xploitscan-shared-rules 1.14.4 → 1.15.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.d.cts CHANGED
@@ -23,6 +23,17 @@ interface Finding {
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  source: "custom" | "semgrep" | "gitleaks" | "ai" | "dependency" | "entropy" | "config" | "multi-file";
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  owasp?: string;
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  cwe?: string;
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+ /**
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+ * True when the finding sits in vendored, generated, or documentation code
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+ * rather than code the app author wrote (see `vendored.ts`). Such findings
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+ * are still reported everywhere — they are only held out of
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+ * `calculateGrade`.
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+ *
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+ * Advisory label for renderers. `calculateGrade` never reads it; it
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+ * re-derives the classification from `file` so a finding cannot exempt
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+ * itself by arriving with the flag already set.
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+ */
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+ vendored?: boolean;
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  }
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  interface RuleMatch {
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  rule: string;
@@ -105,6 +116,130 @@ declare const RULE_IMPACTS: Record<string, string>;
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  type Exposure = "public" | "internal" | "unknown";
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  declare function classifyExposure(filePath: string): Exposure;
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+ /**
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+ * APP vs VENDORED path classification.
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+ *
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+ * ── Why this exists ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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+ *
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+ * A 20-repo field study (5 each from Lovable, v0, Bolt and Base44, scanned
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+ * with the full rule set — 2,961 findings) found four rules firing
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+ * overwhelmingly on code the app author never wrote:
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+ *
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+ * rule sev repos/20 findings vendored mean vendored%
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+ * VC063 critical 16 20 14 83%
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+ * VC017 medium 15 35 20 79%
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+ * VC007 high 17 46 26 69%
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+ * ENTROPY high 15 286 208 66%
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+ *
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+ * The tell is that the hits are byte-identical at identical line numbers
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+ * across unrelated repos: `components/ui/chart.tsx:81`, `sidebar.tsx:87`.
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+ * That is the signature of scaffold code, not of authored vulnerabilities.
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+ * Every one of these builders copies shadcn/ui verbatim into the project
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+ * (49–63 primitives per repo), and shadcn's `ChartStyle` legitimately writes
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+ * CSS custom properties into a `<style dangerouslySetInnerHTML>`.
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+ *
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+ * A further 458 findings in the same sweep fired inside markdown — rules
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+ * matching prose and example code in READMEs and docs.
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+ *
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+ * VC063 is the worst of these because it is `critical`, and `calculateGrade`
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+ * caps a project at D for a single critical. It is also a free-tier rule, so
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+ * a Lovable user's first contact with the product was an "F — critical XSS"
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+ * on a library file they did not author.
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+ *
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+ * ── Why classification and not per-rule suppression ────────────────────────
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+ *
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+ * A per-rule fix for VC063 was written and reverted (2026-07-27): genuine
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+ * shadcn `ChartStyle` *does* interpolate React props, so no file-local rule
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+ * can stay silent on shadcn while still firing on a `<style>` whose `__html`
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+ * comes from a prop. Every attempt to encode "this particular `<style>` is
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+ * safe" ended up spoofable from inside the scanned file. The distinguishing
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+ * fact is not in the code — it is *whose* code it is. So classify the file.
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+ *
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+ * ── What it does and does not do ───────────────────────────────────────────
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+ *
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+ * Vendored findings are still detected, still reported, and still shown. They
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+ * are excluded from `calculateGrade` only, and every surface that shows a
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+ * grade also shows how many findings were held out. Nothing is silently
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+ * dropped — that distinction is the whole point.
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+ *
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+ * ── Trust model ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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+ *
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+ * This is path-based, and the paths come from the repository being scanned —
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+ * i.e. from the same person reading the report. It is the trust model the
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+ * product already ships with `.xploitscanignore`: you can always tell a tool
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+ * scanning your own code to ignore your own code. There is no external
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+ * attacker in this model, because there is no third party whose grade you can
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+ * influence by naming your own files.
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+ *
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+ * Two consequences are handled explicitly rather than assumed away:
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+ *
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+ * 1. A user who puts genuinely-authored code under `components/ui/` gets it
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+ * held out of the grade. That is a real cost, accepted knowingly: the
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+ * finding is still reported, and the held-out count is on-screen.
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+ * 2. Because a grade can be published (Trust Pages), the held-out count
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+ * travels with the grade everywhere the grade travels. A grade that
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+ * excluded findings can never render as though it excluded none.
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+ *
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+ * The classifier itself resolves `.`/`..` before matching, so a path cannot
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+ * claim a vendored prefix and then climb back out of it
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+ * (`src/components/ui/../../server/auth.ts` classifies as app code).
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+ */
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+ /**
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+ * Paths whose findings are not attributable to the code the app author wrote.
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+ *
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+ * gitignore-style patterns; see `globToRegExp` for the supported subset. The
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+ * list is empirical, not guessed — it comes from the FP sweep described above.
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+ *
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+ * Four families:
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+ *
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+ * 1. VENDORED UI PRIMITIVES — shadcn/ui and friends, copied verbatim into the
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+ * project by the builder. `components/ui/chart.tsx` and `sidebar.tsx` alone
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+ * account for the VC063 / VC007 / VC017 clusters.
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+ * 2. DOCUMENTATION — markdown and MDX. The sweep's 458 markdown findings were
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+ * rules matching example code inside docs, not deployed code. Note this
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+ * holdout does not weaken secret detection in markdown one way or the
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+ * other: the secret rules already decline to run on `.md` (VC001 bails on
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+ * `/\.(md|txt|rst|adoc)$/`, `secretRuleCheck` gates on SECRET_FILE_EXT, and
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+ * the entropy scanner's SKIP_FILES covers `md`), so there is nothing here
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+ * for the grade to hold out. Whether that's the right call for READMEs is a
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+ * separate question from this one, and unchanged by it.
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+ * 3. AGENT / EDITOR ARTIFACTS — committed AI-assistant scratch state. One repo
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+ * in the sweep contributed 164 of the corpus's 286 entropy findings from a
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+ * single committed LLM-benchmark result set under `.agent/skills/`.
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+ * 4. EXPLICITLY THIRD-PARTY OR MACHINE-GENERATED TREES — the path names below
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+ * only ever mean "not hand-written here".
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+ */
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+ declare const NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS: readonly string[];
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+ /**
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+ * Reduce a scanner-reported path to a repo-relative, dot-segment-free form.
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+ *
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+ * Resolving `.`/`..` *before* matching is load-bearing, not cosmetic: without
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+ * it, `src/components/ui/../../server/auth.ts` would match the
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+ * `components/ui/**` pattern while actually naming a file in `server/`.
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+ * Windows separators and drive letters are normalised for the same reason.
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+ */
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+ declare function normalizeScanPath(filePath: string): string;
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+ /** True when a repo-relative path belongs to the vendored / non-app bucket. */
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+ declare function isVendoredPath(filePath: string): boolean;
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+ /**
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+ * True when a finding should be reported but held out of the grade.
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+ *
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+ * Derived from `finding.file` every time, on purpose. `Finding.vendored` is an
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+ * advisory label for renderers; it is never the input to a scoring decision,
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+ * so a finding object that arrives over the wire with `vendored: true` cannot
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+ * talk `calculateGrade` out of counting it.
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+ */
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+ declare function isVendoredFinding(finding: {
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+ file?: string;
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+ rule?: string;
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+ category?: string;
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+ }): boolean;
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+ /**
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+ * Human-readable reason a path was held out, for tooltips and `--verbose`.
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+ * Returns null for app code.
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+ */
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+ declare function vendoredReason(filePath: string): string | null;
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+
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  declare const hardcodedSecrets: CustomRule;
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  declare const exposedEnvFile: CustomRule;
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  declare const missingAuthMiddleware: CustomRule;
@@ -209,8 +344,26 @@ interface GradeResult {
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  grade: SecurityGrade;
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  score: number;
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  summary: string;
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+ /**
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+ * How many of the supplied findings were held out of the score because they
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+ * sit in vendored / generated / documentation paths (see `vendored.ts`).
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+ *
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+ * Always present, and always reflected in `summary` when non-zero. Every
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+ * surface that renders a grade must render this too: a grade that excluded
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+ * findings may never be displayed as though it excluded none.
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+ */
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+ ungraded: number;
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+ }
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+ interface GradeOptions {
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+ /**
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+ * Score vendored / generated / documentation findings as if they were app
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+ * code — i.e. the pre-classification behaviour. Opt-out escape hatch for
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+ * users who vendor code they consider their own responsibility. Exposed as
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+ * `--grade-vendored` on the CLI.
