wire-mesh-core 1.24.0 → 1.26.0

package/dist/domain/mesh-session.d.cts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-import { D as Frame, F as ManageCommand, K as PeerAdvert, L as ManageError, R as ManageOk, dt as RevocationEntry, et as ProtocolVersion, o as CapabilityScope, s as CapabilityToken, x as DeviceId } from "../protocol-l9RMR3s5.cjs";
-import { t as IdentityPort } from "../identity-bg6IVGsH.cjs";
+import { D as DeviceId, N as Frame, Q as PeerAdvert, U as ManageError, V as ManageCommand, W as ManageOk, _t as RevocationEntry, f as CapabilityScope, ot as ProtocolVersion, p as CapabilityToken } from "../protocol-sW8d6Og-.cjs";
+import { t as IdentityPort } from "../identity-DJ06jn4k.cjs";
 import { t as Clock } from "../clock-DiSx-WKM.cjs";
-import { r as Transport, t as Connection } from "../transport-Baipikk7.cjs";
+import { r as Transport, t as Connection } from "../transport-DxZ4JWZc.cjs";
 //#region src/domain/mesh-session.d.ts
 /** How long to wait for the node's handshake before calling it unanswered. A relay-only node never sends one; that is a state to display, not an error. */
 export declare const HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS = 3000;
@@ -108,4 +108,15 @@ export interface AcceptedMeshSessionOptions {
 }
 /** Wires an already-accepted Connection up as a full MeshSession, mirroring exactly what createMeshSession's own dial path does once a connection exists (send handshake, send self-advert, negotiate, consume frames) -- the wire-mesh#45 prerequisite agent-comms needs, since its peers both listen and dial rather than only ever dialing the way web-console's own console UI does. Reconnect does not apply here: if this connection drops, only the remote redialing and being accepted again produces a new connection, and therefore a new session -- there is nothing on this side to retry. */
 export declare function acceptMeshSession(connection: Readonly<Connection>, identity: Readonly<IdentityPort>, localDomains: readonly string[], options?: Readonly<AcceptedMeshSessionOptions>): Promise<AcceptedMeshSession>;
+/** Reads exactly one frame off a freshly-accepted, bare connection and, if it's a manage-request, returns an IncomingManageRequest ready to hand to the same application-level dispatch logic session.incomingManageRequests already feeds elsewhere -- no handshake or gossip is ever read or sent on this connection (wire-mesh#38: the manage-request/manage-response exchange has no dependency on handshake state at the dispatch layer, confirmed against applyManageRequest/applyFrame above). respond() sends the manage-response directly and closes the connection, since a one-off request/response is this connection's entire purpose -- unlike a real MeshSession, there is nothing further to do with it afterwards. Resolves null, without closing the connection (that's the caller's call), for any other first frame or if the connection ends before one arrives: interpreting either case is a Transport.listen() caller's own business, e.g. peeking the first frame to route between this path and acceptMeshSession's own handshake path. */
+export declare function acceptDirectManageRequest(connection: Readonly<Connection>): Promise<IncomingManageRequest | null>;
+export interface DirectManageRequestOptions {
+  /** Refuse the connection as a possible spoofing attempt if the transport's own authenticated Connection.peerDeviceId (never a value read off the wire -- see the Transport port's own doc comment) doesn't match this. Left unchecked when the transport gives no authenticated peerDeviceId at all (an unauthenticated transport, or a peer that presented no credential) -- the caller proceeds at its own risk in that case, exactly the same trust boundary Connection.peerDeviceId already documents for every other consumer of it. */
+  expectedPeerDeviceId?: DeviceId;
+  token?: CapabilityToken;
+  /** Omit to wait indefinitely, matching sendManageRequest's own default. */
+  timeoutMs?: number;
+}
+/** Sends exactly one manage-request over a fresh, bare connection with no handshake, negotiation, or gossip exchanged, and no session left behind afterwards -- the connection closes once the correlated response arrives, the wait times out, or the peer-device-id check below refuses it. For attempting a direct connection to a peer whose reachable address is already known (wire-mesh#38), as an alternative to routing the same request through a relay via an established MeshSession's own sendManageRequest(targetDevice, ...). Resolves the same ManageOutcome shape sendManageRequest does -- including `{ result: "error", code: "timeout" }` on a timeout, never a rejection -- so a caller can fall back to the relay path uniformly regardless of which kind of failure this returns for the non-spoofing cases; a peer-device-id mismatch is the one case that rejects outright, since it is not an ordinary reachability failure a relay fallback should silently paper over. */
+export declare function sendDirectManageRequest(transport: Readonly<Pick<Transport, "connect">>, address: string, command: ManageCommand, scope: Readonly<CapabilityScope>, options?: Readonly<DirectManageRequestOptions>): Promise<ManageOutcome>;
 //#endregion

