rules.ts` states the rule plainly: "Pro rules are delivered server-side —
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+ * not shipped in npm package." A count is a number, and a number is all the
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+ * CLI should have to import to print one.
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+ *
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+ * So: literals here, and `rule-counts.test.ts` asserts each one equals the
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+ * real array's length. The value is *derived at test time* and *shipped as a
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+ * constant* — drift fails CI instead of reaching npm, and nothing in this file
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+ * references a rule, so a bundler can tree-shake the catalog away.
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+ *
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+ * THIS FILE MUST NOT IMPORT FROM ./rules.js. That import is the entire bug.
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+ */
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+ /** Rules any caller gets, including anonymous and free-tier CLI users. */
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+ declare const FREE_RULE_COUNT = 30;
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+ /** Rules gated behind a paid plan and served from the API, never bundled. */
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+ declare const PRO_RULE_COUNT = 184;
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+ /** The full catalog. FREE_RULE_COUNT + PRO_RULE_COUNT, asserted in the test. */
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+ declare const TOTAL_RULE_COUNT = 214;
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+
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  interface FilteredFinding {
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  finding: Finding;
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  reason: string;
@@ -578,6 +619,83 @@ declare function scanEntropy(files: {
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  content: string;
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  }[]): Finding[];
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+ /**
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+ * Route-table extraction — what URL, if any, reaches a given source file.
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+ *
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+ * WHY A SCANNER WANTS THIS. Severity is not a property of a line of code, it is
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+ * a property of who can reach it. A hardcoded secret in
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+ * `src/app/api/webhooks/stripe/route.ts` is reachable by anyone who can send a
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+ * POST; the same secret in a build script is not reachable at all. Nothing in
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+ * the finding itself carries that distinction, and a scanner that only reads
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+ * files cannot invent it.
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+ *
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+ * Attaching a route to a finding turns "hardcoded secret in a file you have to
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+ * go look up" into "hardcoded secret reachable at POST /api/webhooks/stripe".
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+ *
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+ * EVERY GATE BELOW EXISTS BECAUSE IT FIRED. Measured against real repositories:
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+ *
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+ * - `src/pages/*.tsx` is NOT Next routing in a Vite app. Lovable, Bolt and
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+ * Base44 ship a plain `src/pages/` component folder; matching it invented
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+ * 38 phantom routes in one repo, with case-duplicate pairs (/about AND
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+ * /About) and entries like /Index and /NotFound that do not exist.
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+ * - A config file is not a dependency. That same repo carries a stray unused
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+ * `next.config.js` with no `next` in package.json; trusting the file
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+ * re-invented all 38.
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+ * - `app.get("/download", ...)` inside THIS repo's own rule-override examples
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+ * produced phantom Express routes in a package with no express dependency.
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+ * A scanner scanning a scanner finds "routes" in its documentation samples.
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+ * - The homepage went missing from every Next project using `src/`: the
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+ * pattern required `app/<seg>/page.tsx` or a TOP-LEVEL `app/page.tsx`, so
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+ * nested `src/app/page.tsx` matched neither and "/" — the single most
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+ * important route in any app — was silently absent.
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+ *
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+ * A phantom route is worse than a missing one: it attaches a confident, wrong
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+ * URL to a real finding. Hence every framework's conventions are gated on that
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+ * framework actually being a declared dependency.
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+ *
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+ * Accuracy at the time of writing, against hand-counted ground truth:
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+ * Next App Router (this repo's web package) 135/135, "/" included
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+ * React Router (a Lovable app) 40/40, 0 missed, 0 extra
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+ * TanStack Start (a Lovable app) 6/6
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+ * Flask (a Python dashboard) 53/53
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+ */
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+ type RouteFramework = "next-app" | "next-pages" | "react-router" | "tanstack-router" | "flask-fastapi" | "express";
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+ interface AppRoute {
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+ /** URL path, e.g. "/api/webhooks/stripe". */
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+ path: string;
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+ /** `api` is a data endpoint; `page` renders a document. */
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+ kind: "page" | "api";
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+ /** Contains a parameter segment, so it cannot be fetched without a value. */
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+ dynamic: boolean;
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+ framework: RouteFramework;
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+ /** Repo-relative file that declares it. */
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+ source: string;
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+ }
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+ interface RouteTable {
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+ frameworks: RouteFramework[];
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+ routes: AppRoute[];
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+ }
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+ interface SourceFile {
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+ path: string;
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+ content: string;
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Extract every route the given files declare.
