xploitscan-shared-rules 1.15.1 → 1.16.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.d.cts CHANGED
@@ -578,6 +578,124 @@ declare function scanEntropy(files: {
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  content: string;
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  }[]): Finding[];
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+ /**
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+ * URL recon — what can be learned about a deployed app from what it already
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+ * serves the public.
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+ *
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+ * Everything here is a PURE function over strings the caller has already
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+ * fetched. No network access lives in this module, which is what makes the
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+ * detection logic unit-testable and keeps the fetching — the dangerous part —
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+ * in one auditable place in the caller.
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+ *
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+ * Scope, deliberately narrow:
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+ *
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+ * IN Reading what a site voluntarily serves to any browser: its HTML, its
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+ * JavaScript bundles, its response headers. This is the same data a
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+ * visitor's devtools shows, and no more.
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+ *
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+ * OUT Probing for vulnerabilities. No injection payloads, no auth-bypass
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+ * attempts, no querying somebody's database with a key we found. Those
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+ * are unauthorized security testing against a host the operator has not
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+ * proven they own, and this product does not do that.
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+ *
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+ * The distinction matters commercially too: "your source maps are public" is a
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+ * finding we can hand to a stranger safely, because acting on it requires
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+ * access they already have. "Your database is unprotected, here is the key" is
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+ * an attack map.
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+ */
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+ /**
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+ * Is a dotted-quad or IPv6 literal outside the publicly routable ranges?
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+ *
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+ * Exported because the caller MUST re-check this against the address DNS
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+ * actually resolved to, not merely against the hostname the user typed.
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+ * Checking only the hostname is defeated by pointing `evil.example.com` at
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+ * 169.254.169.254 — the DNS-rebinding shape — and by any of the dozens of
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+ * decimal / octal / IPv4-mapped-IPv6 spellings of a private address.
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+ */
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+ declare function isPrivateAddress(address: string): boolean;
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+ interface TargetRejection {
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+ ok: false;
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+ reason: string;
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+ }
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+ interface TargetAccepted {
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+ ok: true;
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+ url: string;
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+ hostname: string;
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+ }
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+ type TargetCheck = TargetAccepted | TargetRejection;
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+ /**
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+ * Normalise and vet a user-supplied scan target.
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+ *
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+ * Accepts bare domains ("example.com") because that is what people paste, and
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+ * upgrades them to https. Rejects anything that is not a public http(s)
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+ * endpoint. This is a necessary gate, never a sufficient one — see
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+ * isPrivateAddress on why the resolved IP must be checked separately.
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+ */
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+ declare function parseScanTarget(input: string): TargetCheck;
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+ interface BuilderFingerprint {
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+ id: string;
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+ name: string;
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+ /** What we actually saw. Shown to the user — never assert without evidence. */
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+ evidence: string;
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+ }
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+ declare function detectBuilder(haystack: string): BuilderFingerprint | null;
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+ /**
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+ * Extract `//# sourceMappingURL=` references from a bundle.
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+ *
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+ * This is the highest-value thing a URL scan can find. A production build that
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+ * ships its source maps is publishing its original TypeScript — comments,
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+ * internal names, dead code, and often the server-side helpers that were
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+ * tree-shaken from the runtime but not from the map. It is a real finding on
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+ * its own, and it is also the bridge to the actual product: given the maps we
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+ * can reconstruct sources and run the full rule set against real code, with no
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+ * repository access at all.
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+ *
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+ * Data-URI maps are ignored: inline maps are a bundler default in development
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+ * and expose nothing that the served bundle did not already contain.
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+ */
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+ declare function findSourceMapRefs(js: string, bundleUrl: string): string[];
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+ interface ExposedConfig {
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+ kind: "supabase" | "firebase";
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+ /** Non-secret identifier, safe to echo back (project ref, project id). */
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+ projectRef: string | null;
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+ detail: string;
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Backend configuration that a client bundle necessarily contains.
