whalibmob 5.33.18 → 5.33.20

package/lib/Attestation.js

@@ -21,11 +21,84 @@
 
 const crypto = require('crypto');
 const http   = require('http');
+const curve  = require('./curve');
+
+// ─── Logging helpers (always visible, not gated behind WA_DEBUG) ─────────────
+
+function _log(msg)  { process.stderr.write('[INTEGRITY] ' + msg + '\n'); }
+function _ok(msg)   { process.stderr.write('[INTEGRITY] ✓ ' + msg + '\n'); }
+function _fail(msg) { process.stderr.write('[INTEGRITY] ✗ ' + msg + '\n'); }
 
 const DEFAULT_PORT   = 1119;   // WhatsApp consumer
 const BUSINESS_PORT  = 1120;   // the Business build's own attestation server
 const REQUEST_TIMEMS = 15000;
 
+// ─── _gs: WASafe environment security signals ─────────────────────────────────
+//
+// WhatsApp sends a fresh WASafe envelope (_gs) on every registration request
+// (/v2/exist, /v2/code, /v2/register).  The envelope is a 167-byte blob
+// (ephX25519pub-32 ‖ AES-256-GCM-ct ‖ tag-16) base64url-encoded and wrapped
+// in JSON {"em":"<base64url>"}, then percent-encoded for the form body.
+//
+// The plaintext is a CSV of 19 fields that report an Android environment health
+// profile (root/emulator/tamper checks) plus a timestamp and a random.
+// We generate a "clean reference" profile: only /system/build.prop succeeds
+// (index 2 of 13 stat checks), all others fail — matching a stock Android.
+// The cipher key is the raw X25519 shared secret (no KDF), the server key is
+// the same 32-byte key used to encrypt the registration ENC envelope.
+
+const GS_SERVER_KEY = Buffer.from(
+  '8e8c0f74c3ebc5d7a6865c6c3c843856b06121cce8ea774d22fb6f122512302d',
+  'hex'
+);
+
+// Base stat codes for the 13 path checks; +1000 when stat() fails.
+const GS_BASE_CODES = [10, 11, 0, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 1, 105, 106, 107, 108];
+
+function generateGsToken() {
+  const nowMs = Date.now();
+  const sec   = Math.floor(nowMs / 1000);
+  const usec  = (nowMs % 1000) * 1000;
+
+  // base = ((sec ^ usec) & 0xefff) + 0x1000, range [0x1000, 0xFFFF]
+  const base = ((sec ^ usec) & 0xefff) + 0x1000;
+
+  // Stat fields: index 2 (/system/build.prop) succeeds; all others fail (+1000).
+  const statFields = GS_BASE_CODES.map((c, i) => {
+    const code = (i === 2) ? c : (c + 1000);
+    return (code ^ (base + i * 7)) | 0; // signed int32
+  });
+
+  const randRaw       = (crypto.randomBytes(4).readUInt32BE(0) >>> 1);
+  const rand          = (randRaw ^ (base + 91)) | 0;
+
+  const millis        = BigInt(nowMs);
+  const millisLo      = Number(BigInt.asUintN(32, millis));
+  const millisHi      = Number(millis >> 32n);
+  const millisLoField = (millisLo ^ ((base + 98)  | 0)) | 0;
+  const millisHiField = (millisHi ^ ((base + 105) | 0)) | 0;
+  const preparedField = (4242     ^ ((base + 112) | 0)) | 0; // WASafeSignalsPrepare called
+
+  const csv       = [1, ...statFields, base >>> 0, rand, millisLoField, millisHiField, preparedField].join(',');
+  const plaintext = Buffer.from(csv, 'utf8');
+
+  const ephSeed = crypto.randomBytes(32);
+  const ephKp   = curve.generateKeyPair(ephSeed);
+  const ephPub  = Buffer.from(ephKp.public);
+  const shared  = Buffer.from(curve.sharedKey(ephKp.private, GS_SERVER_KEY));
+
+  const iv     = Buffer.alloc(12);
+  const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', shared, iv);
+  const ct     = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext), cipher.final()]);
+  const tag    = cipher.getAuthTag();
+
+  const envelope = Buffer.concat([ephPub, ct, tag]);
+  const em = envelope.toString('base64')
+    .replace(/\+/g, '-').replace(/\//g, '_').replace(/=/g, '');
+
+  return encodeURIComponent('{"em":"' + em + '"}');
+}
+
 // ─── Empty (NONE) fallbacks ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 const EMPTY_ANDROID = { gpia: '', gg: '', gi: '', gp: '', ge: '', ga: '' };
@@ -97,16 +170,12 @@ function fridaGet(pathname, query, device) {
 
