wire-mesh-core 1.0.1 → 1.0.3

package/dist/adapters/node-identity.d.cts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { j as IdentityKey, v as DeviceId } from "../protocol-B26-5VX7.cjs";
-import { IdentityPort } from "../ports/identity.cjs";
+import { t as IdentityPort } from "../identity-BRLEUfVY.cjs";
 import { webcrypto } from "node:crypto";
 //#region src/adapters/node-identity.d.ts
 export declare function deriveDeviceId(publicKey: Uint8Array): Promise<DeviceId>;

package/dist/adapters/node-identity.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { j as IdentityKey, v as DeviceId } from "../protocol-B26-5VX7.mjs";
-import { IdentityPort } from "../ports/identity.mjs";
+import { t as IdentityPort } from "../identity-qNkmGytv.mjs";
 import { webcrypto } from "node:crypto";
 //#region src/adapters/node-identity.d.ts
 export declare function deriveDeviceId(publicKey: Uint8Array): Promise<DeviceId>;

package/dist/adapters/system-clock.d.cts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Clock } from "../ports/clock.cjs";
+import { t as Clock } from "../clock-DiSx-WKM.cjs";
 //#region src/adapters/system-clock.d.ts
 /** Wraps the system wall clock -- the only place Date.now() appears in this package. */
 export declare function createSystemClock(): Clock;

package/dist/adapters/system-clock.d.mts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Clock } from "../ports/clock.mjs";
+import { t as Clock } from "../clock-DiSx-WKM.mjs";
 //#region src/adapters/system-clock.d.ts
 /** Wraps the system wall clock -- the only place Date.now() appears in this package. */
 export declare function createSystemClock(): Clock;

package/dist/adapters/tcp-transport.cjs

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ function frameReader(socket) {
 			buffer = buffer.subarray(LENGTH_PREFIX_BYTES + bodyLength);
 			let decoded;
 			try {
-				decoded = (0, cbor2.decode)(body, cbor2.cdeDecodeOptions);
+				decoded = (0, cbor2.decode)(new Uint8Array(body.buffer, body.byteOffset, body.byteLength), cbor2.cdeDecodeOptions);
 			} catch (error) {
 				const connectionError = error instanceof Error ? error : /* @__PURE__ */ new Error(`frame body failed to decode: ${String(error)}`);
 				failAll(connectionError);

package/dist/adapters/tcp-transport.mjs

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ function frameReader(socket) {
 			buffer = buffer.subarray(LENGTH_PREFIX_BYTES + bodyLength);
 			let decoded;
 			try {
-				decoded = decode(body, cdeDecodeOptions);
+				decoded = decode(new Uint8Array(body.buffer, body.byteOffset, body.byteLength), cdeDecodeOptions);
 			} catch (error) {
 				const connectionError = error instanceof Error ? error : /* @__PURE__ */ new Error(`frame body failed to decode: ${String(error)}`);
 				failAll(connectionError);

package/dist/adapters/tls-transport.cjs

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ function frameReader(socket) {
 			buffer = buffer.subarray(LENGTH_PREFIX_BYTES + bodyLength);
 			let decoded;
 			try {
-				decoded = (0, cbor2.decode)(body, cbor2.cdeDecodeOptions);
+				decoded = (0, cbor2.decode)(new Uint8Array(body.buffer, body.byteOffset, body.byteLength), cbor2.cdeDecodeOptions);
 			} catch (error) {
 				const connectionError = error instanceof Error ? error : /* @__PURE__ */ new Error(`frame body failed to decode: ${String(error)}`);
 				failAll(connectionError);

package/dist/adapters/tls-transport.mjs

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ function frameReader(socket) {
 			buffer = buffer.subarray(LENGTH_PREFIX_BYTES + bodyLength);
 			let decoded;
 			try {
-				decoded = decode(body, cdeDecodeOptions);
+				decoded = decode(new Uint8Array(body.buffer, body.byteOffset, body.byteLength), cdeDecodeOptions);
 			} catch (error) {
 				const connectionError = error instanceof Error ? error : /* @__PURE__ */ new Error(`frame body failed to decode: ${String(error)}`);
 				failAll(connectionError);