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+ *
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+ * Pure: takes file contents, touches no filesystem, so it runs identically in
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+ * the CLI, the API and a test.
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+ */
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+ declare function extractRoutes(files: SourceFile[]): RouteTable;
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+ /**
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+ * The route a given file is reachable at, if any.
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+ *
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+ * Matches on the declaring file only. A helper imported BY a route handler is
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+ * reachable too, but proving that needs an import graph — claiming it from a
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+ * filename match would attach confident, wrong URLs to real findings, which is
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+ * the failure mode every gate above exists to prevent.
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+ */
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+ declare function routeForFile(table: RouteTable, filePath: string): AppRoute | undefined;
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+
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  /**
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  * URL recon — what can be learned about a deployed app from what it already
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  * serves the public.
@@ -807,4 +925,4 @@ declare function getObjectProperty(node: ObjectExpression, key: string): {
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  /** Does this CallExpression spread an expression `matcher` returns true for? */
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  declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => boolean): boolean;
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- export { type AIFilterResult, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
928
+ export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -34,6 +34,26 @@ interface Finding {
34
34
  * itself by arriving with the flag already set.
35
35
  */
36
36
  vendored?: boolean;
37
+ /**
38
+ * The URL that reaches this finding's file, when one does.
39
+ *
40
+ * Severity is not a property of a line of code, it is a property of who can
41
+ * reach it: a hardcoded secret in `app/api/webhooks/stripe/route.ts` is
42
+ * reachable by anyone who can send a POST, while the same secret in a build
43
+ * script is not reachable at all.
44
+ *
45
+ * Advisory label for renderers, on the same terms as `vendored` above —
46
+ * `calculateGrade` never reads it, so a finding cannot raise or lower its own
47
+ * score by arriving with this set. It is populated from the file's declared
48
+ * route only; a helper imported BY a handler is reachable too, but proving
49
+ * that needs an import graph, and guessing would attach a confident wrong URL
50
+ * to a real finding.
51
+ */
52
+ route?: {
53
+ path: string;
54
+ kind: "page" | "api";
55
+ framework: string;
56
+ };
37
57
  }
38
58
  interface RuleMatch {
39
59
  rule: string;
@@ -324,17 +344,6 @@ declare function detectFramework(files: {
324
344
  content: string;
325
345
  }[]): DetectedFramework[];
326
346
  type VibePlatform = "lovable" | "bolt" | "replit" | "cursor" | "v0" | "claude-code";
327
- /**
328
- * Detect the AI coding platform / scaffold behind a project from tell-tale
329
- * files, dependencies, and generated-comment headers.
330
- *
331
- * Deliberately high-precision: signals are mostly exact config-file paths
332
- * (`.replit`, `.cursorrules`, `.bolt/`) plus a couple of unambiguous content
333
- * markers (`lovable-tagger`, `bolt.new`, `v0.dev`). A plain framework project
334
- * with none of these returns `[]` — we never guess a platform, because a wrong
335
- * "Detected: X" label reads worse than none. Returns every platform detected
336
- * (a Lovable app opened in Cursor legitimately reports both).
