windows-development-sandbox 0.0.0-stage → 1.0.5

package/dist/shared/guest-paths.js

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+// Guest paths on drive letters other than C:. Windows Sandbox can only map folders onto its own C: drive, so a
+// guest path like F:\SteamLibrary\x is mapped to C:\Mirror\F\SteamLibrary\x and, at boot (bootstrap.ps1, before
+// anything else uses the workspace), `subst F: C:\Mirror\F` makes it appear at F:\SteamLibrary\x.
+// Pure functions only: used by the schema, the host (.wsb, session.json) and history sync.
+/** Guest folders no mapping may use: the OS, the sandbox's own folders and the mirror root. */
+export const RESERVED_GUEST = /^C:\\(?:Windows|Program Files|Program Files \(x86\)|ProgramData|Users|AgentLaunch|AgentData|HostTools|nvm|Mirror)(?:\\|$)/i;
+/** Where folders for other drive letters really live inside the sandbox: C:\Mirror\<letter>. */
+export const MIRROR_ROOT = 'C:\\Mirror';
+/** Letters a mirrored path may use. Never C: (the sandbox's own disk); A:/B: are left alone (floppy-era tools). */
+export const MIRROR_LETTER = /^[D-Z]$/;
+const DRIVE_PATH = /^([A-Za-z]):\\(.*)$/;
+// No other ':' (alternate data streams), no wildcards or pipes, no control characters, no forward slashes.
+const BAD_CHARS = /[<>:"|?*/\x00-\x1f]/;
+/** The upper-case drive letter of an absolute guest path (F:\x -> F), or null. */
+export const guestDrive = (guest) => DRIVE_PATH.exec(guest)?.[1].toUpperCase() ?? null;
+/**
+ * A folder the sandbox can show a host folder at: C:\<not reserved>\... or <D-Z>:\..., never a drive root,
+ * no '..' or empty segments, no characters Windows rejects in paths.
+ */
+export const isValidGuestPath = (guest) => {
+    const m = DRIVE_PATH.exec(guest);
+    if (!m)
+        return false;
+    const letter = m[1].toUpperCase();
+    const rest = m[2].replace(/\\+$/, '');
+    if (rest === '' || BAD_CHARS.test(rest))
+        return false;
+    if (rest.split('\\').some((segment) => segment === '' || segment === '.' || segment === '..' || /[. ]$/.test(segment)))
+        return false;
+    if (letter === 'C')
+        return !RESERVED_GUEST.test('C:\\' + rest);
+    return MIRROR_LETTER.test(letter);
+};
+/** Where a guest path really is inside the sandbox (the .wsb SandboxFolder): C: paths as-is, F:\x -> C:\Mirror\F\x. */
+export const sandboxFolder = (guest) => {
+    const m = DRIVE_PATH.exec(guest);
+    if (!m || m[1].toUpperCase() === 'C')
+        return guest;
+    return MIRROR_ROOT + '\\' + m[1].toUpperCase() + (m[2] ? '\\' + m[2] : '');
+};
+/** The subst drives the guest must create at boot for these guest paths, one per letter, sorted. */
+export const substDrives = (guests) => {
+    const letters = [...new Set(guests.map(guestDrive).filter((l) => l !== null && l !== 'C'))].sort();
+    return letters.map((letter) => ({ letter, target: MIRROR_ROOT + '\\' + letter }));
+};
+/**
+ * guestWorkspace "mirror": the workspace at the same path as on this PC, so absolute paths (configs, build caches,
+ * cargo fingerprints, Claude's project folder) match. Falls back to `fallback` (C:\Workspace\<name>) when the host
+ * path cannot be used inside the sandbox (C:\Users\..., a UNC path, A:/B:, odd characters), with a note saying why.
+ */
+export const planMirrorWorkspace = (workspaceHost, fallback) => {
+    const host = workspaceHost.replace(/\\+$/, '');
+    if (isValidGuestPath(host)) {
+        const letter = guestDrive(host);
+        return { guest: letter + host.slice(1), note: letter === 'C' ? null : 'guestWorkspace "mirror": ' + host + ' is mapped to ' + sandboxFolder(letter + host.slice(1)) + ' and shown as ' + letter + ': (subst) inside the sandbox.' };
+    }
+    const why = !guestDrive(host) ? 'it is not on a drive letter'
+        : guestDrive(host) === 'C' && RESERVED_GUEST.test(host) ? 'that folder is reserved inside the sandbox (Windows, Program Files, Users, ...)'
+            : 'the sandbox cannot show a folder at that path';
+    return { guest: fallback, note: 'guestWorkspace "mirror": ' + host + ' cannot appear at the same path (' + why + '); using ' + fallback + ' instead.' };
+};