package/dist/domain/mesh-session.d.mts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-import { D as Frame, F as ManageCommand, K as PeerAdvert, L as ManageError, R as ManageOk, dt as RevocationEntry, et as ProtocolVersion, o as CapabilityScope, s as CapabilityToken, x as DeviceId } from "../protocol-l9RMR3s5.mjs";
-import { t as IdentityPort } from "../identity-5LJ_B8go.mjs";
+import { D as DeviceId, N as Frame, Q as PeerAdvert, U as ManageError, V as ManageCommand, W as ManageOk, _t as RevocationEntry, f as CapabilityScope, ot as ProtocolVersion, p as CapabilityToken } from "../protocol-sW8d6Og-.mjs";
+import { t as IdentityPort } from "../identity-C5N86BPz.mjs";
 import { t as Clock } from "../clock-DiSx-WKM.mjs";
-import { r as Transport, t as Connection } from "../transport-DWbvUc3L.mjs";
+import { r as Transport, t as Connection } from "../transport-B5E896PN.mjs";
 //#region src/domain/mesh-session.d.ts
 /** How long to wait for the node's handshake before calling it unanswered. A relay-only node never sends one; that is a state to display, not an error. */
 export declare const HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS = 3000;
@@ -108,4 +108,15 @@ export interface AcceptedMeshSessionOptions {
 }
 /** Wires an already-accepted Connection up as a full MeshSession, mirroring exactly what createMeshSession's own dial path does once a connection exists (send handshake, send self-advert, negotiate, consume frames) -- the wire-mesh#45 prerequisite agent-comms needs, since its peers both listen and dial rather than only ever dialing the way web-console's own console UI does. Reconnect does not apply here: if this connection drops, only the remote redialing and being accepted again produces a new connection, and therefore a new session -- there is nothing on this side to retry. */
 export declare function acceptMeshSession(connection: Readonly<Connection>, identity: Readonly<IdentityPort>, localDomains: readonly string[], options?: Readonly<AcceptedMeshSessionOptions>): Promise<AcceptedMeshSession>;
+/** Reads exactly one frame off a freshly-accepted, bare connection and, if it's a manage-request, returns an IncomingManageRequest ready to hand to the same application-level dispatch logic session.incomingManageRequests already feeds elsewhere -- no handshake or gossip is ever read or sent on this connection (wire-mesh#38: the manage-request/manage-response exchange has no dependency on handshake state at the dispatch layer, confirmed against applyManageRequest/applyFrame above). respond() sends the manage-response directly and closes the connection, since a one-off request/response is this connection's entire purpose -- unlike a real MeshSession, there is nothing further to do with it afterwards. Resolves null, without closing the connection (that's the caller's call), for any other first frame or if the connection ends before one arrives: interpreting either case is a Transport.listen() caller's own business, e.g. peeking the first frame to route between this path and acceptMeshSession's own handshake path. */
+export declare function acceptDirectManageRequest(connection: Readonly<Connection>): Promise<IncomingManageRequest | null>;
+export interface DirectManageRequestOptions {
+  /** Refuse the connection as a possible spoofing attempt if the transport's own authenticated Connection.peerDeviceId (never a value read off the wire -- see the Transport port's own doc comment) doesn't match this. Left unchecked when the transport gives no authenticated peerDeviceId at all (an unauthenticated transport, or a peer that presented no credential) -- the caller proceeds at its own risk in that case, exactly the same trust boundary Connection.peerDeviceId already documents for every other consumer of it. */
+  expectedPeerDeviceId?: DeviceId;
+  token?: CapabilityToken;
+  /** Omit to wait indefinitely, matching sendManageRequest's own default. */
+  timeoutMs?: number;
+}
+/** Sends exactly one manage-request over a fresh, bare connection with no handshake, negotiation, or gossip exchanged, and no session left behind afterwards -- the connection closes once the correlated response arrives, the wait times out, or the peer-device-id check below refuses it. For attempting a direct connection to a peer whose reachable address is already known (wire-mesh#38), as an alternative to routing the same request through a relay via an established MeshSession's own sendManageRequest(targetDevice, ...). Resolves the same ManageOutcome shape sendManageRequest does -- including `{ result: "error", code: "timeout" }` on a timeout, never a rejection -- so a caller can fall back to the relay path uniformly regardless of which kind of failure this returns for the non-spoofing cases; a peer-device-id mismatch is the one case that rejects outright, since it is not an ordinary reachability failure a relay fallback should silently paper over. */
+export declare function sendDirectManageRequest(transport: Readonly<Pick<Transport, "connect">>, address: string, command: ManageCommand, scope: Readonly<CapabilityScope>, options?: Readonly<DirectManageRequestOptions>): Promise<ManageOutcome>;
 //#endregion