337
- */
338
347
  declare function detectPlatform(files: {
339
348
  path: string;
340
349
  content: string;
@@ -486,6 +495,8 @@ declare const graphqlCSRFDisabled: CustomRule;
486
495
  declare const llmOutputToSink: CustomRule;
487
496
  declare const secretInLLMPrompt: CustomRule;
488
497
  declare const webhookMissingIdempotency: CustomRule;
498
+ declare const entitlementFromWebStorage: CustomRule;
499
+ declare const accountStateFromWebStorage: CustomRule;
489
500
  declare const middlewareMatcherExcludesApi: CustomRule;
490
501
  declare const hardcodedCreditCard: CustomRule;
491
502
  declare const hardcodedSSN: CustomRule;
@@ -507,6 +518,36 @@ declare const allRules: CustomRule[];
507
518
  declare const allCustomRules: CustomRule[];
508
519
  declare function runCustomRules(content: string, filePath: string, disabledRules?: string[], tier?: "free" | "pro", extraRules?: CustomRule[]): Finding[];
509
520
 
521
+ /**
522
+ * Rule-set sizes as plain numbers, importable without dragging the rules in.
523
+ *
524
+ * WHY THIS FILE EXISTS — read before "simplifying" it back to `.length`.
525
+ *
526
+ * The CLI needs to tell a free user how many rules Pro unlocks. The obvious
527
+ * way is `allCustomRules.length`. Doing exactly that shipped **63 Pro-only
528
+ * rule definitions into the published free CLI bundle** in v1.3.3: tsup marks
529
+ * shared-rules `noExternal`, so importing the array inlines every regex, check
530
+ * body and fix string it contains. v1.3.2's executable JS had zero Pro-range
531
+ * rule IDs; v1.3.3's had 63, and the main chunk grew 1.7MB -> 1.9MB.
532
+ *
533
+ * `rules.ts` states the rule plainly: "Pro rules are delivered server-side —
534
+ * not shipped in npm package." A count is a number, and a number is all the
535
+ * CLI should have to import to print one.
536
+ *
537
+ * So: literals here, and `rule-counts.test.ts` asserts each one equals the
538
+ * real array's length. The value is *derived at test time* and *shipped as a
539
+ * constant* — drift fails CI instead of reaching npm, and nothing in this file
540
+ * references a rule, so a bundler can tree-shake the catalog away.
541
+ *
542
+ * THIS FILE MUST NOT IMPORT FROM ./rules.js. That import is the entire bug.
543
+ */
544
+ /** Rules any caller gets, including anonymous and free-tier CLI users. */
545
+ declare const FREE_RULE_COUNT = 30;
546
+ /** Rules gated behind a paid plan and served from the API, never bundled. */
547
+ declare const PRO_RULE_COUNT = 184;
548
+ /** The full catalog. FREE_RULE_COUNT + PRO_RULE_COUNT, asserted in the test. */
549
+ declare const TOTAL_RULE_COUNT = 214;
550
+
510
551
  interface FilteredFinding {
511
552
  finding: Finding;
512
553
  reason: string;
@@ -578,6 +619,83 @@ declare function scanEntropy(files: {
578
619
  content: string;
579
620
  }[]): Finding[];
580
621
 
622
+ /**
623
+ * Route-table extraction — what URL, if any, reaches a given source file.
624
+ *
625
+ * WHY A SCANNER WANTS THIS. Severity is not a property of a line of code, it is
626
+ * a property of who can reach it. A hardcoded secret in
627
+ * `src/app/api/webhooks/stripe/route.ts` is reachable by anyone who can send a
628
+ * POST; the same secret in a build script is not reachable at all. Nothing in
629
+ * the finding itself carries that distinction, and a scanner that only reads
630
+ * files cannot invent it.
631
+ *
632
+ * Attaching a route to a finding turns "hardcoded secret in a file you have to
633
+ * go look up" into "hardcoded secret reachable at POST /api/webhooks/stripe".