 // ─── Android: Play Integrity legs (gpia + _gg _gi _gp _ge _ga) ────────────────
 //
-// Queries /integrity?authKey=<nonce>. The Frida server returns { token }, which
-// becomes the Play Integrity verdict token (gpia). The _gg/_gi/_gp/_ge/_ga GMS
-// legs are only produced by the full native attestor, so a Frida-only setup
-// leaves them empty — the server accepts a gpia-only attestation.
-//
 // nonceB64 is the URL-safe base64 request nonce (see attestationFieldsAndroid).
 async function androidIntegrity(nonceB64, device) {
   if (!isEnabled()) return { ...EMPTY_ANDROID };
   const res = await fridaGet('/integrity', { authKey: nonceB64 }, device);
   if (!res || !res.token) return { ...EMPTY_ANDROID };
+  _ok('gpia field SET from Frida (' + res.token.length + ' chars)');
   return { gpia: res.token, gg: '', gi: '', gp: '', ge: '', ga: '' };
 }
 
@@ -175,7 +244,9 @@ async function attestationFields(device, nonceB64, opts) {
   const pushToken = orNull(opts.pushToken);
 
   if (device && device.os === 'android') {
-    const a = await androidIntegrity(nonceB64 || '', device);
+    const a  = await androidIntegrity(nonceB64 || '', device);
+    const gs = generateGsToken();
+    _ok('_gs field generated (WASafe envelope, ' + gs.length + ' encoded chars)');
     return [
       'gpia',       orNull(a.gpia),
       '_gg',        orNull(a.gg),
@@ -183,6 +254,7 @@ async function attestationFields(device, nonceB64, opts) {
       '_gp',        orNull(a.gp),
       '_ge',        orNull(a.ge),
       '_ga',        orNull(a.ga),
+      '_gs',        gs,
       'push_token', pushToken
     ];
   }

package/lib/Registration.js

@@ -1367,6 +1367,13 @@ function buildClientMetrics(attempt, meta) {
 // validates the shape of what it receives and answers a blank push_code with
 // bad_param/bad_format naming that field, while a field that is not there is
 // not validated at all. buildForm drops nulls, which is exactly what we want.
+function deviceAid(store) {
+  const seed = (store.identityKeyPair && store.identityKeyPair.public)
+    ? Buffer.from(store.identityKeyPair.public)
+    : Buffer.from(String(store.phoneNumber || ''), 'utf8');
+  return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(seed).update('aid').digest('base64');
+}
+
 function getRequestVerificationCodeParameters(store, method, meta, device, attempt) {
   if (device && device.os === 'android') {
     // Flash call is the one method whose delivery the server only routes when
@@ -1382,12 +1389,12 @@ function getRequestVerificationCodeParameters(store, method, meta, device, attem
       'reason',                     '',
       'mcc',                        meta.mcc,
       'mnc',                        meta.mnc,
-      'feo2_query_status',          'error_security_exception',
+      'feo2_query_status',          'client_capabilities_cached',
       'db',                         '1',
       'sim_type',                   '1',
       'recaptcha',                  '%7B%22stage%22%3A%22ABPROP_DISABLED%22%7D',
       'network_radio_type',         '1',
-      'prefer_sms_over_flash',      wantsFlash ? 'false' : 'true',
+      'prefer_sms_over_flash',      wantsFlash ? 'true' : 'false',
       'simnum',                     '0',
       'airplane_mode_type',         '0',
       'client_metrics',             buildClientMetrics(attempt, meta),
@@ -1396,7 +1403,7 @@ function getRequestVerificationCodeParameters(store, method, meta, device, attem
       'hasinrc',                    '1',
       'roaming_type',               '0',
       'device_ram',                 deviceRam(device),
-      'education_screen_displayed', 'true',
+      'education_screen_displayed', 'false',
       'pid',                        getAppPid(store),
       'cellular_strength',          '5',
       'backup_token',               store.backupToken ? toUrlHex(store.backupToken) : '',
@@ -1404,7 +1411,9 @@ function getRequestVerificationCodeParameters(store, method, meta, device, attem
       'call_log_permission',        wantsFlash ? 'true' : 'false',
       'manage_call_permission',     wantsFlash ? 'true' : 'false',
       'clicked_education_link',     'false',
-      'aid',                        '',
+      'aid',                        deviceAid(store),
+      'hasav',                      '2',
+      'entrypoint',                 'suma',
       // Always absent — see the note above the function.
       'push_code',                  null
     ];
@@ -2391,7 +2400,15 @@ async function verifyCode(store, code, opts) {
   const screen = currentVerifyScreen(store);
   await sendFunnelLog(store, waVersion, screen, 'submit_code', 'submit_code_attempt');
 
-  const result = await sendRequest('/register', store, waVersion, true, ['code', normalized]);
+  const result = await sendRequest('/register', store, waVersion, true, [
+    'code',                   normalized,
+    'sim_operator_name',      '',
+    'passkey_login_status',   'not_attempted',
+    'network_operator_name',  '',
+    'entered',                '1',
+    'has_play_store',         'true',
+    'entrypoint',             'suma'
+  ]);
 
   const status = result.status;
   if (status === 'ok' || status === 'sent' || status === 'verified') {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "whalibmob",
-  "version": "5.33.18",
+  "version": "5.33.20",
   "description": "Node.js library for WhatsApp — register a number over SMS, or link as a companion by QR. Signal E2E encryption, media, groups, channels.",
   "author": "Kunboruto20",
   "main": "index.js",