package/dist/domain/mesh-session.mjs

@@ -474,5 +474,63 @@ async function acceptMeshSession(connection, identity, localDomains, options = {
 		peerDeviceId
 	};
 }
+/** Reads exactly one frame off a freshly-accepted, bare connection and, if it's a manage-request, returns an IncomingManageRequest ready to hand to the same application-level dispatch logic session.incomingManageRequests already feeds elsewhere -- no handshake or gossip is ever read or sent on this connection (wire-mesh#38: the manage-request/manage-response exchange has no dependency on handshake state at the dispatch layer, confirmed against applyManageRequest/applyFrame above). respond() sends the manage-response directly and closes the connection, since a one-off request/response is this connection's entire purpose -- unlike a real MeshSession, there is nothing further to do with it afterwards. Resolves null, without closing the connection (that's the caller's call), for any other first frame or if the connection ends before one arrives: interpreting either case is a Transport.listen() caller's own business, e.g. peeking the first frame to route between this path and acceptMeshSession's own handshake path. */
+async function acceptDirectManageRequest(connection) {
+	const result = await connection.receive()[Symbol.asyncIterator]().next();
+	if (result.done === true || result.value.type !== "manage-request") return null;
+	const frame = result.value;
+	return {
+		requestId: frame["request-id"],
+		command: frame.command,
+		scope: frame.scope,
+		...frame.token !== void 0 ? { token: frame.token } : {},
+		respond: async (outcome) => {
+			const response = {
+				type: "manage-response",
+				"request-id": frame["request-id"],
+				outcome
+			};
+			await connection.send(response);
+			await connection.close();
+		}
+	};
+}
+async function waitForDirectManageResponse(link, requestId) {
+	for await (const frame of link.receive()) if (frame.type === "manage-response" && frame["request-id"] === requestId) return frame.outcome;
+	throw new Error("connection closed before a response arrived");
+}
+/** Sends exactly one manage-request over a fresh, bare connection with no handshake, negotiation, or gossip exchanged, and no session left behind afterwards -- the connection closes once the correlated response arrives, the wait times out, or the peer-device-id check below refuses it. For attempting a direct connection to a peer whose reachable address is already known (wire-mesh#38), as an alternative to routing the same request through a relay via an established MeshSession's own sendManageRequest(targetDevice, ...). Resolves the same ManageOutcome shape sendManageRequest does -- including `{ result: "error", code: "timeout" }` on a timeout, never a rejection -- so a caller can fall back to the relay path uniformly regardless of which kind of failure this returns for the non-spoofing cases; a peer-device-id mismatch is the one case that rejects outright, since it is not an ordinary reachability failure a relay fallback should silently paper over. */
+async function sendDirectManageRequest(transport, address, command, scope, options = {}) {
+	const link = await transport.connect(address);
+	if (options.expectedPeerDeviceId !== void 0 && link.peerDeviceId !== void 0 && deviceIdToHex(link.peerDeviceId) !== deviceIdToHex(options.expectedPeerDeviceId)) {
+		await link.close();
+		throw new Error("direct connection's authenticated peer-device-id does not match the expected target -- refusing as a possible spoofing attempt");
+	}
+	const requestId = 0;
+	const frame = {
+		type: "manage-request",
+		"request-id": requestId,
+		command,
+		scope,
+		...options.token !== void 0 ? { token: options.token } : {}
+	};
+	await link.send(frame);
+	const responsePromise = waitForDirectManageResponse(link, requestId);
+	let outcome;
+	if (options.timeoutMs === void 0) outcome = await responsePromise;
+	else {
+		outcome = await Promise.race([responsePromise, new Promise((resolve) => {
+			setTimeout(() => {
+				resolve({
+					result: "error",
+					code: "timeout"
+				});
+			}, options.timeoutMs);
+		})]);
+		responsePromise.catch(() => void 0);
+	}
+	await link.close();
+	return outcome;
+}
 //#endregion
-export { HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS, acceptMeshSession, createMeshSession };
+export { HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS, acceptDirectManageRequest, acceptMeshSession, createMeshSession, sendDirectManageRequest };

package/dist/domain/relay-hub.d.cts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { D as Frame } from "../protocol-l9RMR3s5.cjs";
-import { t as Connection } from "../transport-Baipikk7.cjs";
+import { N as Frame } from "../protocol-sW8d6Og-.cjs";
+import { t as Connection } from "../transport-DxZ4JWZc.cjs";
 //#region src/domain/relay-hub.d.ts
 export interface RelayHub {
   /** Drives one accepted connection until it closes: registers gossip-advertised devices, re-broadcasts each gossip frame to every other connected client and replies to the gossiping connection with a catch-up frame of every other already-known device, answers relay-connect by pairing and notifying the target, and forwards relay-data within established pairings. Resolves when the connection's frame stream ends. Internally just registerConnection followed by a loop of onFrame calls and a final onDisconnect -- kept as its own method since a dedicated hub deployment (wire-mesh-node/cloudflare-hub) has nothing else driving the connection and wants the whole lifecycle in one call. */

package/dist/domain/relay-hub.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { D as Frame } from "../protocol-l9RMR3s5.mjs";
-import { t as Connection } from "../transport-DWbvUc3L.mjs";
+import { N as Frame } from "../protocol-sW8d6Og-.mjs";
+import { t as Connection } from "../transport-B5E896PN.mjs";
 //#region src/domain/relay-hub.d.ts
 export interface RelayHub {
   /** Drives one accepted connection until it closes: registers gossip-advertised devices, re-broadcasts each gossip frame to every other connected client and replies to the gossiping connection with a catch-up frame of every other already-known device, answers relay-connect by pairing and notifying the target, and forwards relay-data within established pairings. Resolves when the connection's frame stream ends. Internally just registerConnection followed by a loop of onFrame calls and a final onDisconnect -- kept as its own method since a dedicated hub deployment (wire-mesh-node/cloudflare-hub) has nothing else driving the connection and wants the whole lifecycle in one call. */

package/dist/domain/relay-use-gate.d.cts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { D as Frame } from "../protocol-l9RMR3s5.cjs";
-import { t as Connection } from "../transport-Baipikk7.cjs";
+import { N as Frame } from "../protocol-sW8d6Og-.cjs";
+import { t as Connection } from "../transport-DxZ4JWZc.cjs";
 //#region src/domain/relay-use-gate.d.ts
 export interface RelayUseAuthorizationTracker {
   /** True once authorize() has been called for this exact connection and revoke() has not been called since. */

package/dist/domain/relay-use-gate.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { D as Frame } from "../protocol-l9RMR3s5.mjs";
-import { t as Connection } from "../transport-DWbvUc3L.mjs";
+import { N as Frame } from "../protocol-sW8d6Og-.mjs";
+import { t as Connection } from "../transport-B5E896PN.mjs";
 //#region src/domain/relay-use-gate.d.ts
 export interface RelayUseAuthorizationTracker {
   /** True once authorize() has been called for this exact connection and revoke() has not been called since. */

package/dist/domain/revocation-view.cjs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
-const require_tokens = require("../tokens-CiNXdKJ8.cjs");
 const require_domain_device_id = require("./device-id.cjs");
+const require_tokens = require("../tokens-CiNXdKJ8.cjs");
 //#region src/domain/revocation-view.ts
 function revocationKey(tokenId) {
 	return require_domain_device_id.bytesToHex(tokenId);

