xploitscan-shared-rules 1.14.4 → 1.15.1

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.cjs CHANGED
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: tru
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  // src/index.ts
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  var index_exports = {};
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  __export(index_exports, {
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+ NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS: () => NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS,
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  RULE_IMPACTS: () => RULE_IMPACTS,
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  allCustomRules: () => allCustomRules,
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  allRules: () => allRules,
@@ -156,6 +157,8 @@ __export(index_exports, {
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  ipcPathTraversal: () => ipcPathTraversal,
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  isCalleeNamed: () => isCalleeNamed,
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  isMethodCall: () => isMethodCall,
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+ isVendoredFinding: () => isVendoredFinding,
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+ isVendoredPath: () => isVendoredPath,
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  javaDeserialization: () => javaDeserialization,
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  jwtAlgConfusion: () => jwtAlgConfusion,
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  k8sNoResourceLimits: () => k8sNoResourceLimits,
@@ -196,6 +199,7 @@ __export(index_exports, {
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  nPlusOneQuery: () => nPlusOneQuery,
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  nextPublicSecret: () => nextPublicSecret,
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  noRateLimiting: () => noRateLimiting,
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+ normalizeScanPath: () => normalizeScanPath,
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  nosqlInjection: () => nosqlInjection,
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  openRedirectParams: () => openRedirectParams,
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  overlyPermissiveIAM: () => overlyPermissiveIAM,
@@ -253,6 +257,7 @@ __export(index_exports, {
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  unvalidatedRedirect: () => unvalidatedRedirect,
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  vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter: () => vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter,
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  vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata: () => vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata,
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+ vendoredReason: () => vendoredReason,
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  visitBinary: () => visitBinary,
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  visitCalls: () => visitCalls,
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  vulnerableDependencies: () => vulnerableDependencies,
@@ -550,6 +555,97 @@ function classifyExposure(filePath) {
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  return "unknown";
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  }
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+ // src/vendored.ts
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+ var NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS = [
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+ // 1. vendored UI component libraries
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+ "**/components/ui/**",
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+ "**/ui/shadcn/**",
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+ "**/shadcn/ui/**",
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+ "**/shadcn/**",
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+ // 2. documentation prose
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+ "**/*.md",
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+ "**/*.mdx",
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+ // 3. AI-agent and editor tooling artifacts. Each gets a `**/`-prefixed form
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+ // as well as the root-anchored one: these directories turn up per-package
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+ // in a monorepo, and a finding's `file` is occasionally an absolute path,
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+ // which makes even a repo-root `.claude/` a nested segment.
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+ ".claude/**",
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+ ".agent/**",
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+ ".cursor/**",
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+ ".superpowers/**",
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+ ".windsurf/**",
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+ "**/.claude/**",
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+ "**/.agent/**",
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+ "**/.cursor/**",
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+ "**/.superpowers/**",
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+ "**/.windsurf/**",
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+ // 4. explicitly third-party or machine-generated trees
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+ "**/vendor/**",
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+ "**/vendored/**",
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+ "**/third_party/**",
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+ "**/generated/**",
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+ "**/__generated__/**"
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+ ];
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+ function globToRegExp(pattern) {
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+ const segments = pattern.split("/");
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+ let src = "^";
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+ for (let i = 0; i < segments.length; i++) {
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+ const seg = segments[i];
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+ const isLast = i === segments.length - 1;
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+ if (seg === "**") {
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+ src += isLast ? ".+" : "(?:[^/]+/)*";
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ src += seg.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, (ch) => ch === "*" ? "[^/]*" : "\\" + ch);
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+ if (!isLast) src += "/";
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+ }
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+ return new RegExp(src + "$", "i");
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+ }
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+ var NON_APP_MATCHERS = NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS.map(globToRegExp);
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+ function normalizeScanPath(filePath) {
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+ const raw = typeof filePath === "string" ? filePath : "";
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+ const trimmed = raw.trim();
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+ const looksWindows = !trimmed.includes("/") && trimmed.includes("\\");
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+ const withForwardSlashes = (looksWindows ? trimmed.replace(/\\/g, "/") : trimmed).replace(/^[A-Za-z]:\//, "/");
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+ const out = [];
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+ for (const segment of withForwardSlashes.split("/")) {
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+ if (segment === "" || segment === ".") continue;
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+ if (segment === "..") {
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+ if (out.length > 0 && out[out.length - 1] !== "..") out.pop();
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+ else out.push("..");
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ out.push(segment);
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+ }
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+ return out.join("/");
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+ }
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+ function isVendoredPath(filePath) {
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+ const normalized = normalizeScanPath(filePath);
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+ if (!normalized) return false;
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+ return NON_APP_MATCHERS.some((re) => re.test(normalized));
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+ }
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+ var HEURISTIC_SECRET_RULES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["ENTROPY"]);
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+ var ALWAYS_GRADED_RULES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["VC115", "VC062"]);
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+ function isAlwaysGraded(finding) {
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+ const rule = finding?.rule ?? "";
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+ if (ALWAYS_GRADED_RULES.has(rule)) return true;
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+ if (finding?.category !== "Secrets") return false;
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+ return !HEURISTIC_SECRET_RULES.has(rule);
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+ }
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+ function isVendoredFinding(finding) {
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+ if (isAlwaysGraded(finding)) return false;
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+ return isVendoredPath(finding?.file ?? "");
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+ }
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+ function vendoredReason(filePath) {
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+ const normalized = normalizeScanPath(filePath);
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+ if (!normalized) return null;
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+ if (/\.mdx?$/.test(normalized)) return "documentation";
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+ if (/(^|\/)(components\/ui|shadcn)(\/|$)/.test(normalized)) return "vendored UI component library";
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+ if (/(^|\/)\.(claude|agent|cursor|superpowers|windsurf)(\/|$)/.test(normalized)) return "AI-agent tooling artifact";
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+ if (isVendoredPath(normalized)) return "third-party or generated code";