634
+ *
635
+ * EVERY GATE BELOW EXISTS BECAUSE IT FIRED. Measured against real repositories:
636
+ *
637
+ * - `src/pages/*.tsx` is NOT Next routing in a Vite app. Lovable, Bolt and
638
+ * Base44 ship a plain `src/pages/` component folder; matching it invented
639
+ * 38 phantom routes in one repo, with case-duplicate pairs (/about AND
640
+ * /About) and entries like /Index and /NotFound that do not exist.
641
+ * - A config file is not a dependency. That same repo carries a stray unused
642
+ * `next.config.js` with no `next` in package.json; trusting the file
643
+ * re-invented all 38.
644
+ * - `app.get("/download", ...)` inside THIS repo's own rule-override examples
645
+ * produced phantom Express routes in a package with no express dependency.
646
+ * A scanner scanning a scanner finds "routes" in its documentation samples.
647
+ * - The homepage went missing from every Next project using `src/`: the
648
+ * pattern required `app/<seg>/page.tsx` or a TOP-LEVEL `app/page.tsx`, so
649
+ * nested `src/app/page.tsx` matched neither and "/" — the single most
650
+ * important route in any app — was silently absent.
651
+ *
652
+ * A phantom route is worse than a missing one: it attaches a confident, wrong
653
+ * URL to a real finding. Hence every framework's conventions are gated on that
654
+ * framework actually being a declared dependency.
655
+ *
656
+ * Accuracy at the time of writing, against hand-counted ground truth:
657
+ * Next App Router (this repo's web package) 135/135, "/" included
658
+ * React Router (a Lovable app) 40/40, 0 missed, 0 extra
659
+ * TanStack Start (a Lovable app) 6/6
660
+ * Flask (a Python dashboard) 53/53
661
+ */
662
+ type RouteFramework = "next-app" | "next-pages" | "react-router" | "tanstack-router" | "flask-fastapi" | "express";
663
+ interface AppRoute {
664
+ /** URL path, e.g. "/api/webhooks/stripe". */
665
+ path: string;
666
+ /** `api` is a data endpoint; `page` renders a document. */
667
+ kind: "page" | "api";
668
+ /** Contains a parameter segment, so it cannot be fetched without a value. */
669
+ dynamic: boolean;
670
+ framework: RouteFramework;
671
+ /** Repo-relative file that declares it. */
672
+ source: string;
673
+ }
674
+ interface RouteTable {
675
+ frameworks: RouteFramework[];
676
+ routes: AppRoute[];
677
+ }
678
+ interface SourceFile {
679
+ path: string;
680
+ content: string;
681
+ }
682
+ /**
683
+ * Extract every route the given files declare.
684
+ *
685
+ * Pure: takes file contents, touches no filesystem, so it runs identically in
686
+ * the CLI, the API and a test.
687
+ */
688
+ declare function extractRoutes(files: SourceFile[]): RouteTable;
689
+ /**
690
+ * The route a given file is reachable at, if any.
691
+ *
692
+ * Matches on the declaring file only. A helper imported BY a route handler is
693
+ * reachable too, but proving that needs an import graph — claiming it from a
694
+ * filename match would attach confident, wrong URLs to real findings, which is
695
+ * the failure mode every gate above exists to prevent.
696
+ */
697
+ declare function routeForFile(table: RouteTable, filePath: string): AppRoute | undefined;
698
+
581
699
  /**
582
700
  * URL recon — what can be learned about a deployed app from what it already
583
701
  * serves the public.
@@ -807,4 +925,4 @@ declare function getObjectProperty(node: ObjectExpression, key: string): {
807
925
  /** Does this CallExpression spread an expression `matcher` returns true for? */
808
926
  declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => boolean): boolean;
809
927
 
810
- export { type AIFilterResult, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
928
+ export { type AIFilterResult, type AppRoute, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, FREE_RULE_COUNT, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, PRO_RULE_COUNT, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RouteFramework, type RouteTable, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, TOTAL_RULE_COUNT, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, accountStateFromWebStorage, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, entitlementFromWebStorage, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractRoutes, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, routeForFile, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };