xploitscan-shared-rules 1.16.0 → 1.18.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.cjs CHANGED
@@ -30,8 +30,11 @@ var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: tru
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  // src/index.ts
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  var index_exports = {};
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  __export(index_exports, {
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+ FREE_RULE_COUNT: () => FREE_RULE_COUNT,
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  NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS: () => NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS,
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+ PRO_RULE_COUNT: () => PRO_RULE_COUNT,
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  RULE_IMPACTS: () => RULE_IMPACTS,
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+ TOTAL_RULE_COUNT: () => TOTAL_RULE_COUNT,
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  allCustomRules: () => allCustomRules,
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  allRules: () => allRules,
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  androidDebuggable: () => androidDebuggable,
@@ -1470,6 +1473,80 @@ var exposedEnvFile = {
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  }];
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  }
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  };
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+ var SUPABASE_EDGE_FN_RE = /(?:^|\/)supabase\/functions\/[^/]+\/.*\.(?:m?[jt]s)$/;
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+ function isDenoEdgeEntry(codeOnly) {
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+ if (/\bDeno\s*\.\s*serve\s*\(/.test(codeOnly)) return true;
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+ const importsStdServe = /from\s+["']https?:\/\/deno\.land\/[^"']{0,120}\/http\/server(?:\.ts)?["']/.test(codeOnly) || /from\s+["'](?:jsr:)?@std\/http[^"']{0,40}["']/.test(codeOnly);
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+ return importsStdServe && /(?<![.\w])serve\s*\(/.test(codeOnly);
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+ }
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+ var DENO_EDGE_ENTRY_RE = /(?:\bDeno\s*\.\s*serve|(?<![.\w])serve)\s*\(/g;
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+ var EDGE_WEAK_AUTH_HINTS = [
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+ // WEAK_AUTH — the author touched the caller's identity somehow.
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+ // Covers the classifier's `/\bheaders\s*(?:\.\s*get\s*\(\s*)?["'`]?[Aa]uthorization/`
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+ // via the plain `authorization` token.
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+ /\bauthorization\b/i,
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+ /\bbearer\b/i,
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+ /\btoken\b/i,
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+ /\bsession\b/i,
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+ /\bapi[_-]?key\b/i,
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+ /\buser\b/,
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+ // Beyond the classifier's WEAK_AUTH list — these are strong-auth or
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+ // ownership signals there, and suppressing on them here can only remove
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+ // findings.
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+ /\b401\b/,
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+ /\b403\b/,
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+ /\bunauthori[sz]ed\b/i,
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+ /\bforbidden\b/i,
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+ /\bgetSession\b/,
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+ /\bgetClaims\b/,
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+ // RLS_DELEGATED — the database is the gate
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+ /\bcreateServerClient\s*\(/,
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+ /\bcreateRouteHandlerClient\s*\(/,
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+ /\bcreateServerComponentClient\s*\(/,
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+ /\bpersistSession\b/,
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+ // SIGNATURE_VERIFY — a receiver that authenticates its caller with a
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+ // signature or a shared secret rather than a session. Matched on content
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+ // rather than on the function's name, because the name is only a
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+ // convention: an edge function called `sync-inventory` can still be a
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+ // signed webhook receiver, and flagging it for "missing authentication"
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+ // would be wrong in the most embarrassing possible way.
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+ /\bconstructEvent\w*\s*\(/,
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+ /\bcreateHmac\s*\(/,
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+ // `hmac` bare, not just Node's `createHmac`. Deno edge functions verify
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+ // signatures with Web Crypto — `crypto.subtle.importKey(…, { name: "HMAC" })`
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+ // — which contains no other token on this list. Its absence flagged
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+ // correctly-signed receivers, which is the worst false positive this rule
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+ // can produce.
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+ /\bhmac\b/i,
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+ /\btimingSafeEqual\s*\(/,
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+ /\bsvix\b/i,
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+ /\bWebhook\s*\(\s*\w{0,64}SECRET/i,
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+ // Header names, quoted or bare. The quoted form below requires the literal
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+ // to END at `-signature`, so it misses `"X-Hub-Signature-256"` — the header
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+ // GitHub actually sends.
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+ /\bx-hub-signature\b/i,
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+ /\bx-signature\b/i,
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+ /\bstripe-signature\b/i,
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+ /\bverifyHeader\s*\(/,
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+ /\bverifySignature\b/i,
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+ /\bwebhook[_-]?secret\b/i,
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+ /\bsigning[_-]?secret\b/i,
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+ // Beyond the classifier's SIGNATURE_VERIFY list.