package/dist/domain/revocation-view.d.cts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { dt as RevocationEntry } from "../protocol-l9RMR3s5.cjs";
-import { a as RevocationCheck, d as VerifyRevocationEntryOptions, o as RevocationEntryVerdict } from "../tokens-H_mV_JCC.cjs";
+import { _t as RevocationEntry } from "../protocol-sW8d6Og-.cjs";
+import { a as RevocationCheck, d as VerifyRevocationEntryOptions, o as RevocationEntryVerdict } from "../tokens-DfVfE00W.cjs";
 //#region src/domain/revocation-view.d.ts
 /**
  * An in-memory RevocationCheck fed by ingested revocation-announce frames. Keyed by token-id alone, per management.cddl's contract: a token-id can legitimately carry multiple recorded entries from different issuers (the token's own issuer, and/or any number of parties holding a delegated manage:revoke authorization over it) -- entriesFor returns every one of them unfiltered, since checking which actually apply (issuer-match, or a verified authorization) is verifyTokenChain's own obligation, not this store's.

package/dist/domain/revocation-view.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { dt as RevocationEntry } from "../protocol-l9RMR3s5.mjs";
-import { a as RevocationCheck, d as VerifyRevocationEntryOptions, o as RevocationEntryVerdict } from "../tokens-CBI54oF-.mjs";
+import { _t as RevocationEntry } from "../protocol-sW8d6Og-.mjs";
+import { a as RevocationCheck, d as VerifyRevocationEntryOptions, o as RevocationEntryVerdict } from "../tokens-CpLDI5Fo.mjs";
 //#region src/domain/revocation-view.d.ts
 /**
  * An in-memory RevocationCheck fed by ingested revocation-announce frames. Keyed by token-id alone, per management.cddl's contract: a token-id can legitimately carry multiple recorded entries from different issuers (the token's own issuer, and/or any number of parties holding a delegated manage:revoke authorization over it) -- entriesFor returns every one of them unfiltered, since checking which actually apply (issuer-match, or a verified authorization) is verifyTokenChain's own obligation, not this store's.

package/dist/domain/revocation-view.mjs

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { a as verifyRevocationEntry } from "../tokens-VicRWTj1.mjs";
 import { bytesToHex } from "./device-id.mjs";
+import { a as verifyRevocationEntry } from "../tokens-VicRWTj1.mjs";
 //#region src/domain/revocation-view.ts
 function revocationKey(tokenId) {
 	return bytesToHex(tokenId);

package/dist/domain/room-token-verification.cjs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
-const require_tokens = require("../tokens-CiNXdKJ8.cjs");
 const require_domain_device_id = require("./device-id.cjs");
+const require_tokens = require("../tokens-CiNXdKJ8.cjs");
 const require_domain_room_path = require("./room-path.cjs");
 //#region src/domain/room-token-verification.ts
 /**

package/dist/domain/room-token-verification.d.cts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { kt as TokenClaims, s as CapabilityToken, x as DeviceId } from "../protocol-l9RMR3s5.cjs";
-import { l as TokenVerdictReason, u as VerifyCapabilityTokenOptions } from "../tokens-H_mV_JCC.cjs";
+import { D as DeviceId, Ft as TokenClaims, p as CapabilityToken } from "../protocol-sW8d6Og-.cjs";
+import { l as TokenVerdictReason, u as VerifyCapabilityTokenOptions } from "../tokens-DfVfE00W.cjs";
 //#region src/domain/room-token-verification.d.ts
 /** The one capability every core/room verb (room.send/read/leave/members) is gated by, per spec/room.cddl -- room.join/room.invite are deliberately ungated instead and need no token check at all. */
 export declare const ROOM_MEMBER_CAPABILITY = "room:member";

package/dist/domain/room-token-verification.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { kt as TokenClaims, s as CapabilityToken, x as DeviceId } from "../protocol-l9RMR3s5.mjs";
-import { l as TokenVerdictReason, u as VerifyCapabilityTokenOptions } from "../tokens-CBI54oF-.mjs";
+import { D as DeviceId, Ft as TokenClaims, p as CapabilityToken } from "../protocol-sW8d6Og-.mjs";
+import { l as TokenVerdictReason, u as VerifyCapabilityTokenOptions } from "../tokens-CpLDI5Fo.mjs";
 //#region src/domain/room-token-verification.d.ts
 /** The one capability every core/room verb (room.send/read/leave/members) is gated by, per spec/room.cddl -- room.join/room.invite are deliberately ungated instead and need no token check at all. */
 export declare const ROOM_MEMBER_CAPABILITY = "room:member";

package/dist/domain/room-token-verification.mjs

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { i as verifyCapabilityToken } from "../tokens-VicRWTj1.mjs";
 import { deviceIdToHex } from "./device-id.mjs";
+import { i as verifyCapabilityToken } from "../tokens-VicRWTj1.mjs";
 import { parseRoomPath } from "./room-path.mjs";
 //#region src/domain/room-token-verification.ts
 /**

