windows-development-sandbox 1.0.5 → 1.1.0

package/dist/shared/projects.js

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+// Several projects in one running sandbox. Windows Sandbox fixes its mapped folders at boot, so a project can only
+// join a running sandbox when it is already visible inside:
+//  - the launch folder (mapped directly, as always);
+//  - a folder inside a project root (projects.roots: whole folders of projects, mapped at every start), including
+//    projects created after boot;
+//  - projects mapped at boot because they were in use when the sandbox was restarted to add them;
+//  - a folder shared into the running sandbox with `wsb share` (Windows 11 24H2+, untested).
+// Roots, boot-mapped projects and shares appear under C:\Projects (roots at their PC path with guestWorkspace "mirror").
+// Pure functions only: used by the host (registration, commands), the guest (daemon checks) and the tests.
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { isValidGuestPath } from './guest-paths.js';
+/** Where roots, boot-mapped projects and shared folders appear inside the sandbox. */
+export const PROJECTS_GUEST = 'C:\\Projects';
+const norm = (p) => path.win32.resolve(p).replace(/[\\/]+$/, '').toLowerCase();
+/** `child` is `parent` or somewhere below it (Windows paths, case-insensitive). */
+export const isWithin = (parent, child) => {
+    const a = norm(parent);
+    const b = norm(child);
+    return a === b || b.startsWith(a.endsWith('\\') ? a : a + '\\');
+};
+/**
+ * A project id (also its folder name under C:\Projects) for a folder: its name with only letters, digits, '-' and
+ * '_' (ids become file names on both sides), at most 48 characters, made unique against `taken` with -2, -3, ...
+ */
+export const hubName = (hostDir, taken) => {
+    const base = path.win32.basename(path.win32.resolve(hostDir)).replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9_-]+/g, '-').replace(/^-+|-+$/g, '').slice(0, 48) || 'project';
+    const used = new Set([...taken].map((t) => t.toLowerCase()));
+    if (!used.has(base.toLowerCase()))
+        return base;
+    for (let i = 2;; i++)
+        if (!used.has((base + '-' + i).toLowerCase()))
+            return base + '-' + i;
+};
+/** The project a folder on this PC belongs to: the most specific one that contains it (a project inside another wins). */
+export const projectForHostDir = (projects, hostDir) => projects.filter((p) => isWithin(p.host, hostDir)).sort((a, b) => b.host.length - a.host.length)[0] ?? null;
+/** The same for a folder inside the sandbox. */
+export const projectForGuestDir = (projects, guestDir) => projects.filter((p) => isWithin(p.guest, guestDir)).sort((a, b) => b.guest.length - a.guest.length)[0] ?? null;
+/** Where a folder on this PC appears inside the sandbox, given the mapped folder (project or root) that contains it. */
+export const guestDirFor = (mapped, hostDir) => {
+    const rel = path.win32.relative(path.win32.resolve(mapped.host), path.win32.resolve(hostDir));
+    return rel ? path.win32.join(mapped.guest, rel) : mapped.guest;
+};
+/** The other way: where a folder inside the sandbox is on this PC, given the mapped folder that contains it. */
+export const hostDirFor = (mapped, guestDir) => {
+    const rel = path.win32.relative(path.win32.resolve(mapped.guest), path.win32.resolve(guestDir));
+    return rel ? path.win32.join(mapped.host, rel) : mapped.host;
+};
+/** Strictly below `parent` (never `parent` itself). */
+export const isBelow = (parent, child) => isWithin(parent, child) && norm(parent) !== norm(child);
+/** A guest folder some project can be in: below C:\Projects, or inside one of the roots (their guest paths). */
+export const insideProjects = (guestDir, roots = [], projectsDir = PROJECTS_GUEST) => isBelow(projectsDir, guestDir) || roots.some((r) => isWithin(r, guestDir));
+/**
+ * Guest folders for the project roots and the projects mapped at boot: C:\Projects\<name>, unique; with
+ * guestWorkspace "mirror" a root appears at its PC path when the sandbox can show it there.
+ */
+export const planProjectMappings = (roots, projects, mirror, taken = []) => {
+    const names = [...taken];
+    const place = (host, tryMirror) => {
+        const resolved = path.win32.resolve(host).replace(/[\\/]+$/, '');
+        if (tryMirror && isValidGuestPath(resolved) && !isWithin(PROJECTS_GUEST, resolved))
+            return { host: resolved, guest: resolved };
+        const name = hubName(resolved, names);
+        names.push(name);
+        return { host: resolved, guest: path.win32.join(PROJECTS_GUEST, name) };
+    };
+    return { roots: roots.map((r) => place(r, mirror)), projects: projects.map((p) => place(p, false)) };
+};

package/dist/shared/rundir.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-import type { GuestRequestT, GuestResponseT, SandboxStatusT, SessionStatusT } from './schema.js';
+import type { z } from 'zod';
+import type { GuestRequestT, GuestResponseT, ProjectStatusT, SandboxStatusT, SessionStatusT } from './schema.js';
 /** Anything bigger than this from the other side is ignored (a compromised sandbox must not exhaust the host). */
 export declare const MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES: number;
 /** Ids become file names, so only a strict alphabet is allowed (no separators, no dots). */
@@ -9,20 +10,28 @@ export declare const runPaths: (dataDir: string) => {
     requests: string;
     responses: string;
     sessions: string;
+    projects: string;
     request: (id: string) => string;
     response: (id: string) => string;
     session: (id: string) => string;
+    project: (id: string) => string;
 };
 export declare const readJsonFile: <T>(file: string) => T | null;
+/** Reads and validates; a missing, oversized or malformed file is simply absent. */
+export declare const readValid: <S extends z.ZodType>(schema: S, file: string) => z.output<S> | null;
 /**
  * Write to a uniquely named temp file and rename, so a reader on the other side of the mapped folder never sees half a
  * file. The rename is retried briefly: antivirus or the other side's reader can hold the target for a moment.
  */
 export declare const writeJsonAtomic: (file: string, value: unknown) => void;
+/** Same for any text file (two commands at once, or a watcher and a command, never leave a half-written file). */
+export declare const writeFileAtomic: (file: string, text: string) => void;
 export declare const readSandboxStatus: (dataDir: string) => SandboxStatusT | null;
 export declare const readSession: (dataDir: string, id: string) => SessionStatusT | null;
 export declare const readResponse: (dataDir: string, id: string) => GuestResponseT | null;
 export declare const listSessions: (dataDir: string) => SessionStatusT[];
+export declare const readProjectStatus: (dataDir: string, name: string) => ProjectStatusT | null;
+export declare const listProjectStatus: (dataDir: string) => ProjectStatusT[];
 export declare const scanRequests: (dataDir: string) => {
     valid: GuestRequestT[];
     invalid: string[];

package/dist/shared/rundir.js

@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
 // written atomically and parsed with the channel schemas on read. Anything that does not parse is ignored.
 import fs from 'node:fs';
 import path from 'node:path';
-import { GuestRequest, GuestResponse, Id, SandboxStatus, SessionStatus } from './schema.js';
+import { GuestRequest, GuestResponse, Id, ProjectStatus, SandboxStatus, SessionStatus } from './schema.js';
+import { assertTestWritable } from './test-guard.js';
 /** Anything bigger than this from the other side is ignored (a compromised sandbox must not exhaust the host). */
 export const MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
 /** Ids become file names, so only a strict alphabet is allowed (no separators, no dots). */
@@ -17,9 +18,11 @@ export const runPaths = (dataDir) => {
         requests: path.join(run, 'requests'),
         responses: path.join(run, 'responses'),
         sessions: path.join(run, 'sessions'),
+        projects: path.join(run, 'projects'),
         request: file('requests'),
         response: file('responses'),
         session: file('sessions'),
+        project: file('projects'),
     };
 };
 export const readJsonFile = (file) => {
@@ -33,7 +36,7 @@ export const readJsonFile = (file) => {
     }
 };
 /** Reads and validates; a missing, oversized or malformed file is simply absent. */
-const readValid = (schema, file) => {
+export const readValid = (schema, file) => {
     const parsed = schema.safeParse(readJsonFile(file));
     return parsed.success ? parsed.data : null;
 };
@@ -42,10 +45,13 @@ const pause = (ms) => { Atomics.wait(new Int32Array(new SharedArrayBuffer(4)), 0
  * Write to a uniquely named temp file and rename, so a reader on the other side of the mapped folder never sees half a
  * file. The rename is retried briefly: antivirus or the other side's reader can hold the target for a moment.
  */
-export const writeJsonAtomic = (file, value) => {
+export const writeJsonAtomic = (file, value) => writeFileAtomic(file, JSON.stringify(value, null, 2) + '\n');
+/** Same for any text file (two commands at once, or a watcher and a command, never leave a half-written file). */
+export const writeFileAtomic = (file, text) => {
+    assertTestWritable(file);
     fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
     const temp = file + '.' + process.pid + '-' + Math.random().toString(36).slice(2) + '.tmp';
-    fs.writeFileSync(temp, JSON.stringify(value, null, 2) + '\n', { encoding: 'utf8', flag: 'wx' });
+    fs.writeFileSync(temp, text, { encoding: 'utf8', flag: 'wx' });
     for (let attempt = 1;; attempt++) {
         try {
             fs.renameSync(temp, file);
@@ -82,5 +88,7 @@ export const readSandboxStatus = (dataDir) => readValid(SandboxStatus, runPaths(
 export const readSession = (dataDir, id) => readValid(SessionStatus, runPaths(dataDir).session(id));
 export const readResponse = (dataDir, id) => readValid(GuestResponse, runPaths(dataDir).response(id));
 export const listSessions = (dataDir) => scan(SessionStatus, runPaths(dataDir).sessions).valid.sort((a, b) => a.startedAt.localeCompare(b.startedAt));
+export const readProjectStatus = (dataDir, name) => readValid(ProjectStatus, runPaths(dataDir).project(name));
+export const listProjectStatus = (dataDir) => scan(ProjectStatus, runPaths(dataDir).projects).valid.slice(0, 64);
 export const scanRequests = (dataDir) => scan(GuestRequest, runPaths(dataDir).requests);
 export const now = () => new Date().toISOString();