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+ *
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+ * IMPORTANT: finding these is NOT a vulnerability report. A Supabase anon key
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+ * is designed to ship to the browser; every Supabase app has one. What matters
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+ * is that it means the app's entire data-access security rests on row-level
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+ * security being configured correctly — which cannot be determined from
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+ * outside without querying their database, and we will not do that.
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+ *
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+ * So this is reported as an architectural fact plus a question the owner
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+ * should answer, never as "you are exposed". Overstating it would be both
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+ * wrong and the kind of scare-marketing this product exists to be the opposite
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+ * of.
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+ *
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+ * A `service_role` key is a different matter entirely — that one is never
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+ * supposed to reach a browser — and is flagged by the existing VC004 rule when
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+ * the reconstructed source is scanned.
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+ */
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+ declare function detectExposedConfig(js: string): ExposedConfig[];
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+ interface HeaderFinding {
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+ header: string;
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+ severity: "medium" | "low" | "info";
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+ message: string;
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Header hygiene. Deliberately the LAST thing reported, and never the headline.
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+ *
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+ * securityheaders.com and Mozilla Observatory do this for free and have done
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+ * for a decade. Leading with it would tell a visitor we are a commodity tool
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+ * competing with something free, when the differentiator is everything above.
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+ * It is included because its absence is conspicuous, not because it sells.
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+ */
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+ declare function assessHeaders(headers: Record<string, string>): HeaderFinding[];
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+ /** Script `src` URLs in an HTML document, resolved against the page URL. */
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+ declare function extractScriptUrls(html: string, pageUrl: string, limit?: number): string[];
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+
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  /**
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  * Centralized Babel parser with per-file caching.
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  *
@@ -689,4 +807,4 @@ declare function getObjectProperty(node: ObjectExpression, key: string): {
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  /** Does this CallExpression spread an expression `matcher` returns true for? */
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  declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => boolean): boolean;
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- export { type AIFilterResult, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type Exposure, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, type TaintMap, type VibePlatform, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, filterFalsePositives, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
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+ export { type AIFilterResult, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -578,6 +578,124 @@ declare function scanEntropy(files: {
578
578
  content: string;
579
579
  }[]): Finding[];
580
580
 
581
+ /**
582
+ * URL recon — what can be learned about a deployed app from what it already
583
+ * serves the public.
584
+ *
585
+ * Everything here is a PURE function over strings the caller has already
586
+ * fetched. No network access lives in this module, which is what makes the
587
+ * detection logic unit-testable and keeps the fetching — the dangerous part —
588
+ * in one auditable place in the caller.
589
+ *
590
+ * Scope, deliberately narrow:
591
+ *
592
+ * IN Reading what a site voluntarily serves to any browser: its HTML, its
593
+ * JavaScript bundles, its response headers. This is the same data a
594
+ * visitor's devtools shows, and no more.
595
+ *
596
+ * OUT Probing for vulnerabilities. No injection payloads, no auth-bypass
597
+ * attempts, no querying somebody's database with a key we found. Those
598
+ * are unauthorized security testing against a host the operator has not
599
+ * proven they own, and this product does not do that.
600
+ *
601
+ * The distinction matters commercially too: "your source maps are public" is a
602
+ * finding we can hand to a stranger safely, because acting on it requires
603
+ * access they already have. "Your database is unprotected, here is the key" is
604
+ * an attack map.
605
+ */
606
+ /**
607
+ * Is a dotted-quad or IPv6 literal outside the publicly routable ranges?
608
+ *
609
+ * Exported because the caller MUST re-check this against the address DNS
610
+ * actually resolved to, not merely against the hostname the user typed.
611
+ * Checking only the hostname is defeated by pointing `evil.example.com` at
612
+ * 169.254.169.254 — the DNS-rebinding shape — and by any of the dozens of
613
+ * decimal / octal / IPv4-mapped-IPv6 spellings of a private address.
614
+ */
615
+ declare function isPrivateAddress(address: string): boolean;
616
+ interface TargetRejection {
617
+ ok: false;
618
+ reason: string;
619
+ }
620
+ interface TargetAccepted {
621
+ ok: true;
622
+ url: string;
623
+ hostname: string;
624
+ }
625
+ type TargetCheck = TargetAccepted | TargetRejection;
626
+ /**
627
+ * Normalise and vet a user-supplied scan target.
628
+ *
629
+ * Accepts bare domains ("example.com") because that is what people paste, and
630
+ * upgrades them to https. Rejects anything that is not a public http(s)
631
+ * endpoint. This is a necessary gate, never a sufficient one — see
632
+ * isPrivateAddress on why the resolved IP must be checked separately.
633
+ */
634
+ declare function parseScanTarget(input: string): TargetCheck;
635
+ interface BuilderFingerprint {
636
+ id: string;
637
+ name: string;
638
+ /** What we actually saw. Shown to the user — never assert without evidence. */
639
+ evidence: string;
640
+ }
641
+ declare function detectBuilder(haystack: string): BuilderFingerprint | null;
642
+ /**
643
+ * Extract `//# sourceMappingURL=` references from a bundle.
644
+ *
645
+ * This is the highest-value thing a URL scan can find. A production build that
646
+ * ships its source maps is publishing its original TypeScript — comments,
647
+ * internal names, dead code, and often the server-side helpers that were
648
+ * tree-shaken from the runtime but not from the map. It is a real finding on
649
+ * its own, and it is also the bridge to the actual product: given the maps we
650
+ * can reconstruct sources and run the full rule set against real code, with no
651
+ * repository access at all.
652
+ *
653
+ * Data-URI maps are ignored: inline maps are a bundler default in development
654
+ * and expose nothing that the served bundle did not already contain.
655
+ */
656
+ declare function findSourceMapRefs(js: string, bundleUrl: string): string[];
657
+ interface ExposedConfig {
658
+ kind: "supabase" | "firebase";
659
+ /** Non-secret identifier, safe to echo back (project ref, project id). */
660
+ projectRef: string | null;
661
+ detail: string;
662
+ }
663
+ /**
664
+ * Backend configuration that a client bundle necessarily contains.
665
+ *
666
+ * IMPORTANT: finding these is NOT a vulnerability report. A Supabase anon key
667
+ * is designed to ship to the browser; every Supabase app has one. What matters
668
+ * is that it means the app's entire data-access security rests on row-level
669
+ * security being configured correctly — which cannot be determined from
670
+ * outside without querying their database, and we will not do that.
671
+ *
672
+ * So this is reported as an architectural fact plus a question the owner
673
+ * should answer, never as "you are exposed". Overstating it would be both
674
+ * wrong and the kind of scare-marketing this product exists to be the opposite
675
+ * of.
676
+ *
677
+ * A `service_role` key is a different matter entirely — that one is never
678
+ * supposed to reach a browser — and is flagged by the existing VC004 rule when
679
+ * the reconstructed source is scanned.
680
+ */
681
+ declare function detectExposedConfig(js: string): ExposedConfig[];
682
+ interface HeaderFinding {
683
+ header: string;
684
+ severity: "medium" | "low" | "info";
685
+ message: string;
686
+ }
687
+ /**
688
+ * Header hygiene. Deliberately the LAST thing reported, and never the headline.
689
+ *
690
+ * securityheaders.com and Mozilla Observatory do this for free and have done
691
+ * for a decade. Leading with it would tell a visitor we are a commodity tool
692
+ * competing with something free, when the differentiator is everything above.
693
+ * It is included because its absence is conspicuous, not because it sells.
694
+ */
695
+ declare function assessHeaders(headers: Record<string, string>): HeaderFinding[];
696
+ /** Script `src` URLs in an HTML document, resolved against the page URL. */
697
+ declare function extractScriptUrls(html: string, pageUrl: string, limit?: number): string[];
698
+
581
699
  /**
582
700
  * Centralized Babel parser with per-file caching.
583
701
  *
@@ -689,4 +807,4 @@ declare function getObjectProperty(node: ObjectExpression, key: string): {
689
807
  /** Does this CallExpression spread an expression `matcher` returns true for? */
690
808
  declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => boolean): boolean;
691
809
 
692
- export { type AIFilterResult, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type Exposure, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, type TaintMap, type VibePlatform, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, filterFalsePositives, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
810
+ export { type AIFilterResult, type BuilderFingerprint, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type ExposedConfig, type Exposure, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, type HeaderFinding, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, type TaintMap, type TargetCheck, type VibePlatform, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, assessHeaders, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectBuilder, detectExposedConfig, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, extractScriptUrls, filterFalsePositives, findSourceMapRefs, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isPrivateAddress, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, parseScanTarget, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -373,6 +373,26 @@ function vendoredReason(filePath) {
373
373
  return null;
374
374
  }
375
375
 
376
+ // src/silencing.ts
377
+ function isInlineSilenced(content, matchIndex, ruleId) {
378
+ const lines = content.split("\n");
379
+ const matchLineNum = content.substring(0, matchIndex).split("\n").length - 1;
380
+ return isLineSilenced(lines, matchLineNum, ruleId);
381
+ }
382
+ function isLineSilenced(lines, lineIdx, ruleId) {
383
+ const matchLine = lines[lineIdx] ?? "";
384
+ const marker = new RegExp(`(?://|/\\*|#)\\s*(?:${ruleId}|scanner)-OK\\b`, "i");
385
+ if (marker.test(matchLine)) return true;
386
+ const COMMENT_LINE = /^\s*[{(]?\s*(?:\/\/|#|\/\*|\*)/;
387
+ const MAX_BLOCK_LINES = 20;
388
+ for (let i = lineIdx - 1, seen = 0; i >= 0 && seen < MAX_BLOCK_LINES; i--, seen++) {
389
+ const line = lines[i] ?? "";
390
+ if (marker.test(line)) return true;
391
+ if (!COMMENT_LINE.test(line)) break;
392
+ }
393
+ return false;
394
+ }
395
+
376
396
  // src/ast/parse.ts
377
397
  import { parse } from "@babel/parser";
378
398
  var MAX_CACHE = 256;
@@ -971,17 +991,6 @@ function isInsideFixMessage(content, matchIndex) {
971
991
  const lineText = content.substring(lineStart, content.indexOf("\n", matchIndex));
972
992
  return /(?:fix|description|message|suggestion|hint|help|example|doc|comment)\s*[:=]\s*["'`]/i.test(lineText) || /return\s*["'`].*\b(?:Use|Replace|Add|Move|Set|Enable|Disable|Never|Don't|Do not|Instead)\b/i.test(lineText);
973
993
  }
974
- function isInlineSilenced(content, matchIndex, ruleId) {
975
- const lines = content.split("\n");
976
- const matchLineNum = content.substring(0, matchIndex).split("\n").length - 1;
977
- const matchLine = lines[matchLineNum] ?? "";
978
- const prevLine = matchLineNum > 0 ? lines[matchLineNum - 1] ?? "" : "";
979
- const marker = new RegExp(
980
- `(?://|/\\*|#)\\s*(?:${ruleId}|scanner)-OK\\b`,
981
- "i"
982
- );
983
- return marker.test(matchLine) || marker.test(prevLine);
984
- }
985
994
  function filterSilenced(matches, content, ruleId) {
986
995
  if (matches.length === 0) return matches;
987
996
  const lines = content.split("\n");
@@ -1240,11 +1249,11 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
1240
1249
  pattern,
1241
1250
  missingAuthMiddleware,
1242
1251
  filePath,
1243
- () => "Add authentication middleware to protect this route. Check the user's session/token before processing the request."
1252
+ () => "Add authentication middleware to protect this route. Check the user's session/token before processing the request. If the endpoint is public by design (an OG image, an embeddable badge, a health check), add an inline `// VC003-OK: <reason>` comment above the handler to silence."