package/dist/shared/netrules.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/** Private, carrier-grade NAT (Tailscale and similar live here), link-local and multicast ranges. */
+export declare const PRIVATE_V4: string[];
+export declare const PRIVATE_V6: string[];
+export declare const RULE_NAMES: string[];
+export declare const isIPv4: (ip: string) => boolean;
+export declare const ipToInt: (ip: string) => number;
+export declare const intToIp: (n: number) => string;
+export declare const cidrToRange: (cidr: string) => [number, number];
+export declare const subtractIps: (ranges: [number, number][], ips: string[]) => [number, number][];
+export declare const formatRange: (range: [number, number]) => string;
+export declare const isPrivateV4: (ip: string) => boolean;
+export declare const parseDefaultGateways: (routePrint: string) => string[];
+/** The IPv4 servers in a dns.getServers() list ('8.8.8.8', '8.8.8.8:1053', '[::1]:53'); IPv6 ones are dropped. */
+export declare const ipv4DnsServers: (servers: string[]) => string[];
+/** Fallback only: the "DNS Servers" label is English, so this finds nothing on localised Windows (dns.getServers() does). */
+export declare const parseDnsServers: (ipconfigAll: string) => string[];
+/** netsh argument lists. Private ranges are blocked EXCEPT DNS/DHCP to the sandbox's own gateway, so name resolution keeps working. */
+export declare const buildFirewallCommands: (exemptIps: string[]) => string[][];

