xploitscan-shared-rules 1.16.0 → 1.17.0

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package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -1190,6 +1190,80 @@ var exposedEnvFile = {
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  }];
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  }
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  };
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+ var SUPABASE_EDGE_FN_RE = /(?:^|\/)supabase\/functions\/[^/]+\/.*\.(?:m?[jt]s)$/;
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+ function isDenoEdgeEntry(codeOnly) {
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+ if (/\bDeno\s*\.\s*serve\s*\(/.test(codeOnly)) return true;
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+ const importsStdServe = /from\s+["']https?:\/\/deno\.land\/[^"']{0,120}\/http\/server(?:\.ts)?["']/.test(codeOnly) || /from\s+["'](?:jsr:)?@std\/http[^"']{0,40}["']/.test(codeOnly);
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+ return importsStdServe && /(?<![.\w])serve\s*\(/.test(codeOnly);
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+ }
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+ var DENO_EDGE_ENTRY_RE = /(?:\bDeno\s*\.\s*serve|(?<![.\w])serve)\s*\(/g;
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+ var EDGE_WEAK_AUTH_HINTS = [
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+ // WEAK_AUTH — the author touched the caller's identity somehow.
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+ // Covers the classifier's `/\bheaders\s*(?:\.\s*get\s*\(\s*)?["'`]?[Aa]uthorization/`
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+ // via the plain `authorization` token.
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+ /\bauthorization\b/i,
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+ /\bbearer\b/i,
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+ /\btoken\b/i,
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+ /\bsession\b/i,
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+ /\bapi[_-]?key\b/i,
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+ /\buser\b/,
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+ // Beyond the classifier's WEAK_AUTH list — these are strong-auth or
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+ // ownership signals there, and suppressing on them here can only remove
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+ // findings.
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+ /\b401\b/,
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+ /\b403\b/,
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+ /\bunauthori[sz]ed\b/i,
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+ /\bforbidden\b/i,
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+ /\bgetSession\b/,
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+ /\bgetClaims\b/,
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+ // RLS_DELEGATED — the database is the gate
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+ /\bcreateServerClient\s*\(/,
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+ /\bcreateRouteHandlerClient\s*\(/,
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+ /\bcreateServerComponentClient\s*\(/,
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+ /\bpersistSession\b/,
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+ // SIGNATURE_VERIFY — a receiver that authenticates its caller with a
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+ // signature or a shared secret rather than a session. Matched on content
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+ // rather than on the function's name, because the name is only a
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+ // convention: an edge function called `sync-inventory` can still be a
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+ // signed webhook receiver, and flagging it for "missing authentication"
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+ // would be wrong in the most embarrassing possible way.
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+ /\bconstructEvent\w*\s*\(/,
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+ /\bcreateHmac\s*\(/,
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+ // `hmac` bare, not just Node's `createHmac`. Deno edge functions verify
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+ // signatures with Web Crypto — `crypto.subtle.importKey(…, { name: "HMAC" })`
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+ // — which contains no other token on this list. Its absence flagged
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+ // correctly-signed receivers, which is the worst false positive this rule
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+ // can produce.
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+ /\bhmac\b/i,
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+ /\btimingSafeEqual\s*\(/,
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+ /\bsvix\b/i,
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+ /\bWebhook\s*\(\s*\w{0,64}SECRET/i,
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+ // Header names, quoted or bare. The quoted form below requires the literal
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+ // to END at `-signature`, so it misses `"X-Hub-Signature-256"` — the header
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+ // GitHub actually sends.
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+ /\bx-hub-signature\b/i,
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+ /\bx-signature\b/i,
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+ /\bstripe-signature\b/i,
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+ /\bverifyHeader\s*\(/,
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+ /\bverifySignature\b/i,
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+ /\bwebhook[_-]?secret\b/i,
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+ /\bsigning[_-]?secret\b/i,
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+ // Beyond the classifier's SIGNATURE_VERIFY list.