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+ return null;
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+ }
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+
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  // src/ast/parse.ts
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  var import_parser = require("@babel/parser");
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  var MAX_CACHE = 256;
@@ -4160,12 +4256,20 @@ function detectPlatform(files) {
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  }
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  return [...platforms];
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  }
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- function calculateGrade(findings, _totalFiles) {
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- if (findings.length === 0) {
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- return { grade: "A+", score: 100, summary: "No security issues detected. Excellent." };
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+ function calculateGrade(findings, _totalFiles, options = {}) {
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+ const scored = options.gradeVendored ? findings : findings.filter((f) => !isVendoredFinding(f));
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+ const ungraded = findings.length - scored.length;
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+ const holdout = ungraded > 0 ? ` ${ungraded} finding${ungraded === 1 ? "" : "s"} in vendored, generated, or documentation files ${ungraded === 1 ? "is" : "are"} reported but not graded.` : "";
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+ if (scored.length === 0) {
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+ return {
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+ grade: "A+",
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+ score: 100,
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+ summary: (ungraded > 0 ? "No security issues detected in your own code." : "No security issues detected. Excellent.") + holdout,
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+ ungraded
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+ };
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  }
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  let critical = 0, high = 0, medium = 0, low = 0;
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- for (const f of findings) {
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+ for (const f of scored) {
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  if (f.severity === "critical") critical++;
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  else if (f.severity === "high") high++;
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  else if (f.severity === "medium") medium++;
@@ -4205,7 +4309,7 @@ function calculateGrade(findings, _totalFiles) {
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  } else {
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  summary = "No security issues detected.";
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  }
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- return { grade, score: rawScore, summary };
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+ return { grade, score: rawScore, summary: summary + holdout, ungraded };
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  }
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  var jwtAlgConfusion = {
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  id: "VC079",
@@ -8783,13 +8887,16 @@ function runCustomRules(content, filePath, disabledRules = [], tier = "free", ex
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  }
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  if (maxLineLen > 5e4) return findings;
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  if (/onboarding|demo-data|example-vulnerable|code-sample/i.test(filePath)) return findings;
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+ const vendoredFile = isVendoredPath(filePath);
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  const ruleset = tier === "pro" && extraRules.length > 0 ? [...freeRules, ...extraRules] : freeRules;
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  for (const rule of ruleset) {
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  if (disabledRules.includes(rule.id)) continue;
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  const matches = rule.check(content, filePath);
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  const compliance = complianceMap[rule.id];
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+ const vendored = vendoredFile && isVendoredFinding({ file: filePath, rule: rule.id, category: rule.category });
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  for (const match of matches) {
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  findings.push({
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+ ...vendored ? { vendored: true } : {},
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  id: `${match.rule}-${match.file}:${match.line}`,
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  rule: match.rule,
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  severity: match.severity,
@@ -8944,6 +9051,17 @@ async function filterFalsePositives(findings, fileContents) {
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  {
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  model: "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
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  max_tokens: 1024,
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+ // Pinned, NOT left to the API default of 1.0. This is a binary
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+ // classification (real vs. false positive), not generation — there
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+ // is no upside to sampling variety and a real downside to it: a
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+ // filtered finding is a finding the user never sees, so drift here
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+ // means scanning the same unchanged code twice can yield different
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+ // results. Temperature 0 does not make the model bit-deterministic
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+ // (Anthropic makes no such guarantee), but it removes the one
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+ // variance source that was ours to control. See
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+ // scripts/fp-filter-repeatability.cjs for the measured flip rate,
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+ // and the assertion in ai-fp-filter.test.ts that keeps it pinned.
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+ temperature: 0,
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  system: REVIEW_SYSTEM_PROMPT,
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  messages: [{ role: "user", content: prompt }]
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  },
@@ -9126,6 +9244,7 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
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  if (filePath.includes(".min.")) continue;
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  if (/pro-rules-bundle|\.bundle\.|\.chunk\./i.test(filePath)) continue;
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  if (/(?:\.test\.|\.spec\.|__tests__|__mocks__|fixtures?\/)/i.test(filePath)) continue;
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+ const vendored = isVendoredPath(filePath);
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  const lines = content.split("\n");
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  for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
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  const line = lines[i];
@@ -9156,6 +9275,7 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
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  if (entropy < 4.5 && !isLikelySecret) continue;
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  const masked = value.substring(0, 6) + "..." + value.substring(value.length - 4);
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  findings.push({
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+ ...vendored ? { vendored: true } : {},
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  id: `ENTROPY-${filePath}:${i + 1}`,
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  rule: "ENTROPY",
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  severity: isLikelySecret ? "critical" : "high",
@@ -9177,6 +9297,7 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
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  }
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  // Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
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  0 && (module.exports = {
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+ NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS,
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  RULE_IMPACTS,
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  allCustomRules,
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  allRules,
@@ -9303,6 +9424,8 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
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  ipcPathTraversal,
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  isCalleeNamed,
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  isMethodCall,
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+ isVendoredFinding,
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+ isVendoredPath,
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  javaDeserialization,
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  jwtAlgConfusion,
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  k8sNoResourceLimits,
@@ -9343,6 +9466,7 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
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  nPlusOneQuery,
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  nextPublicSecret,
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  noRateLimiting,
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+ normalizeScanPath,
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  nosqlInjection,
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  openRedirectParams,
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  overlyPermissiveIAM,
@@ -9400,6 +9524,7 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
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  unvalidatedRedirect,
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  vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter,
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  vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata,
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+ vendoredReason,
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  visitBinary,
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  visitCalls,
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  vulnerableDependencies,