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+ */
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+ gradeVendored?: boolean;
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  }
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- declare function calculateGrade(findings: Finding[], _totalFiles: number): GradeResult;
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+ declare function calculateGrade(findings: Finding[], _totalFiles: number, options?: GradeOptions): GradeResult;
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  declare const jwtAlgConfusion: CustomRule;
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  declare const regexDos: CustomRule;
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  declare const xxeVulnerability: CustomRule;
@@ -536,4 +689,4 @@ declare function getObjectProperty(node: ObjectExpression, key: string): {
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  /** Does this CallExpression spread an expression `matcher` returns true for? */
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  declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => boolean): boolean;
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- export { type AIFilterResult, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type Exposure, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeResult, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, type TaintMap, type VibePlatform, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, filterFalsePositives, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
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+ export { type AIFilterResult, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type Exposure, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, type TaintMap, type VibePlatform, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, filterFalsePositives, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -23,6 +23,17 @@ interface Finding {
23
23
  source: "custom" | "semgrep" | "gitleaks" | "ai" | "dependency" | "entropy" | "config" | "multi-file";
24
24
  owasp?: string;
25
25
  cwe?: string;
26
+ /**
27
+ * True when the finding sits in vendored, generated, or documentation code
28
+ * rather than code the app author wrote (see `vendored.ts`). Such findings
29
+ * are still reported everywhere — they are only held out of
30
+ * `calculateGrade`.
31
+ *
32
+ * Advisory label for renderers. `calculateGrade` never reads it; it
33
+ * re-derives the classification from `file` so a finding cannot exempt
34
+ * itself by arriving with the flag already set.
35
+ */
36
+ vendored?: boolean;
26
37
  }
27
38
  interface RuleMatch {
28
39
  rule: string;
@@ -105,6 +116,130 @@ declare const RULE_IMPACTS: Record<string, string>;
105
116
  type Exposure = "public" | "internal" | "unknown";
106
117
  declare function classifyExposure(filePath: string): Exposure;
107
118
 
119
+ /**
120
+ * APP vs VENDORED path classification.
121
+ *
122
+ * ── Why this exists ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
123
+ *
124
+ * A 20-repo field study (5 each from Lovable, v0, Bolt and Base44, scanned
125
+ * with the full rule set — 2,961 findings) found four rules firing
126
+ * overwhelmingly on code the app author never wrote:
127
+ *
128
+ * rule sev repos/20 findings vendored mean vendored%
129
+ * VC063 critical 16 20 14 83%
130
+ * VC017 medium 15 35 20 79%
131
+ * VC007 high 17 46 26 69%
132
+ * ENTROPY high 15 286 208 66%
133
+ *
134
+ * The tell is that the hits are byte-identical at identical line numbers
135
+ * across unrelated repos: `components/ui/chart.tsx:81`, `sidebar.tsx:87`.
136
+ * That is the signature of scaffold code, not of authored vulnerabilities.
137
+ * Every one of these builders copies shadcn/ui verbatim into the project
138
+ * (49–63 primitives per repo), and shadcn's `ChartStyle` legitimately writes
139
+ * CSS custom properties into a `<style dangerouslySetInnerHTML>`.
140
+ *
141
+ * A further 458 findings in the same sweep fired inside markdown — rules
142
+ * matching prose and example code in READMEs and docs.
143
+ *
144
+ * VC063 is the worst of these because it is `critical`, and `calculateGrade`
145
+ * caps a project at D for a single critical. It is also a free-tier rule, so
146
+ * a Lovable user's first contact with the product was an "F — critical XSS"
147
+ * on a library file they did not author.
148
+ *
149
+ * ── Why classification and not per-rule suppression ────────────────────────
150
+ *
151
+ * A per-rule fix for VC063 was written and reverted (2026-07-27): genuine
152
+ * shadcn `ChartStyle` *does* interpolate React props, so no file-local rule
153
+ * can stay silent on shadcn while still firing on a `<style>` whose `__html`
154
+ * comes from a prop. Every attempt to encode "this particular `<style>` is
155
+ * safe" ended up spoofable from inside the scanned file. The distinguishing
156
+ * fact is not in the code — it is *whose* code it is. So classify the file.
157
+ *
158
+ * ── What it does and does not do ───────────────────────────────────────────
159
+ *
160
+ * Vendored findings are still detected, still reported, and still shown. They
161
+ * are excluded from `calculateGrade` only, and every surface that shows a
162
+ * grade also shows how many findings were held out. Nothing is silently
163
+ * dropped — that distinction is the whole point.
164
+ *
165
+ * ── Trust model ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
166
+ *
167
+ * This is path-based, and the paths come from the repository being scanned —
168
+ * i.e. from the same person reading the report. It is the trust model the
169
+ * product already ships with `.xploitscanignore`: you can always tell a tool
170
+ * scanning your own code to ignore your own code. There is no external
171
+ * attacker in this model, because there is no third party whose grade you can
172
+ * influence by naming your own files.