package/dist/domain/room.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
+const require_generated_protocol = require("../generated/protocol.cjs");
+const require_domain_room_token_verification = require("./room-token-verification.cjs");
+let cbor2 = require("cbor2");
+//#region src/domain/room.ts
+/**
+* Room-notice verification (spec/room.cddl's own noticeboard extension of core/room). A room-notice is self-certifying the same way a capability-token or revocation-entry already is: a bare cose-sign1 whose payload carries its own signer's key, so a reader verifies posting authority from the entry alone, with no prior contact with the poster and no central gatekeeper. This module is the first TypeScript verifier for it -- no `room.ts` domain module existed anywhere before this, despite the CDDL claim (including `valid-until`) having shipped already.
+*/
+/**
+* RFC 9052 §4.4 Sig_structure for a COSE_Sign1 with no external AAD -- identical in shape to tokens.ts's own private helper of the same name, but reimplemented here rather than imported, since tokens.ts does not export it. Worth consolidating into a shared cose.ts once a third caller needs the identical helper, but two independent five-line copies is not yet a real duplication problem on its own.
+*/
+function sig1ToBeSigned(protectedHeader, payload) {
+	return (0, cbor2.encode)([
+		"Signature1",
+		protectedHeader,
+		/* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(0),
+		payload
+	], cbor2.cdeEncodeOptions);
+}
+function bytesEqual(a, b) {
+	if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
+	for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i += 1) if (a[i] !== b[i]) return false;
+	return true;
+}
+/** Lexicographic (bytewise-ascending) ordering -- the same convention room.cddl's own DM room-path already uses for its sorted pair. Shorter-but-equal-prefix sorts first, matching how Uint8Array.prototype comparisons behave nowhere natively, so this exists at all. */
+function compareBytes(a, b) {
+	const length = Math.min(a.length, b.length);
+	for (let i = 0; i < length; i += 1) {
+		const byteA = a[i];
+		const byteB = b[i];
+		if (byteA === void 0 || byteB === void 0) throw new Error("compareBytes: index out of range");
+		if (byteA !== byteB) return byteA - byteB;
+	}
+	return a.length - b.length;
+}
+/**
+* Verifies one room-notice (spec/room.cddl) against every obligation its own "Six verifier obligations" comment documents, including `valid-until` (obligation 6): the envelope is a well-formed COSE_Sign1 whose signature verifies against its own embedded poster-key, and poster-key is self-certifying (sha256(poster-key.public-key) equals poster); the embedded token independently passes every ordinary capability-token obligation (signature, expiry, not-before, revocation, delegations- remaining, and -- since the embedded token is itself room-scoped -- the chain-root and scope obligations spec/room.cddl's own six general verifier obligations require of any room:member token) with its bearer pinned to this notice's own `poster` field and its scope pinned to this notice's own `room` field; and, if present, `valid-until` has not yet elapsed as of the injected clock. Checks run cheapest-and-structural first, signature next, the recursive token-chain verification last, mirroring tokens.ts's own ordering discipline.
+*
+* Cross-author ordering (obligation 4) is deliberately NOT checked here -- it is a property of how a reader merges several posters' notices into one sequence, not a pass/fail condition on any single notice. Use compareRoomNotices for that once notices are already individually verified.
+*
+* Revocation (obligation 5) needs no separate step of its own: verifying the embedded token below already walks the full delegation chain against `options.revocation` as part of ordinary capability-token verification, and obligation 5 explicitly disclaims any retroactive "was the poster revoked as of posted-at" check -- only the token's own present-tense validity matters, which the embedded-token verification already establishes.
+*/
+async function verifyRoomNotice(notice, options) {
+	const [protectedHeader, , payload, signature] = notice;
+	if (payload === null) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "malformed"
+	};
+	let decoded;
+	try {
+		decoded = (0, cbor2.decode)(payload, cbor2.cdeDecodeOptions);
+	} catch {
+		return {
+			ok: false,
+			reason: "malformed"
+		};
+	}
+	const parsed = require_generated_protocol.roomNoticeClaimsSchema.safeParse(decoded);
+	if (!parsed.success) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "malformed"
+	};
+	const claims = parsed.data;
+	if (options.expectedRoom !== void 0 && claims.room !== options.expectedRoom) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "wrong_room"
+	};
+	if (!await options.identity.verify(claims["poster-key"], sig1ToBeSigned(protectedHeader, payload), signature)) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "bad_signature"
+	};
+	if (!bytesEqual(await options.identity.deriveDeviceId(claims["poster-key"]["public-key"]), claims.poster)) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "wrong_poster"
+	};
+	const validUntil = claims["valid-until"];
+	if (validUntil !== void 0 && validUntil <= options.clock.now()) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "content_expired"
+	};
+	const tokenVerdict = await require_domain_room_token_verification.verifyRoomToken(claims.token, {
+		identity: options.identity,
+		clock: options.clock,
+		revocation: options.revocation,
+		expectedBearer: claims.poster,
+		roomPath: claims.room
+	});
+	if (!tokenVerdict.ok) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: tokenVerdict.reason
+	};
+	return {
+		ok: true,
+		claims
+	};
+}
+/**
+* Deterministic display ordering for room-notice entries from possibly several different posters (spec/room.cddl obligation 4): sorts by (posted-at, poster, notice-id), the exact tiebreak idiom the CDDL comment specifies -- the same "lowest wins" idea coordinator-frame's own lowest-device-id rule already uses for equal-term claims elsewhere in this spec. Takes already-verified claims (the output of verifyRoomNotice) -- this is purely a merge-order comparator, never a validity check, so it is kept structurally separate from verifyRoomNotice's own pass/fail verdict.
+*/
+function compareRoomNotices(a, b) {
+	if (a["posted-at"] !== b["posted-at"]) return a["posted-at"] - b["posted-at"];
+	const posterOrder = compareBytes(a.poster, b.poster);
+	if (posterOrder !== 0) return posterOrder;
+	return compareBytes(a["notice-id"], b["notice-id"]);
+}
+//#endregion
+exports.compareRoomNotices = compareRoomNotices;
+exports.verifyRoomNotice = verifyRoomNotice;