1244
1253
  )
1245
1254
  );
1246
1255
  }
1247
- return matches;
1256
+ return filterSilenced(matches, content, "VC003");
1248
1257
  }
1249
1258
  };
1250
1259
  var supabaseNoRLS = {
@@ -9000,6 +9009,7 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
9000
9009
  if (HASH_LIKE_VAR_NAMES.test(varName) && (isHex || isBase64)) continue;
9001
9010
  const isLikelySecret = SECRET_VAR_NAMES.test(varName);
9002
9011
  if (entropy < 4.5 && !isLikelySecret) continue;
9012
+ if (isLineSilenced(lines, i, "ENTROPY")) continue;
9003
9013
  const masked = value.substring(0, 6) + "..." + value.substring(value.length - 4);
9004
9014
  findings.push({
9005
9015
  ...vendored ? { vendored: true } : {},
@@ -9011,7 +9021,7 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
9011
9021
  file: filePath,
9012
9022
  line: i + 1,
9013
9023
  snippet: getSnippet2(content, i + 1),
9014
- fix: "If this is a secret, move it to an environment variable. If it's not a secret (e.g., hash, encoded data), add it to .xploitscanignore.",
9024
+ fix: "If this is a secret, move it to an environment variable. If it's not a secret (e.g. a hash, encoded data, or a public verification token), add an inline `// ENTROPY-OK: <reason>` comment above the line, or add the file to .xploitscanignore.",
9015
9025
  category: "Secrets",
9016
9026
  source: "custom",
9017
9027
  owasp: "A02:2021",
@@ -9022,12 +9032,186 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
9022
9032
  }
9023
9033
  return findings;
9024
9034
  }
9035
+
9036
+ // src/url-recon.ts
9037
+ var BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
9038
+ "localhost",
9039
+ "127.0.0.1",
9040
+ "0.0.0.0",
9041
+ "::1",
9042
+ "[::1]",
9043
+ "metadata.google.internal",
9044
+ "metadata.goog",
9045
+ "instance-data"
9046
+ ]);
9047
+ var BLOCKED_SUFFIXES = [".local", ".localhost", ".internal", ".home.arpa", ".cluster.local"];
9048
+ function isPrivateAddress(address) {
9049
+ const addr = address.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "");
9050
+ const mapped = addr.match(/^::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/);
9051
+ if (mapped) return isPrivateAddress(mapped[1]);
9052
+ const v4 = addr.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/);
9053
+ if (v4) {
9054
+ const [a, b] = [Number(v4[1]), Number(v4[2])];
9055
+ if ([a, Number(v4[2]), Number(v4[3]), Number(v4[4])].some((o) => o > 255)) return true;
9056
+ if (a === 0) return true;
9057
+ if (a === 10) return true;
9058
+ if (a === 127) return true;
9059
+ if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true;
9060
+ if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true;
9061
+ if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true;
9062
+ if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true;
9063
+ if (a === 192 && b === 0) return true;
9064
+ if (a === 198 && (b === 18 || b === 19)) return true;
9065
+ if (a >= 224) return true;
9066
+ return false;
9067
+ }
9068
+ if (addr === "::" || addr === "::1") return true;
9069
+ if (/^f[cd][0-9a-f]{2}:/.test(addr)) return true;
9070
+ if (/^fe[89ab][0-9a-f]:/.test(addr)) return true;
9071
+ return false;
9072
+ }
9073
+ function parseScanTarget(input) {
9074
+ const raw = (input || "").trim();
9075
+ if (!raw) return { ok: false, reason: "Enter a URL to scan." };
9076
+ if (raw.length > 2048) return { ok: false, reason: "That URL is too long." };
9077
+ const withScheme = /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//i.test(raw) ? raw : `https://${raw}`;