package/dist/shared/safe-remove.js

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 import fs from 'node:fs';
 import os from 'node:os';
 import path from 'node:path';
+import { assertTestWritable } from './test-guard.js';
 const norm = (p) => path.resolve(p).replace(/[\\/]+$/, '').toLowerCase();
 const isAncestorOrSame = (parent, child) => { const a = norm(parent); const b = norm(child); return a === b || b.startsWith(a + path.sep); };
 /** Folders no delete may ever reach, or contain: profiles, Windows, program folders. */
@@ -10,6 +11,9 @@ const protectedFolders = () => [
     os.homedir(), process.env.USERPROFILE, process.env.APPDATA, process.env.LOCALAPPDATA, path.join(os.homedir(), 'Documents'), path.join(os.homedir(), 'Desktop'),
     process.env.SystemRoot, process.env.WINDIR, process.env.ProgramFiles, process.env['ProgramFiles(x86)'], process.env.ProgramData, 'C:\\Users', 'C:\\Windows',
 ].filter((p) => typeof p === 'string' && p.trim() !== '');
+/** Folders nothing of ours lives in, so nothing below them may be deleted either. */
+const systemFolders = () => [process.env.SystemRoot, process.env.WINDIR, process.env.ProgramFiles, process.env['ProgramFiles(x86)'], 'C:\\Windows', 'C:\\Program Files', 'C:\\Program Files (x86)']
+    .filter((p) => typeof p === 'string' && p.trim() !== '');
 /**
  * Why `target` may not be deleted, or null when it may. Refused: a relative path, a drive root, a protected folder or
  * any folder that contains one, and anything that is not strictly inside `root`.
@@ -17,12 +21,18 @@ const protectedFolders = () => [
 export const removeRefusal = (target, root) => {
     if (!target || !path.isAbsolute(target) || !root || !path.isAbsolute(root))
         return 'not an absolute path';
+    // \\?\C:\Users and \\.\ spell the same folders in a way the checks below would not recognise.
+    if (/^[\\/]{2}[?.][\\/]/.test(target) || /^[\\/]{2}[?.][\\/]/.test(root))
+        return 'a device path (\\\\?\\ or \\\\.\\)';
     const t = norm(target);
     if (t === norm(path.parse(t).root))
         return 'a drive root';
     const hit = protectedFolders().find((p) => isAncestorOrSame(t, p));
     if (hit)
         return 'it is, or contains, ' + hit;
+    const system = systemFolders().find((p) => isAncestorOrSame(p, t));
+    if (system)
+        return 'it is inside ' + system;
     if (!t.startsWith(norm(root) + path.sep))
         return 'it is not inside ' + root;
     return null;
@@ -35,6 +45,7 @@ export const safeRemove = (target, root) => {
     const refusal = removeRefusal(target, root);
     if (refusal)
         throw new Error('Refusing to delete ' + target + ': ' + refusal);
+    assertTestWritable(target);
     let stat;
     try {
         stat = fs.lstatSync(target);