package/dist/shared/netrules.js

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/** Private, carrier-grade NAT (Tailscale and similar live here), link-local and multicast ranges. */
+export const PRIVATE_V4 = ['10.0.0.0/8', '172.16.0.0/12', '192.168.0.0/16', '100.64.0.0/10', '169.254.0.0/16', '224.0.0.0/4'];
+export const PRIVATE_V6 = ['fc00::/7', 'fe80::/10', 'ff00::/8'];
+export const RULE_NAMES = ['AgentSandbox-Block-Private', 'AgentSandbox-Block-IPv6-Local', 'AgentSandbox-Block-SMB', 'AgentSandbox-Gateway-TCP', 'AgentSandbox-Gateway-UDP'];
+export const isIPv4 = (ip) => {
+    const parts = ip.split('.');
+    return parts.length === 4 && parts.every((p) => /^\d{1,3}$/.test(p) && Number(p) <= 255);
+};
+export const ipToInt = (ip) => {
+    if (!isIPv4(ip))
+        throw new Error('Invalid IPv4 address: ' + ip);
+    const p = ip.split('.').map(Number);
+    return p[0] * 16777216 + p[1] * 65536 + p[2] * 256 + p[3];
+};
+export const intToIp = (n) => {
+    return [Math.floor(n / 16777216) % 256, Math.floor(n / 65536) % 256, Math.floor(n / 256) % 256, n % 256].join('.');
+};
+export const cidrToRange = (cidr) => {
+    const [ip, bits] = cidr.split('/');
+    const size = 2 ** (32 - Number(bits));
+    const start = Math.floor(ipToInt(ip) / size) * size;
+    return [start, start + size - 1];
+};
+export const subtractIps = (ranges, ips) => {
+    let result = ranges.map((r) => [r[0], r[1]]);
+    for (const ip of ips) {
+        const n = ipToInt(ip);
+        const next = [];
+        for (const [start, end] of result) {
+            if (n < start || n > end) {
+                next.push([start, end]);
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (n > start)
+                next.push([start, n - 1]);
+            if (n < end)
+                next.push([n + 1, end]);
+        }
+        result = next;
+    }
+    return result;
+};
+export const formatRange = (range) => {
+    return range[0] === range[1] ? intToIp(range[0]) : intToIp(range[0]) + '-' + intToIp(range[1]);
+};
+export const isPrivateV4 = (ip) => {
+    const n = ipToInt(ip);
+    return PRIVATE_V4.some((c) => { const [s, e] = cidrToRange(c); return n >= s && n <= e; });
+};
+export const parseDefaultGateways = (routePrint) => {
+    const found = [];
+    for (const line of routePrint.split(/\r?\n/)) {
+        const m = /^\s*0\.0\.0\.0\s+0\.0\.0\.0\s+(\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})\s/.exec(line);
+        if (m && isIPv4(m[1]))
+            found.push(m[1]);
+    }
+    return found;
+};
+/** The IPv4 servers in a dns.getServers() list ('8.8.8.8', '8.8.8.8:1053', '[::1]:53'); IPv6 ones are dropped. */
+export const ipv4DnsServers = (servers) => servers.map((s) => s.replace(/:\d+$/, '')).filter(isIPv4);
+/** Fallback only: the "DNS Servers" label is English, so this finds nothing on localised Windows (dns.getServers() does). */
+export const parseDnsServers = (ipconfigAll) => {
+    const found = [];
+    let inDns = false;
+    for (const line of ipconfigAll.split(/\r?\n/)) {
+        if (/DNS Servers/i.test(line)) {
+            inDns = true;
+            for (const m of line.matchAll(/(\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})/g))
+                if (isIPv4(m[1]))
+                    found.push(m[1]);
+        }
+        else if (inDns && /^\s+\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3}\s*$/.test(line)) {
+            found.push(line.trim());
+        }
+        else {
+            inDns = false;
+        }
+    }
+    return found;
+};
+/** netsh argument lists. Private ranges are blocked EXCEPT DNS/DHCP to the sandbox's own gateway, so name resolution keeps working. */
+export const buildFirewallCommands = (exemptIps) => {
+    const exempt = [...new Set(exemptIps.filter((ip) => isIPv4(ip) && isPrivateV4(ip)))];
+    const v4 = subtractIps(PRIVATE_V4.map(cidrToRange), exempt).map(formatRange);
+    const add = (name, extra) => ['advfirewall', 'firewall', 'add', 'rule', 'name=' + name, 'dir=out', 'action=block', 'enable=yes', 'profile=any', ...extra];
+    const commands = [];
+    for (const name of RULE_NAMES)
+        commands.push(['advfirewall', 'firewall', 'delete', 'rule', 'name=' + name]);
+    commands.push(['advfirewall', 'set', 'allprofiles', 'state', 'on']);
+    commands.push(add('AgentSandbox-Block-Private', ['protocol=any', 'remoteip=' + v4.join(',')]));
+    commands.push(add('AgentSandbox-Block-IPv6-Local', ['protocol=any', 'remoteip=' + PRIVATE_V6.join(',')]));
+    commands.push(add('AgentSandbox-Block-SMB', ['protocol=tcp', 'remoteport=135,139,445']));
+    if (exempt.length > 0) {
+        commands.push(add('AgentSandbox-Gateway-TCP', ['protocol=tcp', 'remoteip=' + exempt.join(','), 'remoteport=1-52,54-65535']));
+        commands.push(add('AgentSandbox-Gateway-UDP', ['protocol=udp', 'remoteip=' + exempt.join(','), 'remoteport=1-52,54-66,69-65535']));
+    }
+    return commands;
+};

package/dist/shared/paths.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+/** Claude Code's per-project folder name: every non-alphanumeric character becomes '-' (F:\A\b -> F--A-b). */
+export declare const projectFolderName: (workspace: string) => string;
+/**
+ * Every path the guest may know its workspace by, the real one first: a mirrored F:\A\b is a subst drive onto
+ * C:\Mirror\F\A\b, and programs that resolve real paths (realpath, GetFinalPathNameByHandle) report that one.
+ */
+export declare const guestWorkspaceAliases: (guestWorkspace: string) => string[];
+/** Rewrites `from` to `to` wherever it appears as a whole path (raw, JSON-escaped or with forward slashes). */
+export declare const translatePaths: (text: string, from: string, to: string) => string;