package/dist/clock-DiSx-WKM.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+//#region src/ports/clock.d.ts
+interface Clock {
+  /** Current time as Unix milliseconds, matching every uint timestamp field in the protocol (token-claims.expires, revocation-entry.revoked-at, handshake params, etc.). */
+  now: () => number;
+}
+//#endregion
+export { Clock as t };

package/dist/clock-DiSx-WKM.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+//#region src/ports/clock.d.ts
+interface Clock {
+  /** Current time as Unix milliseconds, matching every uint timestamp field in the protocol (token-claims.expires, revocation-entry.revoked-at, handshake params, etc.). */
+  now: () => number;
+}
+//#endregion
+export { Clock as t };

package/dist/domain/mesh-session.d.cts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { F as ManageOk, M as ManageCommand, P as ManageError, U as PeerAdvert, Z as ProtocolVersion, ct as RevocationEntry, i as CapabilityToken, r as CapabilityScope, v as DeviceId, w as Frame } from "../protocol-B26-5VX7.cjs";
-import { IdentityPort } from "../ports/identity.cjs";
-import { Clock } from "../ports/clock.cjs";
+import { t as IdentityPort } from "../identity-BRLEUfVY.cjs";
+import { t as Clock } from "../clock-DiSx-WKM.cjs";
 import { Connection, Transport } from "../ports/transport.cjs";
 //#region src/domain/mesh-session.d.ts
 /** How long to wait for the node's handshake before calling it unanswered. A relay-only node never sends one; that is a state to display, not an error. */

package/dist/domain/mesh-session.d.mts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { F as ManageOk, M as ManageCommand, P as ManageError, U as PeerAdvert, Z as ProtocolVersion, ct as RevocationEntry, i as CapabilityToken, r as CapabilityScope, v as DeviceId, w as Frame } from "../protocol-B26-5VX7.mjs";
-import { IdentityPort } from "../ports/identity.mjs";
-import { Clock } from "../ports/clock.mjs";
+import { t as IdentityPort } from "../identity-qNkmGytv.mjs";
+import { t as Clock } from "../clock-DiSx-WKM.mjs";
 import { Connection, Transport } from "../ports/transport.mjs";
 //#region src/domain/mesh-session.d.ts
 /** How long to wait for the node's handshake before calling it unanswered. A relay-only node never sends one; that is a state to display, not an error. */

package/dist/domain/revocation-view.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
+const require_domain_device_id = require("./device-id.cjs");
+const require_domain_tokens = require("./tokens.cjs");
+//#region src/domain/revocation-view.ts
+function revocationKey(tokenId, issuer) {
+	return `${require_domain_device_id.bytesToHex(tokenId)}:${require_domain_device_id.deviceIdToHex(issuer)}`;
+}
+function createRevocationView() {
+	const revoked = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+	return {
+		async isRevoked(tokenId, issuer) {
+			return Promise.resolve(revoked.has(revocationKey(tokenId, issuer)));
+		},
+		async record(entry, options) {
+			const verdict = await require_domain_tokens.verifyRevocationEntry(entry, options);
+			if (verdict.ok) revoked.add(revocationKey(verdict.claims["token-id"], verdict.claims.issuer));
+			return verdict;
+		}
+	};
+}
+//#endregion
+exports.createRevocationView = createRevocationView;

package/dist/domain/revocation-view.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+import { ct as RevocationEntry } from "../protocol-B26-5VX7.cjs";
+import { RevocationCheck, RevocationEntryVerdict, VerifyRevocationEntryOptions } from "./tokens.cjs";
+//#region src/domain/revocation-view.d.ts
+/**
+ * An in-memory RevocationCheck fed by ingested revocation-announce frames. Keyed by (token-id, issuer) per management.cddl's contract: an entry counts against a token only when both match, so a third party's entry for someone else's token-id is stored (it is a well-formed, self-certifying entry) but never matches a lookup for the token it does not actually govern.
+ */
+export interface RevocationView extends RevocationCheck {
+  /** Verifies one gossiped revocation-entry via verifyRevocationEntry and, if it verifies, records it. An entry that fails verification is dropped, not stored -- the returned verdict lets a caller log or otherwise report the refusal. */
+  record: (entry: RevocationEntry, options: VerifyRevocationEntryOptions) => Promise<RevocationEntryVerdict>;
+}
+export declare function createRevocationView(): RevocationView;
+//#endregion