9078
+ let url;
9079
+ try {
9080
+ url = new URL(withScheme);
9081
+ } catch {
9082
+ return { ok: false, reason: "That doesn't look like a valid URL." };
9083
+ }
9084
+ if (url.protocol !== "http:" && url.protocol !== "https:") {
9085
+ return { ok: false, reason: "Only http and https URLs can be scanned." };
9086
+ }
9087
+ if (url.username || url.password) {
9088
+ return { ok: false, reason: "Remove the username and password from the URL." };
9089
+ }
9090
+ if (url.port && url.port !== "80" && url.port !== "443") {
9091
+ return { ok: false, reason: "Only the standard web ports (80 and 443) can be scanned." };
9092
+ }
9093
+ const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase();
9094
+ if (BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES.has(host)) {
9095
+ return { ok: false, reason: "That address is not publicly reachable." };
9096
+ }
9097
+ if (BLOCKED_SUFFIXES.some((s) => host.endsWith(s))) {
9098
+ return { ok: false, reason: "That address is not publicly reachable." };
9099
+ }
9100
+ if (isPrivateAddress(host)) {
9101
+ return { ok: false, reason: "That address is not publicly reachable." };
9102
+ }
9103
+ if (!host.includes(".")) {
9104
+ return { ok: false, reason: "Enter a full domain name." };
9105
+ }
9106
+ return { ok: true, url: url.toString(), hostname: host };
9107
+ }
9108
+ var BUILDER_SIGNATURES = [
9109
+ {
9110
+ id: "lovable",
9111
+ name: "Lovable",
9112
+ patterns: [/lovable-tagger/i, /lovable\.dev/i, /data-lov-id=/i, /gpteng\.co/i]
9113
+ },
9114
+ { id: "v0", name: "v0", patterns: [/v0-user-next/i, /v0\.dev/i, /_next\/static.*v0-/i] },
9115
+ { id: "bolt", name: "Bolt", patterns: [/bolt-vite-react/i, /stackblitz/i, /bolt\.new/i] },
9116
+ { id: "base44", name: "Base44", patterns: [/@base44\/sdk/i, /base44\.app/i, /base44\.com/i] }
9117
+ ];
9118
+ function detectBuilder(haystack) {
9119
+ for (const sig of BUILDER_SIGNATURES) {
9120
+ for (const p of sig.patterns) {
9121
+ const m = haystack.match(p);
9122
+ if (m) return { id: sig.id, name: sig.name, evidence: m[0].slice(0, 120) };
9123
+ }
9124
+ }
9125
+ return null;
9126
+ }
9127
+ function findSourceMapRefs(js, bundleUrl) {
9128
+ const out = [];
9129
+ const re = /[#@]\s*sourceMappingURL\s*=\s*([^\s*'"]+)/g;
9130
+ let m;
9131
+ while ((m = re.exec(js)) !== null) {
9132
+ const ref = m[1].trim();
9133
+ if (!ref || ref.startsWith("data:")) continue;
9134
+ try {
9135
+ out.push(new URL(ref, bundleUrl).toString());
9136
+ } catch {
9137
+ }
9138
+ }
9139
+ return [...new Set(out)];
9140
+ }
9141
+ function detectExposedConfig(js) {
9142
+ const out = [];
9143
+ const supabase = js.match(/https:\/\/([a-z0-9]{16,32})\.supabase\.co/i);
9144
+ if (supabase) {
9145
+ out.push({
9146
+ kind: "supabase",
9147
+ projectRef: supabase[1],
9148
+ detail: "A Supabase project URL is present in the client bundle. This is normal and expected \u2014 but it means row-level security is the only thing standing between a visitor and your data."
9149
+ });
9150
+ }
9151
+ const firebase = js.match(/["']?projectId["']?\s*:\s*["']([a-z0-9-]{4,60})["']/i);
9152
+ if (firebase && /firebase/i.test(js)) {
9153
+ out.push({
9154
+ kind: "firebase",
9155
+ projectRef: firebase[1],
9156
+ detail: "A Firebase project configuration is present in the client bundle. This is normal and expected \u2014 but it means your Firestore/Storage rules are the only access control."