package/dist/shared/paths.js

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+// Path translation between this PC and the sandbox (shared by the host history sync and the guest plugin fix-up).
+import { sandboxFolder } from './guest-paths.js';
+/** Claude Code's per-project folder name: every non-alphanumeric character becomes '-' (F:\A\b -> F--A-b). */
+export const projectFolderName = (workspace) => workspace.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/g, '-');
+/**
+ * Every path the guest may know its workspace by, the real one first: a mirrored F:\A\b is a subst drive onto
+ * C:\Mirror\F\A\b, and programs that resolve real paths (realpath, GetFinalPathNameByHandle) report that one.
+ */
+export const guestWorkspaceAliases = (guestWorkspace) => {
+    const real = sandboxFolder(guestWorkspace);
+    return real.toLowerCase() === guestWorkspace.toLowerCase() ? [guestWorkspace] : [real, guestWorkspace];
+};
+const jsonEscaped = (p) => JSON.stringify(p).slice(1, -1);
+const escapeRegex = (s) => s.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
+const forward = (p) => p.replace(/\\/g, '/');
+/** Rewrites `from` to `to` wherever it appears as a whole path (raw, JSON-escaped or with forward slashes). */
+export const translatePaths = (text, from, to) => {
+    if (from.toLowerCase() === to.toLowerCase())
+        return text;
+    const pairs = [[jsonEscaped(from), jsonEscaped(to)], [from, to], [forward(from), forward(to)]];
+    return pairs.reduce((out, [a, b]) => out.replace(new RegExp(escapeRegex(a) + '(?=\\\\|/|"|\'|\\s|$)', 'gi'), b.replace(/\$/g, '$$$$')), text);
+};

package/dist/shared/pty-client.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+import net from 'node:net';
+export declare const FrameType: {
+    readonly Hello: 1;
+    readonly Input: 2;
+    readonly Resize: 3;
+    readonly Restart: 4;
+    readonly Ping: 5;
+    readonly Output: 16;
+    readonly Exit: 17;
+    readonly Error: 18;
+    readonly Restarting: 19;
+    readonly Status: 20;
+};
+/** HELLO flags: control-only connections get no output and never size the console; a query only asks for STATUS. */
+export declare const HelloFlag: {
+    readonly ControlOnly: 1;
+    readonly Query: 2;
+};
+/** Viewers ping this often; ptyhost counts a viewer as gone after 15 s of silence (e.g. its terminal tab was closed). */
+export declare const PING_INTERVAL_MS = 5000;
+export interface Frame {
+    type: number;
+    payload: Buffer;
+}
+export interface Endpoint {
+    addresses: string[];
+    port: number;
+    token: string;
+}
+export type ClientResult = {
+    reason: 'exit';
+    exitCode: number;
+} | {
+    reason: 'detach' | 'closed';
+} | {
+    reason: 'error';
+    message: string;
+};
+/** Ctrl+] — the same detach key telnet uses; Claude Code does not bind it. */
+export declare const DETACH_KEY = 29;
+export declare const encodeFrame: (type: number, payload?: Buffer) => Buffer;
+export declare const helloFrame: (token: string, cols: number, rows: number, flags?: number) => Buffer;
+export declare const resizeFrame: (cols: number, rows: number) => Buffer;
+/** Same limit as ptyhost.cs; a peer announcing more is broken or hostile. */
+export declare const MAX_FRAME_BYTES: number;
+/** Splits a TCP byte stream back into frames. */
+export declare class FrameReader {
+    private pending;
+    push(chunk: Buffer): Frame[];
+}
+/**
+ * Removes OSC 52 (clipboard write) from the sandbox's output before it reaches your terminal: an untrusted program
+ * must not be able to silently put text into your clipboard. Everything else (colours, titles, links) passes.
+ * Stateful, so a sequence split across chunks is still caught.
+ */
+export declare class OutputFilter {
+    private carry;
+    push(chunk: Buffer): Buffer;
+}
+/** Tries every address the sandbox published and returns the first one that answers. */
+export declare const connect: (endpoint: Endpoint, timeoutMs?: number) => Promise<net.Socket>;
+/** Sends one control frame (e.g. RESTART) without taking over the screen. */
+export declare const sendControl: (endpoint: Endpoint, type: number) => Promise<void>;
+/** Who is watching a session right now: `remote` counts viewers on the PC (not the sandbox's own tabs). */
+export interface Viewers {
+    viewers: number;
+    remote: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Asks a session's ptyhost who is attached. Only viewers heard from in the last few seconds count, so a terminal that
+ * was closed (or a PC that went to sleep) is not reported. null when the session does not answer: an older ptyhost
+ * treats the query as a silent control connection, so the caller must not assume anything.
+ */
+export declare const queryViewers: (endpoint: Endpoint, timeoutMs?: number) => Promise<Viewers | null>;
+/**
+ * Node on Windows reads keys through the console API, where Backspace is ^H and Ctrl+Backspace is DEL: the reverse of
+ * what terminals send. ConPTY reads ^H as Ctrl+Backspace (delete a word), so swap them back.
+ */
+export declare const fixWindowsKeys: (chunk: Buffer) => Buffer;
+/**
+ * Bridges this process's terminal to the remote program until it exits, the connection drops, or the user presses
+ * the detach key. Restores the terminal before resolving.
+ */
+export declare const runTerminalClient: (socket: net.Socket, token: string, options?: {
+    detachKey?: number;
+}) => Promise<ClientResult>;