package/dist/domain/revocation-view.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+import { ct as RevocationEntry } from "../protocol-B26-5VX7.mjs";
+import { RevocationCheck, RevocationEntryVerdict, VerifyRevocationEntryOptions } from "./tokens.mjs";
+//#region src/domain/revocation-view.d.ts
+/**
+ * An in-memory RevocationCheck fed by ingested revocation-announce frames. Keyed by (token-id, issuer) per management.cddl's contract: an entry counts against a token only when both match, so a third party's entry for someone else's token-id is stored (it is a well-formed, self-certifying entry) but never matches a lookup for the token it does not actually govern.
+ */
+export interface RevocationView extends RevocationCheck {
+  /** Verifies one gossiped revocation-entry via verifyRevocationEntry and, if it verifies, records it. An entry that fails verification is dropped, not stored -- the returned verdict lets a caller log or otherwise report the refusal. */
+  record: (entry: RevocationEntry, options: VerifyRevocationEntryOptions) => Promise<RevocationEntryVerdict>;
+}
+export declare function createRevocationView(): RevocationView;
+//#endregion

package/dist/domain/revocation-view.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+import { bytesToHex, deviceIdToHex } from "./device-id.mjs";
+import { verifyRevocationEntry } from "./tokens.mjs";
+//#region src/domain/revocation-view.ts
+function revocationKey(tokenId, issuer) {
+	return `${bytesToHex(tokenId)}:${deviceIdToHex(issuer)}`;
+}
+function createRevocationView() {
+	const revoked = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+	return {
+		async isRevoked(tokenId, issuer) {
+			return Promise.resolve(revoked.has(revocationKey(tokenId, issuer)));
+		},
+		async record(entry, options) {
+			const verdict = await verifyRevocationEntry(entry, options);
+			if (verdict.ok) revoked.add(revocationKey(verdict.claims["token-id"], verdict.claims.issuer));
+			return verdict;
+		}
+	};
+}
+//#endregion
+export { createRevocationView };

package/dist/domain/tokens.d.cts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { Et as TokenClaims, ct as RevocationEntry, i as CapabilityToken, st as RevocationClaims, v as DeviceId } from "../protocol-B26-5VX7.cjs";
-import { IdentityPort } from "../ports/identity.cjs";
-import { Clock } from "../ports/clock.cjs";
+import { t as IdentityPort } from "../identity-BRLEUfVY.cjs";
+import { t as Clock } from "../clock-DiSx-WKM.cjs";
 //#region src/domain/tokens.d.ts
 /**
  * The revocation view a verifier consults. Contract per management.cddl: an entry counts against a token only when BOTH its token-id and its issuer match the token's own -- only a token's own issuer may revoke it, so a third party's entry for someone else's token-id must be ignored. Implementations ingest gossiped revocation-announce frames via verifyRevocationEntry (which enforces each entry's own signature and self-certification) and key the resulting claims by token-id + issuer.

package/dist/domain/tokens.d.mts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { Et as TokenClaims, ct as RevocationEntry, i as CapabilityToken, st as RevocationClaims, v as DeviceId } from "../protocol-B26-5VX7.mjs";
-import { IdentityPort } from "../ports/identity.mjs";
-import { Clock } from "../ports/clock.mjs";
+import { t as IdentityPort } from "../identity-qNkmGytv.mjs";
+import { t as Clock } from "../clock-DiSx-WKM.mjs";
 //#region src/domain/tokens.d.ts
 /**
  * The revocation view a verifier consults. Contract per management.cddl: an entry counts against a token only when BOTH its token-id and its issuer match the token's own -- only a token's own issuer may revoke it, so a third party's entry for someone else's token-id must be ignored. Implementations ingest gossiped revocation-announce frames via verifyRevocationEntry (which enforces each entry's own signature and self-certification) and key the resulting claims by token-id + issuer.