9157
+ });
9158
+ }
9159
+ return out;
9160
+ }
9161
+ function assessHeaders(headers) {
9162
+ const h = {};
9163
+ for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(headers)) h[k.toLowerCase()] = v;
9164
+ const out = [];
9165
+ if (!h["content-security-policy"]) {
9166
+ out.push({
9167
+ header: "Content-Security-Policy",
9168
+ severity: "medium",
9169
+ message: "No CSP. A single injected script has nothing stopping it from loading or exfiltrating."
9170
+ });
9171
+ }
9172
+ if (!h["strict-transport-security"]) {
9173
+ out.push({
9174
+ header: "Strict-Transport-Security",
9175
+ severity: "medium",
9176
+ message: "No HSTS. A first visit over http can be intercepted before the redirect to https."
9177
+ });
9178
+ }
9179
+ if (!h["x-content-type-options"]) {
9180
+ out.push({
9181
+ header: "X-Content-Type-Options",
9182
+ severity: "low",
9183
+ message: "Missing nosniff. Browsers may re-interpret a response as a type you did not intend."
9184
+ });
9185
+ }
9186
+ if (!h["referrer-policy"]) {
9187
+ out.push({
9188
+ header: "Referrer-Policy",
9189
+ severity: "low",
9190
+ message: "No referrer policy. Full URLs \u2014 including any ids in the path \u2014 leak to third parties."
9191
+ });
9192
+ }
9193
+ return out;
9194
+ }
9195
+ function extractScriptUrls(html, pageUrl, limit = 12) {
9196
+ const out = [];
9197
+ const re = /<script\b[^>]*\bsrc\s*=\s*["']([^"']+)["']/gi;
9198
+ let m;
9199
+ while ((m = re.exec(html)) !== null && out.length < limit) {
9200
+ try {
9201
+ const u = new URL(m[1], pageUrl);
9202
+ if (u.protocol === "http:" || u.protocol === "https:") out.push(u.toString());
9203
+ } catch {
9204
+ }
9205
+ }
9206
+ return [...new Set(out)];
9207
+ }
9025
9208
  export {
9026
9209
  NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS,
9027
9210
  RULE_IMPACTS,
9028
9211
  allCustomRules,
9029
9212
  allRules,
9030
9213
  androidDebuggable,
9214
+ assessHeaders,
9031
9215
  blockingMainThread,
9032
9216
  buildTaintMap,
9033
9217
  calculateGrade,
@@ -9045,6 +9229,8 @@ export {
9045
9229
  corsWildcard,
9046
9230
  dangerousInnerHTML,
9047
9231
  deprecatedTLS,
9232
+ detectBuilder,
9233
+ detectExposedConfig,
9048
9234
  detectFramework,
9049
9235
  detectPlatform,
9050
9236
  disabledTLSVerification,
@@ -9073,7 +9259,9 @@ export {
9073
9259
  exposedServerActions,
9074
9260
  exposedSourceMaps,
9075
9261
  exposedStackTraces,
9262
+ extractScriptUrls,
9076
9263
  filterFalsePositives,
9264
+ findSourceMapRefs,
9077
9265
  firebaseClientConfig,
9078
9266
  flaskSecretKey,
9079
9267
  freeRules,
@@ -9150,6 +9338,7 @@ export {
9150
9338
  ipcPathTraversal,
9151
9339
  isCalleeNamed,
9152
9340
  isMethodCall,
9341
+ isPrivateAddress,
9153
9342
  isVendoredFinding,
9154
9343
  isVendoredPath,
9155
9344
  javaDeserialization,
@@ -9197,6 +9386,7 @@ export {
9197
9386
  openRedirectParams,
9198
9387
  overlyPermissiveIAM,
9199
9388
  parseFile,
9389
+ parseScanTarget,
9200
9390
  pathTraversal,
9201
9391
  pickleDeserialization,
9202
9392
  piiInLogs,