package/dist/shared/pty-client.js

@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+// Client side of the ptyhost protocol (see sandbox/ptyhost.cs). Used by the window inside the sandbox and by
+// `--terminal` / `attach` on the host, so it only depends on Node built-ins.
+import net from 'node:net';
+export const FrameType = { Hello: 1, Input: 2, Resize: 3, Restart: 4, Ping: 5, Output: 16, Exit: 17, Error: 18, Restarting: 19, Status: 20 };
+/** HELLO flags: control-only connections get no output and never size the console; a query only asks for STATUS. */
+export const HelloFlag = { ControlOnly: 1, Query: 2 };
+/** Viewers ping this often; ptyhost counts a viewer as gone after 15 s of silence (e.g. its terminal tab was closed). */
+export const PING_INTERVAL_MS = 5000;
+/** Ctrl+] — the same detach key telnet uses; Claude Code does not bind it. */
+export const DETACH_KEY = 0x1d;
+export const encodeFrame = (type, payload = Buffer.alloc(0)) => {
+    const header = Buffer.alloc(5);
+    header.writeUInt8(type, 0);
+    header.writeUInt32LE(payload.length, 1);
+    return Buffer.concat([header, payload]);
+};
+export const helloFrame = (token, cols, rows, flags = 0) => {
+    const head = Buffer.alloc(5);
+    head.writeInt16LE(cols, 0);
+    head.writeInt16LE(rows, 2);
+    head.writeUInt8(flags, 4);
+    return encodeFrame(FrameType.Hello, Buffer.concat([head, Buffer.from(token, 'utf8')]));
+};
+export const resizeFrame = (cols, rows) => {
+    const payload = Buffer.alloc(4);
+    payload.writeInt16LE(cols, 0);
+    payload.writeInt16LE(rows, 2);
+    return encodeFrame(FrameType.Resize, payload);
+};
+/** Same limit as ptyhost.cs; a peer announcing more is broken or hostile. */
+export const MAX_FRAME_BYTES = 1 << 20;
+/** Splits a TCP byte stream back into frames. */
+export class FrameReader {
+    pending = Buffer.alloc(0);
+    push(chunk) {
+        this.pending = Buffer.concat([this.pending, chunk]);
+        const frames = [];
+        while (this.pending.length >= 5) {
+            const length = this.pending.readUInt32LE(1);
+            if (length > MAX_FRAME_BYTES)
+                throw new Error('frame too large (' + length + ' bytes)');
+            if (this.pending.length < 5 + length)
+                break;
+            frames.push({ type: this.pending[0], payload: this.pending.subarray(5, 5 + length) });
+            this.pending = this.pending.subarray(5 + length);
+        }
+        return frames;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Removes OSC 52 (clipboard write) from the sandbox's output before it reaches your terminal: an untrusted program
+ * must not be able to silently put text into your clipboard. Everything else (colours, titles, links) passes.
+ * Stateful, so a sequence split across chunks is still caught.
+ */
+export class OutputFilter {
+    carry = '';
+    push(chunk) {
+        let text = (this.carry + chunk.toString('latin1')).replace(/\x1b\]52;[^\x07\x1b]*(\x07|\x1b\\)/g, '');
+        this.carry = '';
+        const open = text.lastIndexOf('\x1b');
+        const tail = open === -1 ? '' : text.slice(open);
+        if (tail.length < 1 << 16 && /^\x1b(\](5(2(;[^\x07\x1b]*)?)?)?)?$/.test(tail)) {
+            this.carry = tail;
+            text = text.slice(0, open);
+        }
+        return Buffer.from(text, 'latin1');
+    }
+}
+const connectOnce = (host, port, timeoutMs) => {
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        const socket = net.connect({ host, port });
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => { socket.destroy(); reject(new Error('timed out connecting to ' + host + ':' + port)); }, timeoutMs);
+        socket.once('connect', () => { clearTimeout(timer); socket.setNoDelay(true); resolve(socket); });
+        socket.once('error', (e) => { clearTimeout(timer); reject(e); });
+    });
+};
+/** Tries every address the sandbox published and returns the first one that answers. */
+export const connect = async (endpoint, timeoutMs = 3000) => {
+    const errors = [];
+    for (const address of endpoint.addresses) {
+        try {
+            return await connectOnce(address, endpoint.port, timeoutMs);
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            errors.push(address + ': ' + (e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)));
+        }
+    }
+    throw new Error('Could not reach the sandbox session (' + errors.join('; ') + ')');
+};
+/** Sends one control frame (e.g. RESTART) without taking over the screen. */
+export const sendControl = async (endpoint, type) => {
+    const socket = await connect(endpoint);
+    await new Promise((resolve) => socket.end(Buffer.concat([helloFrame(endpoint.token, 80, 24, HelloFlag.ControlOnly), encodeFrame(type)]), resolve));
+};
+/**
+ * Asks a session's ptyhost who is attached. Only viewers heard from in the last few seconds count, so a terminal that
+ * was closed (or a PC that went to sleep) is not reported. null when the session does not answer: an older ptyhost
+ * treats the query as a silent control connection, so the caller must not assume anything.
+ */
+export const queryViewers = async (endpoint, timeoutMs = 2000) => {
+    let socket;
+    try {
+        socket = await connect(endpoint, timeoutMs);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+    return new Promise((resolve) => {
+        const reader = new FrameReader();
+        const done = (value) => { clearTimeout(timer); socket.destroy(); resolve(value); };