package/dist/domain/room.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+import { Dt as RoomPath, Et as RoomNoticeClaims, Tt as RoomNotice } from "../protocol-sW8d6Og-.cjs";
+import { t as IdentityPort } from "../identity-DJ06jn4k.cjs";
+import { t as Clock } from "../clock-DiSx-WKM.cjs";
+import { a as RevocationCheck } from "../tokens-DfVfE00W.cjs";
+import { RoomTokenVerdictReason } from "./room-token-verification.cjs";
+//#region src/domain/room.d.ts
+export type RoomNoticeVerdictReason = "malformed" | "wrong_room" | "bad_signature" | "wrong_poster" | "content_expired" | RoomTokenVerdictReason;
+export type RoomNoticeVerdict = {
+  ok: true;
+  claims: RoomNoticeClaims;
+} | {
+  ok: false;
+  reason: RoomNoticeVerdictReason;
+};
+export interface VerifyRoomNoticeOptions {
+  identity: IdentityPort;
+  clock: Clock;
+  revocation: RevocationCheck;
+  /**
+   * When given, refuses any notice not claiming exactly this room -- "is this the room I actually asked to read", checked against the notice's own self-declared `room` field before any cryptographic work, so a caller scanning a mixed stream of notices can cheaply skip ones for other rooms. Independent of, and layered on top of, this function's own unconditional internal self-consistency check (the embedded token's scope.path MUST equal the notice's own `room` field regardless of whether expectedRoom is given at all) -- a notice can be internally self-consistent yet still be for a room other than the one a caller expected, and this is the option that catches that case. Mirrors verifyCapabilityToken's own optional expectedBearer for the same "also assert it matches what I expected" shape.
+   */
+  expectedRoom?: RoomPath;
+}
+/**
+ * Verifies one room-notice (spec/room.cddl) against every obligation its own "Six verifier obligations" comment documents, including `valid-until` (obligation 6): the envelope is a well-formed COSE_Sign1 whose signature verifies against its own embedded poster-key, and poster-key is self-certifying (sha256(poster-key.public-key) equals poster); the embedded token independently passes every ordinary capability-token obligation (signature, expiry, not-before, revocation, delegations- remaining, and -- since the embedded token is itself room-scoped -- the chain-root and scope obligations spec/room.cddl's own six general verifier obligations require of any room:member token) with its bearer pinned to this notice's own `poster` field and its scope pinned to this notice's own `room` field; and, if present, `valid-until` has not yet elapsed as of the injected clock. Checks run cheapest-and-structural first, signature next, the recursive token-chain verification last, mirroring tokens.ts's own ordering discipline.
+ *
+ * Cross-author ordering (obligation 4) is deliberately NOT checked here -- it is a property of how a reader merges several posters' notices into one sequence, not a pass/fail condition on any single notice. Use compareRoomNotices for that once notices are already individually verified.
+ *
+ * Revocation (obligation 5) needs no separate step of its own: verifying the embedded token below already walks the full delegation chain against `options.revocation` as part of ordinary capability-token verification, and obligation 5 explicitly disclaims any retroactive "was the poster revoked as of posted-at" check -- only the token's own present-tense validity matters, which the embedded-token verification already establishes.
+ */
+export declare function verifyRoomNotice(notice: RoomNotice, options: Readonly<VerifyRoomNoticeOptions>): Promise<RoomNoticeVerdict>;
+/**
+ * Deterministic display ordering for room-notice entries from possibly several different posters (spec/room.cddl obligation 4): sorts by (posted-at, poster, notice-id), the exact tiebreak idiom the CDDL comment specifies -- the same "lowest wins" idea coordinator-frame's own lowest-device-id rule already uses for equal-term claims elsewhere in this spec. Takes already-verified claims (the output of verifyRoomNotice) -- this is purely a merge-order comparator, never a validity check, so it is kept structurally separate from verifyRoomNotice's own pass/fail verdict.
+ */
+export declare function compareRoomNotices(a: Readonly<RoomNoticeClaims>, b: Readonly<RoomNoticeClaims>): number;
+//#endregion