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+ /["'`][\w-]*-signature["'`]/i,
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+ /\b\w*(?:webhook|shared|signing|cron|admin|internal)[_-]?secret\b/i
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+ ];
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+ var EDGE_PUBLIC_PATH_RE = /(^|[/_-])(health(?:z|check)?|ping|status|version|readyz|livez|robots|sitemap|manifest|favicon|opengraph|og-image|og|rss|feed|_?static|public|metrics)([/_.-]|$)/i;
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+ var EDGE_AUTH_FLOW_PATH_RE = /(^|[/_[-])(auth|login|signin|sign-in|signup|sign-up|register|logout|signout|sign-out|callback|oauth|sso|session|csrf|reset-password|forgot-password|forgot|magic-?link|verify-?email|confirm|nextauth|otp|invite|token)([/\]_.-]|$)/i;
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+ var EDGE_CRON_PATH_RE = /(^|[/_-])(cron|jobs?|scheduled?|tasks?)([/_.-]|$)/i;
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+ function isPublicByDesignEdgePath(filePath) {
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+ return EDGE_PUBLIC_PATH_RE.test(filePath) || EDGE_AUTH_FLOW_PATH_RE.test(filePath) || EDGE_CRON_PATH_RE.test(filePath);
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+ }
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+ function stripCorsHeaderList(codeOnly) {
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+ return codeOnly.replace(
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+ /["'`]?Access-Control-(?:Allow|Expose)-Headers["'`]?\s*:\s*["'`][^"'`]*["'`]/gi,
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+ ""
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+ );
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+ }
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  var missingAuthMiddleware = {
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  id: "VC003",
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  title: "API Route Missing Authentication",
@@ -1481,14 +1558,19 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
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  const routePatterns = [
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  // Express/Hono style
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  /\.(get|post|put|patch|delete)\s*\(\s*["'`][^"'`]+["'`]\s*,\s*(?:async\s+)?\(?(?:req|c|ctx)/gi,
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- // Next.js API routes
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+ // Next.js API routes — named function declaration
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  /export\s+(?:async\s+)?function\s+(?:GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)\s*\(/gi
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  ];
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+ if (/(?:^|\/)(?:src\/)?app\/(?:.*\/)?route\.(?:m?[jt]sx?)$/.test(filePath)) {
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+ routePatterns.push(
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+ /export\s+const\s+(?:GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,120})?=\s*(?:async\s*)?(?:function\b|\()/g
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+ );
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+ }
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  if (isTestFile(filePath)) return [];
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  if (filePath.match(/\.(md|txt|rst|html|css|json|yaml|yml)$/)) return [];
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  const isAuthRoute = /\/auth\/|\/login|\/signup|\/register|\/logout|\/password\/|\/forgot|\/reset/i.test(filePath);
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  if (isAuthRoute) return [];
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- const isWebhookRoute = /\/webhook/i.test(filePath);
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+ const isWebhookRoute = /\/webhook/i.test(filePath) || /(?:^|[/_-])webhooks?(?:[/_.-]|$)/i.test(filePath);
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  if (isWebhookRoute) return [];
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  const codeOnly = content.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "").replace(/(^|[^:])\/\/.*$/gm, "$1").replace(/^\s*#.*$/gm, "");
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  const authPatterns = [
@@ -1533,6 +1615,21 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
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  )
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  );
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  }
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+ if (matches.length === 0 && SUPABASE_EDGE_FN_RE.test(filePath) && isDenoEdgeEntry(codeOnly) && !isPublicByDesignEdgePath(filePath)) {
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+ const withoutCors = stripCorsHeaderList(codeOnly);
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+ const hasWeakHint = EDGE_WEAK_AUTH_HINTS.some((p) => p.test(withoutCors));
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+ if (!hasWeakHint) {
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+ matches.push(
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+ ...findMatches(
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+ content,
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+ DENO_EDGE_ENTRY_RE,
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+ missingAuthMiddleware,
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+ filePath,
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+ () => "This edge function does not establish who is calling it. Read the caller's token from the Authorization header and resolve it (`const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser(token)`), or build the Supabase client with that token so row-level security scopes every query to the caller. If the endpoint is public by design, add an inline `// VC003-OK: <reason>` comment above the handler to silence."
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+ )
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+ );
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+ }
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+ }
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  return filterSilenced(matches, content, "VC003");
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  }
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  };
@@ -8933,6 +9030,11 @@ function runCustomRules(content, filePath, disabledRules = [], tier = "free", ex
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  return findings;
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  }
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+ // src/rule-counts.ts
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+ var FREE_RULE_COUNT = 30;
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+ var PRO_RULE_COUNT = 182;
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+ var TOTAL_RULE_COUNT = 212;
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+
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  // src/ai-fp-filter.ts
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  var import_sdk = __toESM(require("@anthropic-ai/sdk"), 1);
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  var REVIEW_SYSTEM_PROMPT = `You are reviewing security scan findings for false positives. Your job is to look at each finding and the surrounding code to determine if it's a REAL security vulnerability or a FALSE POSITIVE.
@@ -9487,8 +9589,11 @@ function extractScriptUrls(html, pageUrl, limit = 12) {
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  }
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  // Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
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  0 && (module.exports = {
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+ FREE_RULE_COUNT,
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  NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS,
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+ PRO_RULE_COUNT,
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  RULE_IMPACTS,
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+ TOTAL_RULE_COUNT,
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  allCustomRules,
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  allRules,
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  androidDebuggable,