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+ /["'`][\w-]*-signature["'`]/i,
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+ /\b\w*(?:webhook|shared|signing|cron|admin|internal)[_-]?secret\b/i
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+ ];
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+ var EDGE_PUBLIC_PATH_RE = /(^|[/_-])(health(?:z|check)?|ping|status|version|readyz|livez|robots|sitemap|manifest|favicon|opengraph|og-image|og|rss|feed|_?static|public|metrics)([/_.-]|$)/i;
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+ var EDGE_AUTH_FLOW_PATH_RE = /(^|[/_[-])(auth|login|signin|sign-in|signup|sign-up|register|logout|signout|sign-out|callback|oauth|sso|session|csrf|reset-password|forgot-password|forgot|magic-?link|verify-?email|confirm|nextauth|otp|invite|token)([/\]_.-]|$)/i;
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+ var EDGE_CRON_PATH_RE = /(^|[/_-])(cron|jobs?|scheduled?|tasks?)([/_.-]|$)/i;
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+ function isPublicByDesignEdgePath(filePath) {
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+ return EDGE_PUBLIC_PATH_RE.test(filePath) || EDGE_AUTH_FLOW_PATH_RE.test(filePath) || EDGE_CRON_PATH_RE.test(filePath);
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+ }
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+ function stripCorsHeaderList(codeOnly) {
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+ return codeOnly.replace(
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+ /["'`]?Access-Control-(?:Allow|Expose)-Headers["'`]?\s*:\s*["'`][^"'`]*["'`]/gi,
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+ ""
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+ );
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+ }
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  var missingAuthMiddleware = {
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  id: "VC003",
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  title: "API Route Missing Authentication",
@@ -1201,14 +1275,19 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
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  const routePatterns = [
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  // Express/Hono style
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  /\.(get|post|put|patch|delete)\s*\(\s*["'`][^"'`]+["'`]\s*,\s*(?:async\s+)?\(?(?:req|c|ctx)/gi,
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- // Next.js API routes
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+ // Next.js API routes — named function declaration
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  /export\s+(?:async\s+)?function\s+(?:GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)\s*\(/gi
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  ];
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+ if (/(?:^|\/)(?:src\/)?app\/(?:.*\/)?route\.(?:m?[jt]sx?)$/.test(filePath)) {
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+ routePatterns.push(
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+ /export\s+const\s+(?:GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,120})?=\s*(?:async\s*)?(?:function\b|\()/g
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+ );
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+ }
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  if (isTestFile(filePath)) return [];
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  if (filePath.match(/\.(md|txt|rst|html|css|json|yaml|yml)$/)) return [];
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  const isAuthRoute = /\/auth\/|\/login|\/signup|\/register|\/logout|\/password\/|\/forgot|\/reset/i.test(filePath);
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  if (isAuthRoute) return [];
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- const isWebhookRoute = /\/webhook/i.test(filePath);
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+ const isWebhookRoute = /\/webhook/i.test(filePath) || /(?:^|[/_-])webhooks?(?:[/_.-]|$)/i.test(filePath);
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  if (isWebhookRoute) return [];
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  const codeOnly = content.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "").replace(/(^|[^:])\/\/.*$/gm, "$1").replace(/^\s*#.*$/gm, "");
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  const authPatterns = [
@@ -1253,6 +1332,21 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
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  )
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  );
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  }
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+ if (matches.length === 0 && SUPABASE_EDGE_FN_RE.test(filePath) && isDenoEdgeEntry(codeOnly) && !isPublicByDesignEdgePath(filePath)) {
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+ const withoutCors = stripCorsHeaderList(codeOnly);
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+ const hasWeakHint = EDGE_WEAK_AUTH_HINTS.some((p) => p.test(withoutCors));
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+ if (!hasWeakHint) {
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+ matches.push(
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+ ...findMatches(
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+ content,
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+ DENO_EDGE_ENTRY_RE,
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+ missingAuthMiddleware,
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+ filePath,
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+ () => "This edge function does not establish who is calling it. Read the caller's token from the Authorization header and resolve it (`const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser(token)`), or build the Supabase client with that token so row-level security scopes every query to the caller. If the endpoint is public by design, add an inline `// VC003-OK: <reason>` comment above the handler to silence."
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+ )
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+ );
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+ }
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+ }
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  return filterSilenced(matches, content, "VC003");
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  }
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  };