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => done(null), timeoutMs);
+        socket.on('data', (chunk) => {
+            let frames;
+            try {
+                frames = reader.push(chunk);
+            }
+            catch {
+                done(null);
+                return;
+            }
+            const status = frames.find((f) => f.type === FrameType.Status && f.payload.length >= 4);
+            if (status)
+                done({ viewers: status.payload.readInt16LE(0), remote: status.payload.readInt16LE(2) });
+            else if (frames.some((f) => f.type === FrameType.Error))
+                done(null);
+        });
+        socket.on('error', () => done(null));
+        socket.on('close', () => done(null));
+        socket.write(helloFrame(endpoint.token, 80, 24, HelloFlag.Query));
+    });
+};
+/**
+ * Node on Windows reads keys through the console API, where Backspace is ^H and Ctrl+Backspace is DEL: the reverse of
+ * what terminals send. ConPTY reads ^H as Ctrl+Backspace (delete a word), so swap them back.
+ */
+export const fixWindowsKeys = (chunk) => {
+    if (!chunk.includes(0x08) && !chunk.includes(0x7f))
+        return chunk;
+    return Buffer.from(chunk.map((b) => (b === 0x08 ? 0x7f : b === 0x7f ? 0x08 : b)));
+};
+/**
+ * Bridges this process's terminal to the remote program until it exits, the connection drops, or the user presses
+ * the detach key. Restores the terminal before resolving.
+ */
+export const runTerminalClient = (socket, token, options = {}) => {
+    const stdin = process.stdin;
+    const stdout = process.stdout;
+    // getWindowSize asks the console every time; columns/rows only change when Node noticed a resize.
+    const size = () => { const [c, r] = stdout.isTTY ? stdout.getWindowSize() : [0, 0]; return [c || 120, r || 30]; };
+    const swapKeys = process.platform === 'win32' && stdin.isTTY;
+    return new Promise((resolve) => {
+        let done = false;
+        const reader = new FrameReader();
+        const filter = new OutputFilter();
+        let sent = size();
+        let resizeTimer;
+        const finish = (result) => {
+            if (done)
+                return;
+            done = true;
+            stdin.off('data', onInput);
+            stdout.off('resize', onResize);
+            clearTimeout(resizeTimer);
+            clearInterval(heartbeat);
+            clearInterval(sizeWatch);
+            if (stdin.isTTY)
+                stdin.setRawMode(false);
+            stdin.pause();
+            socket.destroy();
+            stdout.write('\x1b[0m\x1b[?25h\r\n');
+            resolve(result);
+        };
+        const onInput = (chunk) => {
+            if (options.detachKey !== undefined && chunk.includes(options.detachKey)) {
+                finish({ reason: 'detach' });
+                return;
+            }
+            socket.write(encodeFrame(FrameType.Input, swapKeys ? fixWindowsKeys(chunk) : chunk));
+        };
+        // Dragging a window edge fires dozens of resizes; each one makes ConPTY reflow and repaint, and repaints racing each
+        // other are what left the screen garbled. Wait until the size settles, clear what this terminal reflowed on its own,
+        // then let ptyhost repaint everything once at the new size.
+        const sendSize = () => {
+            const [c, r] = size();
+            if (c === sent[0] && r === sent[1])
+                return;
+            sent = [c, r];
+            stdout.write('\x1b[H\x1b[J');
+            socket.write(resizeFrame(c, r));
+        };
+        const onResize = () => { clearTimeout(resizeTimer); resizeTimer = setTimeout(() => { resizeTimer = undefined; sendSize(); }, 120); };
+        const heartbeat = setInterval(() => socket.write(encodeFrame(FrameType.Ping)), PING_INTERVAL_MS);
+        // Windows does not always report a resize in raw mode, so the size is also checked twice a second.
+        const sizeWatch = setInterval(() => { if (!resizeTimer)
+            sendSize(); }, 500);
+        socket.on('data', (chunk) => {
+            let frames;
+            try {
+                frames = reader.push(chunk);
+            }
+            catch {
+                finish({ reason: 'error', message: 'invalid data from the sandbox' });
+                return;
+            }
+            for (const frame of frames) {
+                if (frame.type === FrameType.Output)
+                    stdout.write(filter.push(frame.payload));
+                else if (frame.type === FrameType.Restarting)
+                    stdout.write('\x1b[2J\x1b[3J\x1b[H');
+                else if (frame.type === FrameType.Exit)
+                    finish({ reason: 'exit', exitCode: frame.payload.length >= 4 ? frame.payload.readInt32LE(0) : 1 });
+                else if (frame.type === FrameType.Error)
+                    finish({ reason: 'error', message: frame.payload.toString('utf8').slice(0, 500).replace(/[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/g, ' ') });
+            }
+        });
+        socket.on('close', () => finish({ reason: 'closed' }));
+        socket.on('error', () => finish({ reason: 'closed' }));
+        const [c, r] = size();
+        stdout.write('\x1b[2J\x1b[3J\x1b[H');
+        socket.write(helloFrame(token, c, r));
+        if (stdin.isTTY)
+            stdin.setRawMode(true);
+        stdin.on('data', onInput);
+        stdin.resume();
+        stdout.on('resize', onResize);
+    });
+};