173
+ *
174
+ * Two consequences are handled explicitly rather than assumed away:
175
+ *
176
+ * 1. A user who puts genuinely-authored code under `components/ui/` gets it
177
+ * held out of the grade. That is a real cost, accepted knowingly: the
178
+ * finding is still reported, and the held-out count is on-screen.
179
+ * 2. Because a grade can be published (Trust Pages), the held-out count
180
+ * travels with the grade everywhere the grade travels. A grade that
181
+ * excluded findings can never render as though it excluded none.
182
+ *
183
+ * The classifier itself resolves `.`/`..` before matching, so a path cannot
184
+ * claim a vendored prefix and then climb back out of it
185
+ * (`src/components/ui/../../server/auth.ts` classifies as app code).
186
+ */
187
+ /**
188
+ * Paths whose findings are not attributable to the code the app author wrote.
189
+ *
190
+ * gitignore-style patterns; see `globToRegExp` for the supported subset. The
191
+ * list is empirical, not guessed — it comes from the FP sweep described above.
192
+ *
193
+ * Four families:
194
+ *
195
+ * 1. VENDORED UI PRIMITIVES — shadcn/ui and friends, copied verbatim into the
196
+ * project by the builder. `components/ui/chart.tsx` and `sidebar.tsx` alone
197
+ * account for the VC063 / VC007 / VC017 clusters.
198
+ * 2. DOCUMENTATION — markdown and MDX. The sweep's 458 markdown findings were
199
+ * rules matching example code inside docs, not deployed code. Note this
200
+ * holdout does not weaken secret detection in markdown one way or the
201
+ * other: the secret rules already decline to run on `.md` (VC001 bails on
202
+ * `/\.(md|txt|rst|adoc)$/`, `secretRuleCheck` gates on SECRET_FILE_EXT, and
203
+ * the entropy scanner's SKIP_FILES covers `md`), so there is nothing here
204
+ * for the grade to hold out. Whether that's the right call for READMEs is a
205
+ * separate question from this one, and unchanged by it.
206
+ * 3. AGENT / EDITOR ARTIFACTS — committed AI-assistant scratch state. One repo
207
+ * in the sweep contributed 164 of the corpus's 286 entropy findings from a
208
+ * single committed LLM-benchmark result set under `.agent/skills/`.
209
+ * 4. EXPLICITLY THIRD-PARTY OR MACHINE-GENERATED TREES — the path names below
210
+ * only ever mean "not hand-written here".
211
+ */
212
+ declare const NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS: readonly string[];
213
+ /**
214
+ * Reduce a scanner-reported path to a repo-relative, dot-segment-free form.
215
+ *
216
+ * Resolving `.`/`..` *before* matching is load-bearing, not cosmetic: without
217
+ * it, `src/components/ui/../../server/auth.ts` would match the
218
+ * `components/ui/**` pattern while actually naming a file in `server/`.
219
+ * Windows separators and drive letters are normalised for the same reason.
220
+ */
221
+ declare function normalizeScanPath(filePath: string): string;
222
+ /** True when a repo-relative path belongs to the vendored / non-app bucket. */
223
+ declare function isVendoredPath(filePath: string): boolean;
224
+ /**
225
+ * True when a finding should be reported but held out of the grade.
226
+ *
227
+ * Derived from `finding.file` every time, on purpose. `Finding.vendored` is an
228
+ * advisory label for renderers; it is never the input to a scoring decision,
229
+ * so a finding object that arrives over the wire with `vendored: true` cannot
230
+ * talk `calculateGrade` out of counting it.
231
+ */
232
+ declare function isVendoredFinding(finding: {
233
+ file?: string;
234
+ rule?: string;
235
+ category?: string;
236
+ }): boolean;
237
+ /**
238
+ * Human-readable reason a path was held out, for tooltips and `--verbose`.
239
+ * Returns null for app code.
240
+ */
241
+ declare function vendoredReason(filePath: string): string | null;
242
+
108
243
  declare const hardcodedSecrets: CustomRule;
109
244
  declare const exposedEnvFile: CustomRule;
110
245
  declare const missingAuthMiddleware: CustomRule;
@@ -209,8 +344,26 @@ interface GradeResult {
209
344
  grade: SecurityGrade;
210
345
  score: number;
211
346
  summary: string;
347
+ /**
348
+ * How many of the supplied findings were held out of the score because they
349
+ * sit in vendored / generated / documentation paths (see `vendored.ts`).