package/dist/identity-BRLEUfVY.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+import { j as IdentityKey, v as DeviceId } from "./protocol-B26-5VX7.cjs";
+//#region src/ports/identity.d.ts
+/**
+ * Wraps the local node's own identity plus the signing/verification primitives capability-token handling needs -- never hardcoded to one crypto library's own API shape (Node's webcrypto, a WASM implementation, a hardware key, etc. can all satisfy this same contract).
+ */
+interface IdentityPort {
+  readonly deviceId: DeviceId;
+  readonly identityKey: IdentityKey;
+  /** Signs an already-assembled message (e.g. a COSE Sig_structure) with the local node's own private key. Always a fresh buffer, never a view into shared or offset memory -- directly usable as a CapabilityToken tuple element without further normalisation. */
+  sign: (message: Uint8Array) => Promise<Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>>;
+  /** Verifies a signature against an arbitrary identity-key -- not necessarily the local node's own, since capability-token verification checks a token's issuer-key. */
+  verify: (key: IdentityKey, message: Uint8Array, signature: Uint8Array) => Promise<boolean>;
+  /** Derives the device-id an arbitrary public key would produce (SHA-256 of the raw public-key bytes -- never a certificate's own DER encoding, the bug both Cascade and agent-comms had to fix). Used to check a token's self-certifying issuer-key against its claimed issuer, not just the local node's own identity. */
+  deriveDeviceId: (publicKey: Uint8Array) => Promise<DeviceId>;
+}
+//#endregion
+export { IdentityPort as t };

package/dist/identity-qNkmGytv.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+import { j as IdentityKey, v as DeviceId } from "./protocol-B26-5VX7.mjs";
+//#region src/ports/identity.d.ts
+/**
+ * Wraps the local node's own identity plus the signing/verification primitives capability-token handling needs -- never hardcoded to one crypto library's own API shape (Node's webcrypto, a WASM implementation, a hardware key, etc. can all satisfy this same contract).
+ */
+interface IdentityPort {
+  readonly deviceId: DeviceId;
+  readonly identityKey: IdentityKey;
+  /** Signs an already-assembled message (e.g. a COSE Sig_structure) with the local node's own private key. Always a fresh buffer, never a view into shared or offset memory -- directly usable as a CapabilityToken tuple element without further normalisation. */
+  sign: (message: Uint8Array) => Promise<Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>>;
+  /** Verifies a signature against an arbitrary identity-key -- not necessarily the local node's own, since capability-token verification checks a token's issuer-key. */
+  verify: (key: IdentityKey, message: Uint8Array, signature: Uint8Array) => Promise<boolean>;
+  /** Derives the device-id an arbitrary public key would produce (SHA-256 of the raw public-key bytes -- never a certificate's own DER encoding, the bug both Cascade and agent-comms had to fix). Used to check a token's self-certifying issuer-key against its claimed issuer, not just the local node's own identity. */
+  deriveDeviceId: (publicKey: Uint8Array) => Promise<DeviceId>;
+}
+//#endregion
+export { IdentityPort as t };

package/dist/ports/clock.d.cts

@@ -1,6 +1,2 @@
-//#region src/ports/clock.d.ts
-export interface Clock {
-  /** Current time as Unix milliseconds, matching every uint timestamp field in the protocol (token-claims.expires, revocation-entry.revoked-at, handshake params, etc.). */
-  now: () => number;
-}
-//#endregion
+import { t as Clock } from "../clock-DiSx-WKM.cjs";
+export { Clock };

package/dist/ports/clock.d.mts

@@ -1,6 +1,2 @@
-//#region src/ports/clock.d.ts
-export interface Clock {
-  /** Current time as Unix milliseconds, matching every uint timestamp field in the protocol (token-claims.expires, revocation-entry.revoked-at, handshake params, etc.). */
-  now: () => number;
-}
-//#endregion
+import { t as Clock } from "../clock-DiSx-WKM.mjs";
+export { Clock };