package/dist/domain/room.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+import { Dt as RoomPath, Et as RoomNoticeClaims, Tt as RoomNotice } from "../protocol-sW8d6Og-.mjs";
+import { t as IdentityPort } from "../identity-C5N86BPz.mjs";
+import { t as Clock } from "../clock-DiSx-WKM.mjs";
+import { a as RevocationCheck } from "../tokens-CpLDI5Fo.mjs";
+import { RoomTokenVerdictReason } from "./room-token-verification.mjs";
+//#region src/domain/room.d.ts
+export type RoomNoticeVerdictReason = "malformed" | "wrong_room" | "bad_signature" | "wrong_poster" | "content_expired" | RoomTokenVerdictReason;
+export type RoomNoticeVerdict = {
+  ok: true;
+  claims: RoomNoticeClaims;
+} | {
+  ok: false;
+  reason: RoomNoticeVerdictReason;
+};
+export interface VerifyRoomNoticeOptions {
+  identity: IdentityPort;
+  clock: Clock;
+  revocation: RevocationCheck;
+  /**
+   * When given, refuses any notice not claiming exactly this room -- "is this the room I actually asked to read", checked against the notice's own self-declared `room` field before any cryptographic work, so a caller scanning a mixed stream of notices can cheaply skip ones for other rooms. Independent of, and layered on top of, this function's own unconditional internal self-consistency check (the embedded token's scope.path MUST equal the notice's own `room` field regardless of whether expectedRoom is given at all) -- a notice can be internally self-consistent yet still be for a room other than the one a caller expected, and this is the option that catches that case. Mirrors verifyCapabilityToken's own optional expectedBearer for the same "also assert it matches what I expected" shape.
+   */
+  expectedRoom?: RoomPath;
+}
+/**
+ * Verifies one room-notice (spec/room.cddl) against every obligation its own "Six verifier obligations" comment documents, including `valid-until` (obligation 6): the envelope is a well-formed COSE_Sign1 whose signature verifies against its own embedded poster-key, and poster-key is self-certifying (sha256(poster-key.public-key) equals poster); the embedded token independently passes every ordinary capability-token obligation (signature, expiry, not-before, revocation, delegations- remaining, and -- since the embedded token is itself room-scoped -- the chain-root and scope obligations spec/room.cddl's own six general verifier obligations require of any room:member token) with its bearer pinned to this notice's own `poster` field and its scope pinned to this notice's own `room` field; and, if present, `valid-until` has not yet elapsed as of the injected clock. Checks run cheapest-and-structural first, signature next, the recursive token-chain verification last, mirroring tokens.ts's own ordering discipline.
+ *
+ * Cross-author ordering (obligation 4) is deliberately NOT checked here -- it is a property of how a reader merges several posters' notices into one sequence, not a pass/fail condition on any single notice. Use compareRoomNotices for that once notices are already individually verified.
+ *
+ * Revocation (obligation 5) needs no separate step of its own: verifying the embedded token below already walks the full delegation chain against `options.revocation` as part of ordinary capability-token verification, and obligation 5 explicitly disclaims any retroactive "was the poster revoked as of posted-at" check -- only the token's own present-tense validity matters, which the embedded-token verification already establishes.
+ */
+export declare function verifyRoomNotice(notice: RoomNotice, options: Readonly<VerifyRoomNoticeOptions>): Promise<RoomNoticeVerdict>;
+/**
+ * Deterministic display ordering for room-notice entries from possibly several different posters (spec/room.cddl obligation 4): sorts by (posted-at, poster, notice-id), the exact tiebreak idiom the CDDL comment specifies -- the same "lowest wins" idea coordinator-frame's own lowest-device-id rule already uses for equal-term claims elsewhere in this spec. Takes already-verified claims (the output of verifyRoomNotice) -- this is purely a merge-order comparator, never a validity check, so it is kept structurally separate from verifyRoomNotice's own pass/fail verdict.
+ */
+export declare function compareRoomNotices(a: Readonly<RoomNoticeClaims>, b: Readonly<RoomNoticeClaims>): number;
+//#endregion

package/dist/domain/room.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+import { roomNoticeClaimsSchema } from "../generated/protocol.mjs";
+import { verifyRoomToken } from "./room-token-verification.mjs";
+import { cdeDecodeOptions, cdeEncodeOptions, decode, encode } from "cbor2";
+//#region src/domain/room.ts
+/**
+* Room-notice verification (spec/room.cddl's own noticeboard extension of core/room). A room-notice is self-certifying the same way a capability-token or revocation-entry already is: a bare cose-sign1 whose payload carries its own signer's key, so a reader verifies posting authority from the entry alone, with no prior contact with the poster and no central gatekeeper. This module is the first TypeScript verifier for it -- no `room.ts` domain module existed anywhere before this, despite the CDDL claim (including `valid-until`) having shipped already.
+*/
+/**
+* RFC 9052 §4.4 Sig_structure for a COSE_Sign1 with no external AAD -- identical in shape to tokens.ts's own private helper of the same name, but reimplemented here rather than imported, since tokens.ts does not export it. Worth consolidating into a shared cose.ts once a third caller needs the identical helper, but two independent five-line copies is not yet a real duplication problem on its own.
+*/
+function sig1ToBeSigned(protectedHeader, payload) {
+	return encode([
+		"Signature1",
+		protectedHeader,
+		/* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(0),
+		payload
+	], cdeEncodeOptions);
+}
+function bytesEqual(a, b) {
+	if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
+	for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i += 1) if (a[i] !== b[i]) return false;
+	return true;
+}
+/** Lexicographic (bytewise-ascending) ordering -- the same convention room.cddl's own DM room-path already uses for its sorted pair. Shorter-but-equal-prefix sorts first, matching how Uint8Array.prototype comparisons behave nowhere natively, so this exists at all. */
+function compareBytes(a, b) {
+	const length = Math.min(a.length, b.length);
+	for (let i = 0; i < length; i += 1) {
+		const byteA = a[i];
+		const byteB = b[i];
+		if (byteA === void 0 || byteB === void 0) throw new Error("compareBytes: index out of range");
+		if (byteA !== byteB) return byteA - byteB;
+	}
+	return a.length - b.length;
+}
+/**
+* Verifies one room-notice (spec/room.cddl) against every obligation its own "Six verifier obligations" comment documents, including `valid-until` (obligation 6): the envelope is a well-formed COSE_Sign1 whose signature verifies against its own embedded poster-key, and poster-key is self-certifying (sha256(poster-key.public-key) equals poster); the embedded token independently passes every ordinary capability-token obligation (signature, expiry, not-before, revocation, delegations- remaining, and -- since the embedded token is itself room-scoped -- the chain-root and scope obligations spec/room.cddl's own six general verifier obligations require of any room:member token) with its bearer pinned to this notice's own `poster` field and its scope pinned to this notice's own `room` field; and, if present, `valid-until` has not yet elapsed as of the injected clock. Checks run cheapest-and-structural first, signature next, the recursive token-chain verification last, mirroring tokens.ts's own ordering discipline.
+*
+* Cross-author ordering (obligation 4) is deliberately NOT checked here -- it is a property of how a reader merges several posters' notices into one sequence, not a pass/fail condition on any single notice. Use compareRoomNotices for that once notices are already individually verified.
+*
+* Revocation (obligation 5) needs no separate step of its own: verifying the embedded token below already walks the full delegation chain against `options.revocation` as part of ordinary capability-token verification, and obligation 5 explicitly disclaims any retroactive "was the poster revoked as of posted-at" check -- only the token's own present-tense validity matters, which the embedded-token verification already establishes.
+*/
+async function verifyRoomNotice(notice, options) {
+	const [protectedHeader, , payload, signature] = notice;
+	if (payload === null) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "malformed"
+	};
+	let decoded;
+	try {
+		decoded = decode(payload, cdeDecodeOptions);
+	} catch {
+		return {
+			ok: false,
+			reason: "malformed"
+		};
+	}
+	const parsed = roomNoticeClaimsSchema.safeParse(decoded);
+	if (!parsed.success) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "malformed"
+	};
+	const claims = parsed.data;
+	if (options.expectedRoom !== void 0 && claims.room !== options.expectedRoom) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "wrong_room"
+	};
+	if (!await options.identity.verify(claims["poster-key"], sig1ToBeSigned(protectedHeader, payload), signature)) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "bad_signature"
+	};
+	if (!bytesEqual(await options.identity.deriveDeviceId(claims["poster-key"]["public-key"]), claims.poster)) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "wrong_poster"
+	};
+	const validUntil = claims["valid-until"];
+	if (validUntil !== void 0 && validUntil <= options.clock.now()) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "content_expired"
+	};
+	const tokenVerdict = await verifyRoomToken(claims.token, {
+		identity: options.identity,
+		clock: options.clock,
+		revocation: options.revocation,
+		expectedBearer: claims.poster,
+		roomPath: claims.room
+	});
+	if (!tokenVerdict.ok) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: tokenVerdict.reason
+	};
+	return {
+		ok: true,
+		claims
+	};
+}
+/**
+* Deterministic display ordering for room-notice entries from possibly several different posters (spec/room.cddl obligation 4): sorts by (posted-at, poster, notice-id), the exact tiebreak idiom the CDDL comment specifies -- the same "lowest wins" idea coordinator-frame's own lowest-device-id rule already uses for equal-term claims elsewhere in this spec. Takes already-verified claims (the output of verifyRoomNotice) -- this is purely a merge-order comparator, never a validity check, so it is kept structurally separate from verifyRoomNotice's own pass/fail verdict.
+*/
+function compareRoomNotices(a, b) {
+	if (a["posted-at"] !== b["posted-at"]) return a["posted-at"] - b["posted-at"];
+	const posterOrder = compareBytes(a.poster, b.poster);
+	if (posterOrder !== 0) return posterOrder;
+	return compareBytes(a["notice-id"], b["notice-id"]);
+}
+//#endregion
+export { compareRoomNotices, verifyRoomNotice };

package/dist/domain/tokens.d.cts

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-import { a as RevocationCheck, c as TokenVerdict, d as VerifyRevocationEntryOptions, f as canGrant, g as verifyRevocationEntry, h as verifyCapabilityToken, i as MintVerdict, l as TokenVerdictReason, m as mintRevocationEntry, n as MintRefusalReason, o as RevocationEntryVerdict, p as mintCapabilityToken, r as MintRevocationEntryOptions, s as RevocationEntryVerdictReason, t as MintCapabilityTokenOptions, u as VerifyCapabilityTokenOptions } from "../tokens-H_mV_JCC.cjs";
+import { a as RevocationCheck, c as TokenVerdict, d as VerifyRevocationEntryOptions, f as canGrant, g as verifyRevocationEntry, h as verifyCapabilityToken, i as MintVerdict, l as TokenVerdictReason, m as mintRevocationEntry, n as MintRefusalReason, o as RevocationEntryVerdict, p as mintCapabilityToken, r as MintRevocationEntryOptions, s as RevocationEntryVerdictReason, t as MintCapabilityTokenOptions, u as VerifyCapabilityTokenOptions } from "../tokens-DfVfE00W.cjs";
 export { MintCapabilityTokenOptions, MintRefusalReason, MintRevocationEntryOptions, MintVerdict, RevocationCheck, RevocationEntryVerdict, RevocationEntryVerdictReason, TokenVerdict, TokenVerdictReason, VerifyCapabilityTokenOptions, VerifyRevocationEntryOptions, canGrant, mintCapabilityToken, mintRevocationEntry, verifyCapabilityToken, verifyRevocationEntry };

package/dist/domain/tokens.d.mts

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-import { a as RevocationCheck, c as TokenVerdict, d as VerifyRevocationEntryOptions, f as canGrant, g as verifyRevocationEntry, h as verifyCapabilityToken, i as MintVerdict, l as TokenVerdictReason, m as mintRevocationEntry, n as MintRefusalReason, o as RevocationEntryVerdict, p as mintCapabilityToken, r as MintRevocationEntryOptions, s as RevocationEntryVerdictReason, t as MintCapabilityTokenOptions, u as VerifyCapabilityTokenOptions } from "../tokens-CBI54oF-.mjs";
+import { a as RevocationCheck, c as TokenVerdict, d as VerifyRevocationEntryOptions, f as canGrant, g as verifyRevocationEntry, h as verifyCapabilityToken, i as MintVerdict, l as TokenVerdictReason, m as mintRevocationEntry, n as MintRefusalReason, o as RevocationEntryVerdict, p as mintCapabilityToken, r as MintRevocationEntryOptions, s as RevocationEntryVerdictReason, t as MintCapabilityTokenOptions, u as VerifyCapabilityTokenOptions } from "../tokens-CpLDI5Fo.mjs";
 export { MintCapabilityTokenOptions, MintRefusalReason, MintRevocationEntryOptions, MintVerdict, RevocationCheck, RevocationEntryVerdict, RevocationEntryVerdictReason, TokenVerdict, TokenVerdictReason, VerifyCapabilityTokenOptions, VerifyRevocationEntryOptions, canGrant, mintCapabilityToken, mintRevocationEntry, verifyCapabilityToken, verifyRevocationEntry };