package/dist/shared/rundir.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+import type { GuestRequestT, GuestResponseT, SandboxStatusT, SessionStatusT } from './schema.js';
+/** Anything bigger than this from the other side is ignored (a compromised sandbox must not exhaust the host). */
+export declare const MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES: number;
+/** Ids become file names, so only a strict alphabet is allowed (no separators, no dots). */
+export declare const safeId: (id: string) => string;
+export declare const runPaths: (dataDir: string) => {
+    run: string;
+    sandbox: string;
+    requests: string;
+    responses: string;
+    sessions: string;
+    request: (id: string) => string;
+    response: (id: string) => string;
+    session: (id: string) => string;
+};
+export declare const readJsonFile: <T>(file: string) => T | null;
+/**
+ * Write to a uniquely named temp file and rename, so a reader on the other side of the mapped folder never sees half a
+ * file. The rename is retried briefly: antivirus or the other side's reader can hold the target for a moment.
+ */
+export declare const writeJsonAtomic: (file: string, value: unknown) => void;
+export declare const readSandboxStatus: (dataDir: string) => SandboxStatusT | null;
+export declare const readSession: (dataDir: string, id: string) => SessionStatusT | null;
+export declare const readResponse: (dataDir: string, id: string) => GuestResponseT | null;
+export declare const listSessions: (dataDir: string) => SessionStatusT[];
+export declare const scanRequests: (dataDir: string) => {
+    valid: GuestRequestT[];
+    invalid: string[];
+};
+export declare const now: () => string;