package/dist/ports/identity.d.cts

@@ -1,16 +1,2 @@
-import { j as IdentityKey, v as DeviceId } from "../protocol-B26-5VX7.cjs";
-//#region src/ports/identity.d.ts
-/**
- * Wraps the local node's own identity plus the signing/verification primitives capability-token handling needs -- never hardcoded to one crypto library's own API shape (Node's webcrypto, a WASM implementation, a hardware key, etc. can all satisfy this same contract).
- */
-export interface IdentityPort {
-  readonly deviceId: DeviceId;
-  readonly identityKey: IdentityKey;
-  /** Signs an already-assembled message (e.g. a COSE Sig_structure) with the local node's own private key. Always a fresh buffer, never a view into shared or offset memory -- directly usable as a CapabilityToken tuple element without further normalisation. */
-  sign: (message: Uint8Array) => Promise<Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>>;
-  /** Verifies a signature against an arbitrary identity-key -- not necessarily the local node's own, since capability-token verification checks a token's issuer-key. */
-  verify: (key: IdentityKey, message: Uint8Array, signature: Uint8Array) => Promise<boolean>;
-  /** Derives the device-id an arbitrary public key would produce (SHA-256 of the raw public-key bytes -- never a certificate's own DER encoding, the bug both Cascade and agent-comms had to fix). Used to check a token's self-certifying issuer-key against its claimed issuer, not just the local node's own identity. */
-  deriveDeviceId: (publicKey: Uint8Array) => Promise<DeviceId>;
-}
-//#endregion
+import { t as IdentityPort } from "../identity-BRLEUfVY.cjs";
+export { IdentityPort };

package/dist/ports/identity.d.mts

@@ -1,16 +1,2 @@
-import { j as IdentityKey, v as DeviceId } from "../protocol-B26-5VX7.mjs";
-//#region src/ports/identity.d.ts
-/**
- * Wraps the local node's own identity plus the signing/verification primitives capability-token handling needs -- never hardcoded to one crypto library's own API shape (Node's webcrypto, a WASM implementation, a hardware key, etc. can all satisfy this same contract).
- */
-export interface IdentityPort {
-  readonly deviceId: DeviceId;
-  readonly identityKey: IdentityKey;
-  /** Signs an already-assembled message (e.g. a COSE Sig_structure) with the local node's own private key. Always a fresh buffer, never a view into shared or offset memory -- directly usable as a CapabilityToken tuple element without further normalisation. */
-  sign: (message: Uint8Array) => Promise<Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>>;
-  /** Verifies a signature against an arbitrary identity-key -- not necessarily the local node's own, since capability-token verification checks a token's issuer-key. */
-  verify: (key: IdentityKey, message: Uint8Array, signature: Uint8Array) => Promise<boolean>;
-  /** Derives the device-id an arbitrary public key would produce (SHA-256 of the raw public-key bytes -- never a certificate's own DER encoding, the bug both Cascade and agent-comms had to fix). Used to check a token's self-certifying issuer-key against its claimed issuer, not just the local node's own identity. */
-  deriveDeviceId: (publicKey: Uint8Array) => Promise<DeviceId>;
-}
-//#endregion
+import { t as IdentityPort } from "../identity-qNkmGytv.mjs";
+export { IdentityPort };

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "wire-mesh-core",
-  "version": "1.0.1",
+  "version": "1.0.3",
   "type": "module",
   "packageManager": "pnpm@10.33.0",
   "repository": {
@@ -96,6 +96,10 @@
       "import": "./dist/domain/relay-hub.mjs",
       "require": "./dist/domain/relay-hub.cjs"
     },
+    "./domain/revocation-view": {
+      "import": "./dist/domain/revocation-view.mjs",
+      "require": "./dist/domain/revocation-view.cjs"
+    },
     "./domain/tokens": {
       "import": "./dist/domain/tokens.mjs",
       "require": "./dist/domain/tokens.cjs"