350
+ *
351
+ * Always present, and always reflected in `summary` when non-zero. Every
352
+ * surface that renders a grade must render this too: a grade that excluded
353
+ * findings may never be displayed as though it excluded none.
354
+ */
355
+ ungraded: number;
356
+ }
357
+ interface GradeOptions {
358
+ /**
359
+ * Score vendored / generated / documentation findings as if they were app
360
+ * code — i.e. the pre-classification behaviour. Opt-out escape hatch for
361
+ * users who vendor code they consider their own responsibility. Exposed as
362
+ * `--grade-vendored` on the CLI.
363
+ */
364
+ gradeVendored?: boolean;
212
365
  }
213
- declare function calculateGrade(findings: Finding[], _totalFiles: number): GradeResult;
366
+ declare function calculateGrade(findings: Finding[], _totalFiles: number, options?: GradeOptions): GradeResult;
214
367
  declare const jwtAlgConfusion: CustomRule;
215
368
  declare const regexDos: CustomRule;
216
369
  declare const xxeVulnerability: CustomRule;
@@ -536,4 +689,4 @@ declare function getObjectProperty(node: ObjectExpression, key: string): {
536
689
  /** Does this CallExpression spread an expression `matcher` returns true for? */
537
690
  declare function callSpreads(call: CallExpression, matcher: (node: Node) => boolean): boolean;
538
691
 
539
- export { type AIFilterResult, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type Exposure, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeResult, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, type TaintMap, type VibePlatform, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, filterFalsePositives, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
692
+ export { type AIFilterResult, type Confidence, type CustomRule, type DetectedFramework, type Exposure, type FilteredFinding, type Finding, type GradeOptions, type GradeResult, NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS, type ParsedFile, RULE_IMPACTS, type RuleMatch, type SecurityGrade, type Severity, type TaintMap, type VibePlatform, allCustomRules, allRules, androidDebuggable, blockingMainThread, buildTaintMap, calculateGrade, callSpreads, callbackHell, classifyExposure, clickjacking, clientComponentSecret, clientSideAuth, commandInjection, complianceMap, consoleLogProduction, corsLocalhost, corsServerless, corsWildcard, dangerousInnerHTML, deprecatedTLS, detectFramework, detectPlatform, disabledTLSVerification, djangoDebug, dockerCopySensitive, dockerLatestTag, dockerRunAsRoot, dockerTooManyPorts, dockerfileADDInsteadOfCOPY, dockerfileMissingHealthcheck, dockerfileUnverifiedShellPipe, ecbModeEncryption, electronNavigationUnrestricted, emptyCatchBlock, envNotGitignored, evalUsage, eventListenerLeak, exposedAdminRoutes, exposedAuthSecret, exposedDBCredentials, exposedDatabaseStudio, exposedDebugMode, exposedDockerPorts, exposedEnvFile, exposedGitDir, exposedServerActions, exposedSourceMaps, exposedStackTraces, filterFalsePositives, firebaseClientConfig, flaskSecretKey, freeRules, getObjectProperty, getSnippet, ghaExpressionInjection, ghaPermissionsWriteAll, ghaPullRequestTargetCheckout, ghaThirdPartyActionWithSecrets, githubActionsInjection, graphqlCSRFDisabled, graphqlIntrospection, graphqlNoComplexityLimit, graphqlNoDepthLimit, hardcodedAlgoliaAdminKey, hardcodedAnthropicKey, hardcodedCloudflareToken, hardcodedCohereKey, hardcodedCreditCard, hardcodedDatadogKey, hardcodedDiscordToken, hardcodedEncryptionKey, hardcodedFastlyToken, hardcodedFireworksKey, hardcodedFlyToken, hardcodedGCPServiceAccount, hardcodedGitHubPAT, hardcodedGitLabToken, hardcodedGroqKey, hardcodedHighlightKey, hardcodedIPAllowlist, hardcodedIntercomToken, hardcodedJWTSecret, hardcodedLinearKey, hardcodedLogtailToken, hardcodedLoopsKey, hardcodedMailgunKey, hardcodedMistralKey, hardcodedNetlifyToken, hardcodedNotionKey, hardcodedOAuthSecret, hardcodedPineconeKey, hardcodedPlivoToken, hardcodedPostmarkKey, hardcodedQdrantKey, hardcodedRailwayToken, hardcodedReplicateKey, hardcodedResendKey, hardcodedSSN, hardcodedSecrets, hardcodedSendGridKey, hardcodedSentryAuthToken, hardcodedShopifyToken, hardcodedSlackToken, hardcodedSupabaseServiceRole, hardcodedTogetherKey, hardcodedTwilioKey, hardcodedVaultToken, hardcodedVercelToken, hardcodedWeaviateKey, hostHeaderRedirect, httpRequestSmuggling, insecureCookies, insecureDeepLink, insecureDeserialization, insecureDirectObjectReference, insecureElectronWindow, insecureFileUpload, insecureGRPC, insecureHTTPMethods, insecurePasswordReset, insecureRandomness, insecureWebSocket, ipcPathTraversal, isCalleeNamed, isMethodCall, isVendoredFinding, isVendoredPath, javaDeserialization, jwtAlgConfusion, k8sNoResourceLimits, k8sPrivileged, k8sSecretNotEncrypted, lambdaWithoutVPC, largeBundleImport, llmCallNoMaxTokens, llmOutputAsHTML, llmOutputToSink, llmPromptInjection, llmSystemPromptInjection, logInjection, magicNumbers, massAssignment, middlewareMatcherExcludesApi, missingAIRateLimit, missingAuthMiddleware, missingAuthRateLimit, missingBruteForce, missingCSP, missingCSRF, missingCertPinning, missingCloudTrail, missingContentDisposition, missingDBEncryption, missingErrorBoundary, missingFileSizeLimits, missingHSTS, missingHTTPS, missingLockFile, missingOAuthState, missingPagination, missingRequestSizeLimit, missingRequestValidation, missingSRI, missingSecurityMeta, nPlusOneQuery, nextPublicSecret, noRateLimiting, normalizeScanPath, nosqlInjection, openRedirectParams, overlyPermissiveIAM, parseFile, pathTraversal, pickleDeserialization, piiInLogs, prototypePollution, pyDjangoAllowedHostsWildcard, pyDjangoMarkSafe, pyJWTDecodeWeakConfig, pyJinja2AutoescapeOff, pyParamikoAutoAdd, pyRequestsVerifyFalse, pyTempfileMktemp, raceCondition, rdsPubliclyAccessible, reflectedCORSOrigin, regexDos, runCustomRules, s3BucketNoEncryption, scanEntropy, secretInBundleConfig, secretInCLIArgument, secretInErrorResponse, secretInHTMLAttribute, secretInLLMPrompt, secretInURLParam, secretLoggedToConsole, secretsInCI, securityGroupAllInbound, sensitiveAsyncStorage, sensitiveLocalStorage, sensitiveURLParams, sessionFixation, sqlInjection, ssrfVulnerability, ssti, stripeWebhookUnprotected, supabaseAnonAdmin, supabaseNoRLS, syncFileOps, terraformStateExposed, timingAttack, todoLeftInCode, unencryptedPII, unpinnedGitHubAction, unprotectedAPIRoutes, unprotectedDownload, unsafeObjectAssign, unsanitizedFilenames, unsanitizedHTMLExport, unvalidatedAPIParams, unvalidatedEventData, unvalidatedRedirect, vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter, vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata, vendoredReason, visitBinary, visitCalls, vulnerableDependencies, weakHashing, weakPasswordRequirements, weakRSAKeySize, webhookMissingIdempotency, webhookSignatureVerification, xssVulnerability, xxeVulnerability };
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -282,6 +282,97 @@ function classifyExposure(filePath) {
282
282
  return "unknown";
283
283
  }
284
284
 
285
+ // src/vendored.ts
286
+ var NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS = [
287
+ // 1. vendored UI component libraries
288
+ "**/components/ui/**",
289
+ "**/ui/shadcn/**",
290
+ "**/shadcn/ui/**",
291
+ "**/shadcn/**",
292
+ // 2. documentation prose
293
+ "**/*.md",
294
+ "**/*.mdx",
295
+ // 3. AI-agent and editor tooling artifacts. Each gets a `**/`-prefixed form
296
+ // as well as the root-anchored one: these directories turn up per-package
297
+ // in a monorepo, and a finding's `file` is occasionally an absolute path,
298
+ // which makes even a repo-root `.claude/` a nested segment.