package/dist/shared/rundir.js

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+// The run folder (<data>\run on the host, C:\AgentData\run in the sandbox) is the host <-> sandbox channel. No
+// network needed: boot status, requests (host -> guest) and responses/status (guest -> host) are small JSON files,
+// written atomically and parsed with the channel schemas on read. Anything that does not parse is ignored.
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { GuestRequest, GuestResponse, Id, SandboxStatus, SessionStatus } from './schema.js';
+/** Anything bigger than this from the other side is ignored (a compromised sandbox must not exhaust the host). */
+export const MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
+/** Ids become file names, so only a strict alphabet is allowed (no separators, no dots). */
+export const safeId = (id) => Id.parse(id);
+export const runPaths = (dataDir) => {
+    const run = path.join(dataDir, 'run');
+    const file = (dir) => (id) => path.join(run, dir, safeId(id) + '.json');
+    return {
+        run,
+        sandbox: path.join(run, 'sandbox.json'),
+        requests: path.join(run, 'requests'),
+        responses: path.join(run, 'responses'),
+        sessions: path.join(run, 'sessions'),
+        request: file('requests'),
+        response: file('responses'),
+        session: file('sessions'),
+    };
+};
+export const readJsonFile = (file) => {
+    try {
+        if (fs.statSync(file).size > MAX_MESSAGE_BYTES)
+            return null;
+        return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8').replace(/^\uFEFF/, ''));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+};
+/** Reads and validates; a missing, oversized or malformed file is simply absent. */
+const readValid = (schema, file) => {
+    const parsed = schema.safeParse(readJsonFile(file));
+    return parsed.success ? parsed.data : null;
+};
+const pause = (ms) => { Atomics.wait(new Int32Array(new SharedArrayBuffer(4)), 0, 0, ms); };
+/**
+ * Write to a uniquely named temp file and rename, so a reader on the other side of the mapped folder never sees half a
+ * file. The rename is retried briefly: antivirus or the other side's reader can hold the target for a moment.
+ */
+export const writeJsonAtomic = (file, value) => {
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
+    const temp = file + '.' + process.pid + '-' + Math.random().toString(36).slice(2) + '.tmp';
+    fs.writeFileSync(temp, JSON.stringify(value, null, 2) + '\n', { encoding: 'utf8', flag: 'wx' });
+    for (let attempt = 1;; attempt++) {
+        try {
+            fs.renameSync(temp, file);
+            return;
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            const code = e.code;
+            if (attempt >= 8 || (code !== 'EPERM' && code !== 'EBUSY' && code !== 'EACCES')) {
+                fs.rmSync(temp, { force: true });
+                throw e;
+            }
+            pause(50 * attempt);
+        }
+    }
+};
+/** Message files in a folder (strict names only), validated; invalid ones are reported separately for deletion. */
+const scan = (schema, dir) => {
+    if (!fs.existsSync(dir))
+        return { valid: [], invalid: [] };
+    const valid = [];
+    const invalid = [];
+    for (const name of fs.readdirSync(dir)) {
+        if (name.endsWith('.tmp'))
+            continue;
+        const message = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}\.json$/.test(name) ? readValid(schema, path.join(dir, name)) : null;
+        if (message)
+            valid.push(message);
+        else
+            invalid.push(path.join(dir, name));
+    }
+    return { valid, invalid };
+};
+export const readSandboxStatus = (dataDir) => readValid(SandboxStatus, runPaths(dataDir).sandbox);
+export const readSession = (dataDir, id) => readValid(SessionStatus, runPaths(dataDir).session(id));
+export const readResponse = (dataDir, id) => readValid(GuestResponse, runPaths(dataDir).response(id));
+export const listSessions = (dataDir) => scan(SessionStatus, runPaths(dataDir).sessions).valid.sort((a, b) => a.startedAt.localeCompare(b.startedAt));
+export const scanRequests = (dataDir) => scan(GuestRequest, runPaths(dataDir).requests);
+export const now = () => new Date().toISOString();

package/dist/shared/safe-remove.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+/**
+ * Why `target` may not be deleted, or null when it may. Refused: a relative path, a drive root, a protected folder or
+ * any folder that contains one, and anything that is not strictly inside `root`.
+ */
+export declare const removeRefusal: (target: string, root: string) => string | null;
+/**
+ * Deletes `target` (a folder tree or file) only when it is strictly inside `root` and nothing protected; a link is
+ * removed itself, never followed. Throws instead of deleting anything else.
+ */
+export declare const safeRemove: (target: string, root: string) => void;