299
+ ".claude/**",
300
+ ".agent/**",
301
+ ".cursor/**",
302
+ ".superpowers/**",
303
+ ".windsurf/**",
304
+ "**/.claude/**",
305
+ "**/.agent/**",
306
+ "**/.cursor/**",
307
+ "**/.superpowers/**",
308
+ "**/.windsurf/**",
309
+ // 4. explicitly third-party or machine-generated trees
310
+ "**/vendor/**",
311
+ "**/vendored/**",
312
+ "**/third_party/**",
313
+ "**/generated/**",
314
+ "**/__generated__/**"
315
+ ];
316
+ function globToRegExp(pattern) {
317
+ const segments = pattern.split("/");
318
+ let src = "^";
319
+ for (let i = 0; i < segments.length; i++) {
320
+ const seg = segments[i];
321
+ const isLast = i === segments.length - 1;
322
+ if (seg === "**") {
323
+ src += isLast ? ".+" : "(?:[^/]+/)*";
324
+ continue;
325
+ }
326
+ src += seg.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, (ch) => ch === "*" ? "[^/]*" : "\\" + ch);
327
+ if (!isLast) src += "/";
328
+ }
329
+ return new RegExp(src + "$", "i");
330
+ }
331
+ var NON_APP_MATCHERS = NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS.map(globToRegExp);
332
+ function normalizeScanPath(filePath) {
333
+ const raw = typeof filePath === "string" ? filePath : "";
334
+ const trimmed = raw.trim();
335
+ const looksWindows = !trimmed.includes("/") && trimmed.includes("\\");
336
+ const withForwardSlashes = (looksWindows ? trimmed.replace(/\\/g, "/") : trimmed).replace(/^[A-Za-z]:\//, "/");
337
+ const out = [];
338
+ for (const segment of withForwardSlashes.split("/")) {
339
+ if (segment === "" || segment === ".") continue;
340
+ if (segment === "..") {
341
+ if (out.length > 0 && out[out.length - 1] !== "..") out.pop();
342
+ else out.push("..");
343
+ continue;
344
+ }
345
+ out.push(segment);
346
+ }
347
+ return out.join("/");
348
+ }
349
+ function isVendoredPath(filePath) {
350
+ const normalized = normalizeScanPath(filePath);
351
+ if (!normalized) return false;
352
+ return NON_APP_MATCHERS.some((re) => re.test(normalized));
353
+ }
354
+ var HEURISTIC_SECRET_RULES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["ENTROPY"]);
355
+ var ALWAYS_GRADED_RULES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["VC115", "VC062"]);
356
+ function isAlwaysGraded(finding) {
357
+ const rule = finding?.rule ?? "";
358
+ if (ALWAYS_GRADED_RULES.has(rule)) return true;
359
+ if (finding?.category !== "Secrets") return false;
360
+ return !HEURISTIC_SECRET_RULES.has(rule);
361
+ }
362
+ function isVendoredFinding(finding) {
363
+ if (isAlwaysGraded(finding)) return false;
364
+ return isVendoredPath(finding?.file ?? "");
365
+ }
366
+ function vendoredReason(filePath) {
367
+ const normalized = normalizeScanPath(filePath);
368
+ if (!normalized) return null;
369
+ if (/\.mdx?$/.test(normalized)) return "documentation";
370
+ if (/(^|\/)(components\/ui|shadcn)(\/|$)/.test(normalized)) return "vendored UI component library";
371
+ if (/(^|\/)\.(claude|agent|cursor|superpowers|windsurf)(\/|$)/.test(normalized)) return "AI-agent tooling artifact";
372
+ if (isVendoredPath(normalized)) return "third-party or generated code";
373
+ return null;
374
+ }
375
+
285
376
  // src/ast/parse.ts
286
377
  import { parse } from "@babel/parser";
287
378
  var MAX_CACHE = 256;
@@ -3892,12 +3983,20 @@ function detectPlatform(files) {
3892
3983
  }
3893
3984
  return [...platforms];
3894
3985
  }
3895
- function calculateGrade(findings, _totalFiles) {
3896
- if (findings.length === 0) {
3897
- return { grade: "A+", score: 100, summary: "No security issues detected. Excellent." };
3986
+ function calculateGrade(findings, _totalFiles, options = {}) {
3987
+ const scored = options.gradeVendored ? findings : findings.filter((f) => !isVendoredFinding(f));
3988
+ const ungraded = findings.length - scored.length;
3989
+ const holdout = ungraded > 0 ? ` ${ungraded} finding${ungraded === 1 ? "" : "s"} in vendored, generated, or documentation files ${ungraded === 1 ? "is" : "are"} reported but not graded.` : "";
3990
+ if (scored.length === 0) {
3991
+ return {
3992
+ grade: "A+",
3993
+ score: 100,
3994
+ summary: (ungraded > 0 ? "No security issues detected in your own code." : "No security issues detected. Excellent.") + holdout,
3995
+ ungraded
3996
+ };
3898
3997
  }
3899
3998
  let critical = 0, high = 0, medium = 0, low = 0;
3900
- for (const f of findings) {
3999
+ for (const f of scored) {
3901
4000
  if (f.severity === "critical") critical++;
3902
4001
  else if (f.severity === "high") high++;
3903
4002
  else if (f.severity === "medium") medium++;
@@ -3937,7 +4036,7 @@ function calculateGrade(findings, _totalFiles) {
3937
4036
  } else {
3938
4037
  summary = "No security issues detected.";
3939
4038
  }
3940
- return { grade, score: rawScore, summary };
4039
+ return { grade, score: rawScore, summary: summary + holdout, ungraded };
3941
4040
  }
3942
4041
  var jwtAlgConfusion = {
3943
4042
  id: "VC079",
@@ -8515,13 +8614,16 @@ function runCustomRules(content, filePath, disabledRules = [], tier = "free", ex
8515
8614
  }
8516
8615
  if (maxLineLen > 5e4) return findings;
8517
8616
  if (/onboarding|demo-data|example-vulnerable|code-sample/i.test(filePath)) return findings;
8617
+ const vendoredFile = isVendoredPath(filePath);
8518
8618
  const ruleset = tier === "pro" && extraRules.length > 0 ? [...freeRules, ...extraRules] : freeRules;
8519
8619
  for (const rule of ruleset) {
8520
8620
  if (disabledRules.includes(rule.id)) continue;
8521
8621
  const matches = rule.check(content, filePath);
8522
8622
  const compliance = complianceMap[rule.id];
8623
+ const vendored = vendoredFile && isVendoredFinding({ file: filePath, rule: rule.id, category: rule.category });
8523
8624
  for (const match of matches) {
8524
8625
  findings.push({
8626
+ ...vendored ? { vendored: true } : {},
8525
8627
  id: `${match.rule}-${match.file}:${match.line}`,
8526
8628
  rule: match.rule,
8527
8629
  severity: match.severity,
@@ -8858,6 +8960,7 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
8858
8960
  if (filePath.includes(".min.")) continue;
8859
8961
  if (/pro-rules-bundle|\.bundle\.|\.chunk\./i.test(filePath)) continue;
8860
8962
  if (/(?:\.test\.|\.spec\.|__tests__|__mocks__|fixtures?\/)/i.test(filePath)) continue;
8963
+ const vendored = isVendoredPath(filePath);
8861
8964
  const lines = content.split("\n");
8862
8965
  for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
8863
8966
  const line = lines[i];
@@ -8888,6 +8991,7 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
8888
8991
  if (entropy < 4.5 && !isLikelySecret) continue;
8889
8992
  const masked = value.substring(0, 6) + "..." + value.substring(value.length - 4);
8890
8993
  findings.push({
8994
+ ...vendored ? { vendored: true } : {},
8891
8995
  id: `ENTROPY-${filePath}:${i + 1}`,
8892
8996
  rule: "ENTROPY",
8893
8997
  severity: isLikelySecret ? "critical" : "high",
@@ -8908,6 +9012,7 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
8908
9012
  return findings;
8909
9013
  }
8910
9014
  export {
9015
+ NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS,
8911
9016
  RULE_IMPACTS,
8912
9017
  allCustomRules,
8913
9018
  allRules,
@@ -9034,6 +9139,8 @@ export {
9034
9139
  ipcPathTraversal,
9035
9140
  isCalleeNamed,
9036
9141
  isMethodCall,
9142
+ isVendoredFinding,
9143
+ isVendoredPath,
9037
9144
  javaDeserialization,
9038
9145
  jwtAlgConfusion,
9039
9146
  k8sNoResourceLimits,
@@ -9074,6 +9181,7 @@ export {
9074
9181
  nPlusOneQuery,
9075
9182
  nextPublicSecret,
9076
9183
  noRateLimiting,
9184
+ normalizeScanPath,
9077
9185
  nosqlInjection,
9078
9186
  openRedirectParams,
9079
9187
  overlyPermissiveIAM,
@@ -9131,6 +9239,7 @@ export {
9131
9239
  unvalidatedRedirect,
9132
9240
  vectorStoreQueryNoUserFilter,
9133
9241
  vectorStoreUpsertNoMetadata,
9242
+ vendoredReason,
9134
9243
  visitBinary,
9135
9244
  visitCalls,
9136
9245
  vulnerableDependencies,